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Add authorization support to all network services

PATCH Superseded Daniel P. Berrangé 3 participants 16 messages Oct 9, 2018 – Nov 15, 2018

v3 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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#0 lore raw

v3 cover Add authorization support to all network services

v1: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg04482.html
v2: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg05727.html

This series builds on the core authorization framework:

v5: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-10/msg01613.html

enabling its use with the VNC, chardev, NBD and migration network servers.

In combination with TLS x509 client certificates, this allows these services to whitelist specific clients, which avoids the need to setup restricted child certificate authorities.

In VNC it also allows whitelisting based on SASL user names.

Changed in v3:

- Rebased to latest git master

Changed in v2:

- Document that authz objects are resolved at time of use, not time of network service activation
- Improve docs for tls-authz parameters on services
- Fix 2.13 -> 3.0 version tags
- Remove redundant conditionals around g_strdup
- Fix arg syntax for qemu-nbd s/-/--/
- Remove QAPI (optional) annotation
- Fix some outdated usage example

Based-on: <[email protected]>

Daniel P. Berrangé (6):
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter
chardev: add support for authorization for TLS clients
vnc: allow specifying a custom authorization object name
monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add,
acl_remove

 blockdev-nbd.c        | 11 +++++---
 chardev/char-socket.c | 11 +++++++-
 chardev/char.c        |  3 +++
 hmp.c                 | 11 +++++++-
 include/block/nbd.h   |  4 +--
 migration/migration.c |  8 ++++++
 migration/tls.c       |  2 +-
 monitor.c             | 23 +++++++++++++++++
 nbd/server.c          | 10 ++++----
 qapi/block.json       |  8 +++++-
 qapi/char.json        |  6 +++++
 qapi/migration.json   | 14 ++++++++++-
 qemu-deprecated.texi  | 11 ++++++++
 qemu-nbd.c            | 13 +++++++++-
 qemu-nbd.texi         |  4 +++
 qemu-options.hx       | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 ui/vnc.c              | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 17 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/6 qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is

CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB

use:

  qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                    endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
           --object authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                    O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
           --tls-creds tls0 \
           --tls-authz authz0
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
---
 include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
 nbd/server.c        | 10 +++++-----
 qemu-nbd.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
 qemu-nbd.texi       |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/block/nbd.h +1 -1
index 6a5bfe5d55..d7aa6b24d0 100644
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ void nbd_export_close_all(void);
 
 void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
-                    const char *tlsaclname,
+                    const char *tlsauthz,
                     void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool));
 void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
 void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
nbd/server.c +5 -5
index a1eda0114f..138a35f838 100644
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct NBDClient {
 
     NBDExport *exp;
     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
-    char *tlsaclname;
+    char *tlsauthz;
     QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying data channel */
     QIOChannel *ioc; /* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */
 
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static QIOChannel *nbd_negotiate_handle_starttls(NBDClient *client,
 
     tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(ioc,
                                       client->tlscreds,
-                                      client->tlsaclname,
+                                      client->tlsauthz,
                                       errp);
     if (!tioc) {
         return NULL;
@@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client)
         if (client->tlscreds) {
             object_unref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
         }
-        g_free(client->tlsaclname);
+        g_free(client->tlsauthz);
         if (client->exp) {
             QTAILQ_REMOVE(&client->exp->clients, client, next);
             nbd_export_put(client->exp);
@@ -2403,7 +2403,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
  */
 void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
-                    const char *tlsaclname,
+                    const char *tlsauthz,
                     void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool))
 {
     NBDClient *client;
@@ -2415,7 +2415,7 @@ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
     if (tlscreds) {
         object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
     }
-    client->tlsaclname = g_strdup(tlsaclname);
+    client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
     client->sioc = sioc;
     object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc));
     client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
qemu-nbd.c +12 -1
index e76fe3082a..61fe0fb5b9 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS      261
 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS    262
 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK          263
+#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ      264
 
 #define MBR_SIZE 512
 
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ static int shared = 1;
 static int nb_fds;
 static QIONetListener *server;
 static QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
+static const char *tlsauthz;
 
 static void usage(const char *name)
 {
@@ -354,7 +356,7 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
 
     nb_fds++;
     nbd_update_server_watch();
-    nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, NULL, nbd_client_closed);
+    nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed);
 }
 
 static void nbd_update_server_watch(void)
@@ -532,6 +534,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
         { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
         { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },
         { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
     };
     int ch;
@@ -754,6 +757,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
             g_free(trace_file);
             trace_file = trace_opt_parse(optarg);
             break;
+        case QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ:
+            tlsauthz = optarg;
+            break;
         case QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK:
             fork_process = true;
             break;
@@ -813,6 +819,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
                          error_get_pretty(local_err));
             exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }
+    } else {
+        if (tlsauthz) {
+            error_report("--tls-authz is not permitted without --tls-creds");
+            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+        }
     }
 
     if (disconnect) {
qemu-nbd.texi +4 -0
index 9a84e81eed..7f9503cf05 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ of the TLS credentials object previously created with the --object
 option.
 @item --fork
 Fork off the server process and exit the parent once the server is running.
+@item --tls-authz=ID
+Specify the ID of a qauthz object previously created with the
+--object option. This will be used to authorize connecting users
+against their x509 distinguished name.
 @item -v, --verbose
 Display extra debugging information
 @item -h, --help
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v3 1/6
#2 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/6] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

Quoted 30 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is

CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB

use:

  qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                    endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
           --object authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                    O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
           --tls-creds tls0 \
           --tls-authz authz0
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
Quoted 1 line
#3 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/6] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 18 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is

Quoted 8 lines

CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB

use:

   qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                     endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
            --object authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                     O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \

Missing shell quoting around the space in 'Example Org'. It's also fairly obvious that actual shell commands can't have leading space between \-newline line continuations.

Quoted 22 lines
            --tls-creds tls0 \
            --tls-authz authz0
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
---
  include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
  nbd/server.c        | 10 +++++-----
  qemu-nbd.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
  qemu-nbd.texi       |  4 ++++
  4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

+++ b/qemu-nbd.c

qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS      261
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS    262
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK          263
+#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ      264
 
 

qemu-nbd.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 539

Quoted 6 lines
qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -532,6 +534,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
          { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
          { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
          { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },
          { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
      };

Missing a change to qemu-nbd --help to describe the new option.

Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org
#4 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/6] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

Quoted 23 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 22 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is

CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB

use:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
   qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                     endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
            --object authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                     O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \

Missing shell quoting around the space in 'Example Org'. It's also fairly obvious that actual shell commands can't have leading space between \-newline line continuations.

Yep, leading space is the tradeoff of sticking to sensible line length while maintaining clarity.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 20 lines
            --tls-creds tls0 \
            --tls-authz authz0
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
---
  include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
  nbd/server.c        | 10 +++++-----
  qemu-nbd.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
  qemu-nbd.texi       |  4 ++++
  4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

+++ b/qemu-nbd.c

qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS      261
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS    262
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK          263
+#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ      264
Quoted 9 lines

qemu-nbd.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 539

Quoted 7 lines
qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -532,6 +534,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
          { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
          { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
          { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },
          { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
      };

Missing a change to qemu-nbd --help to describe the new option.

Opps, yes.

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#5 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/6] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients

In reply to Eric Blake
Quoted 52 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 18 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.

This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is

Quoted 8 lines

CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB

use:

   qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                     endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
            --object authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                     O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \

Missing shell quoting around the space in 'Example Org'. It's also fairly obvious that actual shell commands can't have leading space between \-newline line continuations.

Quoted 19 lines
            --tls-creds tls0 \
            --tls-authz authz0
	   ....other qemu-nbd args...
---
  include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
  nbd/server.c        | 10 +++++-----
  qemu-nbd.c          | 13 ++++++++++++-
  qemu-nbd.texi       |  4 ++++
  4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

+++ b/qemu-nbd.c

qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS      261
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS    262
  #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK          263
+#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ      264
Quoted 9 lines

qemu-nbd.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 539

Quoted 7 lines
qemu-nbd.c +1 -0
@@ -532,6 +534,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
          { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS },
          { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' },
          { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
+        { "tls-authz", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ },
          { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
      };

Missing a change to qemu-nbd --help to describe the new option.

Yes, and it should be 'required_argument' too, not 'no_argument'.

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#6 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/6 nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.

First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the 'object-add' command:

   {
     'execute': 'object-add',
     'arguments': {
       'qom-type': 'authz-list',
       'id': 'authz0',
       'parameters': {
         'policy': 'deny',
         'rules': [
           {
             'match': '*CN=fred',
             'policy': 'allow'
           }
         ]
       }
     }
   }

They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:

   {
     'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
     'arguments': {
       'addr': {
           'type': 'inet',
           'host': '127.0.0.1',
           'port': '9000'
       },
       'tls-creds': 'tls0',
       'tls-authz': 'authz0'
     }
   }
---
 blockdev-nbd.c      | 11 ++++++++---
 hmp.c               |  2 +-
 include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
 qapi/block.json     |  8 +++++++-
 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
blockdev-nbd.c +8 -3
index 1d170c80b8..c10d6c0c81 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 typedef struct NBDServerData {
     QIONetListener *listener;
     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
+    char *tlsauthz;
 } NBDServerData;
 
 static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
                        gpointer opaque)
 {
     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
-    nbd_client_new(cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, NULL,
+    nbd_client_new(cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
                    nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
 }
 
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)
     if (server->tlscreds) {
         object_unref(OBJECT(server->tlscreds));
     }
+    g_free(server->tlsauthz);
 
     g_free(server);
 }
@@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ static QCryptoTLSCreds *nbd_get_tls_creds(const char *id, Error **errp)
 
 
 void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
-                      Error **errp)
+                      const char *tls_authz, Error **errp)
 {
     if (nbd_server) {
         error_setg(errp, "NBD server already running");
@@ -117,6 +119,8 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
         }
     }
 
+    nbd_server->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tls_authz);
+
     qio_net_listener_set_client_func(nbd_server->listener,
                                      nbd_accept,
                                      NULL,
@@ -131,11 +135,12 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
 
 void qmp_nbd_server_start(SocketAddressLegacy *addr,
                           bool has_tls_creds, const char *tls_creds,
+                          bool has_tls_authz, const char *tls_authz,
                           Error **errp)
 {
     SocketAddress *addr_flat = socket_address_flatten(addr);
 
-    nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, errp);
+    nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, errp);
     qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr_flat);
 }
 
hmp.c +1 -1
index 61ef120423..7fc5a6502f 100644
@@ -2300,7 +2300,7 @@ void hmp_nbd_server_start(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, &local_err);
+    nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, &local_err);
     qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
     if (local_err != NULL) {
         goto exit;
include/block/nbd.h +1 -1
index d7aa6b24d0..6cb336b45a 100644
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
 void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
 
 void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
-                      Error **errp);
+                      const char *tls_authz, Error **errp);
 
 void nbd_export_bitmap(NBDExport *exp, const char *bitmap,
                        const char *bitmap_export_name, Error **errp);
qapi/block.json +7 -1
index 11f01f28ef..812a9b1917 100644
@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@
 #
 # @addr: Address on which to listen.
 # @tls-creds: (optional) ID of the TLS credentials object. Since 2.6
+# @tls-authz: ID of the QAuthZ authorization object used to validate
+#             the client's x509 distinguished name. This object is
+#             is only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and
+#             recreated on the fly while the NBD server is active.
+#             If missing, it will default to denying access. Since 3.1
 #
 # Returns: error if the server is already running.
 #
@@ -232,7 +237,8 @@
 ##
 { 'command': 'nbd-server-start',
   'data': { 'addr': 'SocketAddressLegacy',
-            '*tls-creds': 'str'} }
+            '*tls-creds': 'str',
+            '*tls-authz': 'str'} }
 
 ##
 # @nbd-server-add:
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v3 2/6
#7 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 2/6] nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command

Quoted 41 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.

First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the 'object-add' command:

   {
     'execute': 'object-add',
     'arguments': {
       'qom-type': 'authz-list',
       'id': 'authz0',
       'parameters': {
         'policy': 'deny',
         'rules': [
           {
             'match': '*CN=fred',
             'policy': 'allow'
           }
         ]
       }
     }
   }

They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:

   {
     'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
     'arguments': {
       'addr': {
           'type': 'inet',
           'host': '127.0.0.1',
           'port': '9000'
       },
       'tls-creds': 'tls0',
       'tls-authz': 'authz0'
     }
   }
Quoted 1 line

similar to previous patch in series.

#8 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/6 migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The QEMU instance that runs as the server for the migration data transport (ie the target QEMU) needs to be able to configure access control so it can prevent unauthorized clients initiating an incoming migration. This adds a new 'tls-authz' migration parameter that is used to provide the QOM ID of a QAuthZ subclass instance that provides the access control check. This is checked against the x509 certificate obtained during the TLS handshake.

For example, when starting a QEMU for incoming migration, it is possible to give an example identity of the source QEMU that is intended to be connecting later:

  $QEMU \
     -monitor stdio \
     -incoming defer \
     ...other args...

  (qemu) object_add tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
             endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
  (qemu) object_add authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
             O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
  (qemu) migrate_incoming tcp:localhost:9000
---
 hmp.c                 |  9 +++++++++
 migration/migration.c |  8 ++++++++
 migration/tls.c       |  2 +-
 qapi/migration.json   | 14 +++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hmp.c +9 -0
index 7fc5a6502f..52ee5e5444 100644
@@ -396,6 +396,9 @@ void hmp_info_migrate_parameters(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         monitor_printf(mon, "%s: %" PRIu64 "\n",
             MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_POSTCOPY_BANDWIDTH),
             params->max_postcopy_bandwidth);
+        monitor_printf(mon, " %s: '%s'\n",
+            MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ),
+            params->has_tls_authz ? params->tls_authz : "");
     }
 
     qapi_free_MigrationParameters(params);
@@ -1702,6 +1705,12 @@ void hmp_migrate_set_parameter(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         p->tls_hostname->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
         visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_hostname->u.s, &err);
         break;
+    case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ:
+        p->has_tls_authz = true;
+        p->tls_authz = g_new0(StrOrNull, 1);
+        p->tls_authz->type = QTYPE_QSTRING;
+        visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_authz->u.s, &err);
+        break;
     case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_BANDWIDTH:
         p->has_max_bandwidth = true;
         /*
migration/migration.c +8 -0
index d6ae879dc8..f8d0251885 100644
@@ -685,6 +685,8 @@ MigrationParameters *qmp_query_migrate_parameters(Error **errp)
     params->tls_creds = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_creds);
     params->has_tls_hostname = true;
     params->tls_hostname = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_hostname);
+    params->has_tls_authz = true;
+    params->tls_authz = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_authz);
     params->has_max_bandwidth = true;
     params->max_bandwidth = s->parameters.max_bandwidth;
     params->has_downtime_limit = true;
@@ -1188,6 +1190,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp)
         s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s);
     }
 
+    if (params->has_tls_authz) {
+        g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz);
+        assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING);
+        s->parameters.tls_authz = g_strdup(params->tls_authz->u.s);
+    }
+
     if (params->has_max_bandwidth) {
         s->parameters.max_bandwidth = params->max_bandwidth;
         if (s->to_dst_file) {
migration/tls.c +1 -1
index 3b9e8c9263..5171afc6c4 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ void migration_tls_channel_process_incoming(MigrationState *s,
 
     tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(
         ioc, creds,
-        NULL, /* XXX pass ACL name */
+        s->parameters.tls_authz,
         errp);
     if (!tioc) {
         return;
qapi/migration.json +13 -1
index 6e8c21258a..9c656effb0 100644
@@ -519,6 +519,12 @@
 #                hostname must be provided so that the server's x509
 #                certificate identity can be validated. (Since 2.7)
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name.
+#             This object is only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted
+#             and recreated on the fly while the migration server is active.
+#             If missing, it will default to denying access (Since 3.1)
+#
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -560,7 +566,7 @@
   'data': ['compress-level', 'compress-threads', 'decompress-threads',
            'compress-wait-thread',
            'cpu-throttle-initial', 'cpu-throttle-increment',
-           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'max-bandwidth',
+           'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'tls-authz', 'max-bandwidth',
            'downtime-limit', 'x-checkpoint-delay', 'block-incremental',
            'x-multifd-channels', 'x-multifd-page-count',
            'xbzrle-cache-size', 'max-postcopy-bandwidth',
@@ -658,6 +664,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'int',
             '*tls-creds': 'StrOrNull',
             '*tls-hostname': 'StrOrNull',
+            '*tls-authz': 'StrOrNull',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'int',
             '*downtime-limit': 'int',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'int',
@@ -727,6 +734,10 @@
 #                associated with the migration URI, if any. (Since 2.9)
 #                Note: 2.8 reports this by omitting tls-hostname instead.
 #
+# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control
+#             checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since
+#             3.1)
+#
 # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in
 #                 bytes per second. (Since 2.8)
 #
@@ -774,6 +785,7 @@
             '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'uint8',
             '*tls-creds': 'str',
             '*tls-hostname': 'str',
+            '*tls-authz': 'str',
             '*max-bandwidth': 'size',
             '*downtime-limit': 'uint64',
             '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'uint32',
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v3 3/6
#9 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/6] migration: add support for a "tls-authz" migration parameter

Quoted 25 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The QEMU instance that runs as the server for the migration data transport (ie the target QEMU) needs to be able to configure access control so it can prevent unauthorized clients initiating an incoming migration. This adds a new 'tls-authz' migration parameter that is used to provide the QOM ID of a QAuthZ subclass instance that provides the access control check. This is checked against the x509 certificate obtained during the TLS handshake.

For example, when starting a QEMU for incoming migration, it is possible to give an example identity of the source QEMU that is intended to be connecting later:

  $QEMU \
     -monitor stdio \
     -incoming defer \
     ...other args...

  (qemu) object_add tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
             endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
  (qemu) object_add authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
             O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
  (qemu) migrate_incoming tcp:localhost:9000
Quoted 1 line
#10 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/6 chardev: add support for authorization for TLS clients

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use a chardev server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the chardev server. This is still a fairly low bar.

This adds a 'tls-authz=OBJECT-ID' option to the socket chardev backend which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the check will not be permitted to use the chardev server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name contains 'CN=fred', you would use:

  $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
        -object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
        -chardev socket,host=127.0.0.1,port=9000,server,\
	         tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0 \
        ...other qemu args...
---
 chardev/char-socket.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 chardev/char.c        |  3 +++
 qapi/char.json        |  6 ++++++
 qemu-options.hx       |  9 +++++++--
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
chardev/char-socket.c +10 -1
index a75b46d9fe..ab121e1e30 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct {
     QIONetListener *listener;
     GSource *hup_source;
     QCryptoTLSCreds *tls_creds;
+    char *tls_authz;
     int connected;
     int max_size;
     int do_telnetopt;
@@ -737,7 +738,7 @@ static void tcp_chr_tls_init(Chardev *chr)
     if (s->is_listen) {
         tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(
             s->ioc, s->tls_creds,
-            NULL, /* XXX Use an ACL */
+            s->tls_authz,
             &err);
     } else {
         tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_client(
@@ -889,6 +890,7 @@ static void char_socket_finalize(Object *obj)
     if (s->tls_creds) {
         object_unref(OBJECT(s->tls_creds));
     }
+    g_free(s->tls_authz);
 
     qemu_chr_be_event(chr, CHR_EVENT_CLOSED);
 }
@@ -994,6 +996,7 @@ static void qmp_chardev_open_socket(Chardev *chr,
             }
         }
     }
+    s->tls_authz = g_strdup(sock->tls_authz);
 
     s->addr = addr = socket_address_flatten(sock->addr);
 
@@ -1075,6 +1078,7 @@ static void qemu_chr_parse_socket(QemuOpts *opts, ChardevBackend *backend,
     const char *fd = qemu_opt_get(opts, "fd");
     const char *tls_creds = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-creds");
     SocketAddressLegacy *addr;
+    const char *tls_authz = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-authz");
     ChardevSocket *sock;
 
     if ((!!path + !!fd + !!host) != 1) {
@@ -1103,6 +1107,10 @@ static void qemu_chr_parse_socket(QemuOpts *opts, ChardevBackend *backend,
     } else {
         g_assert_not_reached();
     }
+    if (tls_authz && !tls_creds) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Authorization can only be used when TLS is enabled");
+        return;
+    }
 
     sock = backend->u.socket.data = g_new0(ChardevSocket, 1);
     qemu_chr_parse_common(opts, qapi_ChardevSocket_base(sock));
@@ -1120,6 +1128,7 @@ static void qemu_chr_parse_socket(QemuOpts *opts, ChardevBackend *backend,
     sock->has_reconnect = true;
     sock->reconnect = reconnect;
     sock->tls_creds = g_strdup(tls_creds);
+    sock->tls_authz = g_strdup(tls_authz);
 
     addr = g_new0(SocketAddressLegacy, 1);
     if (path) {
chardev/char.c +3 -0
index e115166995..987474a950 100644
@@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ QemuOptsList qemu_chardev_opts = {
         },{
             .name = "tls-creds",
             .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
+        },{
+            .name = "tls-authz",
+            .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
         },{
             .name = "width",
             .type = QEMU_OPT_NUMBER,
qapi/char.json +6 -0
index b7b2a05766..244213c075 100644
@@ -243,6 +243,11 @@
 # @addr: socket address to listen on (server=true)
 #        or connect to (server=false)
 # @tls-creds: the ID of the TLS credentials object (since 2.6)
+# @tls-authz: the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object against which
+#             the client's x509 distinguished name will validated. This
+#             object is only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted
+#             and recreated on the fly while the chardev server is active.
+#             If missing, it will default to denying access (since 3.1)
 # @server: create server socket (default: true)
 # @wait: wait for incoming connection on server
 #        sockets (default: false).
@@ -260,6 +265,7 @@
 ##
 { 'struct': 'ChardevSocket', 'data': { 'addr'       : 'SocketAddressLegacy',
                                      '*tls-creds'  : 'str',
+                                     '*tls-authz'  : 'str',
                                      '*server'    : 'bool',
                                      '*wait'      : 'bool',
                                      '*nodelay'   : 'bool',
qemu-options.hx +7 -2
index cc61512db7..5079074088 100644
@@ -2410,7 +2410,7 @@ DEF("chardev", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_chardev,
     "-chardev null,id=id[,mux=on|off][,logfile=PATH][,logappend=on|off]\n"
     "-chardev socket,id=id[,host=host],port=port[,to=to][,ipv4][,ipv6][,nodelay][,reconnect=seconds]\n"
     "         [,server][,nowait][,telnet][,reconnect=seconds][,mux=on|off]\n"
-    "         [,logfile=PATH][,logappend=on|off][,tls-creds=ID] (tcp)\n"
+    "         [,logfile=PATH][,logappend=on|off][,tls-creds=ID][,tls-authz=ID], (tcp)\n"
     "-chardev socket,id=id,path=path[,server][,nowait][,telnet][,reconnect=seconds]\n"
     "         [,mux=on|off][,logfile=PATH][,logappend=on|off] (unix)\n"
     "-chardev udp,id=id[,host=host],port=port[,localaddr=localaddr]\n"
@@ -2539,7 +2539,7 @@ The available backends are:
 A void device. This device will not emit any data, and will drop any data it
 receives. The null backend does not take any options.
 
-@item -chardev socket,id=@var{id}[,@var{TCP options} or @var{unix options}][,server][,nowait][,telnet][,reconnect=@var{seconds}][,tls-creds=@var{id}]
+@item -chardev socket,id=@var{id}[,@var{TCP options} or @var{unix options}][,server][,nowait][,telnet][,reconnect=@var{seconds}][,tls-creds=@var{id}][,tls-authz=@var{id}]
 
 Create a two-way stream socket, which can be either a TCP or a unix socket. A
 unix socket will be created if @option{path} is specified. Behaviour is
@@ -2562,6 +2562,11 @@ and specifies the id of the TLS credentials to use for the handshake. The
 credentials must be previously created with the @option{-object tls-creds}
 argument.
 
+@option{tls-auth} provides the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object against
+which the client's x509 distinguished name will validated. This object is only
+resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and recreated on the fly while the
+chardev server is active. If missing, it will default to denying access.
+
 TCP and unix socket options are given below:
 
 @table @option
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v3 4/6
#11 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 4/6] chardev: add support for authorization for TLS clients

Quoted 26 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use a chardev server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the chardev server. This is still a fairly low bar.

This adds a 'tls-authz=OBJECT-ID' option to the socket chardev backend which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the check will not be permitted to use the chardev server.

For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name contains 'CN=fred', you would use:

  $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
        -object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
                O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
        -chardev socket,host=127.0.0.1,port=9000,server,\
	         tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0 \
        ...other qemu args...
Quoted 1 line
#12 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/6 vnc: allow specifying a custom authorization object name

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The VNC server has historically had support for ACLs to check both the SASL username and the TLS x509 distinguished name. The VNC server was responsible for creating the initial ACL, and the client app was then responsible for populating it with rules using the HMP 'acl_add' command.

This is not satisfactory for a variety of reasons. There is no way to populate the ACLs from the command line, users are forced to use the HMP. With multiple network services all supporting TLS and ACLs now, it is desirable to be able to define a single ACL that is referenced by all services.

To address these limitations, two new options are added to the VNC server CLI. The 'tls-authz' option takes the ID of a QAuthZ object to use for checking TLS x509 distinguished names, and the 'sasl-authz' option takes the ID of another object to use for checking SASL usernames.

In this example, we setup two authorization rules. The first allows any client with a certificate issued by the 'RedHat' organization in the 'London' locality. The second ACL allows clients with either the '[email protected]' or '[email protected]' kerberos usernames. Both checks must pass for the user to be allowed.

    $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                  endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
                  rules.0.match=O=RedHat,,L=London,rules.0.policy=allow \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz1,policy=deny,\
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
          -vnc 0.0.0.0:1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0,
	       sasl,sasl-authz=authz1 \
          ...other QEMU args...
---
 qemu-deprecated.texi |  5 ++++
 qemu-options.hx      | 35 ++++++++++++++++++--------
 ui/vnc.c             | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
qemu-deprecated.texi +5 -0
index 16ff946b55..d74d9ea02c 100644
@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ for these file types is 'host_cdrom' or 'host_device' as appropriate.
 The @option{name} parameter of the @option{-net} option is a synonym
 for the @option{id} parameter, which should now be used instead.
 
+@subsection -vnc acl (since 3.1.0)
+
+The @code{acl} option to the @code{-vnc} argument has been replaced
+by the @code{tls-authz} and @code{sasl-authz} options.
+
 @section QEMU Machine Protocol (QMP) commands
 
 @subsection block-dirty-bitmap-add "autoload" parameter (since 2.12.0)
qemu-options.hx +25 -10
index 5079074088..6c3eef8b32 100644
@@ -1626,6 +1626,14 @@ will cause the VNC server socket to enable the VeNCrypt auth
 mechanism.  The credentials should have been previously created
 using the @option{-object tls-creds} argument.
 
+@item tls-authz=@var{ID}
+
+Provides the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object against which
+the client's x509 distinguished name will validated. This object is
+only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and recreated on the
+fly while the VNC server is active. If missing, it will default
+to denying access.
+
 @item sasl
 
 Require that the client use SASL to authenticate with the VNC server.
@@ -1641,18 +1649,25 @@ ensures a data encryption preventing compromise of authentication
 credentials. See the @ref{vnc_security} section for details on using
 SASL authentication.
 
+@item sasl-authz=@var{ID}
+
+Provides the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object against which
+the client's SASL username will validated. This object is
+only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and recreated on the
+fly while the VNC server is active. If missing, it will default
+to denying access.
+
 @item acl
 
-Turn on access control lists for checking of the x509 client certificate
-and SASL party. For x509 certs, the ACL check is made against the
-certificate's distinguished name. This is something that looks like
-@code{C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob}. For SASL party, the ACL check is
-made against the username, which depending on the SASL plugin, may
-include a realm component, eg @code{bob} or @code{bob@@EXAMPLE.COM}.
-When the @option{acl} flag is set, the initial access list will be
-empty, with a @code{deny} policy. Thus no one will be allowed to
-use the VNC server until the ACLs have been loaded. This can be
-achieved using the @code{acl} monitor command.
+Legacy method for enabling authorization of clients against the
+x509 distinguished name and SASL username. It results in the creation
+of two @code{authz-list} objects with IDs of @code{vnc.username} and
+@code{vnc.x509dname}. The rules for these objects must be configured
+with the HMP ACL commands.
+
+This option is deprecated and should no longer be used. The new
+@option{sasl-authz} and @option{tls-authz} options are a
+replacement.
 
 @item lossy
 
ui/vnc.c +49 -9

90 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v3 5/6
#13 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 5/6] vnc: allow specifying a custom authorization object name

Quoted 35 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>

The VNC server has historically had support for ACLs to check both the SASL username and the TLS x509 distinguished name. The VNC server was responsible for creating the initial ACL, and the client app was then responsible for populating it with rules using the HMP 'acl_add' command.

This is not satisfactory for a variety of reasons. There is no way to populate the ACLs from the command line, users are forced to use the HMP. With multiple network services all supporting TLS and ACLs now, it is desirable to be able to define a single ACL that is referenced by all services.

To address these limitations, two new options are added to the VNC server CLI. The 'tls-authz' option takes the ID of a QAuthZ object to use for checking TLS x509 distinguished names, and the 'sasl-authz' option takes the ID of another object to use for checking SASL usernames.

In this example, we setup two authorization rules. The first allows any client with a certificate issued by the 'RedHat' organization in the 'London' locality. The second ACL allows clients with either the '[email protected]' or '[email protected]' kerberos usernames. Both checks must pass for the user to be allowed.

    $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
                  endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\
                  rules.0.match=O=RedHat,,L=London,rules.0.policy=allow \
          -object authz-simple,id=authz1,policy=deny,\
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
                  [email protected],rules.0.policy=allow \
          -vnc 0.0.0.0:1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0,
	       sasl,sasl-authz=authz1 \
          ...other QEMU args...
Quoted 1 line
#14 lore raw

PATCH v3 6/6 monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

The various ACL related commands are obsolete now that the QAuthZ framework for authorization is fully integrated throughout QEMU network services. Mark it as deprecated with no replacement to be provided.

Authorization is now provided by using 'object_add' together with the 'tls-authz' or 'sasl-authz' parameters to the VNC server, and equivalent for other network services.

---
 monitor.c            | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 qemu-deprecated.texi |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
monitor.c +23 -0
index abedc6263f..8144f304c4 100644
@@ -2056,6 +2056,19 @@ static QAuthZList *find_auth(Monitor *mon, const char *name)
     return QAUTHZ_LIST(obj);
 }
 
+static bool warn_acl;
+static void hmp_warn_acl(void)
+{
+    if (warn_acl) {
+        return;
+    }
+    error_report("The acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove "
+                 "commands are deprecated with no replacement. Authorization "
+                 "for VNC should be performed using the pluggable QAuthZ "
+                 "objects");
+    warn_acl = true;
+}
+
 static void hmp_acl_show(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
 {
     const char *aclname = qdict_get_str(qdict, "aclname");
@@ -2063,6 +2076,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_show(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZListRuleList *rules;
     size_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2086,6 +2101,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_reset(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     const char *aclname = qdict_get_str(qdict, "aclname");
     QAuthZList *auth = find_auth(mon, aclname);
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2104,6 +2121,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_policy(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     int val;
     Error *err = NULL;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2139,6 +2158,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_add(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZListFormat format;
     size_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
@@ -2194,6 +2215,8 @@ static void hmp_acl_remove(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     QAuthZList *auth = find_auth(mon, aclname);
     ssize_t i = 0;
 
+    hmp_warn_acl();
+
     if (!auth) {
         return;
     }
qemu-deprecated.texi +6 -0
index d74d9ea02c..dc6b1909e0 100644
@@ -121,6 +121,12 @@ replaced by the ``target'' output member.
 The @option{[hub_id name]} parameter tuple of the 'hostfwd_add' and
 'hostfwd_remove' HMP commands has been replaced by @option{netdev_id}.
 
+@subsection acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove (since 3.1)
+
+The ``acl_show'', ``acl_reset'', ``acl_policy'', ``acl_add'', and
+``acl_remove'' commands are deprecated with no replacement. Authorization
+for VNC should be performed using the pluggable QAuthZ objects.
+
 @section System emulator devices
 
 @subsection ivshmem (since 2.6.0)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v3 6/6
#15 lore raw

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 6/6] monitor: deprecate acl_show, acl_reset, acl_policy, acl_add, acl_remove

Quoted 9 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

The various ACL related commands are obsolete now that the QAuthZ framework for authorization is fully integrated throughout QEMU network services. Mark it as deprecated with no replacement to be provided.

Authorization is now provided by using 'object_add' together with the 'tls-authz' or 'sasl-authz' parameters to the VNC server, and equivalent for other network services.