Skip to contentSkip to conversation

SELinux: require open policycap in truncate checks

PATCH In review Eric Paris 2 participants 4 messages Jun 6, 2012 – Jun 7, 2012 SELinux security module

lore
Share & tools
lore

Eric Paris

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 SELinux: require open policycap in truncate checks

We were accidentally checking the open permission even on policies that did not define the open permission policy capbility. We should only check open if the policy explicitly claims to mediate the 'open' permission.

This was reported as a problem in that a machine with old policy which did not define the open policy capbility would boot, but the user was unable to ssh into the machine.

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
index 1e59f47..72df621 100644
@@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
+	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && selinux_policycap_openperm)
 		av |= FILE__OPEN;
 
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 SELinux: define mapping for new capabilities

New capabilities were added but the security list was never cc'd on the patches. I missed the patches and thus SELinux does not have the requisite names to do userspace policy mapping. Add those names.

---
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2 -1
index 72c08b9..d76eb53 100644
@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
 	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
 	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
-	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
+	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
+			   "epollwakeup", NULL } },
 	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
 	{ "tun_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 SELinux: Fix sel_netnode_insert suspicious rcu dereference

In reply to Eric Paris

I reported this a year ago (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/4/20/308).
It's still a problem apparently ...

===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted
-------------------------------
security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750:
#0: (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff812d8f8a>] sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0

stack backtrace:
Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff810cec2d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130
 [<ffffffff812d91d1>] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0
 [<ffffffff812d8e20>] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff812d24a6>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0
 [<ffffffff810cd1dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
 [<ffffffff810cdb55>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff81093841>] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60
 [<ffffffff812c9536>] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20
 [<ffffffff815550ca>] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100
 [<ffffffff816c03d5>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
 [<ffffffff810d392d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff8133b09e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [<ffffffff816c03a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread.

---
 security/selinux/netnode.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/netnode.c +2 -1
index e984d6f..3b66d89 100644
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
 	if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
 		struct sel_netnode *tail;
 		tail = list_entry(
-			rcu_dereference(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev),
+			rcu_dereference_protected(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev,
+						  lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)),
 			struct sel_netnode, list);
 		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
 		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] SELinux: Fix sel_netnode_insert suspicious rcu dereference

Quoted 2 lines · Eric Paris

I reported this a year ago (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/4/20/308).
It's still a problem apparently ...

I sent a patch to fix this back on May 16th ... ?

Quoted 59 lines

===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted
-------------------------------
security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750:
#0: (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff812d8f8a>]

sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0

stack backtrace:
Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff810cec2d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130
 [<ffffffff812d91d1>] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0
 [<ffffffff812d8e20>] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff812d24a6>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0
 [<ffffffff810cd1dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
 [<ffffffff810cdb55>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff81093841>] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60
 [<ffffffff812c9536>] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20
 [<ffffffff815550ca>] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100
 [<ffffffff816c03d5>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
 [<ffffffff810d392d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff8133b09e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [<ffffffff816c03a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread.

---
 security/selinux/netnode.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/netnode.c +2 -2
index e984d6f..3b66d89 100644
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
 if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
 		struct sel_netnode *tail;
 		tail = list_entry(
-			rcu_dereference(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev),
+			rcu_dereference_protected(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev,
+						  lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)),
 			struct sel_netnode, list);
 		list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
 		kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
 
 
--

This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

Signature · 8 lines
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com


--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.