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file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()

PATCH In review [email protected] 6 participants 8 messages Feb 28, 2008 – Mar 5, 2008

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
 security/capability.c      |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   40 ----------------------------------------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
index fe52cde..95cb830 100644
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -40
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
index 770eb06..a9ca412 100644
@@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
 	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
Tested-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

For 2.6.25-rc3,

This fixes the 'at' command for non-root users. Thank you.

Quoted 141 lines · On 2/29/08, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote:

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
 security/capability.c      |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   40 ----------------------------------------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +0 -1
index fe52cde..95cb830 100644
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t
 old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int
 sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct

sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);

include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
 task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 

static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)

security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -35
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) ||
 SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)

* done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces

security/commoncap.c +0 -5
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
index 770eb06..a9ca412 100644
@@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct
 *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through

* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
--
1.5.2.5

#2 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · BuraphaLinux Server

For 2.6.25-rc3,

This fixes the 'at' command for non-root users. Thank you.

Cool, thanks much for testing.

-serge

Quoted 146 lines · On 2/29/08, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 136 lines

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
 security/capability.c      |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   40 ----------------------------------------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +0 -1
index fe52cde..95cb830 100644
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t
 old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int
 sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct

sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);

include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
 task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 

static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)

security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -35
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) ||
 SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)

* done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces

security/commoncap.c +0 -5
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
index 770eb06..a9ca412 100644
@@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct
 *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
Quoted 5 lines

* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
--
1.5.2.5

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#3 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:

| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
| 
| 	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| 	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| 	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| 	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
| 
| However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
| are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| as per the check in check_kill_permission().
| 
| This patch removes cap_task_kill().

2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
submit the patch to -stable team?

Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
author maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino

Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:

| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
| 
| 	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| 	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| 	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| 	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
| 
| However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
| are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| as per the check in check_kill_permission().
| 
| This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Quoted 2 lines

2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
submit the patch to -stable team?

Luiz, could you confirm that the below works?

thanks,
-serge

Quoted 1 line

From c77b7d418933c14707383f06a1da61169e84071b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h |    3 +--
 security/capability.c    |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c     |   39 ---------------------------------------
 3 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
index ac05083..d842ee3 100644
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2112,7 +2111,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -39
index ea61bc7..6e9065c 100644
@@ -527,40 +527,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->euid == 0 && p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
 #else
 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 			   struct sched_param *lp)
@@ -575,11 +541,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
#5 lore raw

Em Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:26:34 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:

| Quoting Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino ([email protected]):
| > Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
| > [email protected] escreveu:
| > 
| > | The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
| > | 
| > | 	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| > | 	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| > | 	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| > | 	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
| > | 
| > | However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| > | granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| > | and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| > | where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
| > | are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| > | as per the check in check_kill_permission().
| > | 
| > | This patch removes cap_task_kill().
| > 
| >  2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
| > submit the patch to -stable team?
| 
| Luiz, could you confirm that the below works?

Yes, it does.

Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
#6 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

It works here against 2.6.24.3.
Originaly it was a fix - if I recall correctly - to allow a self started X to kill completly. This works with the patch.

Chris

Quoted 154 lines · On Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:26:34 -0600 [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 19 lines · Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino

Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:

| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
| 
| 	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| 	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| 	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| 	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
| 
| However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
| are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| as per the check in check_kill_permission().
| 
| This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Quoted 2 lines

2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
submit the patch to -stable team?

Luiz, could you confirm that the below works?

thanks,
-serge

From c77b7d418933c14707383f06a1da61169e84071b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h |    3 +--
 security/capability.c    |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c     |   39 ---------------------------------------
 3 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
index ac05083..d842ee3 100644
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2112,7 +2111,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -39
index ea61bc7..6e9065c 100644
@@ -527,40 +527,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->euid == 0 && p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
 #else
 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 			   struct sched_param *lp)
@@ -575,11 +541,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
Signature · 6 lines
1.5.2.5

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--------------------
Chris Friedhoff
[email protected]

Acked-by on v1 1/1
#7 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

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Hash: SHA1

Cheers

Andrew

[email protected] wrote:

| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
|
| 	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| 	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| 	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| 	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
|
| However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
| are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| as per the check in check_kill_permission().
|
| This patch removes cap_task_kill().
|
| Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
| ---
|  include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
|  security/capability.c      |    1 -
|  security/commoncap.c       |   40
- ----------------------------------------
|  security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
|  4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
|
| diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
| index fe52cde..95cb830 100644
| --- a/include/linux/security.h
| +++ b/include/linux/security.h
| @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry
*dentry);
|  extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
|  extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,

uid_t old_suid, int flags);
| extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); | -extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
| extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);

|  extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
|  extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
| @@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
task_struct *p,
|  				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
|  				      u32 secid)
|  {
| -	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
| +	return 0;
|  }
|
|  static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
| diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
| index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
| --- a/security/capability.c
| +++ b/security/capability.c
| @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
|  	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
|  	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
|
| -	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
|  	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
|  	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
|  	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
| diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
| index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
| --- a/security/commoncap.c
| +++ b/security/commoncap.c
| @@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int
nice)
|  	return cap_safe_nice(p);
|  }
|
| -int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
| -				int sig, u32 secid)
| -{
| -	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) ||
SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
| -		return 0;
| -
| -	/*
| -	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
| -	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
| -	 * allowed.
| -	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
| -	 */
| -	if (p->uid == current->uid)
| -		return 0;
| -
| -	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
| -	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
| -		return 0;
| -
| -	if (secid)
| -		/*
| -		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
| -		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
| -		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
| -		 * Used only by usb drivers?
| -		 */
| -		return 0;
| -	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
| -		return 0;
| -	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
| -		return 0;
| -
| -	return -EPERM;
| -}
| -
|  /*
|   * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
|   * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
| @@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int
nice)
|  {
|  	return 0;
|  }
| -int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
| -				int sig, u32 secid)
| -{
| -	return 0;
| -}
|  #endif
|
|  void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
| diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
| index 770eb06..a9ca412 100644
| --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
| +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
| @@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct
task_struct *p)
|  static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
|  			   int sig, u32 secid)
|  {
| -	int rc;
| -
| -	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
| -	if (rc != 0)
| -		return rc;
|  	/*
|  	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
|  	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may

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