SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface
Subsystems (8)
PATCH 1/3 SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface
Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection.
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
---
include/linux/capability.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++++--- security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++---- security/security.c | 7 ++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +1 -0
@@ -514,6 +514,7 @@ kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new);* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ #define has_capability (t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0) +#define has_capability_noaudit (t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)extern int capable (int cap);
include/linux/security.h +9 -3
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct audit_krule;* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used * as the default capabilities functions */ -extern int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); +extern int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap,int audit);extern int cap_settime (struct timespec *ts,struct timezone *tz);extern int cap_ptrace_may_access (struct task_struct *child,unsigned int mode);extern int cap_ptrace_traceme (struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ struct security_operations { kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); +int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap,int audit);int (*acct) (struct file *file);int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table,int op);int (*quotactl) (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block *sb);
@@ -1577,6 +1577,7 @@ void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);int security_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); +int security_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap);int security_acct (struct file *file);int security_sysctl (struct ctl_table *table,int op);int security_quotactl (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block *sb);
@@ -1781,7 +1782,12 @@ static inline void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,static inline int security_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) { -return cap_capable (tsk, cap); +return cap_capable (tsk, cap,1 ); +} + +static inline int security_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +{ +return cap_capable (tsk, cap,0 ); }static inline int security_acct (struct file *file)
security/commoncap.c +4 -4
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);* returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() * returns 1 for this case. */ -int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap,int audit) {/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)* to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability. */ -return (cap_capable (current,CAP_SETPCAP ) !=0 ); +return (cap_capable (current,CAP_SETPCAP ,1 ) !=0 ); }static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target (void ) {return 1 ; }
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) { /*[4]*/ + || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, 1) != 0)) { /*[4]*//* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked * [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) {int cap_sys_admin =0 ; -if (cap_capable (current,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) ==0 ) +if (cap_capable (current,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,0 ) ==0 ) cap_sys_admin =1 ;return __vm_enough_memory (mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); }
security/security.c +6 -1
@@ -163,7 +163,12 @@ void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,int security_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) { -return security_ops->capable (tsk, cap); +return security_ops->capable (tsk, cap,1 ); +} + +int security_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +{ +return security_ops->capable (tsk, cap,0 ); }int security_acct (struct file *file)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -7
@@ -1365,12 +1365,14 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int task_has_capability (struct task_struct *tsk, -int cap) +int cap,int audit) {struct task_security_struct *tsec;struct avc_audit_data ad; +struct av_decision avd;u16 sclass;u32 av =CAP_TO_MASK (cap); +int rc; tsec = tsk->security;
@@ -1390,7 +1392,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);BUG (); } -return avc_has_perm (tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad); + + rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av,0 , &avd); +if (audit) +avc_audit (tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); +return rc; }/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
@@ -1801,15 +1807,15 @@ static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effecti secondary_ops->capset_set (target, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -static int selinux_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +static int selinux_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap,int audit) {int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->capable (tsk, cap); + rc = secondary_ops->capable (tsk, cap, audit);if (rc)return rc; -return task_has_capability (tsk, cap); +return task_has_capability (tsk, cap, audit); }static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid (ctl_table *table,u16 tclass,u32 *sid)
@@ -1974,7 +1980,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)int rc, cap_sys_admin =0 ;struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; - rc = secondary_ops->capable (current,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); + rc = secondary_ops->capable (current,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,0 );if (rc ==0 ) rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
@@ -2819,7 +2825,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error = secondary_ops->capable (current,CAP_MAC_ADMIN ); + error = secondary_ops->capable (current,CAP_MAC_ADMIN ,1 );if (!error) error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
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PATCH 2/3 vm: use new has_capability_noaudit
The oomkiller calculations make decisions based on capabilities. Since these are not security decisions and LSMs should not record if they fall the request they should use the new has_capability_noaudit() interface so the denials will not be recorded.
---
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- mm/oom_kill.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -1
@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, task =get_proc_task (file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);if (!task)return -ESRCH ; -if (oom_adjust < task->oomkilladj && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { +if (oom_adjust < task->oomkilladj && !has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {put_task_struct (task);return -EACCES ; }
mm/oom_kill.c +3 -3
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)* Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it * less likely that we kill those. */ -if (has_capability (p,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || -has_capability (p,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) +if (has_capability_noaudit (p,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +has_capability_noaudit (p,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) points /=4 ;/*
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)* tend to only have this flag set on applications they think * of as important. */ -if (has_capability (p,CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (has_capability_noaudit (p,CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) points /=4 ;/*
--
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Re: [PATCH -v1 2/3] vm: use new has_capability_noaudit
Quoted 17 lines · Eric Paris
The oomkiller calculations make decisions based on capabilities. Since these are not security decisions and LSMs should not record if they fall the request they should use the new
has_capability_noaudit()interface so the denials will not be recorded.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>---
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- mm/oom_kill.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +0
-0
fs/proc/base.c static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, · line 1023
Quoted 5 lines
fs/proc/base.c +1
-1@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, task =get_proc_task (file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);if (!task)return -ESRCH ; -if (oom_adjust < task->oomkilladj && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { +if (oom_adjust < task->oomkilladj && !has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {
This one looks like an actual permission check to see whether the current task is authorized to modify this value (by writing to some proc node). Which should be audited. Unlike the others, where they are checking whether some other task has a capability in order to help decide priorities for the OOM killer.
Quoted 27 lines
fs/proc/base.c +0
-0put_task_struct (task);return -EACCES ; }mm/oom_kill.c +3
-3@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)* Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it * less likely that we kill those. */ -if (has_capability (p,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || -has_capability (p,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) +if (has_capability_noaudit (p,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +has_capability_noaudit (p,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) points /=4 ;/* @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)* tend to only have this flag set on applications they think * of as important. */ -if (has_capability (p,CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (has_capability_noaudit (p,CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) points /=4 ;/*
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Re: [PATCH -v1 2/3] vm: use new has_capability_noaudit
Quoted 13 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 12 lines · Eric Paris
The oomkiller calculations make decisions based on capabilities. Since these are not security decisions and LSMs should not record if they fall the request they should use the new
has_capability_noaudit()interface so the denials will not be recorded.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>---
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- mm/oom_kill.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Quoted 16 lines
fs/proc/base.c static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, · line 1023
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +1
-1@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, task =get_proc_task (file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);if (!task)return -ESRCH ; -if (oom_adjust < task->oomkilladj && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { +if (oom_adjust < task->oomkilladj && !has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {This one looks like an actual permission check to see whether the current task is authorized to modify this value (by writing to some proc node). Which should be audited. Unlike the others, where they are checking whether some other task has a capability in order to help decide priorities for the OOM killer.
Will be fixed in -v2
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PATCH 3/3 filesystems: use has_capability_noaudit interface for reserved blocks checks
In reply to Eric Parisext2, ext3, ufs, and ubifs all check for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to determine if they should allow reserved blocks to be used. A process not having this capability is not failing some security decision and should not be audited. Thus move to using has_capability_noaudit.
---
fs/ext2/balloc.c | 3 ++- fs/ext3/balloc.c | 3 ++- fs/ubifs/budget.c | 4 +++- fs/ufs/balloc.c | 3 ++- security/commoncap.c | 1 + security/security.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/balloc.c +2 -1
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/buffer_head.h> #include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/security.h> /* * balloc.c contains the blocks allocation and deallocation routines
@@ -1192,7 +1193,7 @@ static int ext2_has_free_blocks(struct ext2_sb_info *sbi) free_blocks =percpu_counter_read_positive (&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter); root_blocks =le32_to_cpu (sbi->s_es->s_r_blocks_count); -if (free_blocks < root_blocks +1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && +if (free_blocks < root_blocks +1 && !has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && sbi->s_resuid != current->fsuid && (sbi->s_resgid ==0 || !in_group_p (sbi->s_resgid))) {return 0 ;
fs/ext3/balloc.c +2 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/time.h> #include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/jbd.h> #include <linux/ext3_fs.h>
@@ -1421,7 +1422,7 @@ static int ext3_has_free_blocks(struct ext3_sb_info *sbi) free_blocks =percpu_counter_read_positive (&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter); root_blocks =le32_to_cpu (sbi->s_es->s_r_blocks_count); -if (free_blocks < root_blocks +1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && +if (free_blocks < root_blocks +1 && !has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && sbi->s_resuid != current->fsuid && (sbi->s_resgid ==0 || !in_group_p (sbi->s_resgid))) {return 0 ;
fs/ubifs/budget.c +3 -1
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@#include "ubifs.h" #include <linux/writeback.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/div64.h> /*
@@ -363,7 +365,7 @@ long long ubifs_calc_available(const struct ubifs_info *c, int min_idx_lebs)*/ static int can_use_rp (struct ubifs_info *c) { -if (current->fsuid == c->rp_uid ||capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) || +if (current->fsuid == c->rp_uid ||has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) || (c->rp_gid !=0 &&in_group_p (c->rp_gid)))return 1 ;return 0 ;
fs/ufs/balloc.c +2 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/quotaops.h> #include <linux/buffer_head.h> #include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ u64 ufs_new_fragments(struct inode *inode, void *p, u64 fragment,/* * There is not enough space for user on the device */ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) &&ufs_freespace (uspi,UFS_MINFREE ) <=0 ) { +if (!has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) &&ufs_freespace (uspi,UFS_MINFREE ) <=0 ) {unlock_super (sb);UFSD ("EXIT (FAILED)\n" );return 0 ;
security/commoncap.c +1 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)return 0 ;return -EPERM ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_capable);int cap_settime (struct timespec *ts,struct timezone *tz) {
security/security.c +1 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) {return security_ops->capable (tsk, cap,0 ); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_capable_noaudit);int security_acct (struct file *file) {
--
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Quoted 12 lines · Eric Paris
Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the
vm_enough_memorysecurity check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection.
Quoted 4 lines
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. I.e.
#define CAP_NOAUDIT 0
#define CAP_AUDIT 1
Otherwise, looks fine.
thanks,
-serge
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Quoted 20 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Paris
Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the
vm_enough_memorysecurity check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection.Quoted 5 lines
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. I.e.
#define
CAP_NOAUDIT0
#defineCAP_AUDIT1Otherwise, looks fine.
As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below?
int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); int cap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 27 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 26 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Paris
Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the
vm_enough_memorysecurity check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection.Quoted 5 lines
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. I.e.
#define
CAP_NOAUDIT0
#defineCAP_AUDIT1
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Otherwise, looks fine.
As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below?
int
cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); intcap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
Well from outside the "security" subsystem people should call either
has_capability()has_capability_noaudit()
orcapable() (which calls has_capability())
How far down do I have to keep duplicating functionality to avoid booleans?
-Eric
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Quoted 40 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 27 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 14 lines · Eric Paris
Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions.
It would be possible to solve this problem like thevm_enough_memorysecurity check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection.Quoted 5 lines
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and
1. I.e.#define
CAP_NOAUDIT0
#defineCAP_AUDIT1Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Otherwise, looks fine.
As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below?
int
cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); intcap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);Well from outside the "security" subsystem people should call either
Quoted 7 lines
has_capability()has_capability_noaudit()
orcapable()(which callshas_capability())How far down do I have to keep duplicating functionality to avoid booleans?
Probably not this far :) Sorry, reading mail too quickly ...
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.