signals: check_kill_permission: don't check creds if same_thread_group()
PATCH 1/1 signals: check_kill_permission: don't check creds if same_thread_group()
Andrew Tridgell reports that aio_read(SIGEV_SIGNAL) can fail if the the notification from the helper thread races with setresuid(), see
http://samba.org/~tridge/junkcode/aio_uid.c
This happens because check_kill_permission() doesn't allow to send a signal to the task with the different cred->xids. But there is no any security reason to check ->cred's when the task sends a signal (private or group-wide) to its sub-thread. Whatever we do, any thread can bypass all security checks and send SIGKILL to all threads, or it can block a signal SIG and do kill(gettid(), SIG) to deliver this signal to another sub-thread. Not to mention that CLONE_THREAD implies CLONE_VM.
Change check_kill_permission() to avoid the credentials check when the sender and the target are from the same thread group.
Also, move "cred = current_cred()" down to avoid calling get_current() twice.
Note: David Howells pointed out we could relax this even more, the CLONE_SIGHAND (without CLONE_THREAD) case probably does not need these checks too.
---
kernel/signal.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_CK_STG +4 -2
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const strstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { -const struct cred *cred =current_cred (), *tcred; +const struct cred *cred, *tcred;struct pid *sid;int error;
@@ -656,8 +656,10 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sigif (error)return error; + cred =current_cred (); tcred =__task_cred (t); - if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + if (!same_thread_group(current, t) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
I concur that there is no real security benefit from checking uids for any CLONE_VM case. But there is also no reason to change the old behavior in this corner for any case but CLONE_THREAD.
Thanks,
Roland
Quoted 2 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Also, move "cred =
current_cred()" down to avoid callingget_current()twice.
I don't see what you mean by this. same_thread_group() doesn't call current_cred(), so why this change?
David
Quoted 8 lines · David Howells
Quoted 2 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Also, move "cred =
current_cred()" down to avoid callingget_current()twice.I don't see what you mean by this.
same_thread_group()doesn't callcurrent_cred(), so why this change?
Yes, but both current_cred() and same_thread_group(current, t) call get_current(), and gcc doesn't cache the result because we call audit_signal_info() in between.
In fact, initially I was going to send the patch below, but then decided to make a more simple change.
Oleg.
kernel/signal.c +23 -19
@@ -642,8 +642,6 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const strstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { -const struct cred *cred =current_cred (), *tcred; -struct pid *sid;int error;if (!valid_signal (sig))
@@ -656,23 +654,29 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sigif (error)return error; - tcred =__task_cred (t); -if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && - !capable (CAP_KILL )) { -switch (sig) { -case SIGCONT : - sid =task_session (t); -/* -* We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The -* task was unhashed, the caller must notice this. -*/ -if (!sid || sid ==task_session (current)) -break ; -default : -return -EPERM ; +if (!same_thread_group (current, t)) { +const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); +const struct cred *tcred =__task_cred (t); +struct pid *sid; + +if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && + !capable (CAP_KILL )) { +switch (sig) { +case SIGCONT : + sid =task_session (t); +/* +* We don't return the error if sid == NULL. +* The task was unhashed, the caller must +* notice this. +*/ +if (!sid || sid ==task_session (current)) +break ; +default : +return -EPERM ; + } } }
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Yes, but both
current_cred()andsame_thread_group(current, t)callget_current(), and gcc doesn't cache the result because we callaudit_signal_info()in between.
Sorry, yes. I was reading get_current() as current_cred() for some reason.
However, you are _still_ calling get_current() twice... So that bit of your changelog isn't really correct.
In fact, get_current() should be __attribute_const__ since it can't change whilst you're looking at it, except within switch_to(), probably in a piece of assembly code, so gcc should be free to cache it as long as it likes.
David
Quoted 11 lines · David Howells
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Yes, but both
current_cred()andsame_thread_group(current, t)callget_current(), and gcc doesn't cache the result because we callaudit_signal_info()in between.Sorry, yes. I was reading
get_current()ascurrent_cred()for some reason.However, you are _still_ calling
get_current()twice... So that bit of your changelog isn't really correct.
If I read kernel/signal.s correctly - no.
Well, yes, get_current() is still called twice inside check_kill_permission(). But this is because we have audit_signal_info()->audit_dummy_context() which uses current too.
But "cred = current_cred()" and same_thread_group(current, t) read gs:current_task only once, so this change really helps (although the optimization is very minor, of course).
Quoted 3 lines
In fact,
get_current()should be__attribute_const__since it can't change whilst you're looking at it, except withinswitch_to(), probably in a piece of assembly code, so gcc should be free to cache it as long as it likes.
Agreed! I thought about this many times.
Oleg.
Quoted 16 lines · On Mon, 17 May 2010 21:54:14 +0200 Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> wrote:
Andrew Tridgell reports that
aio_read(SIGEV_SIGNAL)can fail if the the notification from the helper thread races withsetresuid(), see
http://samba.org/~tridge/junkcode/aio_uid.cThis happens because
check_kill_permission()doesn't allow to send a signal to the task with the differentcred->xids. But there is no any security reason to check ->cred's when the task sends a signal (private or group-wide) to its sub-thread. Whatever we do, any thread can bypass all security checks and send SIGKILL to all threads, or it can block a signal SIG and dokill(gettid(), SIG)to deliver this signal to another sub-thread. Not to mention thatCLONE_THREADimpliesCLONE_VM.Change
check_kill_permission()to avoid the credentials check when the sender and the target are from the same thread group.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, move "cred =
current_cred()" down to avoid callingget_current()twice.Note: David Howells pointed out we could relax this even more, the
CLONE_SIGHAND(withoutCLONE_THREAD) case probably does not need these checks too.
So... which kernel(s) do we think this fix should be merged into?
Quoted 1 line
So... which kernel(s) do we think this fix should be merged into?
I'd say all. The glibc (libpthread) that does set*id across threads has been in use for a while (2.3.4?), probably in distro's using kernels as old or older than any active -stable streams. In the race in question, this kernel bug is breaking valid POSIX application expectations.
Thanks,
Roland