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phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

PATCH Applied Gustavo A. R. Silva 3 participants 3 messages Dec 21, 2018 – Dec 22, 2018

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PATCH 1/1 phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

---
 net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/phonet/af_phonet.c +3 -0
index 3b0ef691f5b1..d4b2abd78858 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #include <net/phonet/phonet.h>
 #include <net/phonet/pn_dev.h>
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 /* Transport protocol registration */
 static const struct phonet_protocol *proto_tab[PHONET_NPROTO] __read_mostly;
 
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct phonet_protocol *phonet_proto_get(unsigned int protocol)
 
 	if (protocol >= PHONET_NPROTO)
 		return NULL;
+	protocol = array_index_nospec(protocol, PHONET_NPROTO);
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	pp = rcu_dereference(proto_tab[protocol]);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Le vendredi 21 décembre 2018, 23:41:17 EET Gustavo A. R. Silva a écrit :

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

No objections but AFAIR, only privileged userspace can trigger that code so the impact is kinda limited.

Signature · 1 line
Rémi Denis-Courmont
maintainer Applied
#2 lore raw
In reply to Gustavo A. R. Silva

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 15:41:17 -0600

Quoted 9 lines

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.

Quoted 7 lines

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Applied, thanks.