ALSA: emux_hwdep: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
PATCH 1/1 ALSA: emux_hwdep: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
--- sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c +5 -1
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include "emux_voice.h" +#include <linux/nospec.h> #define TMP_CLIENT_ID 0x1001
@@ -66,13 +67,16 @@ snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode(struct snd_emux *emu, void __user *arg)return -EFAULT ;if (info.mode <0 || info.mode >=EMUX_MD_END )return -EINVAL ; + info.mode =array_index_nospec (info.mode,EMUX_MD_END );if (info.port <0 ) {for (i =0 ; i < emu->num_ports; i++) emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls[info.mode] = info.value; }else { -if (info.port < emu->num_ports) +if (info.port < emu->num_ports) { + info.port =array_index_nospec (info.port, emu->num_ports); emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls[info.mode] = info.value; + } }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Hi,
[This is an automated email]
This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag. The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all
The bot has tested the following trees: v4.19.8, v4.14.87, v4.9.144, v4.4.166, v3.18.128,
v4.19.8: Build OK!
v4.14.87: Build OK!
v4.9.144: Build OK!
v4.4.166: Build OK!
v3.18.128: Build failed! Errors:
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:27:10: fatal error: linux/nospec.h: No such file or directory
How should we proceed with this patch?
--
Thanks,
Sasha
Quoted 15 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva
info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode()warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode()warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap)sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode()warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and
emu->portptrs.
Quoted 8 lines
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Applied now (with moving the linux/nospec.h in a more appropriate line).
thanks,
Takashi