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signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation

PATCH In review Oleg Nesterov 2 participants 2 messages Feb 25, 2008

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation

Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations.

(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session
but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).

NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right.

 kernel/signal.c            |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
 security/commoncap.c       |    3 ---
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |    3 ---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    9 ---------
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~1_LSM_KILL +14 -13
@@ -526,22 +526,23 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long m
 static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 				 struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	int error = -EINVAL;
+	int error;
+
 	if (!valid_signal(sig))
-		return error;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) {
-		error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
-		if (error)
-			return error;
-		error = -EPERM;
-		if (((sig != SIGCONT) ||
-			(task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
-		    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
-		    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
-		    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+		return 0;
+
+	error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
+	if (error)
 		return error;
-	}
+
+	if (((sig != SIGCONT) || (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
+	    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
+	    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
+	    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
 }
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -3
@@ -543,9 +543,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct
 int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 				int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
 	/*
 	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
 	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
security/smack/smack_lsm.c renamed from security/smack/smack_lsm.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -9
@@ -1094,15 +1094,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_s
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
-	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
-	 * make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't
-	 * bother with the LSM hook in these cases.
-	 */
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO &&
-	    (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-	/*
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -3
@@ -3194,9 +3194,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
 	if (!sig)
 		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
 	else
#1 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations.

(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session
but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).

NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right.

And at this point I agree. We started out with a pretty strict version designed to prevent unprivileged code from signaling code owned by the same user but with more privileged. We've at this point reduced the check twice to prevent regressions and I think where we're at right now is that it's meaningless.

Does anyone object to removing cap_task_kill() altogether?

(sigh)

-serge

Quoted 89 lines
 kernel/signal.c            |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
 security/commoncap.c       |    3 ---
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |    3 ---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    9 ---------
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~1_LSM_KILL +14 -13
@@ -526,22 +526,23 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long m
 static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 				 struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	int error = -EINVAL;
+	int error;
+
 	if (!valid_signal(sig))
-		return error;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) {
-		error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
-		if (error)
-			return error;
-		error = -EPERM;
-		if (((sig != SIGCONT) ||
-			(task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
-		    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
-		    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
-		    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+		return 0;
+
+	error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
+	if (error)
 		return error;
-	}
+
+	if (((sig != SIGCONT) || (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
+	    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
+	    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
+	    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
 }
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -3
@@ -543,9 +543,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct
 int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 				int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
 	/*
 	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
 	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
security/smack/smack_lsm.c renamed from security/smack/smack_lsm.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -9
@@ -1094,15 +1094,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_s
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
-	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
-	 * make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't
-	 * bother with the LSM hook in these cases.
-	 */
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO &&
-	    (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-	/*
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c~1_LSM_KILL +0 -3
@@ -3194,9 +3194,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
 	if (!sig)
 		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
 	else