fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
--- fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +8 -2
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary -* formats. +* formats. */ #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1266,6 +1266,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)flush_thread (); current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; +/* +* We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is +* dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace +* trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process +* undergoing exec(2). +*/ +do_close_on_exec (current->files);return 0 ; out:
@@ -1315,7 +1322,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)group */ current->self_exec_id++;flush_signal_handlers (current,0 ); -do_close_on_exec (current->files); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (setup_new_exec);
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Quoted 21 lines · Aleksa Sarai
If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.The race in question is after
set_dumpablehas been (forget_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink):[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
->proc_pid_get_link-> proc_fd_access_allowed -> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because
do_close_on_exechas not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window.
Quoted 5 lines
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since
PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLEdoesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
That seems reasonable. I was thinking cred_guard_mutex should handle this case, but it obviously won't because only ptrace_attach takes that. Sigh with enough cleanups the code might even become comprehensible and correct in there.
I have dropped this onto my for-testing branch for now (so I don't forget it) and after the chaos of the merge window ends I will forward this along.
Eric
Quoted 42 lines
Cc <[email protected]> # v3.2+Reported-by Michael Crosby <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>--- fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/exec.c +8
-2@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary -* formats. +* formats. */ #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -1266,6 +1266,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)flush_thread (); current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; +/* +* We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is +* dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace +* trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process +* undergoing exec(2). +*/ +do_close_on_exec (current->files);return 0 ; out:@@ -1315,7 +1322,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)group */ current->self_exec_id++;flush_signal_handlers (current,0 ); -do_close_on_exec (current->files); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (setup_new_exec);