Avoid well-known port numbers
Subsystems (2)
cover Avoid well-known port numbers
Following up on https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=320 .
Here's a possible way to get libtirpc to avoid well-known port numbers when a caller requests a dynamically-assigned port. This compiles without complaint, but I haven't tested it yet. I'm interested in comments on the approach.
I understand that Fedora 28 is closing soon. It would be nice to see a fix for this issue in libtirpc for that release.
---
Chuck Lever (3):
Add an internal helper for binding to a dynamically-assigned port Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3) Avoid choosing reserved ports in clnt_tli_create(3)
src/Makefile.am | 5 +- src/binddynport.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/clnt_generic.c | 4 +- src/rpc_soc.c | 7 ++- src/svc_generic.c | 12 ++--- 5 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/binddynport.c
--
Chuck Lever
RFC PATCH 1/3 Add an internal helper for binding to a dynamically-assigned port
Create a helper function akin to bindresvport(3) that instead binds to a dynamically assigned port. It uses the rules in RFC 6335 Section 6 to avoid all IANA-assigned service port numbers, even when the caller has the CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege.
This is intended to remain an internal helper for the time being, so this commit provides no header declaration.
All internal bindresvport(3) call sites manufacture an INADDR_ANY- type address to pass to bind(2), so the helper handles that as well, to avoid code duplication. This means that callers do not need to pass in a sockaddr. Only an open socket is required.
--- src/Makefile.am | 5 +- src/binddynport.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/binddynport.c
src/Makefile.am +3 -2
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ lib_LTLIBRARIES = libtirpc.la libtirpc_la_LDFLAGS = @LDFLAG_NOUNDEFINED@ -no-undefined -lpthread libtirpc_la_LDFLAGS += -version-info @LT_VERSION_INFO@ -libtirpc_la_SOURCES = auth_none.c auth_unix.c authunix_prot.c bindresvport.c clnt_bcast.c \ - clnt_dg.c clnt_generic.c clnt_perror.c clnt_raw.c clnt_simple.c \ +libtirpc_la_SOURCES = auth_none.c auth_unix.c authunix_prot.c \ + binddynport.c bindresvport.c \ + clnt_bcast.c clnt_dg.c clnt_generic.c clnt_perror.c clnt_raw.c clnt_simple.c \ clnt_vc.c rpc_dtablesize.c getnetconfig.c getnetpath.c getrpcent.c \ getrpcport.c mt_misc.c pmap_clnt.c pmap_getmaps.c pmap_getport.c \ pmap_prot.c pmap_prot2.c pmap_rmt.c rpc_prot.c rpc_commondata.c \
src/binddynport.c new file +132 -0
132 lines not on this page · raw message
RFC PATCH 2/3 Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3)
In reply to Chuck LeverCallers of svc_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the service listener being created. svc_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.
This approach becomes a problem whenever bindresvport(3) happens to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely prevents the IANA-assigned well-known service from starting.
It seems that a reserved port is completely unnecessary for listener sockets. It does not confer any extra privilege or functionality to the listener socket, nor do remote clients infer any extra privilege from a listener on a port number lower than 1024.
Therefore, remove the bindresvport step to prevent svc_tli_create(3) from choosing a port number that interferes with well-known services assigned to a privileged port.
svc_tli_create(3) will now never assign a privileged port dynamically. If needed, a caller may still bind to a dynamically- assigned reserved port by invoking bindresvport(3) directly and passing the already-bound file descriptor to svc_tli_create(3).
But that should be a special case. It is no longer the default behavior.
--- src/rpc_soc.c | 7 +++++-- src/svc_generic.c | 12 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
src/rpc_soc.c +5 -2
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@extern mutex_t rpcsoc_lock; +extern int __binddynport (int fd); +static CLIENT *clnt_com_create (struct sockaddr_in *,rpcprog_t ,rpcvers_t ,int *,u_int ,u_int ,char *,int );static SVCXPRT *svc_com_create (int ,u_int ,u_int ,char *);
@@ -145,7 +147,8 @@ clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, recvsz, tp, flags) bindaddr.maxlen = bindaddr.len =sizeof (struct sockaddr_in ); bindaddr.buf = raddr; -bindresvport (fd,NULL ); +if (__binddynport (fd) ==-1 ) + goto err; cl =clnt_tli_create (fd, nconf, &bindaddr, prog, vers, sendsz, recvsz);if (cl) {
@@ -332,7 +335,7 @@ svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid)memset (&sin,0 ,sizeof sin); sin.sin_family =AF_INET ; -bindresvport (fd, &sin); +bind (fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&sin,sizeof sin);listen (fd,SOMAXCONN ); svc =svc_tli_create (fd, nconf,NULL , sendsize, recvsize); (void )freenetconfigent (nconf);
src/svc_generic.c +4 -8
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#include <rpc/svc.h> extern int __svc_vc_setflag (SVCXPRT *,int ); +extern int __binddynport (int fd);/* * The highest level interface for server creation.
@@ -220,15 +221,10 @@ svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)*/ if (madefd || !__rpc_sockisbound (fd)) {if (bindaddr ==NULL ) { -if (bindresvport (fd,NULL ) <0 ) { -memset (&ss,0 ,sizeof ss); - ss.ss_family = si.si_af; -if (bind (fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&ss, - (socklen_t )si.si_alen) <0 ) { -warnx ( +if (__binddynport (fd) ==-1 ) { +warnx ("svc_tli_create: could not bind to anonymous port" ); - goto freedata; - } + goto freedata; }listen (fd,SOMAXCONN ); }else {
Re: [PATCH RFC 2/3] Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3)
Quoted 3 lines
On Feb 15, 2018, at 3:22 PM, Chuck Lever <[email protected]> =
Quoted 47 lines · wrote:
=20
Callers ofsvc_tli_create(3)can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the service listener being created.svc_tli_create(3)tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller hasCAP_NET_ADMIN_BINDprivilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.
=20
This approach becomes a problem whenever bindresvport(3) happens to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely prevents the IANA-assigned well-known service from starting.
=20
It seems that a reserved port is completely unnecessary for listener sockets. It does not confer any extra privilege or functionality to the listener socket, nor do remote clients infer any extra privilege from a listener on a port number lower than 1024.
=20
Therefore, remove the bindresvport step to preventsvc_tli_create(3)from choosing a port number that interferes with well-known services assigned to a privileged port.
=20svc_tli_create(3)will now never assign a privileged port dynamically. If needed, a caller may still bind to a dynamically- assigned reserved port by invoking bindresvport(3) directly and passing the already-bound file descriptor tosvc_tli_create(3). =20
But that should be a special case. It is no longer the default behavior.
=20Signed-off-by Chuck Lever <[email protected]>---
src/rpc_soc.c| 7 +++++--src/svc_generic.c| 12 ++++--------2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)=20
src/rpc_soc.c +0
-0@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@=20
externmutex_trpcsoc_lock;
=20src/rpc_soc.c +2
-0+extern int __binddynport (int fd); +
Quoted 1 line
static CLIENT *clnt_com_create(struct
sockaddr_in*,rpcprog_t, =
rpcvers_t,
src/rpc_soc.c clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, =
Quoted 3 lines
int *, u_int, u_int, char *, int);static SVCXPRT *svc_com_create(int,
u_int,u_int, char *);src/rpc_soc.c +0
-0@@ -145,7 +147,8 @@ clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, =
recvsz, tp, flags)
src/rpc_soc.c clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, = · line 147
Quoted 1 line
src/rpc_soc.c +0
-0bindaddr.maxlen =3D bindaddr.len =3D sizeof (struct =
sockaddr_in);
src/rpc_soc.c clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, recvsz, tp, flags) · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
src/rpc_soc.c +0
-0bindaddr.buf =3D raddr;=20
src/rpc_soc.c +2
-1-bindresvport (fd,NULL ); + if (__binddynport(fd) =3D=3D -1) + goto err;
This hunk belongs in the clnt_tli_create(3) patch.
src/rpc_soc.c svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid) · line 338
Quoted 9 lines
cl =3D clnt_tli_create(fd, nconf, &bindaddr, prog, vers, sendsz, recvsz); if (cl) {src/rpc_soc.c +0
-0@@ -332,7 +335,7 @@ svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid)=20
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin); sin.sin_family =3D AF_INET;src/rpc_soc.c +1
-1-bindresvport (fd, &sin); +bind (fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&sin,sizeof sin);
This allows dynamic allocation of a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND. A better choice might be to just pass the fd to svc_tli_create and let it do the bind if needed.
I'll be sending along a "v2" RFC series at some point.
src/svc_generic.c svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, =
Quoted 16 lines
listen(fd, SOMAXCONN); svc =3D svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, NULL, sendsize, recvsize); (void) freenetconfigent(nconf);src/svc_generic.c +0
-0@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#include <rpc/svc.h> =20
extern int__svc_vc_setflag(SVCXPRT *, int); +extern int__binddynport(int fd);
=20
/*
* The highest level interface for server creation.src/svc_generic.c +0
-0@@ -220,15 +221,10 @@ svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, =
recvsz)
src/svc_generic.c svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)
Quoted 7 lines
src/svc_generic.c +0
-4*/ if (madefd || !__rpc_sockisbound (fd)) { if (bindaddr =3D=3D NULL) { -if (bindresvport (fd,NULL ) <0 ) { -memset (&ss,0 ,sizeof ss); - ss.ss_family =3D si.si_af; - if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void =
*)&ss,
src/svc_generic.c svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)
Quoted 5 lines
src/svc_generic.c +2
-2- (socklen_t)si.si_alen) < 0) { - warnx( + if (__binddynport(fd) =3D=3D -1) { + warnx( "svc_tli_create: could not bind to anonymous =
port");
Quoted 9 lines
src/svc_generic.c +1
-2- goto freedata; - } + goto freedata; }listen (fd,SOMAXCONN ); }else {=20
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Quoted 2 lines
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--
Chuck Lever
RFC PATCH 3/3 Avoid choosing reserved ports in clnt_tli_create(3)
In reply to Chuck LeverCallers of clnt_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the client socket being created. clnt_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.
This approach becomes a problem whenever bindresvport(3) happens to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely prevents the IANA-assigned well-known service from starting.
When using the AUTH_SYS authentication flavor, RPC services can use the remote client's port number to determine whether the client is privileged, and thus the UID and GID numbers in the RPC are trustworthy. However, it's pretty easy for a man-in-the-middle to replace these while the RPC is in flight anyway. The port number provides no actual security.
Therefore, remove the bindresvport step to prevent svc_tli_create(3) from choosing a port number that interferes with well-known services assigned to a privileged port.
clnt_tli_create(3) will now never assign a privileged port dynamically. If needed, a caller may still bind to a dynamically- assigned reserved port by invoking bindresvport(3) directly and passing the already-bound file descriptor to clnt_tli_create(3).
But that should be a special case. It is no longer the default behavior.
--- src/clnt_generic.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/clnt_generic.c +3 -1
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@extern bool_t __rpc_is_local_host (const char *);int __rpc_raise_fd (int ); +extern int __binddynport (int fd);#ifndef NETIDLEN #define NETIDLEN 32
@@ -340,7 +341,8 @@ clnt_tli_create(int fd, const struct netconfig *nconf, servtype = nconf->nc_semantics;if (!__rpc_fd2sockinfo (fd, &si)) goto err; -bindresvport (fd,NULL ); +if (__binddynport (fd) ==-1 ) + goto err; }else {if (!__rpc_fd2sockinfo (fd, &si)) goto err;