newrole cleanup
PATCH 1/1 newrole cleanup
Hi,
I've been reviewing newrole in preparation for another patch to add auditing to it. The patch is fairly self-explanatory. Some highlights:
- little const cleanup
- pass tty to pam
- add a function to verify the shell is in fact known to /etc/shells
- make sure no signals are blocked
- If in enforcing mode and error: getting tty context, computing new context, or setting new context then exit with -1.
- Loop the wait call to handle EINTR
- open the tty read only or write only depending on stdin, stdout, stderr.
- pass return from pam_* functions to pam_end
The patch is attached.
-Steve
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newrole/newrole.c +113 -38
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@static char *build_new_range (char *newlevel,const char *range) { -char *newrangep =NULL , *tmpptr; +char *newrangep =NULL ; +const char *tmpptr;size_t len;/* a missing or empty string */
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@#define SERVICE_NAME "newrole"/* the name of this program for PAM */ -int authenticate_via_pam (const struct passwd * ); +int authenticate_via_pam (const struct passwd *,const char * );/* authenticate_via_pam() *
@@ -165,10 +166,12 @@* */ -int authenticate_via_pam (const struct passwd *pw ) { +int authenticate_via_pam (const struct passwd *pw,const char *ttyn ) {int result =0 ;/* our result, set to 0 (not authenticated) by default */ +int rc;/* pam return code */ pam_handle_t *pam_handle;/* opaque handle used by all PAM functions */ +const char *tty_name;/* This is a jump table of functions for PAM to use when it wants to * * communicate with the user. We'll be using misc_conv(), which is *
@@ -180,26 +183,41 @@/* Make `p_pam_handle' a valid PAM handle so we can use it when * * calling PAM functions. */ -if (PAM_SUCCESS !=pam_start (SERVICE_NAME , - pw->pw_name, - &pam_conversation, - &pam_handle ) ) { + rc =pam_start (SERVICE_NAME , + pw->pw_name, + &pam_conversation, + &pam_handle ); +if ( rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) {fprintf ( stderr,_ ("failed to initialize PAM\n" ) );exit (-1 ); } +if (strncmp (ttyn,"/dev/" ,5 ) ==0 ) + tty_name = ttyn+5 ; +else + tty_name = ttyn; + + rc =pam_set_item ( pam_handle,PAM_TTY , tty_name ); +if ( rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) { +fprintf ( stderr,_ ("failed to set PAM_TTY\n" ) ); + goto out; + } +/* Ask PAM to authenticate the user running this program */ -if (PAM_SUCCESS ==pam_authenticate (pam_handle,0 ) ) { - result =1 ;/* user authenticated OK! */ + rc =pam_authenticate (pam_handle,0 ); +if ( rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) { + goto out; }/* Ask PAM to verify acct_mgmt */ -if (PAM_SUCCESS !=pam_acct_mgmt (pam_handle,0 ) ) { - result =0 ; - } + rc =pam_acct_mgmt (pam_handle,0 ); +if ( rc ==PAM_SUCCESS ) { + result =1 ;/* user authenticated OK! */ + }/* We're done with PAM. Free `pam_handle'. */ -pam_end ( pam_handle,PAM_SUCCESS ); +out: +pam_end ( pam_handle, rc );return ( result );
@@ -277,6 +295,33 @@#endif /* if/else USE_PAM */ +/* +* This function checks to see if the shell is known in /etc/shells. +* If so, it returns 1. On error or illegal shell, it returns 0. +*/ +static int verify_shell (const char *shell_name) +{ +int found =0 ; +const char *buf; + +if ( !shell_name ) +return found; + +while ( (buf =getusershell ()) !=NULL ) { +/* ignore comments */ +if ( *buf =='#' ) +continue ; + +/* check the shell skipping newline char */ +if ( !strcmp (shell_name, buf) ) { + found =1 ; +break ; + } + } +endusershell (); +return found; +} +/************************************************************************ * * All code used for both PAM and shadow passwd goes in this section.
@@ -285,13 +330,13 @@int main (int argc,char *argv[] ) { -security_context_t new_context=NULL ;/* our target security context */ +security_context_t new_context=NULL ;/* our target security context */ security_context_t old_context=NULL ;/* our original securiy context */ security_context_t tty_context=NULL ;/* The current context of tty file */ -security_context_t new_tty_context=NULL ;/* The new context of tty file */ +security_context_t new_tty_context=NULL ;/* The new context of tty file */ security_context_t chk_tty_context=NULL ; -context_t context;/* manipulatable form of new_context */ +context_t context;/* manipulatable form of new_context */ const char *se_username;/* SELinux user identity */
@@ -300,7 +345,7 @@int clflag;/* holds codes for command line flags */ int flag_index;/* flag index in argv[] */ -struct option long_options[] = {/* long option flags for getopt() */ +const struct option long_options[] = {/* long option flags for getopt() */ {"role" ,1 ,0 ,'r' }, {"type" ,1 ,0 ,'t' }, {"level" ,1 ,0 ,'l' },
@@ -311,7 +356,13 @@char *level_s =NULL ;/* level spec'd by user in argv[] */ char *ttyn =NULL ;/* tty path */ pid_t childPid=0 ; -int fd=0 ; +int fd; +int enforcing; +sigset_t empty; + +/* Empty the signal mask in case someone is blocking a signal */ +sigemptyset ( &empty ); + (void )sigprocmask (SIG_SETMASK , &empty,NULL );/* Terminate on SIGHUP. */ signal (SIGHUP ,SIG_DFL );
@@ -334,6 +385,11 @@ _("Sorry, newrole may be used only on a SELinux kernel.\n") );exit (-1 ); } + enforcing =security_getenforce (); +if (enforcing <0 ) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Could not determine enforcing mode.\n" )); +exit (-1 ); + }while (1 ) { clflag=getopt_long (argc,argv,"r:t:l:" ,long_options,&flag_index);
@@ -452,11 +508,23 @@ pw->pw_dir =xstrdup (pw->pw_dir); pw->pw_shell =xstrdup (pw->pw_shell); +if (verify_shell (pw->pw_shell) ==0 ) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error! Shell is not valid.\n" )); +exit (-1 ); + } + +/* Get the tty name. Pam will need it. */ + ttyn=ttyname (0 ); +if (!ttyn || *ttyn =='\0' ) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error! Could not retrieve tty information.\n" )); +exit (-1 ); + } +printf (_ ("Authenticating %s.\n" ),pw->pw_name);/* Authenticate the user running this program. */ #ifdef USE_PAM -if ( !authenticate_via_pam (pw) ) +if ( !authenticate_via_pam (pw, ttyn) ) #else /* !USE_PAM */ if( !authenticate_via_shadow_passwd(pw) )#endif /* if/else USE_PAM */
@@ -548,31 +616,30 @@* */ -/* Fetch TTY information */ - ttyn=ttyname (0 ); -if (!ttyn || *ttyn =='\0' ) { -fprintf (stderr,_ ("Warning! Could not retrieve tty information.\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } - +/* Re-open TTY descriptor */ fd =open (ttyn,O_RDWR );if (fd <0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,_ ("Warning! Could not open %s.\n" ), ttyn); +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error! Could not open %s.\n" ), ttyn);exit (-1 ); } tty_context =NULL ; -if (fgetfilecon (fd, &tty_context) <0 ) -fprintf (stderr,_ ("Warning! Could not get current context for %s, not relabeling.\n" ), ttyn); - +if (fgetfilecon (fd, &tty_context) <0 ) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("%s! Could not get current context for %s, not relabeling tty.\n" ), enforcing ?"Error" :"Warning" , ttyn); +if (enforcing) +exit (-1 ); + }#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB if (tty_context)printf ("Your tty %s was labeled with context %s\n" , ttyn, tty_context);#endif new_tty_context =NULL ; -if (tty_context && (security_compute_relabel (new_context,tty_context,SECCLASS_CHR_FILE ,&new_tty_context) <0 )) -fprintf (stderr,_ ("Warning! Could not get new context for %s, not relabeling.\n" ), ttyn); +if (tty_context && (security_compute_relabel (new_context,tty_context,SECCLASS_CHR_FILE ,&new_tty_context) <0 )) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error! Could not get new context for %s, not relabeling tty.\n" ), ttyn); +if (enforcing) +exit (-1 ); + }#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB if (new_tty_context)
@@ -581,9 +648,11 @@if (new_tty_context) {if (fsetfilecon (fd,new_tty_context) <0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,_ ("Warning! Could not set new context for %s\n" ), ttyn); +fprintf (stderr,_ ("%s! Could not set new context for %s\n" ), enforcing ?"Error" :"Warning" , ttyn);freecon (new_tty_context); new_tty_context =NULL ; +if (enforcing) +exit (-1 ); } }
@@ -592,12 +661,18 @@if ( childPid<0 ) {int errsv=errno;fprintf (stderr,_ ("newrole: failure forking: %s" ),strerror (errsv)); +if (fsetfilecon (fd,tty_context) <0 ) +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Warning! Could not restore context for %s\n" ), ttyn); +freecon (tty_context);exit (-1 ); }else if (childPid) {/* PARENT */ -wait (NULL ); +int rc; +do { + rc =wait (NULL ); + }while (rc <0 && errno ==EINTR ); -if (!new_tty_context) +if (!new_tty_context||!tty_context)exit (0 );/* Verify that the tty still has the context set by newrole. */
@@ -634,15 +709,15 @@fprintf (stderr,_ ("Could not close descriptors.\n" ));exit (-1 ); } - fd =open (ttyn,O_RDWR ); + fd =open (ttyn,O_RDONLY );if (fd !=0 ) {exit (-1 ); } - fd =open (ttyn,O_RDWR ); + fd =open (ttyn,O_WRONLY );if (fd !=1 ) {exit (-1 ); } - fd =open (ttyn,O_RDWR ); + fd =open (ttyn,O_WRONLY );if (fd !=2 ) {exit (-1 ); }
Quoted 15 lines · Steve G
Hi,
I've been reviewing newrole in preparation for another patch to add auditing to it. The patch is fairly self-explanatory. Some highlights:
- little const cleanup
- pass tty to pam
- add a function to verify the shell is in fact known to/etc/shells
- make sure no signals are blocked
- If in enforcing mode and error: getting tty context, computing new context, or setting new context then exit with -1.
- Loop the wait call to handle EINTR
- open the tty read only or write only depending on stdin, stdout, stderr.
- pass return from pam_* functions topam_end
Quoted 1 line
The patch is attached.
Merged the updated patch as of policycoreutils 1.29.7.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.