nbd: support for authorization control on TLS connections
v6 cover nbd: support for authorization control on TLS connections
This series provides the NBD parts of the authorization control series previously posted as:
v1: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg04482.html
v2: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg05727.html
v3: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-10/msg01639.html
v4: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2019-02/msg04319.html
Then separated for merge:
v5: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2019-02/msg07347.html
The core authz framework is now merged & these patches have all had positive review. Thus these NBD parts are ready to go into the NBD maintainer's tree, should the maintainer consider them acceptable.
Changed in v6:
- Fix qapi annotations
- Add qemu-nbd example
- Reject authz parameter with --list
Daniel P. Berrangé (3):
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
nbd: fix outdated qapi docs syntax for tls-creds
blockdev-nbd.c | 11 ++++++++--- hmp.c | 2 +- include/block/nbd.h | 4 ++-- nbd/server.c | 10 +++++----- qapi/block.json | 10 ++++++++-- qemu-nbd.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- qemu-nbd.texi | 11 +++++++++-- tests/qemu-iotests/233 | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tests/qemu-iotests/233.out | 11 +++++++++++ 9 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 1/3 qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
--- include/block/nbd.h | 2 +- nbd/server.c | 10 +++++----- qemu-nbd.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- qemu-nbd.texi | 11 +++++++++-- tests/qemu-iotests/233 | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tests/qemu-iotests/233.out | 11 +++++++++++ 6 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/block/nbd.h +1 -1
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ void nbd_export_close_all(void);void nbd_client_new (QIOChannelSocket *sioc,QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds, -const char *tlsaclname, +const char *tlsauthz,void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *,bool ));void nbd_client_get (NBDClient *client);void nbd_client_put (NBDClient *client);
nbd/server.c +5 -5
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct NBDClient {NBDExport *exp;QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds; -char *tlsaclname; +char *tlsauthz;QIOChannelSocket *sioc;/* The underlying data channel */ QIOChannel *ioc;/* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static QIOChannel *nbd_negotiate_handle_starttls(NBDClient *client, tioc =qio_channel_tls_new_server (ioc, client->tlscreds, - client->tlsaclname, + client->tlsauthz, errp);if (!tioc) {return NULL ;
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client)if (client->tlscreds) {object_unref (OBJECT (client->tlscreds)); } -g_free (client->tlsaclname); +g_free (client->tlsauthz);if (client->exp) {QTAILQ_REMOVE (&client->exp->clients, client, next);nbd_export_put (client->exp);
@@ -2425,7 +2425,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)*/ void nbd_client_new (QIOChannelSocket *sioc,QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds, -const char *tlsaclname, +const char *tlsauthz,void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *,bool )) {NBDClient *client;
@@ -2437,7 +2437,7 @@ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,if (tlscreds) {object_ref (OBJECT (client->tlscreds)); } - client->tlsaclname =g_strdup (tlsaclname); + client->tlsauthz =g_strdup (tlsauthz); client->sioc = sioc;object_ref (OBJECT (client->sioc)); client->ioc =QIO_CHANNEL (sioc);
qemu-nbd.c +17 -1
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS 261#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS 262#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK 263 +#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ 264#define MBR_SIZE 512
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static int shared = 1;static int nb_fds;static QIONetListener *server;static QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds; +static const char *tlsauthz;static void usage (const char *name) {
@@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ static void usage(const char *name)" --object type,id=ID,... define an object such as 'secret' for providing\n" " passwords and/or encryption keys\n" " --tls-creds=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide TLS\n" +" --tls-authz=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide authorization\n" " -T, --trace [[enable=]<pattern>][,events=<file>][,file=<file>]\n" " specify tracing options\n" " --fork fork off the server process and exit the parent\n"
@@ -452,7 +455,7 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc, nb_fds++;nbd_update_server_watch (); -nbd_client_new (cioc, tlscreds,NULL , nbd_client_closed); +nbd_client_new (cioc, tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed); }static void nbd_update_server_watch (void )
@@ -643,6 +646,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { "export-name", required_argument, NULL, 'x' }, { "description", required_argument, NULL, 'D' }, { "tls-creds", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, + { "tls-authz", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ }, { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS }, { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' }, { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK },
@@ -862,6 +866,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)g_free (trace_file); trace_file =trace_opt_parse (optarg);break ; +case QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ : + tlsauthz = optarg; +break ;case QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK : fork_process = true;break ;
@@ -934,12 +941,21 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)error_report ("TLS is not supported with a host device" );exit (EXIT_FAILURE ); } +if (tlsauthz && list) { +error_report ("TLS authorization is incompatible with export list" ); +exit (EXIT_FAILURE ); + } tlscreds =nbd_get_tls_creds (tlscredsid, list, &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report ("Failed to get TLS creds %s" ,error_get_pretty (local_err));exit (EXIT_FAILURE ); } + }else { +if (tlsauthz) { +error_report ("--tls-authz is not permitted without --tls-creds" ); +exit (EXIT_FAILURE ); + } }if (list) {
qemu-nbd.texi +9 -2
@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ option; or provide the credentials needed for connecting as a client in list mode. @item --fork Fork off the server process and exit the parent once the server is running. +@item --tls-authz=ID +Specify the ID of a qauthz object previously created with the +--object option. This will be used to authorize connecting users +against their x509 distinguished name. @item -v, --verbose Display extra debugging information. @item -h, --help
@@ -142,13 +146,16 @@ qemu-nbd -f qcow2 file.qcow2 @end example Start a long-running server listening with encryption on port 10810, -and require clients to have a correct X.509 certificate to connect to +and whitelist clients with a specific X.509 certificate to connect to a 1 megabyte subset of a raw file, using the export name 'subset': @example qemu-nbd \ --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,endpoint=server,dir=/path/to/qemutls \ - --tls-creds tls0 -t -x subset -p 10810 \ + --object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\ + O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \ + --tls-creds tls0 --tls-authz auth0 \ + -t -x subset -p 10810 \ --image-opts driver=raw,offset=1M,size=1M,file.driver=file,file.filename=file.raw @end example
tests/qemu-iotests/233 +28 -3
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ tls_x509_create_root_ca "ca2" tls_x509_create_server "ca1" "server1" tls_x509_create_client "ca1" "client1" tls_x509_create_client "ca2" "client2" +tls_x509_create_client "ca1" "client3" echo echo "== preparing image =="
@@ -91,11 +92,15 @@ $QEMU_NBD_PROG -L -b $nbd_tcp_addr -p $nbd_tcp_port echo echo "== check TLS works ==" -obj=tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client1,endpoint=client,id=tls0 -$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts --object $obj \ +obj1=tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client1,endpoint=client,id=tls0 +obj2=tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client3,endpoint=client,id=tls0 +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts --object $obj1 \ driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 \ 2>&1 | sed "s/$nbd_tcp_port/PORT/g" -$QEMU_NBD_PROG -L -b $nbd_tcp_addr -p $nbd_tcp_port --object $obj \ +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts --object $obj2 \ + driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 \ + 2>&1 | sed "s/$nbd_tcp_port/PORT/g" +$QEMU_NBD_PROG -L -b $nbd_tcp_addr -p $nbd_tcp_port --object $obj1 \ --tls-creds=tls0 echo
@@ -117,6 +122,26 @@ $QEMU_IO -c 'r -P 0x11 1m 1m' -c 'w -P 0x22 1m 1m' --image-opts \ $QEMU_IO -f $IMGFMT -r -U -c 'r -P 0x22 1m 1m' "$TEST_IMG" | _filter_qemu_io +echo +echo "== check TLS with authorization ==" + +nbd_server_stop + +nbd_server_start_tcp_socket \ + --object tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/server1,endpoint=server,id=tls0,verify-peer=yes \ + --object "authz-simple,identity=CN=localhost,,O=Cthulu Dark Lord Enterprises client1,,L=R'lyeh,,C=South Pacific,id=authz0" \ + --tls-authz authz0 \ + --tls-creds tls0 \ + -f $IMGFMT "$TEST_IMG" 2>> "$TEST_DIR/server.log" + +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts \ + --object tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client1,endpoint=client,id=tls0 \ + driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 + +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts \ + --object tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client3,endpoint=client,id=tls0 \ + driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 + echo echo "== final server log ==" cat "$TEST_DIR/server.log"
tests/qemu-iotests/233.out +11 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Generating a self signed certificate... Generating a signed certificate... Generating a signed certificate... Generating a signed certificate... +Generating a signed certificate... == preparing image == Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT', fmt=IMGFMT size=67108864
@@ -29,6 +30,10 @@ image: nbd://127.0.0.1:PORT file format: nbd virtual size: 64M (67108864 bytes) disk size: unavailable +image: nbd://127.0.0.1:PORT +file format: nbd +virtual size: 64M (67108864 bytes) +disk size: unavailable exports available: 1 export: '' size: 67108864
@@ -51,7 +56,13 @@ wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576 read 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576 1 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec) +== check TLS with authorization == +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort + == final server log == qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Verify failed: No certificate was found. qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Verify failed: No certificate was found. +qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS x509 authz check for CN=localhost,O=Cthulhu Dark Lord Enterprises client1,L=R'lyeh,C=South Pacific is denied +qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS x509 authz check for CN=localhost,O=Cthulhu Dark Lord Enterprises client3,L=R'lyeh,C=South Pacific is denied *** done
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.
+++
b/qemu-nbd.c
qemu-nbd.c static void usage(const char *name) · line 108
Quoted 4 lines
qemu-nbd.c +1
-0@@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ static void usage(const char *name)" --object type,id=ID,... define an object such as 'secret' for providing\n" " passwords and/or encryption keys\n" " --tls-creds=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide TLS\n" +" --tls-authz=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide authorization\n"
Usage line exceeds 80 columns; I don't mind splitting the line.
Quoted 4 lines
qemu-nbd.texi +0
-0@@ -142,13 +146,16 @@ qemu-nbd -f qcow2 file.qcow2 @end example Start a long-running server listening with encryption on port 10810,
qemu-nbd.texi qemu-nbd -f qcow2 file.qcow2 · line 156
Quoted 10 lines
qemu-nbd.texi +3
-2-and require clients to have a correct X.509 certificate to connect to +and whitelist clients with a specific X.509 certificate to connect to a 1 megabyte subset of a raw file, using the export name 'subset': @example qemu-nbd \ --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,endpoint=server,dir=/path/to/qemutls \ - --tls-creds tls0 -t -x subset -p 10810 \ + --object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\ + O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
A long line may be necessary here, unless the whitespace in the identity= parameter inserted by the line continuation is harmless. Long lines in man pages are annoying, but even worse is an example that copies-and-pastes incorrectly. I may just s/^ *O/O/.
tests/qemu-iotests/233.out wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576 · line 61
Quoted 4 lines
tests/qemu-iotests/233.out +3
-0+== check TLS with authorization == +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
A rather uninformative message for the client to figure out why it failed, but (as with all things security-related), giving too many details may in itself be an improper information leak. At any rate, I don't know that you could make it work any better, so it is not a problem with this patch. It may be the sign of a server bug for closing the socket too soon (before the client has a chance to read an actual error message), where we could tweak things to provoke a nicer error than 'Software caused connection abort', but that would be a separate patch.
I can make the minor changes as part of staging through my NBD tree without needing a v7.
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Quoted 19 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.
+++
b/qemu-nbd.c
Quoted 7 lines
qemu-nbd.c static void usage(const char *name) · line 108
Quoted 5 lines
qemu-nbd.c +1
-0@@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ static void usage(const char *name)" --object type,id=ID,... define an object such as 'secret' for providing\n" " passwords and/or encryption keys\n" " --tls-creds=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide TLS\n" +" --tls-authz=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide authorization\n" Usage line exceeds 80 columns; I don't mind splitting the line.
Odd that checkpatch.pl didn't complain about this.
Quoted 4 lines
tests/qemu-iotests/233.out wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576 · line 61
Quoted 3 lines
tests/qemu-iotests/233.out +3
-0+== check TLS with authorization == +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
Quoted 8 lines
A rather uninformative message for the client to figure out why it failed, but (as with all things security-related), giving too many details may in itself be an improper information leak. At any rate, I don't know that you could make it work any better, so it is not a problem with this patch. It may be the sign of a server bug for closing the socket too soon (before the client has a chance to read an actual error message), where we could tweak things to provoke a nicer error than 'Software caused connection abort', but that would be a separate patch.
I'm not sure how we'd do anything better here. From NBD's pov the TLS handshake failed to complete. At that point NBD can't assume that it is able to successfully able to send anything over the connection, so has little choice but to close it.
To some extent this is a result of the QIOChannelTLS API design, because in acutal fact we've completed the TLS protocol handshake, so we do actually have an established TLS connection, but we don't consider the client authorized.
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
In reply to Eric BlakeQuoted 11 lines · Eric Blake
Review
Quoted 6 lines
@example
qemu-nbd \ --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,endpoint=server,dir=/path/to/qemutls \(quoted diff) +2
-1- --tls-creds tls0 -t -x subset -p 10810 \ + --object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\ + O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \A long line may be necessary here, unless the whitespace in the identity= parameter inserted by the line continuation is harmless. Long lines in man pages are annoying, but even worse is an example that copies-and-pastes incorrectly. I may just s/^ *O/O/.
I've just confirmed that whitespace in the identity= parameter is harmless, via this change:
tests/qemu-iotests/233 +0 -0
@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ nbd_server_stop nbd_server_start_tcp_socket \ --object
tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/server1,endpoint=server,id=tls0,verify-peer=yes \
- --object "authz-simple,identity=CN=localhost,,O=Cthulu Dark Lord
Enterprises client1,,L=R'lyeh,,C=South Pacific,id=authz0" \
+ --object "authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=CN=localhost,, \
+ O=Cthulu Dark Lord Enterprises client1,,L=R'lyeh,,C=South Pacific" \
--tls-authz authz0 \
--tls-creds tls0 \
-f $IMGFMT "$TEST_IMG" 2>> "$TEST_DIR/server.log"So I'll go ahead and tweak the patch along those lines.
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
In reply to Daniel P. BerrangéQuoted 9 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.
Quoted 5 lines
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.
It doesn't hold up this patch, but I note that with the qemu QMP command changes you make in 2/3, you document that the object can be created/removed on the fly, and the server will adjust which clients can then subsequently connect. Is there any need for the same sort of runtime configurability in qemu-nbd, and if so, how would we accomplish it? Perhaps by having a command-line option to parse --tls-authz from a file, where you can send SIGHUP to qemu-nbd to force it to re-read the file? Or am I worrying about something unlikely to be needed in practice?
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Quoted 16 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross.
Quoted 5 lines
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server.
Quoted 8 lines
It doesn't hold up this patch, but I note that with the qemu QMP command changes you make in 2/3, you document that the object can be created/removed on the fly, and the server will adjust which clients can then subsequently connect. Is there any need for the same sort of runtime configurability in qemu-nbd, and if so, how would we accomplish it? Perhaps by having a command-line option to parse --tls-authz from a file, where you can send SIGHUP to qemu-nbd to force it to re-read the file? Or am I worrying about something unlikely to be needed in practice?
Well the QAuthZListFile object type can store its contents in an external file that gets auto-reloaded upon inotify triggers from the main loop. The QAuthZPAM type can also be fairly dynamic depending on its backend. I think any single process is unlikely to need to switch between different object types, so this is good enough dynamic support.
I can't help thinking we should add QMP to qemu-nbd one day though....
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 8 lines
It doesn't hold up this patch, but I note that with the qemu QMP command changes you make in 2/3, you document that the object can be created/removed on the fly, and the server will adjust which clients can then subsequently connect. Is there any need for the same sort of runtime configurability in qemu-nbd, and if so, how would we accomplish it? Perhaps by having a command-line option to parse --tls-authz from a file, where you can send SIGHUP to qemu-nbd to force it to re-read the file? Or am I worrying about something unlikely to be needed in practice?
Quoted 5 lines
Well the QAuthZListFile object type can store its contents in an external file that gets auto-reloaded upon inotify triggers from the main loop. The QAuthZPAM type can also be fairly dynamic depending on its backend. I think any single process is unlikely to need to switch between different object types, so this is good enough dynamic support.
That, and QMP nbd-server-start can serve up multiple exports, while qemu-nbd serves exactly one export.
I also note that my work on incremental backups has raised the topic that we someday want to support multiple parallel NBD servers. Right now, you are limited to exactly one (even though it can server multiple exports), which makes serving different content to different clients harder than if you could have different servers on separate ports with per-server settings on which clients to allow. Or, if we have tls-authz items per-export instead of per-server, so that different clients see a different subset of available exports when doing NBD_OPT_LIST.
Quoted 2 lines
I can't help thinking we should add QMP to qemu-nbd one day though....
Yeah, as QMP nbd server gets more powerful, we may eventually need a similar monitor interface into controlling a long-running qemu-nbd process...
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
PATCH v6 2/3 nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
In reply to Daniel P. BerrangéFrom: "Daniel P. Berrange" <[email protected]>
As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.
First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the 'object-add' command:
{
'execute': 'object-add',
'arguments': {
'qom-type': 'authz-list',
'id': 'authz0',
'parameters': {
'policy': 'deny',
'rules': [
{
'match': '*CN=fred',
'policy': 'allow'
}
]
}
}
}They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:
{
'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
'arguments': {
'addr': {
'type': 'inet',
'host': '127.0.0.1',
'port': '9000'
},
'tls-creds': 'tls0',
'tls-authz': 'authz0'
}
}--- blockdev-nbd.c | 11 ++++++++--- hmp.c | 2 +- include/block/nbd.h | 2 +- qapi/block.json | 8 +++++++- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
blockdev-nbd.c +8 -3
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@typedef struct NBDServerData {QIONetListener *listener;QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds; +char *tlsauthz; }NBDServerData ;static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc, gpointer opaque) {qio_channel_set_name (QIO_CHANNEL (cioc),"nbd-server" ); -nbd_client_new (cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds,NULL , +nbd_client_new (cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz, nbd_blockdev_client_closed); }
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)if (server->tlscreds) {object_unref (OBJECT (server->tlscreds)); } +g_free (server->tlsauthz);g_free (server); }
@@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ static QCryptoTLSCreds *nbd_get_tls_creds(const char *id, Error **errp)void nbd_server_start (SocketAddress *addr,const char *tls_creds, -Error **errp) +const char *tls_authz,Error **errp) {if (nbd_server) {error_setg (errp,"NBD server already running" );
@@ -117,6 +119,8 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds, } } + nbd_server->tlsauthz =g_strdup (tls_authz); + qio_net_listener_set_client_func(nbd_server->listener, nbd_accept, NULL,
@@ -131,11 +135,12 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,void qmp_nbd_server_start (SocketAddressLegacy *addr,bool has_tls_creds,const char *tls_creds, +bool has_tls_authz,const char *tls_authz,Error **errp) {SocketAddress *addr_flat =socket_address_flatten (addr); -nbd_server_start (addr_flat, tls_creds, errp); +nbd_server_start (addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, errp);qapi_free_SocketAddress (addr_flat); }
hmp.c +1 -1
@@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ void hmp_nbd_server_start(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) goto exit; } -nbd_server_start (addr,NULL , &local_err); +nbd_server_start (addr,NULL ,NULL , &local_err);qapi_free_SocketAddress (addr);if (local_err !=NULL ) { goto exit;
include/block/nbd.h +1 -1
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);void nbd_client_put (NBDClient *client);void nbd_server_start (SocketAddress *addr,const char *tls_creds, -Error **errp); +const char *tls_authz,Error **errp);/* nbd_read * Reads @size bytes from @ioc. Returns 0 on success.
qapi/block.json +7 -1
@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ # # @addr: Address on which to listen. # @tls-creds: (optional) ID of the TLS credentials object. Since 2.6 +# @tls-authz: ID of the QAuthZ authorization object used to validate +# the client's x509 distinguished name. This object is +# is only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and +# recreated on the fly while the NBD server is active. +# If missing, it will default to denying access (since 4.0). # # Returns: error if the server is already running. #
@@ -232,7 +237,8 @@ ## { 'command': 'nbd-server-start', 'data': { 'addr': 'SocketAddressLegacy', - '*tls-creds': 'str'} } + '*tls-creds': 'str', + '*tls-authz': 'str'} } ## # @nbd-server-add:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 3/3 nbd: fix outdated qapi docs syntax for tls-creds
In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé--- qapi/block.json | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
qapi/block.json +1 -1
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ # QEMU instance could refer to them as "nbd:HOST:PORT:exportname=NAME". # # @addr: Address on which to listen. -# @tls-creds: (optional) ID of the TLS credentials object. Since 2.6 +# @tls-creds: ID of the TLS credentials object (since 2.6). # @tls-authz: ID of the QAuthZ authorization object used to validate # the client's x509 distinguished name. This object is # is only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 3/3] nbd: fix outdated qapi docs syntax for tls-creds
Quoted 10 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>--- qapi/block.json | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)qapi/block.json +0
-0
qapi/block.json line 227
Quoted 5 lines
qapi/block.json +1
-1@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ # QEMU instance could refer to them as "nbd:HOST:PORT:exportname=NAME". # # @addr: Address on which to listen. -# @tls-creds: (optional) ID of the TLS credentials object. Since 2.6 +# @tls-creds: ID of the TLS credentials object (since 2.6).
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
Quoted 8 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
This series provides the NBD parts of the authorization control series previously posted as:
v1: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg04482.html
v2: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg05727.html
v3: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-10/msg01639.html
v4: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2019-02/msg04319.html
Quoted 7 lines
Then separated for merge:
v5: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2019-02/msg07347.html
The core authz framework is now merged & these patches have all had positive review. Thus these NBD parts are ready to go into the NBD maintainer's tree, should the maintainer consider them acceptable.
Thanks; series is queued for my next pull request.
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org