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Avoid well-known port numbers

RFC PATCH Superseded Chuck Lever 1 participant 5 messages Feb 15, 2018

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v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

cover Avoid well-known port numbers

Following up on https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=320 .

Here's a possible way to get libtirpc to avoid well-known port numbers when a caller requests a dynamically-assigned port. This compiles without complaint, but I haven't tested it yet. I'm interested in comments on the approach.

I understand that Fedora 28 is closing soon. It would be nice to see a fix for this issue in libtirpc for that release.

---

Chuck Lever (3):
Add an internal helper for binding to a dynamically-assigned port Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3) Avoid choosing reserved ports in clnt_tli_create(3)

 src/Makefile.am    |    5 +-
 src/binddynport.c  |  132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/clnt_generic.c |    4 +-
 src/rpc_soc.c      |    7 ++-
 src/svc_generic.c  |   12 ++---
 5 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/binddynport.c

--
Chuck Lever

#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/3 Add an internal helper for binding to a dynamically-assigned port

Create a helper function akin to bindresvport(3) that instead binds to a dynamically assigned port. It uses the rules in RFC 6335 Section 6 to avoid all IANA-assigned service port numbers, even when the caller has the CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege.

This is intended to remain an internal helper for the time being, so this commit provides no header declaration.

All internal bindresvport(3) call sites manufacture an INADDR_ANY- type address to pass to bind(2), so the helper handles that as well, to avoid code duplication. This means that callers do not need to pass in a sockaddr. Only an open socket is required.

---
 src/Makefile.am   |    5 +-
 src/binddynport.c |  132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/binddynport.c
src/Makefile.am +3 -2
index fba2aa4..932414d 100644
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ lib_LTLIBRARIES = libtirpc.la
 libtirpc_la_LDFLAGS = @LDFLAG_NOUNDEFINED@ -no-undefined -lpthread
 libtirpc_la_LDFLAGS += -version-info @LT_VERSION_INFO@
 
-libtirpc_la_SOURCES = auth_none.c auth_unix.c authunix_prot.c bindresvport.c clnt_bcast.c \
-        clnt_dg.c clnt_generic.c clnt_perror.c clnt_raw.c clnt_simple.c \
+libtirpc_la_SOURCES = auth_none.c auth_unix.c authunix_prot.c \
+        binddynport.c bindresvport.c \
+        clnt_bcast.c clnt_dg.c clnt_generic.c clnt_perror.c clnt_raw.c clnt_simple.c \
         clnt_vc.c rpc_dtablesize.c getnetconfig.c getnetpath.c getrpcent.c \
         getrpcport.c mt_misc.c pmap_clnt.c pmap_getmaps.c pmap_getport.c \
         pmap_prot.c pmap_prot2.c pmap_rmt.c rpc_prot.c rpc_commondata.c \
src/binddynport.c new file +132 -0

132 lines not on this page · raw message

#2 lore raw

RFC PATCH 2/3 Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3)

In reply to Chuck Lever

Callers of svc_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the service listener being created. svc_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.

This approach becomes a problem whenever bindresvport(3) happens to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely prevents the IANA-assigned well-known service from starting.

It seems that a reserved port is completely unnecessary for listener sockets. It does not confer any extra privilege or functionality to the listener socket, nor do remote clients infer any extra privilege from a listener on a port number lower than 1024.

Therefore, remove the bindresvport step to prevent svc_tli_create(3) from choosing a port number that interferes with well-known services assigned to a privileged port.

svc_tli_create(3) will now never assign a privileged port dynamically. If needed, a caller may still bind to a dynamically- assigned reserved port by invoking bindresvport(3) directly and passing the already-bound file descriptor to svc_tli_create(3).

But that should be a special case. It is no longer the default behavior.

---
 src/rpc_soc.c     |    7 +++++--
 src/svc_generic.c |   12 ++++--------
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
src/rpc_soc.c +5 -2
index ed0892a..5ec96a7 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
 
 extern mutex_t	rpcsoc_lock;
 
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
+
 static CLIENT *clnt_com_create(struct sockaddr_in *, rpcprog_t, rpcvers_t,
     int *, u_int, u_int, char *, int);
 static SVCXPRT *svc_com_create(int, u_int, u_int, char *);
@@ -145,7 +147,8 @@ clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, recvsz, tp, flags)
 	bindaddr.maxlen = bindaddr.len =  sizeof (struct sockaddr_in);
 	bindaddr.buf = raddr;
 
-	bindresvport(fd, NULL);
+	if (__binddynport(fd) == -1)
+		goto err;
 	cl = clnt_tli_create(fd, nconf, &bindaddr, prog, vers,
 				sendsz, recvsz);
 	if (cl) {
@@ -332,7 +335,7 @@ svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid)
 
 	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
 	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
-	bindresvport(fd, &sin);
+	bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&sin, sizeof sin);
 	listen(fd, SOMAXCONN);
 	svc = svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, NULL, sendsize, recvsize);
 	(void) freenetconfigent(nconf);
src/svc_generic.c +4 -8
index 7aae796..52a56c2 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <rpc/svc.h>
 
 extern int __svc_vc_setflag(SVCXPRT *, int);
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
 
 /*
  * The highest level interface for server creation.
@@ -220,15 +221,10 @@ svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)
 	 */
 	if (madefd || !__rpc_sockisbound(fd)) {
 		if (bindaddr == NULL) {
-			if (bindresvport(fd, NULL) < 0) {
-				memset(&ss, 0, sizeof ss);
-				ss.ss_family = si.si_af;
-				if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&ss,
-				    (socklen_t)si.si_alen) < 0) {
-					warnx(
+			if (__binddynport(fd) == -1) {
+				warnx(
 			"svc_tli_create: could not bind to anonymous port");
-					goto freedata;
-				}
+				goto freedata;
 			}
 			listen(fd, SOMAXCONN);
 		} else {
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH RFC 2/3] Avoid choosing reserved ports in svc_tli_create(3)

Quoted 3 lines

On Feb 15, 2018, at 3:22 PM, Chuck Lever <[email protected]> =

Quoted 47 lines · wrote:

=20
Callers of svc_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the service listener being created. svc_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.
=20
This approach becomes a problem whenever bindresvport(3) happens to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely prevents the IANA-assigned well-known service from starting.
=20
It seems that a reserved port is completely unnecessary for listener sockets. It does not confer any extra privilege or functionality to the listener socket, nor do remote clients infer any extra privilege from a listener on a port number lower than 1024.
=20
Therefore, remove the bindresvport step to prevent svc_tli_create(3) from choosing a port number that interferes with well-known services assigned to a privileged port.
=20
svc_tli_create(3) will now never assign a privileged port dynamically. If needed, a caller may still bind to a dynamically- assigned reserved port by invoking bindresvport(3) directly and passing the already-bound file descriptor to svc_tli_create(3). =20
But that should be a special case. It is no longer the default behavior.
=20

---
src/rpc_soc.c | 7 +++++--
src/svc_generic.c | 12 ++++--------

2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

=20

src/rpc_soc.c +0 -0
index ed0892a..5ec96a7 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@

=20
extern mutex_t rpcsoc_lock;
=20

src/rpc_soc.c +2 -0
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
+
Quoted 1 line

static CLIENT *clnt_com_create(struct sockaddr_in *, rpcprog_t, =

rpcvers_t,

src/rpc_soc.c clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, =

Quoted 3 lines
    int *, u_int, u_int, char *, int);

static SVCXPRT *svc_com_create(int, u_int, u_int, char *);

src/rpc_soc.c +0 -0
@@ -145,7 +147,8 @@ clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, =

recvsz, tp, flags)

src/rpc_soc.c clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, = · line 147

Quoted 1 line
src/rpc_soc.c +0 -0
 	bindaddr.maxlen =3D bindaddr.len =3D  sizeof (struct =

sockaddr_in);

src/rpc_soc.c clnt_com_create(raddr, prog, vers, sockp, sendsz, recvsz, tp, flags) · line 151

Quoted 5 lines
src/rpc_soc.c +0 -0
 	bindaddr.buf =3D raddr;

=20

src/rpc_soc.c +2 -1
-	bindresvport(fd, NULL);
+	if (__binddynport(fd) =3D=3D -1)
+		goto err;

This hunk belongs in the clnt_tli_create(3) patch.

src/rpc_soc.c svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid) · line 338

Quoted 9 lines
	cl =3D clnt_tli_create(fd, nconf, &bindaddr, prog, vers,
				sendsz, recvsz);
	if (cl) {
src/rpc_soc.c +0 -0
@@ -332,7 +335,7 @@ svc_com_create(fd, sendsize, recvsize, netid)

=20

	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
	sin.sin_family =3D AF_INET;
src/rpc_soc.c +1 -1
-	bindresvport(fd, &sin);
+	bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void *)&sin, sizeof sin);

This allows dynamic allocation of a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND. A better choice might be to just pass the fd to svc_tli_create and let it do the bind if needed.

I'll be sending along a "v2" RFC series at some point.

src/svc_generic.c svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, =

Quoted 16 lines
	listen(fd, SOMAXCONN);
	svc =3D svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, NULL, sendsize, recvsize);
	(void) freenetconfigent(nconf);
src/svc_generic.c +0 -0
index 7aae796..52a56c2 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <rpc/svc.h>

=20
extern int __svc_vc_setflag(SVCXPRT *, int); +extern int __binddynport(int fd);
=20
/*
* The highest level interface for server creation.

src/svc_generic.c +0 -0
@@ -220,15 +221,10 @@ svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, =

recvsz)

src/svc_generic.c svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)

Quoted 7 lines
src/svc_generic.c +0 -4
 	 */
 	if (madefd || !__rpc_sockisbound(fd)) {
 		if (bindaddr =3D=3D NULL) {
-			if (bindresvport(fd, NULL) < 0) {
-				memset(&ss, 0, sizeof ss);
-				ss.ss_family =3D si.si_af;
-				if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)(void =

*)&ss,

src/svc_generic.c svc_tli_create(fd, nconf, bindaddr, sendsz, recvsz)

Quoted 5 lines
src/svc_generic.c +2 -2
-				    (socklen_t)si.si_alen) < 0) {
-					warnx(
+			if (__binddynport(fd) =3D=3D -1) {
+				warnx(
 			"svc_tli_create: could not bind to anonymous =

port");

Quoted 9 lines
src/svc_generic.c +1 -2
-					goto freedata;
-				}
+				goto freedata;
 			}
 			listen(fd, SOMAXCONN);
 		} else {

=20
--
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Quoted 2 lines

the body of a message to [email protected]
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--
Chuck Lever

#4 lore raw

RFC PATCH 3/3 Avoid choosing reserved ports in clnt_tli_create(3)

In reply to Chuck Lever

Callers of clnt_tli_create(3) can specify that an arbitrary port number be dynamically assigned for the client socket being created. clnt_tli_create(3) tries bindresvport(3) first in this case. bindresvport(3) chooses a reserved port if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIND privilege. If this fails, bind(2) is used to assign a port number from the range above 1024.

This approach becomes a problem whenever bindresvport(3) happens to choose the port number of a well-known service. If the caller is a long-running service (like rpc.statd), it indefinitely prevents the IANA-assigned well-known service from starting.

When using the AUTH_SYS authentication flavor, RPC services can use the remote client's port number to determine whether the client is privileged, and thus the UID and GID numbers in the RPC are trustworthy. However, it's pretty easy for a man-in-the-middle to replace these while the RPC is in flight anyway. The port number provides no actual security.

Therefore, remove the bindresvport step to prevent svc_tli_create(3) from choosing a port number that interferes with well-known services assigned to a privileged port.

clnt_tli_create(3) will now never assign a privileged port dynamically. If needed, a caller may still bind to a dynamically- assigned reserved port by invoking bindresvport(3) directly and passing the already-bound file descriptor to clnt_tli_create(3).

But that should be a special case. It is no longer the default behavior.

---
 src/clnt_generic.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/clnt_generic.c +3 -1
index 3f3dabf..e5a314f 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 
 extern bool_t __rpc_is_local_host(const char *);
 int __rpc_raise_fd(int);
+extern int __binddynport(int fd);
 
 #ifndef NETIDLEN
 #define	NETIDLEN 32
@@ -340,7 +341,8 @@ clnt_tli_create(int fd, const struct netconfig *nconf,
 		servtype = nconf->nc_semantics;
 		if (!__rpc_fd2sockinfo(fd, &si))
 			goto err;
-		bindresvport(fd, NULL);
+		if (__binddynport(fd) == -1)
+			goto err;
 	} else {
 		if (!__rpc_fd2sockinfo(fd, &si))
 			goto err;