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Add authorization support to all network services

PATCH Superseded Daniel P. Berrangé 4 participants 19 messages Jun 15, 2018 – Jun 20, 2018

v1 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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#0 lore raw

cover Add authorization support to all network services

This series builds on the core authorization framework:

https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg04469.html

enabling its use with the VNC, chardev, NBD and migration network servers.

In combination with TLS x509 client certificates, this allows these services to whitelist specific clients, which avoids the need to setup restricted child certificate authorities.

In VNC it also allows whitelisting based on SASL user names.

Based-on: <[email protected]>

Daniel P. Berrangé (6):
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter
chardev: add support for authorization for TLS clients
vnc: allow specifying a custom authorization object name
monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add,
acl_remove

 blockdev-nbd.c        | 14 ++++++++---
 chardev/char-socket.c | 11 +++++++-
 chardev/char.c        |  3 +++
 hmp.c                 | 11 +++++++-
 include/block/nbd.h   |  4 +--
 migration/migration.c |  8 ++++++
 migration/tls.c       |  2 +-
 monitor.c             | 23 +++++++++++++++++
 nbd/server.c          | 12 +++++----
 qapi/block.json       |  4 ++-
 qapi/char.json        |  2 ++
 qapi/migration.json   | 12 ++++++++-
 qemu-doc.texi         | 19 ++++++++------
 qemu-nbd.c            | 13 +++++++++-
 qemu-nbd.texi         |  4 +++
 ui/vnc.c              | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 16 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name contains 'CN=fred', you would use:

  qemu-nbd -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                   endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
           -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
	           rules.0.match=*CN=fred,rules.0.policy=allow \
           -tls-creds tls0 \
           -tls-authz authz0
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
---
 include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
 nbd/server.c        | 12 +++++++-----
 qemu-nbd.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
 qemu-nbd.texi       |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/block/nbd.h +1 -1
index fcdcd54502..80ea9d240c 100644
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ void nbd_export_close_all(void);
 void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
                     QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
-                    const char *tlsaclname,
+                    const char *tlsauthz,
                     void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool));
 void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
 void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
nbd/server.c +7 -5
index 9e1f227178..579fc828e1 100644
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct NBDClient {
 
     NBDExport *exp;
     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
-    char *tlsaclname;
+    char *tlsauthz;
     QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying data channel */
     QIOChannel *ioc; /* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */
 
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static QIOChannel *nbd_negotiate_handle_starttls(NBDClient *client,
 
     tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(ioc,
                                       client->tlscreds,
-                                      client->tlsaclname,
+                                      client->tlsauthz,
                                       errp);
     if (!tioc) {
         return NULL;
@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client)
         if (client->tlscreds) {
             object_unref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
         }
-        g_free(client->tlsaclname);
+        g_free(client->tlsauthz);
         if (client->exp) {
             QTAILQ_REMOVE(&client->exp->clients, client, next);
             nbd_export_put(client->exp);
@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
 void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
                     QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
-                    const char *tlsaclname,
+                    const char *tlsauthz,
                     void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool))
 {
     NBDClient *client;
@@ -2153,7 +2153,9 @@ void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
     if (tlscreds) {
         object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
     }
-    client->tlsaclname = g_strdup(tlsaclname);
+    if (tlsauthz) {
+        client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
+    }
     client->sioc = sioc;
     object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc));
     client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
qemu-nbd.c +12 -1
index 51b9d38c72..c0c9c805c0 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS      261
 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS    262
 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK          263
+#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ      264
 
 #define MBR_SIZE 512
 
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ static int shared = 1;
 static int nb_fds;
 static QIONetListener *server;
 static QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
+static const char *tlsauthz;
 
 static void usage(const char *name)
 {
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
     nb_fds++;
     nbd_update_server_watch();
     nbd_client_new(newproto ? NULL : exp, cioc,
-                   tlscreds, NULL, nbd_client_closed);
+                   tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed);
 }
 
 static void nbd_update_server_watch(void)
@@ -533,6 +535,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
         { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
         { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },
         { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
     };
     int ch;
@@ -755,6 +758,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
             g_free(trace_file);
             trace_file = trace_opt_parse(optarg);
             break;
+        case QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ:
+            tlsauthz = optarg;
+            break;
         case QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK:
             fork_process = true;
             break;
@@ -819,6 +825,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
                          error_get_pretty(local_err));
             exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }
+    } else {
+        if (tlsauthz) {
+            error_report("--tls-authz is not permitted without --tls-creds");
+            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+        }
     }
 
     if (disconnect) {
qemu-nbd.texi +4 -0
index 9a84e81eed..8f16bfb513 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object
 option.
 @item --fork
 Fork off the server process and exit the parent once the server is running.
+@item --tls-authz=ID
+Specify the ID of a qauthz object previously created with the
+--object option. This will be used to authorize users who
+connect against their x509 distinguished name.
 @item -v, --verbose
 Display extra debugging information
 @item -h, --help
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/6] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

Quoted 15 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

Quoted 8 lines

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name contains 'CN=fred', you would use:

   qemu-nbd -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                    endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
            -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
	           rules.0.match=*CN=fred,rules.0.policy=allow \

s/-object/--object/g

Quoted 2 lines
            -tls-creds tls0 \
            -tls-authz authz0

s/-tls/--tls/g

(qemu-nbd requires double-dash long-opts, -o means --offset except that 'bject' is not an offset; similarly for -t meaning --persistent)

Quoted 13 lines
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
---
  include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
  nbd/server.c        | 12 +++++++-----
  qemu-nbd.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
  qemu-nbd.texi       |  4 ++++
  4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

+++ b/nbd/server.c

nbd/server.c void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp, · line 2158

Quoted 7 lines
nbd/server.c +3 -1
@@ -2153,7 +2153,9 @@ void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
      if (tlscreds) {
          object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
      }
-    client->tlsaclname = g_strdup(tlsaclname);
+    if (tlsauthz) {
+        client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
+    }

The 'if' is pointless; g_strdup(NULL) is safe.

qemu-nbd.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 538

Quoted 7 lines
qemu-nbd.c +2 -0
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
 
@@ -533,6 +535,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
          { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
          { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
          { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },

Not your fault, but worth sorting these alphabetically?

Bummer that pre-patch, you could use '--tls' as an unambiguous abbreviation for --tls-creds; now it is an ambiguous prefix (you have to type --tls-c or --tls-a to get to the point of no ambiguity). If we really cared, we could add:

{ "t", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, { "tl", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, { "tls", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, { "tls-", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS },

since getopt_long() no longer reports ambiguity if there is an exact match to what is otherwise the common prefix of two ambiguous options. But I don't think backwards-compatibility on this front is worth worrying about (generally, scripts don't rely on getopt_long()'s unambiguous prefix handling).

qemu-nbd.texi of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object · line 95

Quoted 7 lines
qemu-nbd.texi +3 -0
+++ b/qemu-nbd.texi
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object
  option.
  @item --fork
  Fork off the server process and exit the parent once the server is running.
+@item --tls-authz=ID
+Specify the ID of a qauthz object previously created with the

s/qauthz/authz-simple/ ?

qemu-nbd.texi of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object · line 97

Quoted 2 lines
qemu-nbd.texi +2 -0
+--object option. This will be used to authorize users who
+connect against their x509 distinguished name.

Sounds like someone is "connecting against their name", rather than "authorizing against their name". Better might be:

This will be used to authorize connecting users against their x509 distinguished name.

Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org
#3 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/6] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

Quoted 27 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 15 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

Quoted 8 lines

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name contains 'CN=fred', you would use:

   qemu-nbd -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                    endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
            -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
	           rules.0.match=*CN=fred,rules.0.policy=allow \

s/-object/--object/g

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
            -tls-creds tls0 \
            -tls-authz authz0

s/-tls/--tls/g

(qemu-nbd requires double-dash long-opts, -o means --offset except that 'bject' is not an offset; similarly for -t meaning --persistent)

Sigh, yes, just another reason for us to standardize on -- everywhere

Quoted 20 lines

qemu-nbd.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 538

Quoted 7 lines

+++ b/qemu-nbd.c

qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -533,6 +535,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
          { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
          { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
          { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },

Not your fault, but worth sorting these alphabetically?

Bummer that pre-patch, you could use '--tls' as an unambiguous abbreviation for --tls-creds; now it is an ambiguous prefix (you have to type --tls-c or --tls-a to get to the point of no ambiguity). If we really cared, we could add:

{ "t", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, { "tl", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, { "tls", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, { "tls-", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS },

Quoted 5 lines

since getopt_long() no longer reports ambiguity if there is an exact match to what is otherwise the common prefix of two ambiguous options. But I don't think backwards-compatibility on this front is worth worrying about (generally, scripts don't rely on getopt_long()'s unambiguous prefix handling).

Personally I think this is not worth worrying about. We've never documented ability to abbreviate nor ever promised they are stable. Abbreviations are inherantly unstable as you illustrate, so if anything we should just document that you should never abbreviate args.

Quoted 10 lines

qemu-nbd.texi of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object · line 95

Quoted 8 lines
qemu-nbd.texi +3 -0
+++ b/qemu-nbd.texi
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object
  option.
  @item --fork
  Fork off the server process and exit the parent once the server is running.
+@item --tls-authz=ID
+Specify the ID of a qauthz object previously created with the

s/qauthz/authz-simple/ ?

No, qauthz is a QOM interface, which is implemented by many subclasses, of which authz-simple is just one example.

Quoted 8 lines

qemu-nbd.texi of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object · line 97

Quoted 2 lines
qemu-nbd.texi +2 -0
+--object option. This will be used to authorize users who
+connect against their x509 distinguished name.

Sounds like someone is "connecting against their name", rather than "authorizing against their name". Better might be:

This will be used to authorize connecting users against their x509 distinguished name.

Ok

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.

First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the 'object-add' command:

   {
     'execute': 'object-add',
     'arguments': {
       'qom-type': 'authz-simple',
       'id': 'authz0',
       'parameters': {
         'policy': 'deny',
         'rules': [
           {
             'match': '*CN=fred',
             'policy': 'allow'
           }
         ]
       }
     }
   }

They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:

   {
     'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
     'arguments': {
       'addr': {
           'type': 'inet',
           'host': '127.0.0.1',
           'port': '9000'
       },
       'tls-creds': 'tls0',
       'tls-authz': 'authz0'
     }
   }
---
 blockdev-nbd.c      | 14 +++++++++++---
 hmp.c               |  2 +-
 include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
 qapi/block.json     |  4 +++-
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
blockdev-nbd.c +11 -3
index 65a84739ed..1ef2989118 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 typedef struct NBDServerData {
     QIONetListener *listener;
     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
+    char *tlsauthz;
 } NBDServerData;
 
 static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
@@ -37,7 +38,8 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
 {
     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
     nbd_client_new(NULL, cioc,
-                   nbd_server->tlscreds, NULL,
+                   nbd_server->tlscreds,
+                   nbd_server->tlsauthz,
                    nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
 }
 
@@ -53,6 +55,7 @@ static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)
     if (server->tlscreds) {
         object_unref(OBJECT(server->tlscreds));
     }
+    g_free(server->tlsauthz);
 
     g_free(server);
 }
@@ -88,7 +91,7 @@ static QCryptoTLSCreds *nbd_get_tls_creds(const char *id, Error **errp)
 
 
 void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
-                      Error **errp)
+                      const char *tls_authz, Error **errp)
 {
     if (nbd_server) {
         error_setg(errp, "NBD server already running");
@@ -118,6 +121,10 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
         }
     }
 
+    if (tls_authz) {
+        nbd_server->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tls_authz);
+    }
+
     qio_net_listener_set_client_func(nbd_server->listener,
                                      nbd_accept,
                                      NULL,
@@ -132,11 +139,12 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
 
 void qmp_nbd_server_start(SocketAddressLegacy *addr,
                           bool has_tls_creds, const char *tls_creds,
+                          bool has_tls_authz, const char *tls_authz,
                           Error **errp)
 {
     SocketAddress *addr_flat = socket_address_flatten(addr);
 
-    nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, errp);
+    nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, errp);
     qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr_flat);
 }
 
hmp.c +1 -1
index ef93f4878b..74e18db103 100644
@@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ void hmp_nbd_server_start(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, &local_err);
+    nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, &local_err);
     qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
     if (local_err != NULL) {
         goto exit;
include/block/nbd.h +1 -1
index 80ea9d240c..8a8ae8c3a7 100644
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
 void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
 
 void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
-                      Error **errp);
+                      const char *tls_authz, Error **errp);
 
 
 /* nbd_read
qapi/block.json +3 -1
index c694524002..8c7cc9b798 100644
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
 #
 # @addr: Address on which to listen.
 # @tls-creds: (optional) ID of the TLS credentials object. Since 2.6
+# @tls-authz: (optional) ID of the QAuthZ authorization object. Since 2.13
 #
 # Returns: error if the server is already running.
 #
@@ -204,7 +205,8 @@
 ##
 { 'command': 'nbd-server-start',
   'data': { 'addr': 'SocketAddressLegacy',
-            '*tls-creds': 'str'} }
+            '*tls-creds': 'str',
+            '*tls-authz': 'str'} }
 
 ##
 # @nbd-server-add:
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
#5 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/6] nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command

Quoted 28 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.

First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the 'object-add' command:

    {
      'execute': 'object-add',
      'arguments': {
        'qom-type': 'authz-simple',
        'id': 'authz0',
        'parameters': {
          'policy': 'deny',
          'rules': [
            {
              'match': '*CN=fred',
              'policy': 'allow'
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    }

They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:

Quoted 12 lines
    {
      'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
      'arguments': {
        'addr': {
            'type': 'inet',
            'host': '127.0.0.1',
            'port': '9000'
        },
        'tls-creds': 'tls0',
        'tls-authz': 'authz0'
      }
    }

Is it worth using a discriminated union (string vs. QAuthZ) so that one could specify the authz policy inline rather than as a separate object, for convenience? But that would be fine as a followup patch, if we even want it.

Quoted 11 lines
---
  blockdev-nbd.c      | 14 +++++++++++---
  hmp.c               |  2 +-
  include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
  qapi/block.json     |  4 +++-
  4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

blockdev-nbd.c void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds, · line 126

Quoted 6 lines
blockdev-nbd.c +3 -0
@@ -118,6 +121,10 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
          }
      }
 
+    if (tls_authz) {
+        nbd_server->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tls_authz);
+    }

Pointless 'if'; g_strdup() does the right thing.

qapi/block.json line 200

Quoted 6 lines
qapi/block.json +2 -0
+++ b/qapi/block.json
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
  #
  # @addr: Address on which to listen.
  # @tls-creds: (optional) ID of the TLS credentials object. Since 2.6
+# @tls-authz: (optional) ID of the QAuthZ authorization object. Since 2.13

No need for the string '(optional)' (I thought we killed those uses when we automated the documentation generation - but obviously a few were left behind).

s/2.13/3.0/

Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org
#6 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/6] nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command

Quoted 42 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 28 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.

First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the 'object-add' command:

    {
      'execute': 'object-add',
      'arguments': {
        'qom-type': 'authz-simple',
        'id': 'authz0',
        'parameters': {
          'policy': 'deny',
          'rules': [
            {
              'match': '*CN=fred',
              'policy': 'allow'
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    }

They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:

Quoted 12 lines
    {
      'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
      'arguments': {
        'addr': {
            'type': 'inet',
            'host': '127.0.0.1',
            'port': '9000'
        },
        'tls-creds': 'tls0',
        'tls-authz': 'authz0'
      }
    }
Quoted 4 lines

Is it worth using a discriminated union (string vs. QAuthZ) so that one could specify the authz policy inline rather than as a separate object, for convenience? But that would be fine as a followup patch, if we even want it.

QAuthZ isn't a QAPI type - its a QOM object interface, so you'd have to allow the entire object_add arg set inline, and then validate the QOM type you received after the fact actually implemented the interface. Also for migration at least it is likely the single authz impl will be shared for both migration + nbd services. So I think its cleaner just to keep it separate to avoid having 2 distinct codepaths for handling the same thing

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
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#7 lore raw

PATCH 3/6 migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The QEMU instance that runs as the server for the migration data transport (ie the target QEMU) needs to be able to configure access control so it can prevent unauthorized clients initiating an incoming migration. This adds a new 'tls-authz' migration parameter that is used to provide the QOM ID of a QAuthZ subclass instance that provides the access control check. This is checked against the x509 certificate obtained during the TLS handshake.

---
 hmp.c                 |  9 +++++++++
 migration/migration.c |  8 ++++++++
 migration/tls.c       |  2 +-
 qapi/migration.json   | 12 +++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hmp.c +9 -0
index 74e18db103..bef8ea2531 100644
@@ -370,6 +370,9 @@ void hmp_info_migrate_parameters(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         monitor_printf(mon, "%s: %" PRIu64 "\n",
             MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_XBZRLE_CACHE_SIZE),
             params->xbzrle_cache_size);
+        monitor_printf(mon, " %s: '%s'\n",
+            MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ),
+            params->has_tls_authz ? params->tls_authz : "");
     }
 
     qapi_free_MigrationParameters(params);
@@ -1632,6 +1635,12 @@ void hmp_migrate_set_parameter(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         p->tls_hostname->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
         visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_hostname->u.s, &err);
         break;
+    case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ:
+        p->has_tls_authz = true;
+        p->tls_authz = g_new0(StrOrNull, 1);
+        p->tls_authz->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
+        visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_authz->u.s, &err);
+        break;
     case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_BANDWIDTH:
         p->has_max_bandwidth = true;
         /*
migration/migration.c +8 -0
index 1e99ec9b7e..d14c8d7003 100644
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ MigrationParameters *qmp_query_migrate_parameters(Error **errp)
     params->tls_creds = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_creds);
     params->has_tls_hostname = true;
     params->tls_hostname = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_hostname);
+    params->has_tls_authz = true;
+    params->tls_authz = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_authz);
     params->has_max_bandwidth = true;
     params->max_bandwidth = s->parameters.max_bandwidth;
     params->has_downtime_limit = true;
@@ -1106,6 +1108,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
+        s->parameters.tls_authz = g_strdup(params->tls_authz->u.s);
+    }
+
     if (params->has_max_bandwidth) {
         s->parameters.max_bandwidth = params->max_bandwidth;
         if (s->to_dst_file) {
migration/tls.c +1 -1
index 3b9e8c9263..5171afc6c4 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ void migration_tls_channel_process_incoming(MigrationState *s,
 
     tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(
         ioc, creds,
-        NULL, /* XXX pass ACL name */
+        s->parameters.tls_authz,
         errp);
     if (!tioc) {
         return;
qapi/migration.json +11 -1
index f7e10ee90f..b9ba34e3a6 100644
@@ -488,6 +488,10 @@
 #                hostname must be provided so that the server's x509
 #                certificate identity can be validated. (Since 2.7)
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             2.13)
+#
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -522,7 +526,7 @@
 { 'enum': 'MigrationParameter',
   'data': ['compress-level', 'compress-threads', 'decompress-threads',
            'cpu-throttle-initial', 'cpu-throttle-increment',
-           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'max-bandwidth',
+           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'tls-authz', 'max-bandwidth',
            'downtime-limit', 'x-checkpoint-delay', 'block-incremental',
            'x-multifd-channels', 'x-multifd-page-count',
            'xbzrle-cache-size' ] }
@@ -605,6 +609,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'int',
             '*tls-creds': 'StrOrNull',
             '*tls-hostname': 'StrOrNull',
+            '*tls-authz': 'StrOrNull',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'int',
             '*downtime-limit': 'int',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'int',
@@ -667,6 +672,10 @@
 #                associated with the migration URI, if any. (Since 2.9)
 #                Note: 2.8 reports this by omitting tls-hostname instead.
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             2.13)
+#
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -704,6 +713,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'uint8',
             '*tls-creds': 'str',
             '*tls-hostname': 'str',
+            '*tls-authz': 'str',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'size',
             '*downtime-limit': 'uint64',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'uint32',
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
Reviewed-by on v1 3/6
#8 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/6] migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

Quoted 11 lines · * Daniel P. Berrangé ([email protected]) wrote:

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The QEMU instance that runs as the server for the migration data transport (ie the target QEMU) needs to be able to configure access control so it can prevent unauthorized clients initiating an incoming migration. This adds a new 'tls-authz' migration parameter that is used to provide the QOM ID of a QAuthZ subclass instance that provides the access control check. This is checked against the x509 certificate obtained during the TLS handshake.

I'd appreciate an example of using it, either in the migration docs or the commit message.

Quoted 78 lines
---
 hmp.c                 |  9 +++++++++
 migration/migration.c |  8 ++++++++
 migration/tls.c       |  2 +-
 qapi/migration.json   | 12 +++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hmp.c +9 -0
index 74e18db103..bef8ea2531 100644
@@ -370,6 +370,9 @@ void hmp_info_migrate_parameters(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         monitor_printf(mon, "%s: %" PRIu64 "\n",
             MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_XBZRLE_CACHE_SIZE),
             params->xbzrle_cache_size);
+        monitor_printf(mon, " %s: '%s'\n",
+            MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ),
+            params->has_tls_authz ? params->tls_authz : "");
     }
 
     qapi_free_MigrationParameters(params);
@@ -1632,6 +1635,12 @@ void hmp_migrate_set_parameter(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         p->tls_hostname->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
         visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_hostname->u.s, &err);
         break;
+    case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ:
+        p->has_tls_authz = true;
+        p->tls_authz = g_new0(StrOrNull, 1);
+        p->tls_authz->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
+        visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_authz->u.s, &err);
+        break;
     case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_BANDWIDTH:
         p->has_max_bandwidth = true;
         /*
migration/migration.c +8 -0
index 1e99ec9b7e..d14c8d7003 100644
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ MigrationParameters *qmp_query_migrate_parameters(Error **errp)
     params->tls_creds = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_creds);
     params->has_tls_hostname = true;
     params->tls_hostname = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_hostname);
+    params->has_tls_authz = true;
+    params->tls_authz = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_authz);
     params->has_max_bandwidth = true;
     params->max_bandwidth = s->parameters.max_bandwidth;
     params->has_downtime_limit = true;
@@ -1106,6 +1108,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
+        s->parameters.tls_authz = g_strdup(params->tls_authz->u.s);
+    }
+
     if (params->has_max_bandwidth) {
         s->parameters.max_bandwidth = params->max_bandwidth;
         if (s->to_dst_file) {
migration/tls.c +1 -1
index 3b9e8c9263..5171afc6c4 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ void migration_tls_channel_process_incoming(MigrationState *s,
 
     tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(
         ioc, creds,
-        NULL, /* XXX pass ACL name */
+        s->parameters.tls_authz,
         errp);
     if (!tioc) {
         return;
qapi/migration.json +0 -0
index f7e10ee90f..b9ba34e3a6 100644

qapi/migration.json line 494

Quoted 7 lines
qapi/migration.json +4 -0
@@ -488,6 +488,10 @@
 #                hostname must be provided so that the server's x509
 #                certificate identity can be validated. (Since 2.7)
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             2.13)
+#

Oops, 2.13 strikes again :-)

Other than that, OK from migration and HMP.

Quoted 42 lines
qapi/migration.json +7 -1
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -522,7 +526,7 @@
 { 'enum': 'MigrationParameter',
   'data': ['compress-level', 'compress-threads', 'decompress-threads',
            'cpu-throttle-initial', 'cpu-throttle-increment',
-           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'max-bandwidth',
+           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'tls-authz', 'max-bandwidth',
            'downtime-limit', 'x-checkpoint-delay', 'block-incremental',
            'x-multifd-channels', 'x-multifd-page-count',
            'xbzrle-cache-size' ] }
@@ -605,6 +609,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'int',
             '*tls-creds': 'StrOrNull',
             '*tls-hostname': 'StrOrNull',
+            '*tls-authz': 'StrOrNull',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'int',
             '*downtime-limit': 'int',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'int',
@@ -667,6 +672,10 @@
 #                associated with the migration URI, if any. (Since 2.9)
 #                Note: 2.8 reports this by omitting tls-hostname instead.
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             2.13)
+#
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -704,6 +713,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'uint8',
             '*tls-creds': 'str',
             '*tls-hostname': 'str',
+            '*tls-authz': 'str',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'size',
             '*downtime-limit': 'uint64',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'uint32',
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0

--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK

#9 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/6] migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

Quoted 11 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Quoted 10 lines · * Daniel P. Berrangé ([email protected]) wrote:

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The QEMU instance that runs as the server for the migration data transport (ie the target QEMU) needs to be able to configure access control so it can prevent unauthorized clients initiating an incoming migration. This adds a new 'tls-authz' migration parameter that is used to provide the QOM ID of a QAuthZ subclass instance that provides the access control check. This is checked against the x509 certificate obtained during the TLS handshake.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

I'd appreciate an example of using it, either in the migration docs or the commit message.

Hmm, yes, it's an oversight to have missed an example in this commit message.

Quoted 129 lines
Quoted 79 lines
---
 hmp.c                 |  9 +++++++++
 migration/migration.c |  8 ++++++++
 migration/tls.c       |  2 +-
 qapi/migration.json   | 12 +++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hmp.c +9 -0
index 74e18db103..bef8ea2531 100644
@@ -370,6 +370,9 @@ void hmp_info_migrate_parameters(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         monitor_printf(mon, "%s: %" PRIu64 "\n",
             MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_XBZRLE_CACHE_SIZE),
             params->xbzrle_cache_size);
+        monitor_printf(mon, " %s: '%s'\n",
+            MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ),
+            params->has_tls_authz ? params->tls_authz : "");
     }
 
     qapi_free_MigrationParameters(params);
@@ -1632,6 +1635,12 @@ void hmp_migrate_set_parameter(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         p->tls_hostname->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
         visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_hostname->u.s, &err);
         break;
+    case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ:
+        p->has_tls_authz = true;
+        p->tls_authz = g_new0(StrOrNull, 1);
+        p->tls_authz->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
+        visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_authz->u.s, &err);
+        break;
     case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_BANDWIDTH:
         p->has_max_bandwidth = true;
         /*
migration/migration.c +8 -0
index 1e99ec9b7e..d14c8d7003 100644
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ MigrationParameters *qmp_query_migrate_parameters(Error **errp)
     params->tls_creds = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_creds);
     params->has_tls_hostname = true;
     params->tls_hostname = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_hostname);
+    params->has_tls_authz = true;
+    params->tls_authz = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_authz);
     params->has_max_bandwidth = true;
     params->max_bandwidth = s->parameters.max_bandwidth;
     params->has_downtime_limit = true;
@@ -1106,6 +1108,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
+        s->parameters.tls_authz = g_strdup(params->tls_authz->u.s);
+    }
+
     if (params->has_max_bandwidth) {
         s->parameters.max_bandwidth = params->max_bandwidth;
         if (s->to_dst_file) {
migration/tls.c +1 -1
index 3b9e8c9263..5171afc6c4 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ void migration_tls_channel_process_incoming(MigrationState *s,
 
     tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(
         ioc, creds,
-        NULL, /* XXX pass ACL name */
+        s->parameters.tls_authz,
         errp);
     if (!tioc) {
         return;
qapi/migration.json +0 -0
index f7e10ee90f..b9ba34e3a6 100644

qapi/migration.json line 494

Quoted 7 lines
qapi/migration.json +4 -0
@@ -488,6 +488,10 @@
 #                hostname must be provided so that the server's x509
 #                certificate identity can be validated. (Since 2.7)
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             2.13)
+#

Oops, 2.13 strikes again :-)

Other than that, OK from migration and HMP.

Quoted 36 lines
qapi/migration.json +7 -1
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -522,7 +526,7 @@
 { 'enum': 'MigrationParameter',
   'data': ['compress-level', 'compress-threads', 'decompress-threads',
            'cpu-throttle-initial', 'cpu-throttle-increment',
-           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'max-bandwidth',
+           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'tls-authz', 'max-bandwidth',
            'downtime-limit', 'x-checkpoint-delay', 'block-incremental',
            'x-multifd-channels', 'x-multifd-page-count',
            'xbzrle-cache-size' ] }
@@ -605,6 +609,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'int',
             '*tls-creds': 'StrOrNull',
             '*tls-hostname': 'StrOrNull',
+            '*tls-authz': 'StrOrNull',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'int',
             '*downtime-limit': 'int',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'int',
@@ -667,6 +672,10 @@
 #                associated with the migration URI, if any. (Since 2.9)
 #                Note: 2.8 reports this by omitting tls-hostname instead.
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             2.13)
+#
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -704,6 +713,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'uint8',
             '*tls-creds': 'str',
             '*tls-hostname': 'str',
+            '*tls-authz': 'str',
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
qapi/migration.json +0 -0
             '*max-bandwidth': 'size',
             '*downtime-limit': 'uint64',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'uint32',
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0

--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#10 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/6] migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 1 line · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

.....

It is not just the fault of this patch, but as you are the one doing the tls bits on migration...

migration/migration.c static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp) · line 1113

Quoted 7 lines
migration/migration.c +3 -0
@@ -1106,6 +1108,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);

We really try hard not to use assert() on migration code (yes, it is an ongoing effort). The code around this is something like:

static void migrate_params_test_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params,
MigrationParameters *dest)

{
    [...]

    if (params->has_compress_level) {
        dest->compress_level = params->compress_level;
    }

    [...]

    if (params->has_tls_creds) {
        assert(params->tls_creds->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
        dest->tls_creds = g_strdup(params->tls_creds->u.s);
    }
    [...]
}

Ok, tls code is the one with strings, but still.

static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)

{
    [...]
    if (params->has_compress_level) {
        s->parameters.compress_level = params->compress_level;
    }
    [...]

    if (params->has_tls_creds) {
        g_free(s->parameters.tls_creds);
        assert(params->tls_creds->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
        s->parameters.tls_creds = g_strdup(params->tls_creds->u.s);
    }
}

And this other function:

static bool migrate_params_check(MigrationParameters *params, Error **errp)

{
    if (params->has_compress_level &&
        (params->compress_level > 9)) {
        error_setg(errp, QERR_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE, "compress_level",
                   "is invalid, it should be in the range of 0 to 9");
        return false;
    }
    [...]
}

Where we don't check anything for tls.

Perhaps we can move the asserts here?

We can also try to merge migrate_params_check and migrate_params_test_apply() into a single function, but it is not completely trivial at the moment.

Wondering if we can do it better.

Later, Juan.

#11 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/6] migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

Quoted 39 lines · Juan Quintela
Quoted 1 line · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

.....

It is not just the fault of this patch, but as you are the one doing the tls bits on migration...

migration/migration.c static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp) · line 1113

Quoted 7 lines
migration/migration.c +3 -0
@@ -1106,6 +1108,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);

We really try hard not to use assert() on migration code (yes, it is an ongoing effort). The code around this is something like:

static void migrate_params_test_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params,
MigrationParameters *dest)

{
    [...]

    if (params->has_compress_level) {
        dest->compress_level = params->compress_level;
    }

    [...]

    if (params->has_tls_creds) {
        assert(params->tls_creds->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
        dest->tls_creds = g_strdup(params->tls_creds->u.s);
    }
    [...]
}
Quoted 1 line

Ok, tls code is the one with strings, but still.

My understanding is that because we declared this parameter to have "str" type in the QAPI schema, the QAPI code should already guarantee that "params->tls_creds->type == QTYPE_QSTRING" is true.

IOW, the assert should never fail, and if it does, that would be a good thing as if QAPI wasn't validating input correctly something very bad has gone wrong.

Quoted 7 lines

static bool migrate_params_check(MigrationParameters *params, Error **errp)

{
    if (params->has_compress_level &&
        (params->compress_level > 9)) {
        error_setg(errp, QERR_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE, "compress_level",
                   "is invalid, it should be in the range of 0 to 9");
        return false;

This is different because QAPI schema merely declares it to be an int, so nothing in the QAPI input validation will do range checking. So this codepath is definitely reachable by users feeding bad input.

Regards,
Daniel

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#12 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/6] migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

Quoted 60 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 39 lines · Juan Quintela
Quoted 1 line · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

.....

It is not just the fault of this patch, but as you are the one doing the tls bits on migration...

migration/migration.c static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp) · line 1113

Quoted 7 lines
migration/migration.c +3 -0
@@ -1106,6 +1108,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);

We really try hard not to use assert() on migration code (yes, it is an ongoing effort). The code around this is something like:

static void migrate_params_test_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params,
MigrationParameters *dest)

{
    [...]

    if (params->has_compress_level) {
        dest->compress_level = params->compress_level;
    }

    [...]

    if (params->has_tls_creds) {
        assert(params->tls_creds->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
        dest->tls_creds = g_strdup(params->tls_creds->u.s);
    }
    [...]
}
Quoted 1 line

Ok, tls code is the one with strings, but still.

My understanding is that because we declared this parameter to have "str" type in the QAPI schema, the QAPI code should already guarantee that "params->tls_creds->type == QTYPE_QSTRING" is true.

IOW, the assert should never fail, and if it does, that would be a good thing as if QAPI wasn't validating input correctly something very bad has gone wrong.

Quoted 7 lines

static bool migrate_params_check(MigrationParameters *params, Error **errp)

{
    if (params->has_compress_level &&
        (params->compress_level > 9)) {
        error_setg(errp, QERR_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE, "compress_level",
                   "is invalid, it should be in the range of 0 to 9");
        return false;
Quoted 3 lines

This is different because QAPI schema merely declares it to be an int, so nothing in the QAPI input validation will do range checking. So this codepath is definitely reachable by users feeding bad input.

ok then. Thanks for the explanation.

Later, Juan.

#13 lore raw

PATCH 4/6 chardev: add support for authorization for TLS clients

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use a chardev server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the chardev server. This is still a fairly low bar.

This adds a 'tls-authz=OBJECT-ID' option to the socket chardev backend which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the check will not be permitted to use the chardev server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name contains 'CN=fred', you would use:

  $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
        -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
                rules.0.match=\*CN=fred,rules.0.policy=allow \
        -chardev socket,host=127.0.0.1,port=9000,server,\
	         tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0 \
        ...other qemud args...
---
 chardev/char-socket.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 chardev/char.c        |  3 +++
 qapi/char.json        |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
chardev/char-socket.c +10 -1
index 159e69c3b1..d0c9d26025 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ typedef struct {
     QIONetListener *listener;
     GSource *hup_source;
     QCryptoTLSCreds *tls_creds;
+    char *tls_authz;
     int connected;
     int max_size;
     int do_telnetopt;
@@ -729,7 +730,7 @@ static void tcp_chr_tls_init(Chardev *chr)
     if (s->is_listen) {
         tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(
             s->ioc, s->tls_creds,
-            NULL, /* XXX Use an ACL */
+            s->tls_authz,
             &err);
     } else {
         tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_client(
@@ -881,6 +882,7 @@ static void char_socket_finalize(Object *obj)
     if (s->tls_creds) {
         object_unref(OBJECT(s->tls_creds));
     }
+    g_free(s->tls_authz);
 
     qemu_chr_be_event(chr, CHR_EVENT_CLOSED);
 }
@@ -986,6 +988,7 @@ static void qmp_chardev_open_socket(Chardev *chr,
             }
         }
     }
+    s->tls_authz = g_strdup(sock->tls_authz);
 
     s->addr = addr = socket_address_flatten(sock->addr);
 
@@ -1066,6 +1069,7 @@ static void qemu_chr_parse_socket(QemuOpts *opts, ChardevBackend *backend,
     const char *fd = qemu_opt_get(opts, "fd");
     const char *tls_creds = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-creds");
     SocketAddressLegacy *addr;
+    const char *tls_authz = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-authz");
     ChardevSocket *sock;
 
     if ((!!path + !!fd + !!host) != 1) {
@@ -1094,6 +1098,10 @@ static void qemu_chr_parse_socket(QemuOpts *opts, ChardevBackend *backend,
     } else {
         g_assert_not_reached();
     }
+    if (tls_authz && !tls_creds) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Authorization can only be used when TLS is enabled");
+        return;
+    }
 
     sock = backend->u.socket.data = g_new0(ChardevSocket, 1);
     qemu_chr_parse_common(opts, qapi_ChardevSocket_base(sock));
@@ -1111,6 +1119,7 @@ static void qemu_chr_parse_socket(QemuOpts *opts, ChardevBackend *backend,
     sock->has_reconnect = true;
     sock->reconnect = reconnect;
     sock->tls_creds = g_strdup(tls_creds);
+    sock->tls_authz = g_strdup(tls_authz);
 
     addr = g_new0(SocketAddressLegacy, 1);
     if (path) {
chardev/char.c +3 -0
index 76d866e6fe..d28c16ccca 100644
@@ -837,6 +837,9 @@ QemuOptsList qemu_chardev_opts = {
         },{
             .name = "tls-creds",
             .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
+        },{
+            .name = "tls-authz",
+            .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
         },{
             .name = "width",
             .type = QEMU_OPT_NUMBER,
qapi/char.json +2 -0
index ae19dcd1ed..284f3ee4f1 100644
@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@
 # @addr: socket address to listen on (server=true)
 #        or connect to (server=false)
 # @tls-creds: the ID of the TLS credentials object (since 2.6)
+# @tls-authz: the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object (since 2.13)
 # @server: create server socket (default: true)
 # @wait: wait for incoming connection on server
 #        sockets (default: false).
@@ -259,6 +260,7 @@
 ##
 { 'struct': 'ChardevSocket', 'data': { 'addr'       : 'SocketAddressLegacy',
                                      '*tls-creds'  : 'str',
+                                     '*tls-authz'  : 'str',
                                      '*server'    : 'bool',
                                      '*wait'      : 'bool',
                                      '*nodelay'   : 'bool',
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
#14 lore raw

PATCH 5/6 vnc: allow specifying a custom authorization object name

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The VNC server has historically had support for ACLs to check both the SASL username and the TLS x509 distinguished name. The VNC server was responsible for creating the initial ACL, and the client app was then responsible for populating it with rules using the HMP 'acl_add' command.

This is not satisfactory for a variety of reasons. There is no way to populate the ACLs from the command line, users are forced to use the HMP. With multiple network services all supporting TLS and ACLs now, it is desirable to be able to define a single ACL that is referenced by all services.

To address these limitations, two new options are added to the VNC server CLI. The 'tls-authz' option takes the ID of a QAuthZ object to use for checking TLS x509 distinguished names, and the 'sasl-authz' option takes the ID of another object to use for checking SASL usernames.

In this example, we setup two authorization rules. The first allows any client with a certificate issued by the 'RedHat' organization in the 'London' locality. The second ACL allows clients with either the '[email protected]' or '[email protected]' kerberos usernames. Both checks must pass for the user to be allowed.

    $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                  endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
                  rules.0.match=O=RedHat,,L=London,rules.0.policy=allow \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz1,policy=deny,\
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
          -vnc 0.0.0.0:1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0,
	       sasl,sasl-authz=authz1 \
          ...other QEMU args...
---
 qemu-doc.texi | 11 +++-------
 ui/vnc.c      | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
qemu-doc.texi +3 -8
index cd05760cac..5b7e3faab2 100644
@@ -2917,15 +2917,10 @@ The @code{-localtime} option has been replaced by @code{-rtc base=localtime}.
 
 The @code{-startdate} option has been replaced by @code{-rtc base=@var{date}}.
 
-@subsection -virtioconsole (since 3.0.0)
+@subsection -vnc acl (since 3.0.0)
 
-Option @option{-virtioconsole} has been replaced by
-@option{-device virtconsole}.
-
-@subsection -clock (since 3.0.0)
-
-The @code{-clock} option is ignored since QEMU version 1.7.0. There is no
-replacement since it is not needed anymore.
+The @code{acl} option to the @code{-vnc} argument has been replaced
+by the @code{tls-authz} and @code{sasl-authz} options.
 
 @section QEMU Machine Protocol (QMP) commands
 
ui/vnc.c +49 -9

90 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
#15 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 5/6] vnc: allow specifying a custom authorization object name

Quoted 24 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The VNC server has historically had support for ACLs to check both the SASL username and the TLS x509 distinguished name. The VNC server was responsible for creating the initial ACL, and the client app was then responsible for populating it with rules using the HMP 'acl_add' command.

This is not satisfactory for a variety of reasons. There is no way to populate the ACLs from the command line, users are forced to use the HMP. With multiple network services all supporting TLS and ACLs now, it is desirable to be able to define a single ACL that is referenced by all services.

To address these limitations, two new options are added to the VNC server CLI. The 'tls-authz' option takes the ID of a QAuthZ object to use for checking TLS x509 distinguished names, and the 'sasl-authz' option takes the ID of another object to use for checking SASL usernames.

In this example, we setup two authorization rules. The first allows any client with a certificate issued by the 'RedHat' organization in the 'London' locality. The second ACL allows clients with either the '[email protected]' or '[email protected]' kerberos usernames. Both checks must pass for the user to be allowed.

Quoted 7 lines
    $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                  endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
                  rules.0.match=O=RedHat,,L=London,rules.0.policy=allow \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz1,policy=deny,\
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \

Opps this msg is outdated, since we don't have ability to express such nested properties with -object since I dropped my hacky impl of that.

Quoted 135 lines
          -vnc 0.0.0.0:1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0,
	       sasl,sasl-authz=authz1 \
          ...other QEMU args...
---
 qemu-doc.texi | 11 +++-------
 ui/vnc.c      | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
qemu-doc.texi +3 -8
index cd05760cac..5b7e3faab2 100644
@@ -2917,15 +2917,10 @@ The @code{-localtime} option has been replaced by @code{-rtc base=localtime}.
 
 The @code{-startdate} option has been replaced by @code{-rtc base=@var{date}}.
 
-@subsection -virtioconsole (since 3.0.0)
+@subsection -vnc acl (since 3.0.0)
 
-Option @option{-virtioconsole} has been replaced by
-@option{-device virtconsole}.
-
-@subsection -clock (since 3.0.0)
-
-The @code{-clock} option is ignored since QEMU version 1.7.0. There is no
-replacement since it is not needed anymore.
+The @code{acl} option to the @code{-vnc} argument has been replaced
+by the @code{tls-authz} and @code{sasl-authz} options.
 
 @section QEMU Machine Protocol (QMP) commands
 
ui/vnc.c +49 -9
index 9fb8430c35..2da9433ca7 100644
@@ -3407,6 +3407,12 @@ static QemuOptsList qemu_vnc_opts = {
         },{
             .name = "acl",
             .type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
+        },{
+            .name = "tls-authz",
+            .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
+        },{
+            .name = "sasl-authz",
+            .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
         },{
             .name = "lossy",
             .type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
@@ -3894,6 +3900,8 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp)
     int saslErr;
 #endif
     int acl = 0;
+    const char *tlsauthz;
+    const char *saslauthz;
     int lock_key_sync = 1;
     int key_delay_ms;
 
@@ -3999,7 +4007,33 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp)
             }
         }
     }
+    if (qemu_opt_get(opts, "acl")) {
+        error_report("The 'acl' option to -vnc is deprecated. "
+                     "Please use the 'tls-authz' and 'sasl-authz' "
+                     "options instead");
+    }
     acl = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "acl", false);
+    tlsauthz = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-authz");
+    if (acl && tlsauthz) {
+        error_setg(errp, "'acl' option is mutually exclusive with the "
+                   "'tls-authz' option");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    if (tlsauthz && !vd->tlscreds) {
+        error_setg(errp, "'tls-authz' provided but TLS is not enabled");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    saslauthz = qemu_opt_get(opts, "sasl-authz");
+    if (acl && saslauthz) {
+        error_setg(errp, "'acl' option is mutually exclusive with the "
+                   "'sasl-authz' option");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    if (saslauthz && !sasl) {
+        error_setg(errp, "'sasl-authz' provided but SASL auth is not enabled");
+        goto fail;
+    }
 
     share = qemu_opt_get(opts, "share");
     if (share) {
@@ -4029,7 +4063,9 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp)
         vd->non_adaptive = true;
     }
 
-    if (acl) {
+    if (tlsauthz) {
+        vd->tlsauthzid = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
+    } else if (acl) {
         if (strcmp(vd->id, "default") == 0) {
             vd->tlsauthzid = g_strdup("vnc.x509dname");
         } else {
@@ -4040,15 +4076,19 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp)
                                               &error_abort));
     }
 #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
-    if (acl && sasl) {
-        if (strcmp(vd->id, "default") == 0) {
-            vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup("vnc.username");
-        } else {
-            vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup_printf("vnc.%s.username", vd->id);
+    if (sasl) {
+        if (saslauthz) {
+            vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup(saslauthz);
+        } else if (acl) {
+            if (strcmp(vd->id, "default") == 0) {
+                vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup("vnc.username");
+            } else {
+                vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup_printf("vnc.%s.username", vd->id);
+            }
+            vd->sasl.authz = QAUTHZ(qauthz_list_new(vd->sasl.authzid,
+                                                    QAUTHZ_LIST_POLICY_DENY,
+                                                    &error_abort));
         }
-        vd->sasl.authz = QAUTHZ(qauthz_list_new(vd->sasl.authzid,
-                                                QAUTHZ_LIST_POLICY_DENY,
-                                                &error_abort));
     }
 #endif
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
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#16 lore raw

PATCH 6/6 monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

The various ACL related commands are obsolete now that the QAuthZ framework for authorization is fully integrated throughout QEMU network services. Mark it as deprecated with no replacement to be provided.

---
 monitor.c     | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 qemu-doc.texi |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
monitor.c +23 -0
index 67c63013bd..c4a9ae5c85 100644
@@ -2089,6 +2089,19 @@ static QAuthZList *find_auth(Monitor *mon, const char *name)
     return QAUTHZ_LIST(obj);
 }
 
+static bool warn_acl;
+static void hmp_warn_acl(void)
+{
+    if (warn_acl) {
+        return;
+    }
+    error_report("The acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove "
+                 "commands are deprecated with no replacement. Authorization "
+                 "for VNC should be performed using the pluggable QAuthZ "
+                 "objects");
+    warn_acl = true;
+}
+
 static void hmp_acl_show(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
 {
     const char *aclname = qdict_get_str(qdict, "aclname");
@@ -2096,6 +2109,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_show(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZListRuleList *rules;
     size_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2119,6 +2134,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_reset(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     const char *aclname = qdict_get_str(qdict, "aclname");
     QAuthZList *auth = find_auth(mon, aclname);
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2137,6 +2154,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_policy(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     int val;
     Error *err = NULL;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2172,6 +2191,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_add(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZListFormat format;
     size_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2227,6 +2248,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_remove(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZList *auth = find_auth(mon, aclname);
     ssize_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
qemu-doc.texi +8 -0
index 5b7e3faab2..c6aad94015 100644
@@ -2938,6 +2938,14 @@ The ``query-cpus'' command is replaced by the ``query-cpus-fast'' command.
 The ``arch'' output member of the ``query-cpus-fast'' command is
 replaced by the ``target'' output member.
 
+@section Human Monitor Protocol (HMP) commands
+
+@subsection acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove (since 3.0.0)
+
+The ``acl_show'', ``acl_reset'', ``acl_policy'', ``acl_add'', and
+``acl_remove'' commands are deprecated with no replacement. Authorization
+for VNC should be performed using the pluggable QAuthZ objects.
+
 @section System emulator devices
 
 @subsection ivshmem (since 2.6.0)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
Reviewed-by on v1 6/6
#17 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 6/6] monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove

Quoted 5 lines · * Daniel P. Berrangé ([email protected]) wrote:

The various ACL related commands are obsolete now that the QAuthZ framework for authorization is fully integrated throughout QEMU network services. Mark it as deprecated with no replacement to be provided.

OK, so I can do all these by using object_add/object_del with the right type and parameters?

but looks OK:

Quoted 96 lines
---
 monitor.c     | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 qemu-doc.texi |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
monitor.c +23 -0
index 67c63013bd..c4a9ae5c85 100644
@@ -2089,6 +2089,19 @@ static QAuthZList *find_auth(Monitor *mon, const char *name)
     return QAUTHZ_LIST(obj);
 }
 
+static bool warn_acl;
+static void hmp_warn_acl(void)
+{
+    if (warn_acl) {
+        return;
+    }
+    error_report("The acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove "
+                 "commands are deprecated with no replacement. Authorization "
+                 "for VNC should be performed using the pluggable QAuthZ "
+                 "objects");
+    warn_acl = true;
+}
+
 static void hmp_acl_show(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
 {
     const char *aclname = qdict_get_str(qdict, "aclname");
@@ -2096,6 +2109,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_show(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZListRuleList *rules;
     size_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2119,6 +2134,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_reset(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     const char *aclname = qdict_get_str(qdict, "aclname");
     QAuthZList *auth = find_auth(mon, aclname);
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2137,6 +2154,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_policy(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     int val;
     Error *err = NULL;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2172,6 +2191,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_add(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZListFormat format;
     size_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2227,6 +2248,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_remove(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZList *auth = find_auth(mon, aclname);
     ssize_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
qemu-doc.texi +8 -0
index 5b7e3faab2..c6aad94015 100644
@@ -2938,6 +2938,14 @@ The ``query-cpus'' command is replaced by the ``query-cpus-fast'' command.
 The ``arch'' output member of the ``query-cpus-fast'' command is
 replaced by the ``target'' output member.
 
+@section Human Monitor Protocol (HMP) commands
+
+@subsection acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove (since 3.0.0)
+
+The ``acl_show'', ``acl_reset'', ``acl_policy'', ``acl_add'', and
+``acl_remove'' commands are deprecated with no replacement. Authorization
+for VNC should be performed using the pluggable QAuthZ objects.
+
 @section System emulator devices
 
 @subsection ivshmem (since 2.6.0)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0

--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK

#18 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 6/6] monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove

Quoted 9 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Quoted 5 lines · * Daniel P. Berrangé ([email protected]) wrote:

The various ACL related commands are obsolete now that the QAuthZ framework for authorization is fully integrated throughout QEMU network services. Mark it as deprecated with no replacement to be provided.

OK, so I can do all these by using object_add/object_del with the right type and parameters?

It is a different paradigm for the way you manage it, but the end result allows the same thing to be achieved, in a more flexible way.

With the old way, we precreated an ACL object for VNC, and then you had to use these commands to add/remove individual match rules and or change the policy, etc. You could never create/delete the ACL itself.

With the new way, we have 4 different ACL implementations (so far) and you can choose which to use. So you create the entire ACL with all its rules populated atomically with object_add. There's no create/delete of individual rules within the ACL, so if you want to change rules you just delete the entire ACL & create it again. It has failsafe to reject in case a client connects between the time you delete and recreate.

One of the ACL impls allows storing the rules in a standalone text file which we monitor with inotify. So in fact using that you can update rules on the fly without needing QEMU interaction - just change the content whenever needed.

Regards,
Daniel

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