overlayfs override_creds=off
Subsystems (35)
v13 cover overlayfs override_creds=off
Patch series:
overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
The first four patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
on them).
The fifth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
---
v13:
- add flags argument to __vfs_getxattr
- drop GFP_NOFS side-effect
v12:
- Restore squished out patch 2 and 3 in the series, then change algorithm to add flags argument. Per-thread flag is a large security surface.
v11:
- Squish out v10 introduced patch 2 and 3 in the series, then and use per-thread flag instead for nesting.
- Switch name to ovl_do_vds_getxattr for __vds_getxattr wrapper.
- Add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work.
v10:
- Return NULL on CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
- Add __get xattr method to solve sepolicy logging issue
- Drop unnecessary sys_admin sepolicy checking for administrative driver internal xattr functions.
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation, drop rationalizations.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
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PATCH v13 1/5 overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh
Assumption never checked, should fail if the mounter creds are not sufficient.
---
v11 + v12 + v13 - rebase
v10:
- return NULL rather than ERR_PTR(-EPERM)
- did _not_ add it ovl_can_decode_fh() because of changes since last review, suspect needs to be added to ovl_lower_uuid_ok()?
v8 + v9:
- rebase
v7:
- This time for realz
v6:
- rebase
v5:
- dependency of "overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred"
--- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +3 -0
@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fh *fh, struct vfsmount *mnt,if (!uuid_equal (&fh->uuid, &mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid))return NULL ; +if (!capable (CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH )) +return NULL ; + bytes = (fh->len - offsetof(struct ovl_fh , fid)); real = exportfs_decode_fh(mnt, (struct fid *)fh->fid, bytes >> 2, (int)fh->type,
Signature · 8 lines
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
PATCH v13 2/5 Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
In reply to Mark SalyzynAdd a flag option to get xattr method that could have a bit flag of XATTR_NOSECURITY passed to it. XATTR_NOSECURITY is generally then set in the __vfs_getxattr path.
This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being requested by the security layer to report back the data that is the target label or context embedded into wrapped filesystem's xattr.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then could be security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECUIRTY) -> handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> __vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECUIRTY) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECUIRTY) which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, but the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back the target context that was blocked.
Without the get handler flag, the path on a union filesystem would be the errant security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) -> handler->get(dentry) -> vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> nested -> security(lower_dentry, log off) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry) which would report back through the chain no data, and -EACCES.
For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly determined blocked access. In the first corrected case a correct avc log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow.
This patch series is inert and is the wide-spread addition of the flags option for xattr functions, and a replacement of _vfs_getxattr with __vfs_getxattr(...XATTR_NOSECURITY).
---
v13 - added flags to __vfs_getxattr call, and moved all the security
code from vfs_getxattr into it.
v12 - Added back to patch series as get xattr with flag option.
v11 - Squashed out of patch series and replaced with per-thread flag
solution.
v10 - Added to patch series as __get xattr method.
--- fs/9p/acl.c | 3 ++- fs/9p/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/afs/xattr.c | 6 +++--- fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/cifs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 6 ++++-- fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 4 ++-- fs/fuse/xattr.c | 4 ++-- fs/gfs2/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfs/attr.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/security.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jfs/xattr.c | 5 +++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 3 ++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 6 ++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 9 +++++--- fs/orangefs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 8 ++++--- fs/posix_acl.c | 2 +- fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/squashfs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/xattr.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------- fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c | 3 ++- include/linux/xattr.h | 9 ++++---- include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 5 +++-- mm/shmem.c | 3 ++- net/socket.c | 3 ++- security/commoncap.c | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++++++---- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++-- 44 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
fs/9p/acl.c +2 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ int v9fs_acl_mode(struct inode *dir, umode_t *modep,static int v9fs_xattr_get_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;struct posix_acl *acl;
fs/9p/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ ssize_t v9fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)static int v9fs_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {const char *full_name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);
fs/afs/xattr.c +3 -3
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_yfs_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_cell (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);struct afs_cell *cell = vnode->volume->cell;
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_afs_cell_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_fid (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);char text[16 +1 +24 +1 +8 +1 ];
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_afs_fid_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_volume (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);const char *volname = vnode->volume->name;
fs/btrfs/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ ssize_t btrfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size)static int btrfs_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) { name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);return btrfs_getxattr (inode, name, buffer, size);
fs/ceph/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -1171,7 +1171,8 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int ceph_get_xattr_handler (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!ceph_is_valid_xattr (name))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/cifs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int cifs_creation_time_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,static int cifs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {ssize_t rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ;unsigned int xid;
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +4 -2
@@ -1018,7 +1018,8 @@ ecryptfs_getxattr_lower(struct dentry *lower_dentry, struct inode *lower_inode, goto out; }inode_lock (lower_inode); - rc =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size, +XATTR_NOSECURITY );inode_unlock (lower_inode); out:return rc;
@@ -1103,7 +1104,8 @@ const struct inode_operations ecryptfs_main_iops = {static int ecryptfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ecryptfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); }
fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c +1 -1
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_xattr(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode) }inode_lock (lower_inode); size =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode,ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME , - xattr_virt,PAGE_SIZE ); + xattr_virt,PAGE_SIZE ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (size <0 ) size =8 ;put_unaligned_be64 (i_size_read (ecryptfs_inode), xattr_virt);
fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ext2_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext2_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext2_xattr_get (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext2/xattr_user.c +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ext2_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext2_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/ext4/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@static int ext4_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ext4_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext4/xattr_user.c +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ext4_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@static int f2fs_xattr_generic_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_SB (inode->i_sb);
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static bool f2fs_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int f2fs_xattr_advise_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (buffer) *((char *)buffer) =F2FS_I (inode)->i_advise;
fs/fuse/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int fuse_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name)static int fuse_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return fuse_getxattr (inode, name, value, size); }
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static bool no_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int no_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
fs/gfs2/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -588,7 +588,8 @@ static int __gfs2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int gfs2_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct gfs2_inode *ip =GFS2_I (inode);struct gfs2_holder gh;
fs/hfs/attr.c +1 -1
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static ssize_t __hfs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, enum hfs_xattr_type type,static int hfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return __hfs_getxattr (inode, handler->flags, value, size); }
fs/hfsplus/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -839,7 +839,8 @@ static int hfsplus_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name)static int hfsplus_osx_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {/* * Don't allow retrieving properly prefixed attributes
fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c +2 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@static int hfsplus_trusted_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer, +size_t size,int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c +2 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@static int hfsplus_user_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size,
fs/jffs2/security.c +2 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,/* ---- XATTR Handler for "security.*" ----------------- */ static int jffs2_security_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c +2 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int jffs2_trusted_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c +2 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int jffs2_user_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_USER , name, buffer, size);
fs/jfs/xattr.c +3 -2
@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static int __jfs_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int jfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) { name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);return __jfs_getxattr (inode, name, value, size);
@@ -942,7 +942,8 @@ static int jfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int jfs_xattr_get_os2 (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (is_known_namespace (name))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/kernfs/inode.c +2 -1
@@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size) +const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {const char *name =xattr_full_name (handler, suffix);struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +4 -2
@@ -7203,7 +7203,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_acl(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {return nfs4_proc_get_acl (inode, buf, buflen); }
@@ -7228,7 +7229,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_label(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_label (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {if (security_ismaclabel (key))return nfs4_get_security_label (inode, buf, buflen);
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +6 -3
@@ -7245,7 +7245,8 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ocfs2_xattr_get (inode,OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
@@ -7317,7 +7318,8 @@ const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_security_handler = {*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ocfs2_xattr_get (inode,OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
@@ -7343,7 +7345,8 @@ const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_trusted_handler = {*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct ocfs2_super *osb =OCFS2_SB (inode->i_sb);
fs/orangefs/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -541,7 +541,8 @@ static int orangefs_xattr_get_default(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, - size_t size) + size_t size, + int flags) { return orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size);
fs/overlayfs/super.c +5 -3
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static unsigned int ovl_split_lowerdirs(char *str)static int __maybe_unused ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ovl_xattr_get (dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size); }
@@ -919,7 +919,8 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int ovl_own_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
@@ -934,7 +935,8 @@ static int ovl_own_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int ovl_other_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ovl_xattr_get (dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); }
fs/posix_acl.c +1 -1
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_to_xattr);static int posix_acl_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {struct posix_acl *acl;int error;
fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +2 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@static int security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (IS_PRIVATE (inode))return -EPERM ;
fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c +2 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@static int trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) ||IS_PRIVATE (inode))return -EPERM ;
fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c +2 -1
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@static int user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!reiserfs_xattrs_user (inode->i_sb))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/squashfs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static int squashfs_xattr_handler_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, - void *buffer, size_t size) + void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { return squashfs_xattr_get(inode, handler->flags, name,buffer ,size );
fs/xattr.c +18 -18
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,return PTR_ERR (handler);if (!handler->get)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name,NULL ,0 ); + error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name,NULL ,0 ,0 );if (error <0 )return error;
@@ -292,32 +292,20 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,memset (value,0 , error +1 ); } - error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, error); + error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, error,0 ); *xattr_value = value;return error; }ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size) +void *value,size_t size,int flags) {const struct xattr_handler *handler; - - handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name); -if (IS_ERR (handler)) -return PTR_ERR (handler); -if (!handler->get) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr); - -ssize_t -vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) -{ -struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;int error; +if (flags &XATTR_NOSECURITY ) + goto nolsm; error =xattr_permission (inode, name,MAY_READ );if (error)return error;
@@ -339,7 +327,19 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)return ret; } nolsm: -return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, name, value, size); + handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name); +if (IS_ERR (handler)) +return PTR_ERR (handler); +if (!handler->get) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr); + +ssize_t +vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +{ +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, dentry->d_inode, name, value, size,0 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfs_getxattr);
fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int xfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {int xflags = handler->flags;struct xfs_inode *ip =XFS_I (inode);
include/linux/xattr.h +5 -4
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ struct xattr_handler {const char *prefix;int flags;/* fs private flags */ bool (*list)(struct dentry *dentry); -int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *,struct dentry *dentry, +int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer, -size_t size); -int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *,struct dentry *dentry, +size_t size,int flags); +int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *buffer,size_t size,int flags); };
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ struct xattr {size_t value_len; }; -ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,void *,size_t ); +ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,void *, +size_t ,int );ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_listxattr (struct dentry *d,char *list,size_t size);int __vfs_setxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );
include/uapi/linux/xattr.h +3 -2
@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@#if __UAPI_DEF_XATTR#define __USE_KERNEL_XATTR_DEFS -#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1/* set value, fail if attr already exists */ -#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2/* set value, fail if attr does not exist */ +#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1/* set value, fail if attr already exists */ +#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2/* set value, fail if attr does not exist */ +#define XATTR_NOSECURITY 0x4/* get value, do not involve security check */ #endif /* Namespaces */
mm/shmem.c +2 -1
@@ -3206,7 +3206,8 @@ static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode,static int shmem_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct shmem_inode_info *info =SHMEM_I (inode);
net/socket.c +2 -1
@@ -300,7 +300,8 @@ static const struct dentry_operations sockfs_dentry_operations = {static int sockfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size) +const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (value) {if (dentry->d_name.len +1 > size)
security/commoncap.c +4 -2
@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);int error; - error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL ,0 ); + error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );return error >0 ; }
@@ -586,7 +587,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size =__vfs_getxattr ((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, -XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &data,XATTR_CAPS_SZ ); +XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &data,XATTR_CAPS_SZ , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP )/* no data, that's ok */ return -ENODATA ;
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +2 -1
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;list_for_each_entry_rcu (xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { - error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, xattr->name,NULL ,0 ); + error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, xattr->name,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (error <0 ) {if (error == -ENODATA )continue ;
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -4
@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) goto out; } - rc =__vfs_getxattr (root, root_inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (root, root_inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL , +0 ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 && rc != -ENODATA ) {if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
@@ -1378,12 +1379,14 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,return -ENOMEM ; context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len, +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc == -ERANGE ) {kfree (context);/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 )return rc;
@@ -1394,7 +1397,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, context[len] ='\0' ; rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , - context, len); + context, len,XATTR_NOSECURITY ); }if (rc <0 ) {kfree (context);
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,if (buffer ==NULL )return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, ip, name, buffer,SMK_LONGLABEL ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, ip, name, buffer,SMK_LONGLABEL , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 ) skp =ERR_PTR (rc);else if (rc ==0 )
@@ -3442,7 +3443,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) }else { rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, inode,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE , trattr, -TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ); +TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc >=0 &&strncmp (trattr,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 ) rc = -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
Re: [PATCH v13 2/5] Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
I have been told privately that this patch should be pulled out of the overlayfs series, and independently approved. In effect by security focus (the filesystem folks generally ignore patches that are related to overlayfs or are security related).
Once accepted, we can _then_ get on with the fixes for overlayfs (or any other unionfs that needs this) under separate cover.
Does the flags option to __vfs_getxattr deal with your (Stephen Smalley) concerns about attack surface (the flag is passed programmatically/internally and resides only on the randomized stack)?
Sincerely -- Mark
Quoted 992 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Add a flag option to get xattr method that could have a bit flag of
XATTR_NOSECURITYpassed to it.XATTR_NOSECURITYis generally then set in the__vfs_getxattrpath.This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being requested by the security layer to report back the data that is the target label or context embedded into wrapped filesystem's xattr.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then could be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECUIRTY)->handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY)->__vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECUIRTY)->lower_handler->get(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECUIRTY)which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, but the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back the target context that was blocked.Without the get handler flag, the path on a union filesystem would be the errant security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr(dentry)->handler->get(dentry)->vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry)-> nested ->security(lower_dentry, log off)->lower_handler->get(lower_dentry)which would report back through the chain no data, and-EACCES.For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly determined blocked access. In the first corrected case a correct avc log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow.
This patch series is inert and is the wide-spread addition of the flags option for xattr functions, and a replacement of
_vfs_getxattrwith__vfs_getxattr(...XATTR_NOSECURITY).Signed-off-by Mark Salyzyn <[email protected]>Cc Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>Cc Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>Cc Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>Cc Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>Cc Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>Cc Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Cc Eric Van Hensbergen <[email protected]>Cc Latchesar Ionkov <[email protected]>Cc Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Chris Mason <[email protected]>Cc Josef Bacik <[email protected]>Cc David Sterba <[email protected]>Cc Jeff Layton <[email protected]>Cc Sage Weil <[email protected]>Cc Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Cc Jan Kara <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Cc Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>Cc Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>Cc Chao Yu <[email protected]>Cc Bob Peterson <[email protected]>Cc Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>Cc Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>Cc Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>Cc Tejun Heo <[email protected]>Cc Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>Cc Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>Cc Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>Cc Joel Becker <[email protected]>Cc Joseph Qi <[email protected]>Cc Mike Marshall <[email protected]>Cc Martin Brandenburg <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>Cc Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>Cc Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>Cc Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>Cc David S. Miller <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]>Cc Ernesto A. Fernández <[email protected]>Cc Vyacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]>Cc [email protected] # 4.4, 4.9, 4.14 & 4.19---
v13 - added flags to__vfs_getxattrcall, and moved all the security
code fromvfs_getxattrinto it.v12 - Added back to patch series as get xattr with flag option.
v11 - Squashed out of patch series and replaced with per-thread flag
solution.v10 - Added to patch series as
__getxattr method.--- fs/9p/acl.c | 3 ++- fs/9p/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/afs/xattr.c | 6 +++--- fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/cifs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 6 ++++-- fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 4 ++-- fs/fuse/xattr.c | 4 ++-- fs/gfs2/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfs/attr.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/security.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jfs/xattr.c | 5 +++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 3 ++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 6 ++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 9 +++++--- fs/orangefs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 8 ++++--- fs/posix_acl.c | 2 +- fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/squashfs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/xattr.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------- fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c | 3 ++- include/linux/xattr.h | 9 ++++---- include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 5 +++-- mm/shmem.c | 3 ++- net/socket.c | 3 ++- security/commoncap.c | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++++++---- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++-- 44 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)fs/9p/acl.c +2
-1@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ int v9fs_acl_mode(struct inode *dir, umode_t *modep,static int v9fs_xattr_get_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;struct posix_acl *acl;fs/9p/xattr.c +2
-1@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ ssize_t v9fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)static int v9fs_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {const char *full_name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);fs/afs/xattr.c +3
-3@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_yfs_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_cell (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);struct afs_cell *cell = vnode->volume->cell;@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_afs_cell_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_fid (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);char text[16 +1 +24 +1 +8 +1 ];@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_afs_fid_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_volume (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);const char *volname = vnode->volume->name;fs/btrfs/xattr.c +2
-1@@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ ssize_t btrfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size)static int btrfs_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) { name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);return btrfs_getxattr (inode, name, buffer, size);fs/ceph/xattr.c +2
-1@@ -1171,7 +1171,8 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int ceph_get_xattr_handler (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!ceph_is_valid_xattr (name))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;fs/cifs/xattr.c +1
-1@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int cifs_creation_time_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,static int cifs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {ssize_t rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ;unsigned int xid;fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +4
-2@@ -1018,7 +1018,8 @@ ecryptfs_getxattr_lower(struct dentry *lower_dentry, struct inode *lower_inode, goto out; }inode_lock (lower_inode); - rc =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size, +XATTR_NOSECURITY );inode_unlock (lower_inode); out:return rc;@@ -1103,7 +1104,8 @@ const struct inode_operations ecryptfs_main_iops = {static int ecryptfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ecryptfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); }fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c +1
-1@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_xattr(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode) }inode_lock (lower_inode); size =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode,ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME , - xattr_virt,PAGE_SIZE ); + xattr_virt,PAGE_SIZE ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (size <0 ) size =8 ;put_unaligned_be64 (i_size_read (ecryptfs_inode), xattr_virt);fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c +1
-1@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ext2_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext2_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext2_xattr_get (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);fs/ext2/xattr_user.c +1
-1@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ext2_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext2_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;fs/ext4/xattr_security.c +1
-1@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@static int ext4_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c +1
-1@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ext4_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);fs/ext4/xattr_user.c +1
-1@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ext4_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2
-2@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@static int f2fs_xattr_generic_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_SB (inode->i_sb);@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static bool f2fs_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int f2fs_xattr_advise_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (buffer) *((char *)buffer) =F2FS_I (inode)->i_advise;fs/fuse/xattr.c +2
-2@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int fuse_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name)static int fuse_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return fuse_getxattr (inode, name, value, size); }@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static bool no_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int no_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }fs/gfs2/xattr.c +2
-1@@ -588,7 +588,8 @@ static int __gfs2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int gfs2_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct gfs2_inode *ip =GFS2_I (inode);struct gfs2_holder gh;fs/hfs/attr.c +1
-1@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static ssize_t __hfs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, enum hfs_xattr_type type,static int hfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return __hfs_getxattr (inode, handler->flags, value, size); }fs/hfsplus/xattr.c +2
-1@@ -839,7 +839,8 @@ static int hfsplus_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name)static int hfsplus_osx_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {/* * Don't allow retrieving properly prefixed attributes fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c +2
-1@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@static int hfsplus_trusted_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer, +size_t size,int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c +2
-1@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@static int hfsplus_user_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size,fs/jffs2/security.c +2
-1@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,/* ---- XATTR Handler for "security.*" ----------------- */ static int jffs2_security_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c +2
-1@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int jffs2_trusted_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c +2
-1@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int jffs2_user_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_USER , name, buffer, size);fs/jfs/xattr.c +3
-2@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static int __jfs_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int jfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) { name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);return __jfs_getxattr (inode, name, value, size);@@ -942,7 +942,8 @@ static int jfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int jfs_xattr_get_os2 (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (is_known_namespace (name))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;fs/kernfs/inode.c +2
-1@@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size) +const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {const char *name =xattr_full_name (handler, suffix);struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +4
-2@@ -7203,7 +7203,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_acl(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {return nfs4_proc_get_acl (inode, buf, buflen); }@@ -7228,7 +7229,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_label(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_label (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {if (security_ismaclabel (key))return nfs4_get_security_label (inode, buf, buflen);fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +6
-3@@ -7245,7 +7245,8 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ocfs2_xattr_get (inode,OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);@@ -7317,7 +7318,8 @@ const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_security_handler = {*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ocfs2_xattr_get (inode,OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);@@ -7343,7 +7345,8 @@ const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_trusted_handler = {*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct ocfs2_super *osb =OCFS2_SB (inode->i_sb);fs/orangefs/xattr.c +2
-1@@ -541,7 +541,8 @@ static int orangefs_xattr_get_default(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, - size_t size) + size_t size, + int flags) { return orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size);fs/overlayfs/super.c +5
-3@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static unsigned int ovl_split_lowerdirs(char *str)static int __maybe_unused ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ovl_xattr_get (dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size); }@@ -919,7 +919,8 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int ovl_own_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }@@ -934,7 +935,8 @@ static int ovl_own_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int ovl_other_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ovl_xattr_get (dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); }fs/posix_acl.c +1
-1@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_to_xattr);static int posix_acl_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {struct posix_acl *acl;int error;fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +2
-1@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@static int security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (IS_PRIVATE (inode))return -EPERM ;fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c +2
-1@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@static int trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) ||IS_PRIVATE (inode))return -EPERM ;fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c +2
-1@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@static int user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!reiserfs_xattrs_user (inode->i_sb))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;fs/squashfs/xattr.c +1
-1@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static int squashfs_xattr_handler_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, - void *buffer, size_t size) + void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { return squashfs_xattr_get(inode, handler->flags, name,buffer ,size );fs/xattr.c +18
-18@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,return PTR_ERR (handler);if (!handler->get)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name,NULL ,0 ); + error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name,NULL ,0 ,0 );if (error <0 )return error;@@ -292,32 +292,20 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,memset (value,0 , error +1 ); } - error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, error); + error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, error,0 ); *xattr_value = value;return error; }ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size) +void *value,size_t size,int flags) {const struct xattr_handler *handler; - - handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name); -if (IS_ERR (handler)) -return PTR_ERR (handler); -if (!handler->get) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr); - -ssize_t -vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) -{ -struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;int error; +if (flags &XATTR_NOSECURITY ) + goto nolsm; error =xattr_permission (inode, name,MAY_READ );if (error)return error;@@ -339,7 +327,19 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)return ret; } nolsm: -return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, name, value, size); + handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name); +if (IS_ERR (handler)) +return PTR_ERR (handler); +if (!handler->get) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr); + +ssize_t +vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +{ +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, dentry->d_inode, name, value, size,0 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfs_getxattr);fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c +2
-1@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int xfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {int xflags = handler->flags;struct xfs_inode *ip =XFS_I (inode);include/linux/xattr.h +5
-4@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ struct xattr_handler {const char *prefix;int flags;/* fs private flags */ bool (*list)(struct dentry *dentry); -int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *,struct dentry *dentry, +int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer, -size_t size); -int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *,struct dentry *dentry, +size_t size,int flags); +int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *buffer,size_t size,int flags); };@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ struct xattr {size_t value_len; }; -ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,void *,size_t ); +ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,void *, +size_t ,int );ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_listxattr (struct dentry *d,char *list,size_t size);int __vfs_setxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );include/uapi/linux/xattr.h +3
-2@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@#if __UAPI_DEF_XATTR#define __USE_KERNEL_XATTR_DEFS -#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1/* set value, fail if attr already exists */ -#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2/* set value, fail if attr does not exist */ +#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1/* set value, fail if attr already exists */ +#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2/* set value, fail if attr does not exist */ +#define XATTR_NOSECURITY 0x4/* get value, do not involve security check */ #endif /* Namespaces */ mm/shmem.c +2
-1@@ -3206,7 +3206,8 @@ static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode,static int shmem_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct shmem_inode_info *info =SHMEM_I (inode);net/socket.c +2
-1@@ -300,7 +300,8 @@ static const struct dentry_operations sockfs_dentry_operations = {static int sockfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size) +const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (value) {if (dentry->d_name.len +1 > size)security/commoncap.c +4
-2@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);int error; - error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL ,0 ); + error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );return error >0 ; }@@ -586,7 +587,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size =__vfs_getxattr ((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, -XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &data,XATTR_CAPS_SZ ); +XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &data,XATTR_CAPS_SZ , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP )/* no data, that's ok */ return -ENODATA ;security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +2
-1@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;list_for_each_entry_rcu (xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { - error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, xattr->name,NULL ,0 ); + error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, xattr->name,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (error <0 ) {if (error == -ENODATA )continue ;security/selinux/hooks.c +7
-4@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) goto out; } - rc =__vfs_getxattr (root, root_inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (root, root_inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL , +0 ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 && rc != -ENODATA ) {if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "@@ -1378,12 +1379,14 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,return -ENOMEM ; context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len, +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc == -ERANGE ) {kfree (context);/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 )return rc;@@ -1394,7 +1397,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, context[len] ='\0' ; rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , - context, len); + context, len,XATTR_NOSECURITY ); }if (rc <0 ) {kfree (context);security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3
-2@@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,if (buffer ==NULL )return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, ip, name, buffer,SMK_LONGLABEL ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, ip, name, buffer,SMK_LONGLABEL , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 ) skp =ERR_PTR (rc);else if (rc ==0 )@@ -3442,7 +3443,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) }else { rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, inode,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE , trattr, -TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ); +TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc >=0 &&strncmp (trattr,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 ) rc = -EINVAL ;
PATCH v13 3/5 overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
In reply to Mark SalyzynBecause of the overlayfs getxattr recursion, the incoming inode fails to update the selinux sid resulting in avc denials being reported against a target context of u:object_r:unlabeled:s0.
Solution is to respond to the XATTR_NOSECURITY flag in get xattr method that calls the __vfs_getxattr handler instead so that the context can be read in, rather than being denied with an -EACCES when vfs_getxattr handler is called.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then would be security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> __vfs_getxattr(realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> lower_handler->get(realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and the caller that the target context was blocked.
For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address the access problem.
---
v13 - rebase to use __vfs_getxattr flags option.
v12 - Added back to patch series as get xattr with flag option.
v11 - Squashed out of patch series and replaced with per-thread flag
solution.
v10 - Added to patch series as __get xattr method.
--- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 5 +++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +3 -2
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, }int ovl_xattr_get (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size) +void *value,size_t size,int flags) {ssize_t res;const struct cred *old_cred;
@@ -371,7 +371,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,ovl_i_dentry_upper (inode) ?:ovl_dentry_lower (dentry); old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); - res =vfs_getxattr (realdentry, name, value, size); + res =__vfs_getxattr (realdentry,d_inode (realdentry), name, + value, size, flags);revert_creds (old_cred);return res; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -1
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);int ovl_xattr_set (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int ovl_xattr_get (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size); +void *value,size_t size,int flags);ssize_t ovl_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *list,size_t size);struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl (struct inode *inode,int type);int ovl_update_time (struct inode *inode,struct timespec64 *ts,int flags);
fs/overlayfs/super.c +2 -2
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size); + return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size, flags); } static int __maybe_unused
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static int ovl_other_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); + return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, name, buffer, size, flags); } static int ovl_other_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
PATCH v13 4/5 overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
In reply to Mark SalyzynCheck impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.
This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new ovl_do_vfs_getxattr function if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.
Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and sys_admin capability. Providing blanket support for sys_admin would be bad for all possible callers.
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has sys_admin capabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.
It should be noted that there is precedence, __vfs_getxattr is used in other filesystems for their own internal trusted xattr management.
---
v13 - rebase to use __vfs_getxattr flags option
v12 - rebase
v11 - switch name to ovl_do_vfs_getxattr, fortify comment
v10 - added to patch series
--- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 12 +++++++----- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 ++ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +7 -5
@@ -106,10 +106,11 @@ int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { -int res, err; +ssize_t res; +int err;struct ovl_fh *fh =NULL ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return NULL ;
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)if (!fh)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, fh, res); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, fh, res);if (res <0 ) goto fail;
@@ -141,10 +142,11 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)return NULL ; fail: -pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%i)\n" , res); +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%zi)\n" , res); goto out; invalid: -pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n" , res, fh); +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n" , + (int )res, fh); goto out; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +2 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);void ovl_drop_write (struct dentry *dentry);struct dentry *ovl_workdir (struct dentry *dentry);const struct cred *ovl_override_creds (struct super_block *sb); +ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf, +size_t size);struct super_block *ovl_same_sb (struct super_block *sb);int ovl_can_decode_fh (struct super_block *sb);struct dentry *ovl_indexdir (struct super_block *sb);
fs/overlayfs/util.c +16 -9
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)return override_creds (ofs->creator_cred); } +ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf, +size_t size) +{ +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry,d_inode (dentry), name, buf, size, +XATTR_NOSECURITY ); +} +struct super_block *ovl_same_sb (struct super_block *sb) {struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
@@ -537,9 +544,9 @@ void ovl_copy_up_end(struct dentry *dentry)bool ovl_check_origin_xattr (struct dentry *dentry) { -int res; +ssize_t res; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN ,NULL ,0 );/* Zero size value means "copied up but origin unknown" */ if (res >=0 )
@@ -550,13 +557,13 @@ bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)bool ovl_check_dir_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { -int res; +ssize_t res;char val;if (!d_is_dir (dentry))return false; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, &val,1 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, &val,1 );if (res ==1 && val =='y' )return true;
@@ -837,13 +844,13 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir)/* err < 0, 0 if no metacopy xattr, 1 if metacopy xattr found */ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr (struct dentry *dentry) { -int res; +ssize_t res;/* Only regular files can have metacopy xattr */ if (!S_ISREG (d_inode (dentry)->i_mode))return 0 ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;
@@ -852,7 +859,7 @@ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)return 1 ; out: -pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%i)\n" , res); +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%zi)\n" , res);return res; }
@@ -878,7 +885,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,ssize_t res;char *buf =NULL ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return -ENODATA ;
@@ -890,7 +897,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,if (!buf)return -ENOMEM ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, buf, res); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, buf, res);if (res <0 ) goto fail; }
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
PATCH v13 5/5 overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
In reply to Mark SalyzynBy default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds.
It was not always this way. Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories were temporarily increased to perform the operations. The MAC (selinux) policies were caller's in all cases. override_creds=off partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure temporary credential increases. This is to permit use in a system with non-overlapping security models for each executable including the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem. In Android this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations, has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface, and services that use the content have a different set of MAC privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for vendor libraries and modules). The caveats are not a problem in the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for completeness and for general use in time.
---
v12 + v13:
- Rebase
v11:
- add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work
v10:
- Rebase (and expand because of increased revert_cred usage)
v9:
- Add to the caveats
v8:
- drop pr_warn message after straw poll to remove it.
- added a use case in the commit message
v7:
- change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def
- report override_creds only if different than default
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
--- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 11 ++++++----- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 18 +++++++++--------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 11 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt +23 -0
@@ -102,6 +102,29 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged. Other content such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper directory only. These attributes of the lower directory are hidden. +credentials +----------- + +By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are +checked against the caller's credentials. + +In the case where caller MAC or DAC credentials do not overlap, a +use case available in older versions of the driver, the +override_creds mount flag can be turned off and help when the use +pattern has caller with legitimate credentials where the mounter +does not. Several unintended side effects will occur though. The +caller without certain key capabilities or lower privilege will not +always be able to delete files or directories, create nodes, or +search some restricted directories. The ability to search and read +a directory entry is spotty as a result of the cache mechanism not +retesting the credentials because of the assumption, a privileged +caller can fill cache, then a lower privilege can read the directory +cache. The uneven security model where cache, upperdir and workdir +are opened at privilege, but accessed without creating a form of +privilege escalation, should only be used with strict understanding +of the side effects and of the security policies. + whiteouts and opaque directories --------------------------------
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +1 -1
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)dput (parent);dput (next); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +6 -5
@@ -563,7 +563,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;if (!attr->hardlink) { err =security_dentry_create_files_as (dentry, - attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred, + attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, + old_cred ? old_cred :current_cred (), override_cred);if (err) {put_cred (override_cred);
@@ -579,7 +580,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, err =ovl_create_over_whiteout (dentry, inode, attr); } out_revert_creds: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ static int ovl_set_link_redirect(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =ovl_set_redirect (dentry, false); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -851,7 +852,7 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) err =ovl_remove_upper (dentry, is_dir, &list); else err =ovl_remove_and_whiteout (dentry, &list); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (!err) {if (is_dir)clear_nlink (dentry->d_inode);
@@ -1221,7 +1222,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old, out_unlock:unlock_rename (new_upperdir, old_upperdir); out_revert_creds: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (old->d_sb, old_cred);if (update_nlink)ovl_nlink_end (new); out_drop_write:
fs/overlayfs/file.c +10 -10
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); realfile =open_with_fake_path (&file->f_path, flags, realinode,current_cred ()); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred); pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n", file, file, ovl_whatisit(inode, realinode), file->f_flags,
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); ret =vfs_llseek (real.file, offset, whence); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred); file->f_pos = real.file->f_pos;inode_unlock (inode);
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_iter_read (real.file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos,ovl_iocb_to_rwf (iocb)); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);ovl_file_accessed (file);
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) ret =vfs_iter_write (real.file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos,ovl_iocb_to_rwf (iocb));file_end_write (real.file); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode), inode);
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)if (file_inode (real.file) ==ovl_inode_upper (file_inode (file))) { old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fsync_range (real.file, start, end, datasync); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred); }fdput (real);
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int ovl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =call_mmap (vma->vm_file, vma); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);if (ret) {/* Drop reference count from new vm_file value */
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fallocate (real.file, mode, offset, len); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode), inode);
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static int ovl_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fadvise (real.file, offset, len, advice); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real);
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static long ovl_real_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_ioctl (real.file, cmd, arg); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real);
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, flags);break ; } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file_out)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode_out), inode_out);
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +9 -9
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)inode_lock (upperdentry->d_inode); old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =notify_change (upperdentry, attr,NULL ); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (!err)ovl_copyattr (upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);inode_unlock (upperdentry->d_inode);
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; out: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) mask |=MAY_READ ; } err =inode_permission (realinode, mask); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); p =vfs_get_link (ovl_dentry_real (dentry), done); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return p; }
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,WARN_ON (flags !=XATTR_REPLACE ); err =vfs_removexattr (realdentry, name); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);/* copy c/mtime */ ovl_copyattr (d_inode (realdentry), inode);
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); res =__vfs_getxattr (realdentry,d_inode (realdentry), name, value, size, flags); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return res; }
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); res =vfs_listxattr (realdentry, list, size); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (res <=0 || size ==0 )return res;
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); acl =get_acl (realinode, type); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return acl; }
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,filemap_write_and_wait (realinode->i_mapping); err = realinode->i_op->fiemap (realinode, fieinfo, start, len); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return err; }
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +3 -3
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_free_oe; } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (origin_path) {dput (origin_path->dentry);kfree (origin_path);
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,kfree (upperredirect); out:kfree (d.redirect); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return ERR_PTR (err); }
@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)dput (this); } } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return positive; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);void ovl_drop_write (struct dentry *dentry);struct dentry *ovl_workdir (struct dentry *dentry);const struct cred *ovl_override_creds (struct super_block *sb); +void ovl_revert_creds (struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *oldcred);ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf,size_t size);struct super_block *ovl_same_sb (struct super_block *sb);
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct ovl_config {bool nfs_export;int xino;bool metacopy; +bool override_creds; };struct ovl_sb {
fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +2 -2
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd) }inode_unlock (dir->d_inode); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (rdd->dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =ovl_dir_read_merged (dentry, list, &root); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (err)return err;
fs/overlayfs/super.c +21 -1
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);MODULE_PARM_DESC (xino_auto,"Auto enable xino feature" ); +static bool __read_mostly ovl_override_creds_def = true; +module_param_named (override_creds, ovl_override_creds_def, bool,0644 ); +MODULE_PARM_DESC (ovl_override_creds_def, +"Use mounter's credentials for accesses" ); +static void ovl_entry_stack_free (struct ovl_entry *oe) {unsigned int i;
@@ -362,6 +367,9 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)if (ofs->config.metacopy != ovl_metacopy_def)seq_printf (m,",metacopy=%s" , ofs->config.metacopy ?"on" :"off" ); +if (ofs->config.override_creds != ovl_override_creds_def) +seq_show_option (m,"override_creds" , + ofs->config.override_creds ?"on" :"off" );return 0 ; }
@@ -402,6 +410,8 @@ enum {OPT_XINO_AUTO ,OPT_METACOPY_ON ,OPT_METACOPY_OFF , +OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON , +OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF , OPT_ERR, };
@@ -420,6 +430,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = { {OPT_XINO_AUTO, "xino=auto"}, {OPT_METACOPY_ON, "metacopy=on"}, {OPT_METACOPY_OFF, "metacopy=off"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, "override_creds=on"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, "override_creds=off"}, {OPT_ERR, NULL} };
@@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->redirect_mode =kstrdup (ovl_redirect_mode_def (),GFP_KERNEL );if (!config->redirect_mode)return -ENOMEM ; + config->override_creds = ovl_override_creds_def;while ((p =ovl_next_opt (&opt)) !=NULL ) {int token;
@@ -558,6 +571,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->metacopy = false;break ; +case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON : + config->override_creds = true; +break ; + +case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF : + config->override_creds = false; +break ; +default :pr_err ("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n" , p);return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1674,7 +1695,6 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) ovl_dentry_lower(root_dentry), NULL); sb->s_root = root_dentry; -return 0 ; out_free_oe:
fs/overlayfs/util.c +10 -2
@@ -37,9 +37,17 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) {struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; +if (!ofs->config.override_creds) +return NULL ;return override_creds (ofs->creator_cred); } +void ovl_revert_creds (struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *old_cred) +{ +if (old_cred) +revert_creds (old_cred); +} +ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf,size_t size) {
@@ -798,7 +806,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry)* value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. */ err =ovl_set_nlink_upper (dentry); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred); out:if (err)
@@ -816,7 +824,7 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb);ovl_cleanup_index (dentry); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred); }ovl_inode_unlock (inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
v13 cover overlayfs override_creds=off
In reply to Mark SalyzynPatch series:
overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
The first four patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
on them).
The fifth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
---
v13:
- add flags argument to __vfs_getxattr
- drop GFP_NOFS side-effect
v12:
- Restore squished out patch 2 and 3 in the series, then change algorithm to add flags argument. Per-thread flag is a large security surface.
v11:
- Squish out v10 introduced patch 2 and 3 in the series, then and use per-thread flag instead for nesting.
- Switch name to ovl_do_vds_getxattr for __vds_getxattr wrapper.
- Add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work.
v10:
- Return NULL on CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
- Add __get xattr method to solve sepolicy logging issue
- Drop unnecessary sys_admin sepolicy checking for administrative driver internal xattr functions.
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation, drop rationalizations.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.