SELinux: require open policycap in truncate checks
PATCH 1/3 SELinux: require open policycap in truncate checks
We were accidentally checking the open permission even on policies that did not define the open permission policy capbility. We should only check open if the policy explicitly claims to mediate the 'open' permission.
This was reported as a problem in that a machine with old policy which did not define the open policy capbility would boot, but the user was unable to ssh into the machine.
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))return dentry_has_perm (cred, dentry,FILE__SETATTR ); -if (ia_valid &ATTR_SIZE ) +if ((ia_valid &ATTR_SIZE ) && selinux_policycap_openperm) av |=FILE__OPEN ;return dentry_has_perm (cred, dentry, av);
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PATCH 2/3 SELinux: define mapping for new capabilities
New capabilities were added but the security list was never cc'd on the patches. I missed the patches and thus SELinux does not have the requisite names to do userspace policy mapping. Add those names.
--- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } }, { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, - { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } }, + { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", + "epollwakeup", NULL } }, { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
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PATCH 3/3 SELinux: Fix sel_netnode_insert suspicious rcu dereference
In reply to Eric ParisI reported this a year ago (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/4/20/308).
It's still a problem apparently ...
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted
-------------------------------security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750:
#0: (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff812d8f8a>] sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0
stack backtrace: Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810cec2d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [<ffffffff812d91d1>] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0 [<ffffffff812d8e20>] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0 [<ffffffff812d24a6>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0 [<ffffffff810cd1dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff810cdb55>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81093841>] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60 [<ffffffff812c9536>] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815550ca>] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100 [<ffffffff816c03d5>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810d392d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8133b09e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff816c03a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread.
--- security/selinux/netnode.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/netnode.c +2 -1
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size ==SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT ) {struct sel_netnode *tail; tail =list_entry ( -rcu_dereference (sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev), +rcu_dereference_protected (sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev, +lockdep_is_held (&sel_netnode_lock)), struct sel_netnode, list);list_del_rcu (&tail->list);kfree_rcu (tail, rcu);
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Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] SELinux: Fix sel_netnode_insert suspicious rcu dereference
Quoted 2 lines · Eric Paris
I reported this a year ago (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/4/20/308).
It's still a problem apparently ...
I sent a patch to fix this back on May 16th ... ?
Quoted 59 lines
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted
-------------------------------security/selinux/netnode.c:178suspiciousrcu_dereference_check()usage!other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active= 1,debug_locks= 0
1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750:
#0: (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff812d8f8a>]sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0 stack backtrace: Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810cec2d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [<ffffffff812d91d1>] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0 [<ffffffff812d8e20>] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0 [<ffffffff812d24a6>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0 [<ffffffff810cd1dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff810cdb55>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81093841>] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60 [<ffffffff812c9536>] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815550ca>] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100 [<ffffffff816c03d5>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810d392d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8133b09e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff816c03a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1bThis patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread.
Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/netnode.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)security/selinux/netnode.c +2
-2@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size ==SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT ) {struct sel_netnode *tail; tail =list_entry ( -rcu_dereference (sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev), +rcu_dereference_protected (sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev, +lockdep_is_held (&sel_netnode_lock)), struct sel_netnode, list);list_del_rcu (&tail->list);kfree_rcu (tail, rcu); --This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.