efi: add a function to convert the status value to string
Subsystems (6)
PATCH v2 1/2 efi: add a function to convert the status value to string
This function can be used to convert EFI status value to string for printing out debug message. Using this function can improve the readability of log.
v2.
- Changed the wording in subject and description.
- Moved the marco immediately after the status value definitions.
- Turned into a proper function instead of inline.
--- include/linux/efi.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
include/linux/efi.h +28 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,34 @@#define EFI_ABORTED (21 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))#define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION (26 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) +#define EFI_STATUS_STR (_status) \ +case EFI_##_status: \ + return "EFI_" __stringify(_status); + +static __attribute__((unused))char * +efi_status_to_str (unsigned long status) +{ +switch (status) { + EFI_STATUS_STR(SUCCESS) + EFI_STATUS_STR(LOAD_ERROR) + EFI_STATUS_STR(INVALID_PARAMETER) + EFI_STATUS_STR(UNSUPPORTED) + EFI_STATUS_STR(BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) + EFI_STATUS_STR(BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) + EFI_STATUS_STR(NOT_READY) + EFI_STATUS_STR(DEVICE_ERROR) + EFI_STATUS_STR(WRITE_PROTECTED) + EFI_STATUS_STR(OUT_OF_RESOURCES) + EFI_STATUS_STR(NOT_FOUND) + EFI_STATUS_STR(ABORTED) + EFI_STATUS_STR(SECURITY_VIOLATION) + default: + pr_warn("Unknown efi status: 0x%lx", status); + } + +return "Unknown efi status" ; +} +typedef unsigned long efi_status_t ;typedef u8 efi_bool_t ;typedef u16 efi_char16_t ;/* UNICODE character */
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH v3 2/2 efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
So, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:
[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash
'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +2 -1
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +29 -11
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h>
@@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */
@@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db; +str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr)); status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; } +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)
@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }
@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }
@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }
@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)
@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)
@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx);
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Re: [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Quoted 87 lines · Chun-Yi
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx listSo, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.Cc James Morris <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +14
-0@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> @@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 64
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +2
-0@@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db; +str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr));
Please drop this (and the function above) - instead, just return NULL if the variable is not found (without reporting an error).
Quoted 33 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +9
-2status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; } +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, · line 133
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }
These are separate changes - I don't have an opinion whether they are appropriate or not, but they should be in a separate patch.
Quoted 34 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +3
-10@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx); --
Quoted 2 lines
2.16.4
I think we should consider carefully what it means if some of these variables don't exist:
- if secure boot is enabled, db and dbx must exist, so if they don't, something is wrong
- secure boot might be enabled but we may be booting without shim.
- secure boot might be disabled.
Tweaking the severity of error messages without having a clear idea of the policy we are aiming to implement is likely to cause trouble down the road, so perhaps someone could explain what this code does, and how it should behave in the above circumstances.
Re: [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Hi Ard,
Quoted 94 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 93 lines · Chun-Yi
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx listSo, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.Cc James Morris <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +15
-0@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> @@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ @@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db;
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 64
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0+str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr));Please drop this (and the function above) - instead, just return NULL if the variable is not found (without reporting an error).
This name string is for printing debug level message, not error message. This function already returns NULL when EFI_NOT_FOUND be returned by firmware.
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 72
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +5
-1status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ;
here returns NULL when EFI_NOT_FOUND. The message of existence is for debugging.
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +4
-1} +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }
Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, · line 133
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }These are separate changes - I don't have an opinion whether they are appropriate or not, but they should be in a separate patch.
I will move the message of blacklising hash to other patch. Thanks!
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +2
-6@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) }
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-4dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx); --2.16.4
I think we should consider carefully what it means if some of these variables don't exist:
- if secure boot is enabled, db and dbx must exist, so if they don't, something is wrong
The existence of db/dbx is not related to secure boot. If manufacturer/user enrolled certificate/hash to db or dbx, then the variable will be created. If user didn't enroll anything to db/dbx, then variables will not show up.
Quoted 1 line
- secure boot might be enabled but we may be booting without shim.
Shim always creates MokListRT no matter secure boot enabled or disabled.
Quoted 2 lines
- secure boot might be disabled.
It's not about secure boot, db/dbx/MokListRT are always available at runtime if user was enrolled something to those list.
Quoted 4 lines
Tweaking the severity of error messages without having a clear idea of the policy we are aiming to implement is likely to cause trouble down the road, so perhaps someone could explain what this code does, and how it should behave in the above circumstances.
Thanks
Joey Lee
Re: [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Quoted 118 lines · joeyli
Hi Ard,
Quoted 94 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 93 lines · Chun-Yi
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx listSo, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.Cc James Morris <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +15
-0@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> @@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ @@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db;Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 64
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0+str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr));Please drop this (and the function above) - instead, just return NULL if the variable is not found (without reporting an error).
This name string is for printing debug level message, not error message. This function already returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUNDbe returned by firmware.Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 72
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +5
-1status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ;
Quoted 3 lines
here returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUND. The message of existence is for debugging.
I understand that. But I don't think we need it.
Quoted 80 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +4
-1} +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, · line 133
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }These are separate changes - I don't have an opinion whether they are appropriate or not, but they should be in a separate patch.
I will move the message of blacklising hash to other patch. Thanks!
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +2
-6@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) }Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-4dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx); --2.16.4
I think we should consider carefully what it means if some of these variables don't exist:
- if secure boot is enabled, db and dbx must exist, so if they don't, something is wrong
Quoted 4 lines
The existence of db/dbx is not related to secure boot. If manufacturer/user enrolled certificate/hash to db or dbx, then the variable will be created. If user didn't enroll anything to db/dbx, then variables will not show up.
Yes, but if secure boot is enabled and db is empty, how could you have booted in the first place?
And what about the converse case: if secure boot is not enabled, why should we trust the contents of db?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- secure boot might be enabled but we may be booting without shim.
Shim always creates MokListRT no matter secure boot enabled or disabled.
That is not my point. What happens if you booted with secure boot enabled but without the help of shim?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
- secure boot might be disabled.
It's not about secure boot, db/dbx/MokListRT are always available at runtime if user was enrolled something to those list.
Yes, but again, depending on whether shim was involved, and/or whether secure boot was enabled or not, the way we interpret these things may be very different.
I want the reasoning to be sound before merging any patches that deal with these variables.
Re: [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Quoted 119 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 118 lines · joeyli
Hi Ard,
Quoted 94 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 93 lines · Chun-Yi
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx listSo, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.Cc James Morris <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +15
-0@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> @@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ @@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db;Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 64
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0+str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr));Please drop this (and the function above) - instead, just return NULL if the variable is not found (without reporting an error).
This name string is for printing debug level message, not error message. This function already returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUNDbe returned by firmware.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +5
-1status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
here returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUND. The message of existence is for debugging.I understand that. But I don't think we need it.
OK. I will remove the debug message.
Quoted 80 lines
Quoted 80 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +4
-1} +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, · line 133
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }These are separate changes - I don't have an opinion whether they are appropriate or not, but they should be in a separate patch.
I will move the message of blacklising hash to other patch. Thanks!
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 34 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +3
-10@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx); --Quoted 2 lines
2.16.4
I think we should consider carefully what it means if some of these variables don't exist:
- if secure boot is enabled, db and dbx must exist, so if they don't, something is wrong
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The existence of db/dbx is not related to secure boot. If manufacturer/user enrolled certificate/hash to db or dbx, then the variable will be created. If user didn't enroll anything to db/dbx, then variables will not show up.
Yes, but if secure boot is enabled and db is empty, how could you have booted in the first place?
I agree. When secure boot enabled, kernel can not be booted without db.
Quoted 3 lines
And what about the converse case: if secure boot is not enabled, why should we trust the contents of db?
The db and dbx are authenticated variables that it protected by KEK. So it can be trusted even secure boot is disabled. Unless manufacturer or user's KEK is leaked.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- secure boot might be enabled but we may be booting without shim.
Shim always creates MokListRT no matter secure boot enabled or disabled.
That is not my point. What happens if you booted with secure boot enabled but without the help of shim?
Without shim, the signed EFI stub can still be booted by EFI boot manager. But the MokListRT will not be created for runtime. So MOK signed kernel module can not be verified. (or IMA can not verify MOK signed kernel image for kexec...)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
- secure boot might be disabled.
It's not about secure boot, db/dbx/MokListRT are always available at runtime if user was enrolled something to those list.
Quoted 6 lines
Yes, but again, depending on whether shim was involved, and/or whether secure boot was enabled or not, the way we interpret these things may be very different.
I want the reasoning to be sound before merging any patches that deal with these variables.
Here is a simple summary:
When secure boot is enabled:
- db/dbx: Can be trusted because they are authenticated variables. (unless end user doesn't want to trust db/dbx)
- MokListRT:
- with shim: MokListRT will be created. It can be trusted.
- without shim: MokListRT will not be created.
MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
When secure boot is disabled:
- db/dbx: Can be trusted because they are authenticated variables. (unless end user doesn't want to trust db/dbx)
- MokListRT:
- with shim: MokListRT will be created. But it can not be trusted. MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
- without shim: MokListRT will not be created.
MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Re: [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Quoted 221 lines · joeyli
Quoted 119 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 118 lines · joeyli
Hi Ard,
Quoted 94 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 93 lines · Chun-Yi
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx listSo, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.Cc James Morris <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +15
-0@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> @@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ @@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db;Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 64
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0+str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr));Please drop this (and the function above) - instead, just return NULL if the variable is not found (without reporting an error).
This name string is for printing debug level message, not error message. This function already returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUNDbe returned by firmware.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +5
-1status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ;Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
here returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUND. The message of existence is for debugging.I understand that. But I don't think we need it.
OK. I will remove the debug message.
Quoted 80 lines
Quoted 80 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +4
-1} +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, · line 133
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }These are separate changes - I don't have an opinion whether they are appropriate or not, but they should be in a separate patch.
I will move the message of blacklising hash to other patch. Thanks!
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 34 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +3
-10@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx); --Quoted 2 lines
2.16.4
I think we should consider carefully what it means if some of these variables don't exist:
- if secure boot is enabled, db and dbx must exist, so if they don't, something is wrongQuoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The existence of db/dbx is not related to secure boot. If manufacturer/user enrolled certificate/hash to db or dbx, then the variable will be created. If user didn't enroll anything to db/dbx, then variables will not show up.
Yes, but if secure boot is enabled and db is empty, how could you have booted in the first place?
I agree. When secure boot enabled, kernel can not be booted without db.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
And what about the converse case: if secure boot is not enabled, why should we trust the contents of db?
The db and dbx are authenticated variables that it protected by KEK. So it can be trusted even secure boot is disabled. Unless manufacturer or user's KEK is leaked.
Is that true for non-secureboot capable firmware? Of course, in that case, we cannot be sure that the kernel itself is trusted, but we shouldn't open up another hole either.
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- secure boot might be enabled but we may be booting without shim.
Shim always creates MokListRT no matter secure boot enabled or disabled.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
That is not my point. What happens if you booted with secure boot enabled but without the help of shim?
Without shim, the signed EFI stub can still be booted by EFI boot manager. But the MokListRT will not be created for runtime. So MOK signed kernel module can not be verified. (or IMA can not verify MOK signed kernel image for kexec...)
So if we opt out of using shim, we lose kexec capability as well? That doesn't make any sense.
In general, I am very uncomfortable with the way we have painted ourselves into a corner with shim. If I install Suse on a system that has the Suse cert in db or KEK, why would I need shim in the first place?
Quoted 16 lines
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- secure boot might be disabled.
It's not about secure boot, db/dbx/MokListRT are always available at runtime if user was enrolled something to those list.
Quoted 6 lines
Yes, but again, depending on whether shim was involved, and/or whether secure boot was enabled or not, the way we interpret these things may be very different.
I want the reasoning to be sound before merging any patches that deal with these variables.
Here is a simple summary:
Quoted 9 lines
When secure boot is enabled:
- db/dbx: Can be trusted because they are authenticated variables. (unless end user doesn't want to trust db/dbx)
- MokListRT:
- with shim: MokListRT will be created. It can be trusted.
- without shim: MokListRT will not be created.
MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
So who polices that MoKlistRT is not created?
Quoted 3 lines
When secure boot is disabled:
- db/dbx: Can be trusted because they are authenticated variables. (unless end user doesn't want to trust db/dbx)
Is this true? Does non-secure boot capable firmware still guarantee that db/dbx can't be created?
Quoted 8 lines
- MokListRT:
- with shim: MokListRT will be created. But it can not be trusted. MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
- without shim: MokListRT will not be created.
MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
Enabling this securely involves more than connecting the dots when it comes to db, MokListRT etc. I would like for someone to convince me as a maintainer, as well as the IMA maintainers, that the security requirements are still met in all cases we care about. Just copying db and MokListRT into a kernel keychain doesn't appear to do that, and if it does, it needs more documentation to clarify that.
Re: [PATCH 2/2 v3] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Quoted 226 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 225 lines · joeyli
Quoted 119 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 118 lines · joeyli
Hi Ard,
Quoted 94 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 93 lines · Chun-Yi
When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks ugly:
[ 2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT [ 2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx listSo, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.
On the other hand, the "Couldn't get UEFI" message doesn't need to be exposed when db/dbx/mok variable do not exist. So, this patch set the message level to debug.
v3.
- Print messages similar to db/mok when loading dbx hash to blacklist:[ 1.500952] EFI: Blacklisting hash of an executable: UEFI:dbx [ 1.501773] blacklist: Loaded blacklisting hash'bin:80b4d96931bf0d02fd91a61e19d14f1da452e66db2408ca8604d411f92659f0a'
- Setting messages for the existence of db/mok/dbx lists to debug level.
v2.
Setting the MODSIGN messages level to debug.Cc James Morris <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 3 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));return PTR_ERR (key); - } + }else +pr_notice ("Loaded blacklisting hash '%s'\n" , hash);return 0 ; }security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +15
-0@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "EFI: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> @@ -35,6 +37,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)return status ==EFI_SUCCESS ; } +static void str16_to_str (efi_char16_t *str16,char *str,int str_size) +{ +int i =0 ; + +while (str16[i] !='\0' && i < (str_size -1 )) { + str[i] = str16[i]; + i++; + } + + str[i] ='\0' ; +} +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ @@ -44,13 +58,20 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,efi_status_t status;unsigned long lsize =4 ;unsigned long tmpdb[4 ]; +char namestr[16 ];void *db;Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, · line 64
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security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0+str16_to_str (name, namestr,ARRAY_SIZE (namestr));Please drop this (and the function above) - instead, just return NULL if the variable is not found (without reporting an error).
This name string is for printing debug level message, not error message. This function already returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUNDbe returned by firmware.Quoted 9 lines
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security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +5
-1status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, &tmpdb);if (status !=EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { -pr_err ("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n" , status); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list doesn't exist\n" , namestr); +else +pr_err ("Couldn't get size for UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ;Quoted 6 lines
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here returns NULL when
EFI_NOT_FOUND. The message of existence is for debugging.I understand that. But I don't think we need it.
OK. I will remove the debug message.
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security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +4
-1} +pr_debug ("UEFI %s list exists\n" , namestr); db =kmalloc (lsize,GFP_KERNEL );if (!db)@@ -59,7 +80,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, status = efi.get_variable (name, guid,NULL , &lsize, db);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {kfree (db); -pr_err ("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n" , status); +pr_err ("Error reading UEFI %s list: %s\n" , + namestr,efi_status_to_str (status));return NULL ; }@@ -95,6 +117,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting X.509 TBS hash: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); }Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, · line 133
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security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1
-0@@ -104,6 +127,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { +pr_info ("Blacklisting hash of an executable: %s\n" , source);uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); }These are separate changes - I don't have an opinion whether they are appropriate or not, but they should be in a separate patch.
I will move the message of blacklising hash to other patch. Thanks!
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security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +3
-10@@ -154,9 +178,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)*/ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db ()) { db =get_cert_list (L"db" , &secure_var, &dbsize); -if (!db) { -pr_err ("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n" ); - }else { +if (db) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:db" , db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -167,9 +189,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } mok =get_cert_list (L"MokListRT" , &mok_var, &moksize); -if (!mok) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n" ); - }else { +if (mok) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:MokListRT" , mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);if (rc)@@ -178,9 +198,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } dbx =get_cert_list (L"dbx" , &secure_var, &dbxsize); -if (!dbx) { -pr_info ("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n" ); - }else { +if (dbx) { rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("UEFI:dbx" , dbx, dbxsize, get_handler_for_dbx); --Quoted 2 lines
2.16.4
I think we should consider carefully what it means if some of these variables don't exist:
- if secure boot is enabled, db and dbx must exist, so if they don't, something is wrongQuoted 8 lines
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The existence of db/dbx is not related to secure boot. If manufacturer/user enrolled certificate/hash to db or dbx, then the variable will be created. If user didn't enroll anything to db/dbx, then variables will not show up.
Yes, but if secure boot is enabled and db is empty, how could you have booted in the first place?
I agree. When secure boot enabled, kernel can not be booted without db.
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And what about the converse case: if secure boot is not enabled, why should we trust the contents of db?
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The db and dbx are authenticated variables that it protected by KEK. So it can be trusted even secure boot is disabled. Unless manufacturer or user's KEK is leaked.
Is that true for non-secureboot capable firmware? Of course, in that case, we cannot be sure that the kernel itself is trusted, but we shouldn't open up another hole either.
I agree with you that we should filer-out non-secureboot firmware. I think that we can check the existence of SecureBoot variable before loading db/dbx. On the other hand, the SetupMode should also be checked because db/dbx can be changed in setup mode.
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- secure boot might be enabled but we may be booting without shim.
Shim always creates MokListRT no matter secure boot enabled or disabled.
That is not my point. What happens if you booted with secure boot enabled but without the help of shim?
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Without shim, the signed EFI stub can still be booted by EFI boot manager. But the MokListRT will not be created for runtime. So MOK signed kernel module can not be verified. (or IMA can not verify MOK signed kernel image for kexec...)
So if we opt out of using shim, we lose kexec capability as well? That doesn't make any sense.
MOK is just one of options that it can be used to sign crash kernel image. We can also use the key in db or the kernel embedded keys.
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In general, I am very uncomfortable with the way we have painted ourselves into a corner with shim. If I install Suse on a system that has the Suse cert in db or KEK, why would I need shim in the first place?
Yes! We don't need MOK if distro's certificates are preloaded in most machines' db. Unfortunately it's not the case on most x86 machines.
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- secure boot might be disabled.
It's not about secure boot, db/dbx/MokListRT are always available at runtime if user was enrolled something to those list.
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Yes, but again, depending on whether shim was involved, and/or whether secure boot was enabled or not, the way we interpret these things may be very different.
I want the reasoning to be sound before merging any patches that deal with these variables.
Here is a simple summary:
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When secure boot is enabled:
- db/dbx: Can be trusted because they are authenticated variables. (unless end user doesn't want to trust db/dbx)
- MokListRT:
- with shim: MokListRT will be created. It can be trusted.
- without shim: MokListRT will not be created.
MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
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So who polices that MoKlistRT is not created?
At boot time, shim copies MokList (boot variable) to MokListRT (runtime variable). The MokListRT is a read-only runtime volatile variable. So, without shim, the MokListRT will not be created for runtime.
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When secure boot is disabled:
- db/dbx: Can be trusted because they are authenticated variables. (unless end user doesn't want to trust db/dbx)Is this true? Does non-secure boot capable firmware still guarantee that db/dbx can't be created?
I agree. So we should check the existence of SecureBoot variable as I mentioned above.
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- MokListRT:
- with shim: MokListRT will be created. But it can not be trusted. MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
- without shim: MokListRT will not be created.
MOK protected kernel module or file can not be verified.
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Enabling this securely involves more than connecting the dots when it comes to db, MokListRT etc. I would like for someone to convince me as a maintainer, as well as the IMA maintainers, that the security requirements are still met in all cases we care about. Just copying db and MokListRT into a kernel keychain doesn't appear to do that, and if it does, it needs more documentation to clarify that.
Welcome for more input from other maintainers. But I hope that my cosmetic can be accepted because current warning messages looks ugly.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Quoted 6 lines · Chun-Yi
This function can be used to convert EFI status value to string for printing out debug message. Using this function can improve the readability of log.
v2.
Please move the changelog out of the commit log (move it below the --- further down)
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- Changed the wording in subject and description.
- Moved the marco immediately after the status value definitions.
- Turned into a proper function instead of inline.
You missed my point here. A proper function means the function in a .c file, and only the declaration in a .h file. This way, you are still duplicating the literal strings into every object file that references this function.
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Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>Cc Colin Cross <[email protected]>Cc Tony Luck <[email protected]>Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- include/linux/efi.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)include/linux/efi.h +28
-1@@ -42,6 +42,34 @@#define EFI_ABORTED (21 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))#define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION (26 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) +#define EFI_STATUS_STR (_status) \ +case EFI_##_status: \ + return "EFI_" __stringify(_status); + +static __attribute__((unused))char * +efi_status_to_str (unsigned long status) +{ +switch (status) { + EFI_STATUS_STR(SUCCESS) + EFI_STATUS_STR(LOAD_ERROR) + EFI_STATUS_STR(INVALID_PARAMETER) + EFI_STATUS_STR(UNSUPPORTED) + EFI_STATUS_STR(BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) + EFI_STATUS_STR(BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) + EFI_STATUS_STR(NOT_READY) + EFI_STATUS_STR(DEVICE_ERROR) + EFI_STATUS_STR(WRITE_PROTECTED) + EFI_STATUS_STR(OUT_OF_RESOURCES) + EFI_STATUS_STR(NOT_FOUND) + EFI_STATUS_STR(ABORTED) + EFI_STATUS_STR(SECURITY_VIOLATION) + default: + pr_warn("Unknown efi status: 0x%lx", status); + } + +return "Unknown efi status" ; +} +typedef unsigned long efi_status_t ;typedef u8 efi_bool_t ;typedef u16 efi_char16_t ;/* UNICODE character */ --2.16.4
Quoted 11 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 6 lines · Chun-Yi
This function can be used to convert EFI status value to string for printing out debug message. Using this function can improve the readability of log.
v2.
Please move the changelog out of the commit log (move it below the --- further down)
OK! I will moved the changelog out of the commit log.
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- Changed the wording in subject and description.
- Moved the marco immediately after the status value definitions.
- Turned into a proper function instead of inline.You missed my point here. A proper function means the function in a .c file, and only the declaration in a .h file. This way, you are still duplicating the literal strings into every object file that references this function.
Sorry for I missunderstood. I will move the function to load_uefi.c.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Quoted 21 lines · joeyli
Quoted 11 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 6 lines · Chun-Yi
This function can be used to convert EFI status value to string for printing out debug message. Using this function can improve the readability of log.
v2.
Please move the changelog out of the commit log (move it below the --- further down)
OK! I will moved the changelog out of the commit log.
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- Changed the wording in subject and description.
- Moved the marco immediately after the status value definitions.
- Turned into a proper function instead of inline.
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You missed my point here. A proper function means the function in a .c file, and only the declaration in a .h file. This way, you are still duplicating the literal strings into every object file that references this function.
Sorry for I missunderstood. I will move the function to
load_uefi.c.
No, please move it to a file that is shared between all EFI code.
Quoted 28 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 27 lines · joeyli
Quoted 11 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 6 lines · Chun-Yi
This function can be used to convert EFI status value to string for printing out debug message. Using this function can improve the readability of log.
v2.
Please move the changelog out of the commit log (move it below the --- further down)
OK! I will moved the changelog out of the commit log.
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- Changed the wording in subject and description.
- Moved the marco immediately after the status value definitions.
- Turned into a proper function instead of inline.You missed my point here. A proper function means the function in a .c file, and only the declaration in a .h file. This way, you are still duplicating the literal strings into every object file that references this function.
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Sorry for I missunderstood. I will move the function to
load_uefi.c.No, please move it to a file that is shared between all EFI code.
I see! I will move the function to the position that it is just behind efi_status_to_str() in drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c. Please let me know if the position is not suitable.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee