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f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary

PATCH In review Randall Huang 3 participants 6 messages Apr 11, 2019 – May 10, 2019 F2FS file system

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/1 f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
v2:
* return EFAULT if OOB error is detected

v3:
* fix typo in setxattr()

v4:
* change boundry definition

v5:
* revise boundry definition

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +27 -5
index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
@@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				void *last_base_addr, int index,
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
+			sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+			return NULL;
+
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 				void **base_addr, int *base_size)
 {
 	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+	void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
 	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
+
 	/* read from inline xattr */
 	if (inline_size) {
 		err = read_inline_xattr(inode, ipage, txattr_addr);
@@ -337,7 +346,11 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, last_txattr_addr, index, len, name);
+	if (!*xe) {
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
 check:
 	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
 		err = -ENODATA;
@@ -581,10 +594,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 			struct page *ipage, int flags)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *here, *last;
-	void *base_addr;
+	void *base_addr, *last_base_addr = NULL;
 	int found, newsize;
 	size_t len;
 	__u32 new_hsize;
+	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
+	unsigned int xattr_nid_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
+	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
+
 	int error = 0;
 
 	if (name == NULL)
@@ -604,9 +621,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 	error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
+	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + xattr_nid_size + inline_size;
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
+	if (!here) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto exit;
+	}
 
 	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
Reviewed-by on v5 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Quoted 3 lines

Bug: 126558260

Looks good to me now. :)

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, · line 602

Quoted 1 line
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -0
+	unsigned int xattr_nid_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;

Nitpick, xnode_size or xattr_node_size will be better than xattr_nid_size?

Maybe Jaegeuk can help to change this when merging this patch, no new version patch needed.

Thanks,

maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Randall Huang
Quoted 84 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
v2:
* return EFAULT if OOB error is detected

v3:
* fix typo in setxattr()

v4:
* change boundry definition

v5:
* revise boundry definition

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +9 -2
index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
@@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				void *last_base_addr, int index,
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
+			sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+			return NULL;
+
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 				void **base_addr, int *base_size)
 {
 	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+	void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
 	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 321

Quoted 4 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -0
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;

I just found this should be + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE. Otherwise, generic/026 fails. Let me know, if there is any other concern below.

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 12 ++++--------
 fs/f2fs/xattr.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +4 -8
index 019778fb9a0d..cd199a09d436 100644
@@ -306,19 +306,18 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
 	void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
-	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!size && !inline_size)
+	if (!xnid && !inline_size)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
-	*base_size = inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
+	*base_size = XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
 	txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + *base_size;
 
 	/* read from inline xattr */
 	if (inline_size) {
@@ -599,9 +598,6 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 	size_t len;
 	__u32 new_hsize;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
-	unsigned int xnode_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
-	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
-
 	int error = 0;
 
 	if (name == NULL)
@@ -621,7 +617,7 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 	error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + xnode_size + inline_size;
+	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
 	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
fs/f2fs/xattr.h +2 -0
index 9172ee082ca8..1eca1a2d996a 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
 				entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
 #define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE	(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
 #define XATTR_PADDING_SIZE	(sizeof(__u32))
+#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i)		(((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) +	\
+				(inline_xattr_size(i)) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE)
 #define MIN_OFFSET(i)		XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) +	\
 						VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog
#3 lore raw
Quoted 88 lines · Jaegeuk Kim
Quoted 87 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
v2:
* return EFAULT if OOB error is detected

v3:
* fix typo in setxattr()

v4:
* change boundry definition

v5:
* revise boundry definition

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +9 -2
index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
@@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				void *last_base_addr, int index,
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
+			sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+			return NULL;
+
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 				void **base_addr, int *base_size)
 {
 	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+	void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
 	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
Quoted 4 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 321

Quoted 1 line
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -0
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;

I just found this should be + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE. Otherwise, generic/026 fails. Let me know, if there is any other concern below.

We're trying to use [txattr_addr, last_txattr_addr] to indicate valid range of xattr datas, any valid entries across the boundary is not allowed, so I think it's correct to exclude padding space for last_txattr_addr.

I added log and tested generic/026, found that:

[365804.868431] base:ffff89e391f8e000, last:ffff89e391f8f0b0
[365804.868433] entry:ffff89e391f8e018, next:ffff89e391f8f0b0

The root cause of this issue is caused by below condition:

		(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
		sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)

It occurs when the end address of last valid entry is located in range (last_base_addr - XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, last_base_addr], then next invalid entry's head will across last_base_addr, result in returning -EFAULT.

So anyway, please try below diff instead. ;)

fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -2
index 019778fb9a0d..217bf7c2bb7a 100644
@@ -210,10 +210,8 @@ static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
 		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
-			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
-			sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr)
 			return NULL;
 
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 

Thanks,

Quoted 66 lines
---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 12 ++++--------
 fs/f2fs/xattr.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +4 -8
index 019778fb9a0d..cd199a09d436 100644
@@ -306,19 +306,18 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
 	void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
-	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!size && !inline_size)
+	if (!xnid && !inline_size)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
-	*base_size = inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
+	*base_size = XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
 	txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + *base_size;
 
 	/* read from inline xattr */
 	if (inline_size) {
@@ -599,9 +598,6 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 	size_t len;
 	__u32 new_hsize;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
-	unsigned int xnode_size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
-	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
-
 	int error = 0;
 
 	if (name == NULL)
@@ -621,7 +617,7 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 	error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + xnode_size + inline_size;
+	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
 	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
fs/f2fs/xattr.h +2 -0
index 9172ee082ca8..1eca1a2d996a 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
 				entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
 #define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE	(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
 #define XATTR_PADDING_SIZE	(sizeof(__u32))
+#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i)		(((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) +	\
+				(inline_xattr_size(i)) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE)
 #define MIN_OFFSET(i)		XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) +	\
 						VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE)
 
maintainer Reviewed-by Chao Yu
#4 lore raw
Quoted 89 lines · Chao Yu
Quoted 88 lines · Jaegeuk Kim
Quoted 87 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
v2:
* return EFAULT if OOB error is detected

v3:
* fix typo in setxattr()

v4:
* change boundry definition

v5:
* revise boundry definition

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +9 -2
index 848a785abe25..587429e29a69 100644
@@ -202,12 +202,18 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				void *last_base_addr, int index,
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) +
+			sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr)
+			return NULL;
+
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -298,6 +304,7 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 				void **base_addr, int *base_size)
 {
 	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+	void *last_txattr_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
 	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 321

Quoted 1 line
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -0
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + inline_size + size;

I just found this should be + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE. Otherwise, generic/026 fails. Let me know, if there is any other concern below.

We're trying to use [txattr_addr, last_txattr_addr] to indicate valid range of xattr datas, any valid entries across the boundary is not allowed, so I think it's correct to exclude padding space for last_txattr_addr.

Okay, how about this?

Quoted 1 line

From 2777e654371dd4207a3a7f4fb5fa39550053a080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:26:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
[Jaegeuk Kim: Fix wrong ending boundary]
---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 fs/f2fs/xattr.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +27 -9
index 848a785abe25..e791741d193b 100644
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				void *last_base_addr, int index,
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr)
+			return NULL;
+
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -297,20 +302,22 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 				const char *name, struct f2fs_xattr_entry **xe,
 				void **base_addr, int *base_size)
 {
-	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_addr = NULL;
+	void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_txattr_addr;
+	void *last_addr = NULL;
 	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
-	unsigned int size = xnid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0;
 	unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!size && !inline_size)
+	if (!xnid && !inline_size)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
-	*base_size = inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
+	*base_size = XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
 	txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!txattr_addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
 	/* read from inline xattr */
 	if (inline_size) {
 		err = read_inline_xattr(inode, ipage, txattr_addr);
@@ -337,7 +344,11 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, last_txattr_addr, index, len, name);
+	if (!*xe) {
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
 check:
 	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
 		err = -ENODATA;
@@ -581,7 +592,8 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 			struct page *ipage, int flags)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *here, *last;
-	void *base_addr;
+	void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
+	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
 	int found, newsize;
 	size_t len;
 	__u32 new_hsize;
@@ -605,8 +617,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
+	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
+	if (!here) {
+		error = -EFAULT;
+		goto exit;
+	}
 
 	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
fs/f2fs/xattr.h +2 -0
index 9172ee082ca8..a90920e2f949 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
 				entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
 #define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE	(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
 #define XATTR_PADDING_SIZE	(sizeof(__u32))
+#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i)		(((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) +	\
+						(inline_xattr_size(i)))
 #define MIN_OFFSET(i)		XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) +	\
 						VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog
#5 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Jaegeuk Kim

Okay, how about this?

Quoted 1 line

From 2777e654371dd4207a3a7f4fb5fa39550053a080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Randall Huang <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:26:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary

Looks good to me, and more clean. :)

Thanks,