signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation
PATCH 1/3 signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations.
(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session
but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).
NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right.
kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- security/commoncap.c | 3 --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 --------- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~1_LSM_KILL +14 -13
@@ -526,22 +526,23 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { -int error = -EINVAL ; +int error; +if (!valid_signal (sig)) -return error; +return -EINVAL ; -if (info ==SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special (info) &&SI_FROMUSER (info))) { - error =audit_signal_info (sig, t);/* Let audit system see the signal */ -if (error) -return error; - error = -EPERM ; -if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || - (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) - && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) - && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) - && !capable (CAP_KILL )) +if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) +return 0 ; + + error =audit_signal_info (sig, t);/* Let audit system see the signal */ +if (error)return error; - } + +if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) + && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) + && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) + && !capable (CAP_KILL )) +return -EPERM ;return security_task_kill (t, info, sig,0 ); }
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -3
@@ -543,9 +543,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_structint cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid) { -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; -/* * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
security/smack/smack_lsm.c renamed from security/smack/smack_lsm.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -9
@@ -1094,15 +1094,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_s int sig, u32 secid) {/* -* Special cases where signals really ought to go through -* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may -* make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't -* bother with the LSM hook in these cases. -*/ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && - (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; -/* * Sending a signal requires that the sender * can write the receiver. */
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -3
@@ -3194,9 +3194,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct taskif (rc)return rc; -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; -if (!sig) perm =PROCESS__SIGNULL ;/* null signal; existence test */ else
Quoted 10 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that
check_kill_permission()should callsecurity_task_kill()only forSI_FROMUSER()case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations.(sadly,
check_kill_permission()is the last user of signal->session/__session
but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out
cap_task_kill()should die, and I think he is very right.
And at this point I agree. We started out with a pretty strict version designed to prevent unprivileged code from signaling code owned by the same user but with more privileged. We've at this point reduced the check twice to prevent regressions and I think where we're at right now is that it's meaningless.
Does anyone object to removing cap_task_kill() altogether?
(sigh)
-serge
Quoted 89 lines
Signed-off-by Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- security/commoncap.c | 3 --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 --------- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~1_LSM_KILL +14
-13@@ -526,22 +526,23 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { -int error = -EINVAL ; +int error; +if (!valid_signal (sig)) -return error; +return -EINVAL ; -if (info ==SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special (info) &&SI_FROMUSER (info))) { - error =audit_signal_info (sig, t);/* Let audit system see the signal */ -if (error) -return error; - error = -EPERM ; -if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || - (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) - && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) - && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) - && !capable (CAP_KILL )) +if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) +return 0 ; + + error =audit_signal_info (sig, t);/* Let audit system see the signal */ +if (error)return error; - } + +if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) + && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) + && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) + && !capable (CAP_KILL )) +return -EPERM ;return security_task_kill (t, info, sig,0 ); }security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~1_LSM_KILL +0
-3@@ -543,9 +543,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_structint cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid) { -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; -/* * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously security/smack/smack_lsm.c renamed from security/smack/smack_lsm.c~1_LSM_KILL +0
-9@@ -1094,15 +1094,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_s int sig, u32 secid) {/* -* Special cases where signals really ought to go through -* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may -* make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't -* bother with the LSM hook in these cases. -*/ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && - (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; -/* * Sending a signal requires that the sender * can write the receiver. */ security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c~1_LSM_KILL +0
-3@@ -3194,9 +3194,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct taskif (rc)return rc; -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; -if (!sig) perm =PROCESS__SIGNULL ;/* null signal; existence test */ else