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ALSA: emux_hwdep: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

PATCH In review Gustavo A. R. Silva 3 participants 3 messages Dec 12, 2018 – Dec 13, 2018 Sound

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PATCH 1/1 ALSA: emux_hwdep: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

---
 sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c +5 -1
index e557946718a9..a0d5cd99572f 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "emux_voice.h"
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #define TMP_CLIENT_ID	0x1001
 
@@ -66,13 +67,16 @@ snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode(struct snd_emux *emu, void __user *arg)
 		return -EFAULT;
 	if (info.mode < 0 || info.mode >= EMUX_MD_END)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	info.mode = array_index_nospec(info.mode, EMUX_MD_END);
 
 	if (info.port < 0) {
 		for (i = 0; i < emu->num_ports; i++)
 			emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls[info.mode] = info.value;
 	} else {
-		if (info.port < emu->num_ports)
+		if (info.port < emu->num_ports) {
+			info.port = array_index_nospec(info.port, emu->num_ports);
 			emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls[info.mode] = info.value;
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

Hi,

[This is an automated email]

This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag. The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all

The bot has tested the following trees: v4.19.8, v4.14.87, v4.9.144, v4.4.166, v3.18.128,

v4.19.8: Build OK!
v4.14.87: Build OK!
v4.9.144: Build OK!
v4.4.166: Build OK!
v3.18.128: Build failed! Errors:
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:27:10: fatal error: linux/nospec.h: No such file or directory

How should we proceed with this patch?

--
Thanks,
Sasha

#2 lore raw
In reply to Gustavo A. R. Silva
Quoted 15 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva

info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs.

Quoted 8 lines

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Applied now (with moving the linux/nospec.h in a more appropriate line).

thanks,

Takashi