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signals: check_kill_permission: don't check creds if same_thread_group()

PATCH In review Oleg Nesterov 4 participants 8 messages May 17, 2010 – May 20, 2010

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 signals: check_kill_permission: don't check creds if same_thread_group()

Andrew Tridgell reports that aio_read(SIGEV_SIGNAL) can fail if the the notification from the helper thread races with setresuid(), see
http://samba.org/~tridge/junkcode/aio_uid.c

This happens because check_kill_permission() doesn't allow to send a signal to the task with the different cred->xids. But there is no any security reason to check ->cred's when the task sends a signal (private or group-wide) to its sub-thread. Whatever we do, any thread can bypass all security checks and send SIGKILL to all threads, or it can block a signal SIG and do kill(gettid(), SIG) to deliver this signal to another sub-thread. Not to mention that CLONE_THREAD implies CLONE_VM.

Change check_kill_permission() to avoid the credentials check when the sender and the target are from the same thread group.

Also, move "cred = current_cred()" down to avoid calling get_current() twice.

Note: David Howells pointed out we could relax this even more, the CLONE_SIGHAND (without CLONE_THREAD) case probably does not need these checks too.

---

 kernel/signal.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_CK_STG +4 -2
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const str
 static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 				 struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+	const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
 	struct pid *sid;
 	int error;
 
@@ -656,8 +656,10 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
+	cred = current_cred();
 	tcred = __task_cred(t);
-	if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
+	if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
+	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
 	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
 	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
 	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

I concur that there is no real security benefit from checking uids for any CLONE_VM case. But there is also no reason to change the old behavior in this corner for any case but CLONE_THREAD.

Thanks,
Roland

#2 lore raw
In reply to Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 2 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Also, move "cred = current_cred()" down to avoid calling get_current() twice.

I don't see what you mean by this. same_thread_group() doesn't call current_cred(), so why this change?

David

#3 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · David Howells
Quoted 2 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Also, move "cred = current_cred()" down to avoid calling get_current() twice.

I don't see what you mean by this. same_thread_group() doesn't call current_cred(), so why this change?

Yes, but both current_cred() and same_thread_group(current, t) call get_current(), and gcc doesn't cache the result because we call audit_signal_info() in between.

In fact, initially I was going to send the patch below, but then decided to make a more simple change.

Oleg.

kernel/signal.c +23 -19
@@ -642,8 +642,6 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const str
 static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 				 struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
-	struct pid *sid;
 	int error;
 
 	if (!valid_signal(sig))
@@ -656,23 +654,29 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	tcred = __task_cred(t);
-	if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
-	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
-	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
-	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
-		switch (sig) {
-		case SIGCONT:
-			sid = task_session(t);
-			/*
-			 * We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The
-			 * task was unhashed, the caller must notice this.
-			 */
-			if (!sid || sid == task_session(current))
-				break;
-		default:
-			return -EPERM;
+	if (!same_thread_group(current, t)) {
+		const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+		const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
+		struct pid *sid;
+
+		if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
+		    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
+		    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
+		    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
+			switch (sig) {
+			case SIGCONT:
+				sid = task_session(t);
+				/*
+				 * We don't return the error if sid == NULL.
+				 * The task was unhashed, the caller must
+				 * notice this.
+				 */
+				if (!sid || sid == task_session(current))
+					break;
+			default:
+				return -EPERM;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
#4 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Yes, but both current_cred() and same_thread_group(current, t) call get_current(), and gcc doesn't cache the result because we call audit_signal_info() in between.

Sorry, yes. I was reading get_current() as current_cred() for some reason.

However, you are _still_ calling get_current() twice... So that bit of your changelog isn't really correct.

In fact, get_current() should be __attribute_const__ since it can't change whilst you're looking at it, except within switch_to(), probably in a piece of assembly code, so gcc should be free to cache it as long as it likes.

David

#5 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · David Howells
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Yes, but both current_cred() and same_thread_group(current, t) call get_current(), and gcc doesn't cache the result because we call audit_signal_info() in between.

Sorry, yes. I was reading get_current() as current_cred() for some reason.

However, you are _still_ calling get_current() twice... So that bit of your changelog isn't really correct.

If I read kernel/signal.s correctly - no.

Well, yes, get_current() is still called twice inside check_kill_permission(). But this is because we have audit_signal_info()->audit_dummy_context() which uses current too.

But "cred = current_cred()" and same_thread_group(current, t) read gs:current_task only once, so this change really helps (although the optimization is very minor, of course).

Quoted 3 lines

In fact, get_current() should be __attribute_const__ since it can't change whilst you're looking at it, except within switch_to(), probably in a piece of assembly code, so gcc should be free to cache it as long as it likes.

Agreed! I thought about this many times.

Oleg.

#6 lore raw
In reply to Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 16 lines · On Mon, 17 May 2010 21:54:14 +0200 Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> wrote:

Andrew Tridgell reports that aio_read(SIGEV_SIGNAL) can fail if the the notification from the helper thread races with setresuid(), see
http://samba.org/~tridge/junkcode/aio_uid.c

This happens because check_kill_permission() doesn't allow to send a signal to the task with the different cred->xids. But there is no any security reason to check ->cred's when the task sends a signal (private or group-wide) to its sub-thread. Whatever we do, any thread can bypass all security checks and send SIGKILL to all threads, or it can block a signal SIG and do kill(gettid(), SIG) to deliver this signal to another sub-thread. Not to mention that CLONE_THREAD implies CLONE_VM.

Change check_kill_permission() to avoid the credentials check when the sender and the target are from the same thread group.

Quoted 6 lines

Also, move "cred = current_cred()" down to avoid calling get_current() twice.

Note: David Howells pointed out we could relax this even more, the CLONE_SIGHAND (without CLONE_THREAD) case probably does not need these checks too.

So... which kernel(s) do we think this fix should be merged into?

#7 lore raw
Quoted 1 line

So... which kernel(s) do we think this fix should be merged into?

I'd say all. The glibc (libpthread) that does set*id across threads has been in use for a while (2.3.4?), probably in distro's using kernels as old or older than any active -stable streams. In the race in question, this kernel bug is breaking valid POSIX application expectations.

Thanks,
Roland