phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
--- net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/phonet/af_phonet.c +3 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@#include <net/phonet/phonet.h> #include <net/phonet/pn_dev.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> +/* Transport protocol registration */ static const struct phonet_protocol *proto_tab[PHONET_NPROTO ]__read_mostly ;
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct phonet_protocol *phonet_proto_get(unsigned int protocol)if (protocol >=PHONET_NPROTO )return NULL ; + protocol =array_index_nospec (protocol,PHONET_NPROTO );rcu_read_lock (); pp =rcu_dereference (proto_tab[protocol]);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 2 lines · Le vendredi 21 décembre 2018, 23:41:17 EET Gustavo A. R. Silva a écrit :
protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
No objections but AFAIR, only privileged userspace can trigger that code so the impact is kinda limited.
Signature · 1 line
Rémi Denis-Courmont
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 15:41:17 -0600
Quoted 9 lines
protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48phonet_proto_get()warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index
proto_tab.
Quoted 7 lines
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks.