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f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary

PATCH Superseded Randall Huang 2 participants 5 messages Apr 8, 2019 – Apr 9, 2019 F2FS file system

v1 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +16 -6
index 848a785abe25..0531c1e38275 100644
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				int base_addr_limit, int index,
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
+	void *max_addr = base_addr + ENTRY_SIZE(XATTR_ENTRY(base_addr)) +
+		base_addr_limit - 1;
 
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr)
+			return NULL;
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -337,9 +342,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, index, len, name);
 check:
-	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
+	if (!*xe || IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
 		err = -ENODATA;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -606,9 +611,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 		return error;
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, inline_xattr_size(inode) +
+			VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE,
+			index, len, name);
 
-	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
+	if (!here)
+		found = 0;
+	else
+		found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
 	if (found) {
 		if ((flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
#1 lore raw

Hi Randall,

Quoted 43 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 848a785abe25..0531c1e38275 100644

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 206

Quoted 7 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				int base_addr_limit, int index,

unsigned int max_size,

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 211

Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -0
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
+	void *max_addr = base_addr + ENTRY_SIZE(XATTR_ENTRY(base_addr)) +
+		base_addr_limit - 1;

If I'm not missing something, shouldn't it be?

void *max_addr = base_addr + max_size;

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 345

Quoted 13 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -1
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr)
+			return NULL;
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -337,9 +342,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, index, len, name);

max_size = *base_size - (txattr_addr - cur_addr); *xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, max_size, index, len, name);

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 347

Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
 check:
-	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
+	if (!*xe || IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {

If xattr entry across boundary of max xattr space size, maybe we'd better return -EFAULT which can be distinguished from a real -ENODATA error, latter, we can set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a repairing hint to fsck. :)

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, · line 616

Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -1
 		err = -ENODATA;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -606,9 +611,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 		return error;
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, inline_xattr_size(inode) +
+			VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE,
+			index, len, name);

unsigned int size = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0; unsigned int max_size = inline_xattr_size(inode) + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;

here = __find_xattr(..., max_size, ...);

if (!here)

	return -EFAULT;

Thanks,

Quoted 10 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +4 -1
-	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
+	if (!here)
+		found = 0;
+	else
+		found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
 	if (found) {
 		if ((flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
 
#2 lore raw
Quoted 77 lines · Chao Yu

Hi Randall,

Quoted 43 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 848a785abe25..0531c1e38275 100644

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 206

Quoted 7 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				int base_addr_limit, int index,

unsigned int max_size,

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 211

Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -0
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
+	void *max_addr = base_addr + ENTRY_SIZE(XATTR_ENTRY(base_addr)) +
+		base_addr_limit - 1;

If I'm not missing something, shouldn't it be?

void *max_addr = base_addr + max_size;

Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -0
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr)
+			return NULL;
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -337,9 +342,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
Quoted 4 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 345

Quoted 2 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, index, len, name);

max_size = *base_size - (txattr_addr - cur_addr);

max_size = *base_size - (cur_addr - txattr_addr);

Quoted 50 lines

*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, max_size, index, len, name);

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 347

Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
 check:
-	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
+	if (!*xe || IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {

If xattr entry across boundary of max xattr space size, maybe we'd better return -EFAULT which can be distinguished from a real -ENODATA error, latter, we can set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a repairing hint to fsck. :)

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, · line 616

Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -1
 		err = -ENODATA;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -606,9 +611,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 		return error;
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, inline_xattr_size(inode) +
+			VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE,
+			index, len, name);

unsigned int size = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0; unsigned int max_size = inline_xattr_size(inode) + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;

here = __find_xattr(..., max_size, ...);

if (!here)

	return -EFAULT;

Thanks,

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,

Quoted 10 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +4 -1
-	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
+	if (!here)
+		found = 0;
+	else
+		found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
 	if (found) {
 		if ((flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
 

_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 65 lines · Chao Yu
Quoted 64 lines · Chao Yu

Hi Randall,

Quoted 43 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 848a785abe25..0531c1e38275 100644

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 206

Quoted 7 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				int base_addr_limit, int index,

unsigned int max_size,

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 211

Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -0
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
+	void *max_addr = base_addr + ENTRY_SIZE(XATTR_ENTRY(base_addr)) +
+		base_addr_limit - 1;

If I'm not missing something, shouldn't it be?

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

void *max_addr = base_addr + max_size;

Hi Chao,
Let me show the buggy example of xattr entries.

Here is the buggy xattr entries.
The address 0x1201f24 - 0x1201fcb is correct content. (Each entry occupies 4 + 9 + 10 + 1 bytes, 24 bytes) Hacker append a faked entry at 0x1201fcc - 0x1201fe5 (entry length = 4 + 9 + 12 + 1 bytes)

01201f00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 11 20 f5 f2  |............. ..|
01201f10  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
01201f20  00 00 00 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |........attrname|
01201f30  31 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  |1attrvalue1.....|
01201f40  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  32 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname2attrval|
01201f50  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |ue1.....attrname|
01201f60  33 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  |3attrvalue1.....|
01201f70  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  34 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname4attrval|
01201f80  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |ue1.....attrname|
01201f90  35 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  |5attrvalue1.....|
01201fa0  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  36 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname6attrval|
01201fb0  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |ue1.....attrname|
01201fc0  37 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0c 00  |7attrvalue1.....|
01201fd0  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  38 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname8attrval|
01201fe0  75 65 31 31 31 00 00 00  07 00 00 00 07 00 00 00  |ue111...........|

After lookup_all_xattrs() traveses all inline+xnid entries, the base_addr becomes the starting pointer of the last xattr entry.

	if (last_addr)
		cur_addr = XATTR_HDR(last_addr) - 1;
	else
		cur_addr = txattr_addr;

For example,
before OOB error occurs, the lookup_all_xattrs() calls __find_xattr() with base_addr = ffffffc05fe98228, max_size = 4 (= XATTR_PADDING_SIZE).

The entry size is 24 bytes = 0x18.
The expected design, the next entry of base_addr (ffffffc05fe98228 + 0x18), ffffffc05fe98240, should be 4 bytes of zeros.

Because there are faked contents, the stop condition will not be triggered and an OOB error happenes.

My aim is to block the lookup process by introducing boundary check.

In this case, we should not access ffffffc05fe98244. That's why I set the last address to ffffffc05fe98243.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -0
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr)
+			return NULL;
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -337,9 +342,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 4 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 345

Quoted 2 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, index, len, name);

max_size = *base_size - (txattr_addr - cur_addr);

max_size = *base_size - (cur_addr - txattr_addr);

Quoted 10 lines

*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, max_size, index, len, name);

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 347

Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
 check:
-	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
+	if (!*xe || IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {

If xattr entry across boundary of max xattr space size, maybe we'd better return -EFAULT which can be distinguished from a real -ENODATA error, latter, we can set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a repairing hint to fsck. :)

I will send v2 patch for review.

Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 40 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, · line 616

Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -1
 		err = -ENODATA;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -606,9 +611,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 		return error;
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, inline_xattr_size(inode) +
+			VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE,
+			index, len, name);

unsigned int size = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0; unsigned int max_size = inline_xattr_size(inode) + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;

here = __find_xattr(..., max_size, ...);

if (!here)

	return -EFAULT;

Thanks,

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,

Quoted 10 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +4 -1
-	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
+	if (!here)
+		found = 0;
+	else
+		found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
 	if (found) {
 		if ((flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
 

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#4 lore raw

Hi Randall,

Quoted 77 lines · Randall Huang
Quoted 65 lines · Chao Yu
Quoted 64 lines · Chao Yu

Hi Randall,

Quoted 43 lines · Randall Huang

When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs, out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.

[   38.402878] c7   1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.402891] c7   1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[   38.402935] c7   1827 Call trace:
[   38.402952] c7   1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[   38.402966] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[   38.402981] c7   1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[   38.402995] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[   38.403009] c7   1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[   38.403022] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[   38.403037] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[   38.403051] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[   38.403066] c7   1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[   38.403080] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[   38.403096] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[   38.403109] c7   1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[   38.403123] c7   1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[   38.403136] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[   38.403149] c7   1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[   38.403163] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[   38.403177] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[   38.403190] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[   38.403203] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[   38.403216] c7   1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[   38.403229] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[   38.403241] c7   1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

Bug: 126558260

---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 848a785abe25..0531c1e38275 100644

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 206

Quoted 7 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -202,12 +202,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
 	return handler;
 }
 
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
-					size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+				int base_addr_limit, int index,

unsigned int max_size,

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index) · line 211

Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -0
+				size_t len, const char *name)
 {
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
+	void *max_addr = base_addr + ENTRY_SIZE(XATTR_ENTRY(base_addr)) +
+		base_addr_limit - 1;

If I'm not missing something, shouldn't it be?

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

void *max_addr = base_addr + max_size;

Hi Chao,
Let me show the buggy example of xattr entries.

Here is the buggy xattr entries.
The address 0x1201f24 - 0x1201fcb is correct content. (Each entry occupies 4 + 9 + 10 + 1 bytes, 24 bytes) Hacker append a faked entry at 0x1201fcc - 0x1201fe5 (entry length = 4 + 9 + 12 + 1 bytes)

Quoted 15 lines
01201f00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 11 20 f5 f2  |............. ..|
01201f10  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
01201f20  00 00 00 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |........attrname|
01201f30  31 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  |1attrvalue1.....|
01201f40  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  32 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname2attrval|
01201f50  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |ue1.....attrname|
01201f60  33 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  |3attrvalue1.....|
01201f70  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  34 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname4attrval|
01201f80  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |ue1.....attrname|
01201f90  35 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  |5attrvalue1.....|
01201fa0  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  36 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname6attrval|
01201fb0  75 65 31 00 01 09 0a 00  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  |ue1.....attrname|
01201fc0  37 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  75 65 31 00 01 09 0c 00  |7attrvalue1.....|
01201fd0  61 74 74 72 6e 61 6d 65  38 61 74 74 72 76 61 6c  |attrname8attrval|
01201fe0  75 65 31 31 31 00 00 00  07 00 00 00 07 00 00 00  |ue111...........|

Thanks for the detailed info. :)

Quoted 8 lines

After lookup_all_xattrs() traveses all inline+xnid entries, the base_addr becomes the starting pointer of the last xattr entry.

	if (last_addr)
		cur_addr = XATTR_HDR(last_addr) - 1;
	else
		cur_addr = txattr_addr;

Actually, if last_addr is valid, it means we have traversed inline xattr space, but haven't found target xattr entry yet, then we will make cur_addr pointing to ((void *)last_addr - sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_header *)), that's because in __find_xattr, list_for_each_xattr() will treat @base_addr as the pointer which points to xattr header.

Thanks,

Quoted 89 lines

For example,
before OOB error occurs, the lookup_all_xattrs() calls __find_xattr() with base_addr = ffffffc05fe98228, max_size = 4 (= XATTR_PADDING_SIZE).

The entry size is 24 bytes = 0x18.
The expected design, the next entry of base_addr (ffffffc05fe98228 + 0x18), ffffffc05fe98240, should be 4 bytes of zeros.

Because there are faked contents, the stop condition will not be triggered and an OOB error happenes.

My aim is to block the lookup process by introducing boundary check.

In this case, we should not access ffffffc05fe98244. That's why I set the last address to ffffffc05fe98243.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -0
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+		if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr)
+			return NULL;
 		if (entry->e_name_index != index)
 			continue;
 		if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -337,9 +342,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	else
 		cur_addr = txattr_addr;
 
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 4 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 345

Quoted 2 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
-	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, index, len, name);
+	*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, index, len, name);

max_size = *base_size - (txattr_addr - cur_addr);

max_size = *base_size - (cur_addr - txattr_addr);

Quoted 10 lines

*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, max_size, index, len, name);

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage, · line 347

Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +1 -1
 check:
-	if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
+	if (!*xe || IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {

If xattr entry across boundary of max xattr space size, maybe we'd better return -EFAULT which can be distinguished from a real -ENODATA error, latter, we can set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a repairing hint to fsck. :)

I will send v2 patch for review.

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, · line 616

Quoted 11 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -1
 		err = -ENODATA;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -606,9 +611,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
 		return error;
 
 	/* find entry with wanted name. */
-	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+	here = __find_xattr(base_addr, inline_xattr_size(inode) +
+			VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE,
+			index, len, name);

unsigned int size = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0; unsigned int max_size = inline_xattr_size(inode) + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;

here = __find_xattr(..., max_size, ...);

if (!here)

	return -EFAULT;

Thanks,

Quoted 7 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +4 -1
-	found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
+	if (!here)
+		found = 0;
+	else
+		found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
 
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines

fs/f2fs/xattr.c static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,

Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +0 -0
 	if (found) {
 		if ((flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
 

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