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pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read

PATCH Applied Ben Hutchings 3 participants 3 messages Feb 13, 2016 – Feb 15, 2016 Stable branch

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PATCH 1/1 pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read

Quoting the RHEL advisory:

Quoted 5 lines

It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)

The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.

References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html

---

fs/pipe.c +4 -1
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru
 			void *addr;
 			size_t chars = buf->len, remaining;
 			int error, atomic;
+			int offset;
 
 			if (chars > total_len)
 				chars = total_len;
@@ -408,9 +409,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru
 
 			atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars);
 			remaining = chars;
+			offset = buf->offset;
 redo:
 			addr = ops->map(pipe, buf, atomic);
-			error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &buf->offset,
+			error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &offset,
 						      &remaining, atomic);
 			ops->unmap(pipe, buf, addr);
 			if (unlikely(error)) {
@@ -426,6 +428,7 @@ redo:
 				break;
 			}
 			ret += chars;
+			buf->offset += chars;
 			buf->len -= chars;
 
 			/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */
#1 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Ben Hutchings

Quoting the RHEL advisory:

Quoted 5 lines

It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)

Quoted 4 lines

The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.

Queued for last 2.6.32, thanks Ben!
Willy

#2 lore raw
In reply to Ben Hutchings

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Quoted 8 lines · Ben Hutchings

Quoting the RHEL advisory:

Quoted 5 lines

It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)

Quoted 7 lines

The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.

References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html

Thanks, now applied to 3.12.

Quoted 15 lines

--- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c @@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru void *addr; size_t chars =
buf->len, remaining; int error, atomic; + int offset;

if (chars > total_len) chars = total_len; @@ -408,9 +409,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru

atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars); remaining = chars;

(quoted diff) +1 -0
+			offset = buf->offset; redo: addr = ops->map(pipe, buf,

atomic); - error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr,
&buf->offset, + error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr,
&offset, &remaining, atomic); ops->unmap(pipe, buf, addr); if (unlikely(error)) { @@ -426,6 +428,7 @@ redo: break; } ret +=
chars; + buf->offset += chars; buf->len -= chars;

Quoted 2 lines

/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */

- --
js
suse labs
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