file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()
Subsystems (3)
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 1/1 file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
--- include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- security/capability.c | 1 - security/commoncap.c | 40 ---------------------------------------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ----- 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid,uid_t old_euid,uid_t old_suid,int flags);extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); -extern int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid);extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,int policy,struct sched_param *lp);extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);
@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + return 0; }static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, - .task_kill = cap_task_kill, .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler, .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -40
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)return cap_safe_nice (p); } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; - -/* -* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. -* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously -* allowed. -* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. -*/ -if (p->uid == current->uid) -return 0 ; - -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; - -if (secid) -/* -* Signal sent as a particular user. -* Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the -* only thing we can do at the moment. -* Used only by usb drivers? -*/ -return 0 ; -if (cap_issubset (p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) -return 0 ; -if (capable (CAP_KILL )) -return 0 ; - -return -EPERM ; -} -/* * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP) * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) {return 0 ; } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -return 0 ; -}#endif void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
@@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)static int smack_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid) { -int rc; - - rc =cap_task_kill (p, info, sig, secid); -if (rc !=0 ) -return rc;/* * Special cases where signals really ought to go through * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
For 2.6.25-rc3,
This fixes the 'at' command for non-root users. Thank you.
Quoted 141 lines · On 2/29/08, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote:
The original justification for
cap_task_kill()was as follows:
check_kill_permission()does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.However now that
cap_task_kill()always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return-EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check incheck_kill_permission().This patch removes
cap_task_kill().Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- security/capability.c | 1 - security/commoncap.c | 40 ---------------------------------------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ----- 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +0
-1@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid,uid_t old_euid,uid_t old_suid,int flags);extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); -extern int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig, u32 secid); extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct
sched_param*lp);
extern intcap_task_setioprio(structtask_struct*p, int ioprio); extern intcap_task_setnice(structtask_struct*p, int nice);include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (structtask_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + return 0; }static inline int
security_task_wait(structtask_struct*p)security/capability.c +0
-1@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, - .task_kill = cap_task_kill, .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler, .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,security/commoncap.c +0
-35@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)return cap_safe_nice (p); } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) -return 0 ; - -/* -* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. -* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously -* allowed. -* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. -*/ -if (p->uid == current->uid) -return 0 ; - -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; - -if (secid) -/* -* Signal sent as a particular user. -* Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the -* only thing we can do at the moment. -* Used only by usb drivers? -*/ -return 0 ; -if (cap_issubset (p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) -return 0 ; -if (capable (CAP_KILL )) -return 0 ; - -return -EPERM ; -} -/* * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP) * done without
task_capability_lock()because it introducessecurity/commoncap.c +0
-5@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) {return 0 ; } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -return 0 ; -}#endif void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0
-5@@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)static int smack_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid) { -int rc; - - rc =cap_task_kill (p, info, sig, secid); -if (rc !=0 ) -return rc;/* * Special cases where signals really ought to go through * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
--
1.5.2.5
Quoted 4 lines · BuraphaLinux Server
For 2.6.25-rc3,
Tested-by John Gatewood Ham <[email protected]>This fixes the 'at' command for non-root users. Thank you.
Cool, thanks much for testing.
-serge
Quoted 146 lines · On 2/29/08, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 136 lines
The original justification for
cap_task_kill()was as follows:
check_kill_permission()does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.However now that
cap_task_kill()always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return-EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check incheck_kill_permission().This patch removes
cap_task_kill().Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- security/capability.c | 1 - security/commoncap.c | 40 ---------------------------------------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ----- 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +0
-1@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid,uid_t old_euid,uid_t old_suid,int flags);extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); -extern int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig, u32 secid); extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct
sched_param*lp);
extern intcap_task_setioprio(structtask_struct*p, int ioprio); extern intcap_task_setnice(structtask_struct*p, int nice);include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (structtask_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + return 0; }static inline int
security_task_wait(structtask_struct*p)security/capability.c +0
-1@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, - .task_kill = cap_task_kill, .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler, .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,security/commoncap.c +0
-35@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)return cap_safe_nice (p); } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) -return 0 ; - -/* -* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. -* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously -* allowed. -* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. -*/ -if (p->uid == current->uid) -return 0 ; - -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; - -if (secid) -/* -* Signal sent as a particular user. -* Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the -* only thing we can do at the moment. -* Used only by usb drivers? -*/ -return 0 ; -if (cap_issubset (p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) -return 0 ; -if (capable (CAP_KILL )) -return 0 ; - -return -EPERM ; -} -/* * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP) * done without
task_capability_lock()because it introducessecurity/commoncap.c +0
-5@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) {return 0 ; } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -return 0 ; -}#endif void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0
-5@@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)static int smack_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid) { -int rc; - - rc =cap_task_kill (p, info, sig, secid); -if (rc !=0 ) -return rc;/* * Special cases where signals really ought to go through Quoted 5 lines
* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
--
1.5.2.5--
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Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:
| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows: | | check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. | However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an | unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities | resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid. | | However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission | granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, | and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases | where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases | are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent | as per the check in check_kill_permission(). | | This patch removes cap_task_kill().
2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
submit the patch to -stable team?
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
[email protected]
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows: | | check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. | However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an | unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities | resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid. | | However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission | granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, | and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases | where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases | are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent | as per the check in check_kill_permission(). | | This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Quoted 2 lines
2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
submit the patch to -stable team?
Luiz, could you confirm that the below works?
thanks,
-serge
Quoted 1 line
From
c77b7d418933c14707383f06a1da61169e84071bMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
--- include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- security/capability.c | 1 - security/commoncap.c | 39 --------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid,uid_t old_euid,uid_t old_suid,int flags);extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); -extern int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid);extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,int policy,struct sched_param *lp);extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);
@@ -2112,7 +2111,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + return 0; }static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, - .task_kill = cap_task_kill, .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler, .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -39
@@ -527,40 +527,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) return cap_safe_nice(p); } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; - -/* -* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. -* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously -* allowed. -* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. -*/ -if (p->euid ==0 && p->uid == current->uid) -return 0 ; - -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; - -if (secid) -/* -* Signal sent as a particular user. -* Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the -* only thing we can do at the moment. -* Used only by usb drivers? -*/ -return 0 ; -if (cap_issubset (p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) -return 0 ; -if (capable (CAP_KILL )) -return 0 ; - -return -EPERM ; -}#else int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,int policy,struct sched_param *lp)
@@ -575,11 +541,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) {return 0 ; } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -return 0 ; -}#endif void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
Em Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:26:34 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:
| Quoting Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino ([email protected]): | > Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600 | > [email protected] escreveu: | > | > | The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows: | > | | > | check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. | > | However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an | > | unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities | > | resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid. | > | | > | However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission | > | granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, | > | and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases | > | where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases | > | are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent | > | as per the check in check_kill_permission(). | > | | > | This patch removes cap_task_kill(). | > | > 2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and | > submit the patch to -stable team? | | Luiz, could you confirm that the below works?
Yes, it does.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
It works here against 2.6.24.3.
Originaly it was a fix - if I recall correctly - to allow a self started X to kill completly. This works with the patch.
Chris
Quoted 154 lines · On Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:26:34 -0600 [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 19 lines · Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
Em Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:38:17 -0600
[email protected] escreveu:| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows: | | check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. | However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an | unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities | resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid. | | However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission | granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, | and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases | where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases | are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent | as per the check in check_kill_permission(). | | This patch removes cap_task_kill().Quoted 2 lines
2.6.24 seems to have the same bug, what about a rediff for it and
submit the patch to -stable team?Luiz, could you confirm that the below works?
thanks,
-sergeFrom
c77b7d418933c14707383f06a1da61169e84071bMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: removecap_task_kill()The original justification for
cap_task_kill()was as follows:
check_kill_permission()does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.However now that
cap_task_kill()always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return-EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check incheck_kill_permission().This patch removes
cap_task_kill().Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- security/capability.c | 1 - security/commoncap.c | 39 --------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-2@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid,uid_t old_euid,uid_t old_suid,int flags);extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); -extern int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info,int sig,u32 secid);extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,int policy,struct sched_param *lp);extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);@@ -2112,7 +2111,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + return 0; }static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)security/capability.c +0
-1@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = { .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, - .task_kill = cap_task_kill, .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler, .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,security/commoncap.c +0
-39@@ -527,40 +527,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) return cap_safe_nice(p); } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -if (info !=SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special (info) ||SI_FROMKERNEL (info))) -return 0 ; - -/* -* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. -* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously -* allowed. -* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. -*/ -if (p->euid ==0 && p->uid == current->uid) -return 0 ; - -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; - -if (secid) -/* -* Signal sent as a particular user. -* Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the -* only thing we can do at the moment. -* Used only by usb drivers? -*/ -return 0 ; -if (cap_issubset (p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) -return 0 ; -if (capable (CAP_KILL )) -return 0 ; - -return -EPERM ; -}#else int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,int policy,struct sched_param *lp)@@ -575,11 +541,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) {return 0 ; } -int cap_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,struct siginfo *info, -int sig,u32 secid) -{ -return 0 ; -}#endif void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)Signature · 6 lines
1.5.2.5 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--------------------
Chris Friedhoff
[email protected]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cheers
Andrew
[email protected] wrote:
| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows: | | check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. | However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an | unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities | resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid. | | However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission | granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, | and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases | where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases | are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent | as per the check in check_kill_permission(). | | This patch removes cap_task_kill(). | | Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> | --- | include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- | security/capability.c | 1 - | security/commoncap.c | 40 - ---------------------------------------- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ----- | 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) | | diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h | index fe52cde..95cb830 100644 | --- a/include/linux/security.h | +++ b/include/linux/security.h | @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); | extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); | extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
uid_t old_suid, int flags);
| extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p); | -extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
| extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
| extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
| extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
| @@ -2138,7 +2137,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
task_struct *p,
| struct siginfo *info, int sig,
| u32 secid)
| {
| - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
| + return 0;
| }
|
| static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
| diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
| index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
| --- a/security/capability.c
| +++ b/security/capability.c
| @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
| .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
| .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
|
| - .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
| .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
| .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
| .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
| diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
| index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
| --- a/security/commoncap.c
| +++ b/security/commoncap.c
| @@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int
nice)
| return cap_safe_nice(p);
| }
|
| -int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
| - int sig, u32 secid)
| -{
| - if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) ||
SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
| - return 0;
| -
| - /*
| - * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
| - * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
| - * allowed.
| - * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
| - */
| - if (p->uid == current->uid)
| - return 0;
| -
| - /* sigcont is permitted within same session */
| - if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
| - return 0;
| -
| - if (secid)
| - /*
| - * Signal sent as a particular user.
| - * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the
| - * only thing we can do at the moment.
| - * Used only by usb drivers?
| - */
| - return 0;
| - if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
| - return 0;
| - if (capable(CAP_KILL))
| - return 0;
| -
| - return -EPERM;
| -}
| -
| /*
| * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
| * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
| @@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int
nice)
| {
| return 0;
| }
| -int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
| - int sig, u32 secid)
| -{
| - return 0;
| -}
| #endif
|
| void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
| diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
| index 770eb06..a9ca412 100644
| --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
| +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
| @@ -1124,11 +1124,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct
task_struct *p)
| static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
| int sig, u32 secid)
| {
| - int rc;
| -
| - rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
| - if (rc != 0)
| - return rc;
| /*
| * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
| * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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