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fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags

PATCH In review Aleksa Sarai 2 participants 2 messages Dec 21, 2016 – Dec 22, 2016

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags

If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink):

[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link

      -> proc_fd_access_allowed
         -> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);

Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window.

This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).

---
 fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +8 -2
index 4e497b9ee71e..b0a98ef03253 100644
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * current->executable is only used by the procfs.  This allows a dispatch
  * table to check for several different types  of binary formats.  We keep
  * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
- * formats. 
+ * formats.
  */
 
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1266,6 +1266,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	flush_thread();
 	current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
 
+	/*
+	 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
+	 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
+	 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
+	 * undergoing exec(2).
+	 */
+	do_close_on_exec(current->files);
 	return 0;
 
 out:
@@ -1315,7 +1322,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	   group */
 	current->self_exec_id++;
 	flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
-	do_close_on_exec(current->files);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Aleksa Sarai

If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink):

[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link

      -> proc_fd_access_allowed
         -> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);

Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window.

Quoted 5 lines

This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).

That seems reasonable. I was thinking cred_guard_mutex should handle this case, but it obviously won't because only ptrace_attach takes that. Sigh with enough cleanups the code might even become comprehensible and correct in there.

I have dropped this onto my for-testing branch for now (so I don't forget it) and after the chaos of the merge window ends I will forward this along.

Eric

Quoted 42 lines
---
 fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +8 -2
index 4e497b9ee71e..b0a98ef03253 100644
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * current->executable is only used by the procfs.  This allows a dispatch
  * table to check for several different types  of binary formats.  We keep
  * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
- * formats. 
+ * formats.
  */
 
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1266,6 +1266,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	flush_thread();
 	current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
 
+	/*
+	 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
+	 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
+	 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
+	 * undergoing exec(2).
+	 */
+	do_close_on_exec(current->files);
 	return 0;
 
 out:
@@ -1315,7 +1322,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	   group */
 	current->self_exec_id++;
 	flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
-	do_close_on_exec(current->files);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);