pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read
PATCH 1/1 pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read
Quoting the RHEL advisory:
Quoted 5 lines
It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.
References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html
---
fs/pipe.c +4 -1
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struvoid *addr;size_t chars = buf->len, remaining;int error, atomic; +int offset;if (chars > total_len) chars = total_len;
@@ -408,9 +409,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write (iov, chars); remaining = chars; + offset = buf->offset; redo: addr = ops->map (pipe, buf, atomic); - error =pipe_iov_copy_to_user (iov, addr, &buf->offset, + error =pipe_iov_copy_to_user (iov, addr, &offset, &remaining, atomic); ops->unmap (pipe, buf, addr);if (unlikely (error)) {
@@ -426,6 +428,7 @@ redo:break ; } ret += chars; + buf->offset += chars; buf->len -= chars;/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */
Willy Tarreau
AppliedQuoted 8 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoting the RHEL advisory:
Quoted 5 lines
It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
Quoted 4 lines
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give
pipe_iov_copy_to_user()a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.
Queued for last 2.6.32, thanks Ben!
Willy
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Quoted 8 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoting the RHEL advisory:
Quoted 5 lines
It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
Quoted 7 lines
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give
pipe_iov_copy_to_user()a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html
Signed-off-by Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Thanks, now applied to 3.12.
Quoted 15 lines
---
a/fs/pipe.c+++b/fs/pipe.c@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru void *addr;size_tchars =buf->len, remaining; int error, atomic; + int offset;if (chars >
total_len) chars =total_len; @@ -408,9 +409,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struatomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars); remaining = chars;
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ offset = buf->offset; redo: addr = ops->map(pipe, buf,atomic); - error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr,
&buf->offset, + error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr,
&offset, &remaining, atomic);ops->unmap(pipe, buf, addr); if (unlikely(error)) { @@ -426,6 +428,7 @@ redo: break; } ret +=
chars; +buf->offset+= chars;buf->len-= chars;
Quoted 2 lines
/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */
- --
js
suse labs
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