kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec
Subsystems (5)
PATCH v2 1/1 kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set.
---
v2:
- updated sysctl documentation; akpm
--- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 13 ++++++++++++- include/linux/kexec.h | 1 + kernel/kexec.c | 3 ++- kernel/sysctl.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +12 -1
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - domainname - hostname - hotplug +- kexec_disabled - kptr_restrict - kstack_depth_to_print [ X86 only ] - l2cr [ PPC only ]
@@ -287,6 +288,16 @@ Default value is "/sbin/hotplug". ============================================================== +kexec_disabled: + +A toggle indicating if the kexec_load syscall has been disabled. This +value defaults to 0 (false: kexec_load enabled), but can be set to 1 +(true: kexec_load disabled). Once true, kexec can no longer be used, and +the toggle cannot be set back to false. Generally used together with the +"modules_disabled" sysctl. + +============================================================== + kptr_restrict: This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
@@ -331,7 +342,7 @@ A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded in an otherwise modular kernel. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, modules can be neither loaded nor unloaded, and the toggle cannot be set back -to false. +to false. Generally used with the "kexec_disabled" toggle. ==============================================================
include/linux/kexec.h +1 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ unsigned long paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void);extern struct kimage *kexec_image;extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; +extern int kexec_disabled;#ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page#define kexec_flush_icache_page (page)
kernel/kexec.c +2 -1
@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ static int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image,*/ struct kimage *kexec_image;struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; +int kexec_disabled;static DEFINE_MUTEX (kexec_mutex);
@@ -939,7 +940,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,int result;/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_BOOT )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_BOOT ) || kexec_disabled)return -EPERM ;/*
kernel/sysctl.c +13 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/sched/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/kexec.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -614,6 +615,18 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, },#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC + { + .procname = "kexec_disabled", + .data = &kexec_disabled, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + /* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */ + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &one, + .extra2 = &one, + }, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES { .procname = "modprobe",
Signature · 11 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
So the logic is to load a crashkernel and then lock down the machine before services, networking etc. are enabled?
-hpa
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Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>So the logic is to load a crashkernel and then lock down the machine before services, networking etc. are enabled?
Right, or to just turn it off at boot time if kexec will not be used at all.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>So the logic is to load a crashkernel and then lock down the machine before services, networking etc. are enabled?
Right, or to just turn it off at boot time if kexec will not be used at all.
kdump kernel is loaded with the help of kdump service. Different distro's might have different dependencies for that serivce. But recently in fedora we wait network to come up before starting that service. (So that nfs targets can be mounted and checked for valid dump destinations).
IOW, crash kernel is loaded quite late in the game (quite a few services have run and possibly networking is up too). To me, practically one will disable kdump also if you change state of this knob early.
Thanks
Vivek
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Quoted 18 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>So the logic is to load a crashkernel and then lock down the machine before services, networking etc. are enabled?
Right, or to just turn it off at boot time if kexec will not be used at all.
Quoted 8 lines
kdump kernel is loaded with the help of kdump service. Different distro's might have different dependencies for that serivce. But recently in fedora we wait network to come up before starting that service. (So that nfs targets can be mounted and checked for valid dump destinations).
IOW, crash kernel is loaded quite late in the game (quite a few services have run and possibly networking is up too). To me, practically one will disable kdump also if you change state of this knob early.
Of course it also removes the possibility of re-loading crash kernel after doing some changes to /etc/kdump.conf (like dump destination or kernel command line).
I am wondering if it is sufficient to disable kexec jump back functionality only while retaining kexec and kdump. That seems to be easiest way to change kernel's data structures.
Thanks
Vivek
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Of course it isn't.
Quoted 41 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 3 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 2 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to
build with
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things theywant to do
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system
with such
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like
module loading
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user
to modify
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
kernel memory even when
CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>So the logic is to load a crashkernel and then lock down the
machine
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
before services, networking etc. are enabled?
Right, or to just turn it off at boot time if kexec will not be used
at all.
kdump kernel is loaded with the help of kdump service. Different distro's
might have different dependencies for that serivce. But recently in fedora
we wait network to come up before starting that service. (So that nfs targets can be mounted and checked for valid dump destinations).IOW, crash kernel is loaded quite late in the game (quite a few services
have run and possibly networking is up too). To me, practically one will
disable kdump also if you change state of this knob early.Thanks
Vivek
Signature · 6 lines
Sent from my mobile phone. Please pardon brevity and lack of formatting. _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 1 line · H. Peter Anvin
Of course it isn't.
I am not sure what are you trying to say. This is too brief.
Thanks
Vivek
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 33 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 3 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 2 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to
build with
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things theywant to do
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system
with such
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like
module loading
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user
to modify
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
kernel memory even when
CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>So the logic is to load a crashkernel and then lock down the
machine
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
before services, networking etc. are enabled?
Right, or to just turn it off at boot time if kexec will not be used
at all.
kdump kernel is loaded with the help of kdump service. Different distro's
might have different dependencies for that serivce. But recently in fedora
we wait network to come up before starting that service. (So that nfs targets can be mounted and checked for valid dump destinations).
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
IOW, crash kernel is loaded quite late in the game (quite a few services
have run and possibly networking is up too). To me, practically one will
disable kdump also if you change state of this knob early.Thanks
VivekSignature · 1 line
Sent from my mobile phone. Please pardon brevity and lack of formatting.
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 8 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 1 line · H. Peter Anvin
Of course it isn't.
I am not sure what are you trying to say. This is too brief.
Thanks
Vivek
Of course it is not sufficient. Once you can get arbitrary code into kernel space (CPL 0) you can do anything, and "disabling jump back" is just a speed bump.
-hpa
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Quoted 6 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 5 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 1 line · H. Peter Anvin
Of course it isn't.
I am not sure what are you trying to say. This is too brief.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks
VivekOf course it is not sufficient. Once you can get arbitrary code into kernel space (CPL 0) you can do anything, and "disabling jump back" is just a speed bump.
Agreed that disabling jump back is only a speed bump.
Kees, so how would be use this knob?
- If I put it in some init script, then root will permission to modify and remove it.
- Can one specify sysctl parameters on command line? If yes, then one can disable this using kernel command line and in that case kdump will be disabled too.
Thanks
Vivek
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Quoted 15 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 6 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 5 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 1 line · H. Peter Anvin
Of course it isn't.
I am not sure what are you trying to say. This is too brief.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks
VivekOf course it is not sufficient. Once you can get arbitrary code into kernel space (CPL 0) you can do anything, and "disabling jump back" is just a speed bump.
Quoted 6 lines
Agreed that disabling jump back is only a speed bump.
Kees, so how would be use this knob?
- If I put it in some init script, then root will permission to modify and remove it.
Correct. Same applies to changing the kernel itself, yes. However, all those options require a reboot, and unexpected system reboots should signal a significant problem to a system owner. :) This is a big step better than a silent kernel root kit getting installed.
Quoted 3 lines
- Can one specify sysctl parameters on command line? If yes, then one can disable this using kernel command line and in that case kdump will be disabled too.
If they can be set on the command line, I'd like to know about it. That would let me flip the bit even earlier, since I don't use kexec at all (and don't need to wait until boot up is done).
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
So let me get this straight. You object to what happens in sys_reboot so you patch sys_kexec_load?
You give someone the privilege to boot whatever they want and yet you don't want to support them booting whatever they want?
I'm sorry my brain is hurting trying to understand the logic of this patch.
Eric
Quoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.
Quoted 2 lines
So let me get this straight. You object to what happens in
sys_rebootso you patchsys_kexec_load?
Yes; it's the entry point for loading the image used for crashes and LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC.
Quoted 5 lines
You give someone the privilege to boot whatever they want and yet you don't want to support them booting whatever they want?
I'm sorry my brain is hurting trying to understand the logic of this patch.
I'm not trying to claim this fixes all attack vectors from a root user. That is exceedingly hard. :) However, kexec gives the root user a trivial (and undetectable) way to modify the running kernel. Providing an option to block sys_kexec_load for systems that will never use it (or will use it once at startup) is valuable in several situations. There's no reason to make an attacker's job easier, and this doesn't get in any one else's way.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 24 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.Quoted 2 lines
So let me get this straight. You object to what happens in
sys_rebootso you patchsys_kexec_load?Yes; it's the entry point for loading the image used for crashes and
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC.Quoted 5 lines
You give someone the privilege to boot whatever they want and yet you don't want to support them booting whatever they want?
I'm sorry my brain is hurting trying to understand the logic of this patch.
Quoted 7 lines
I'm not trying to claim this fixes all attack vectors from a root user. That is exceedingly hard. :) However, kexec gives the root user a trivial (and undetectable) way to modify the running kernel. Providing an option to block
sys_kexec_loadfor systems that will never use it (or will use it once at startup) is valuable in several situations. There's no reason to make an attacker's job easier, and this doesn't get in any one else's way.
I am simply trying to point out your patch is incomplete and silly as presented.
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC should be disabled if you are calling the sysctl kexec_disable. If you want to it to be kexec_load_disable please call it that. A kexec_load_disable is a different thing than a kexec_disable.
A kexec_disable would block both sys_kexec_load and sys_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC) and would remove any staged kexec images. Allowing you to stop considering kexec past that point from a security analysis perspective. That is what it sounds like you want.
What I am asking for is an problem description and an implementation that are in sync, and a problem description that people can look at and say was this a complete implementation.
Right now I can not tell what was intended so I can not truly tell if the patch is correct. Code with that property does not serve anyone any good, especially as the kernel evolves.
So please decide if you want kexec_disable or kexec_load_disable, or if you want something a little more nuanced.
Right now I think a full and complete kexec_disable makes sense. I probably won't use it but I think it makes sense. Your patch implementiong kexec_load_disable seems to be a half solution that tries to please everyone and does not serve anyone well. So I don't see the point.
Eric
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 24 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.Quoted 2 lines
So let me get this straight. You object to what happens in
sys_rebootso you patchsys_kexec_load?Yes; it's the entry point for loading the image used for crashes and
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC.Quoted 5 lines
You give someone the privilege to boot whatever they want and yet you don't want to support them booting whatever they want?
I'm sorry my brain is hurting trying to understand the logic of this patch.
Quoted 7 lines
I'm not trying to claim this fixes all attack vectors from a root user. That is exceedingly hard. :) However, kexec gives the root user a trivial (and undetectable) way to modify the running kernel. Providing an option to block
sys_kexec_loadfor systems that will never use it (or will use it once at startup) is valuable in several situations. There's no reason to make an attacker's job easier, and this doesn't get in any one else's way.I am simply trying to point out your patch is incomplete and silly as presented.
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXECshould be disabled if you are calling the sysctlkexec_disable. If you want to it to bekexec_load_disableplease call it that. Akexec_load_disableis a different thing than akexec_disable.A
kexec_disablewould block bothsys_kexec_loadandsys_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC)and would remove any staged kexec images. Allowing you to stop considering kexec past that point from a security analysis perspective. That is what it sounds like you want.What I am asking for is an problem description and an implementation that are in sync, and a problem description that people can look at and say was this a complete implementation.
Right now I can not tell what was intended so I can not truly tell if the patch is correct. Code with that property does not serve anyone any good, especially as the kernel evolves.
Quoted 8 lines
So please decide if you want
kexec_disableorkexec_load_disable, or if you want something a little more nuanced.Right now I think a full and complete
kexec_disablemakes sense. I probably won't use it but I think it makes sense. Your patch implementiongkexec_load_disableseems to be a half solution that tries to please everyone and does not serve anyone well. So I don't see the point.
Sure, it seems reasonable to clarify it's purpose. I would like block _changes_ to the kexec image. In the case of systems not using kexec, this freezes it to "no kexec image", for those with a crash kernel, it freezes it to just that image, and makes sure it can't change until reboot. Blocking LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC doesn't make sense in the latter sense, so it seems like changing the sysctl to "kexec_load_disable" is the sensible direction. I can send a v3 that changes the name and clarifies the purpose and potential uses.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 66 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 24 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with
CONFIG_KEXECto allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even whenCONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEMandmodules_disabledare set.Quoted 2 lines
So let me get this straight. You object to what happens in
sys_rebootso you patchsys_kexec_load?Yes; it's the entry point for loading the image used for crashes and
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC.Quoted 5 lines
You give someone the privilege to boot whatever they want and yet you don't want to support them booting whatever they want?
I'm sorry my brain is hurting trying to understand the logic of this patch.
Quoted 7 lines
I'm not trying to claim this fixes all attack vectors from a root user. That is exceedingly hard. :) However, kexec gives the root user a trivial (and undetectable) way to modify the running kernel. Providing an option to block
sys_kexec_loadfor systems that will never use it (or will use it once at startup) is valuable in several situations. There's no reason to make an attacker's job easier, and this doesn't get in any one else's way.I am simply trying to point out your patch is incomplete and silly as presented.
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXECshould be disabled if you are calling the sysctlkexec_disable. If you want to it to bekexec_load_disableplease call it that. Akexec_load_disableis a different thing than akexec_disable.A
kexec_disablewould block bothsys_kexec_loadandsys_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC)and would remove any staged kexec images. Allowing you to stop considering kexec past that point from a security analysis perspective. That is what it sounds like you want.What I am asking for is an problem description and an implementation that are in sync, and a problem description that people can look at and say was this a complete implementation.
Right now I can not tell what was intended so I can not truly tell if the patch is correct. Code with that property does not serve anyone any good, especially as the kernel evolves.
Quoted 8 lines
So please decide if you want
kexec_disableorkexec_load_disable, or if you want something a little more nuanced.Right now I think a full and complete
kexec_disablemakes sense. I probably won't use it but I think it makes sense. Your patch implementiongkexec_load_disableseems to be a half solution that tries to please everyone and does not serve anyone well. So I don't see the point.
Quoted 8 lines
Sure, it seems reasonable to clarify it's purpose. I would like block _changes_ to the kexec image. In the case of systems not using kexec, this freezes it to "no kexec image", for those with a crash kernel, it freezes it to just that image, and makes sure it can't change until reboot. Blocking
LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXECdoesn't make sense in the latter sense, so it seems like changing the sysctl to "kexec_load_disable" is the sensible direction. I can send a v3 that changes the name and clarifies the purpose and potential uses.
The name change is definitely needed.
My concern from the conversation. Is there anyone we actually expect to use the functionality of loading an image and then disabling kexec_load?
Quoted 1 line
From the earlier discussion it appeared that no one could actually
figure out how to practically use the functionality of loading a kexec on panic image and then disabling kexec. Not to mention the weirdness caused by cpu/memory hotplug which trigger a need to reload the kexec on panic kernel.
If there is not a clear use case for limiting ourselves to just the loaded kexec images my preference would be to make it a big hammer that disabled kexec_load and LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC, as that is easier to reason about.
Eric