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drm/i915: Re-apply "Perform link quality check, unconditionally during long pulse"

PATCH In review Sasha Levin 13 participants 195 messages Sep 3, 2019 – Sep 15, 2019 Page 2 of 2

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lore
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 133/167 KVM: VMX: Always signal #GP on WRMSR to MSR_IA32_CR_PAT with bad value

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d28f4290b53a157191ed9991ad05dffe9e8c0c89 ]

The behavior of WRMSR is in no way dependent on whether or not KVM consumes the value.

Fixes 4566654bb9be9 ("KVM: vmx: Inject #GP on invalid PAT CR")
Cc Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +3 -2
index feff7ed44a2bb..e4bba840a0708 100644
@@ -4265,9 +4265,10 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 					      MSR_TYPE_W);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
+			return 1;
+
 		if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
-			if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
-				return 1;
 			vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
 			vcpu->arch.pat = data;
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 134/167 KVM: VMX: Fix handling of #MC that occurs during VM-Entry

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit beb8d93b3e423043e079ef3dda19dad7b28467a8 ]

A previous fix to prevent KVM from consuming stale VMCS state after a failed VM-Entry inadvertantly blocked KVM's handling of machine checks that occur during VM-Entry.

Per Intel's SDM, a #MC during VM-Entry is handled in one of three ways, depending on when the #MC is recognoized. As it pertains to this bug fix, the third case explicitly states EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY is handled like any other VM-Exit during VM-Entry, i.e. sets bit 31 to indicate the VM-Entry failed.

If a machine-check event occurs during a VM entry, one of the following occurs:
- The machine-check event is handled as if it occurred before the VM entry:

        ...
 - The machine-check event is handled after VM entry completes:
        ...

- A VM-entry failure occurs as described in Section 26.7. The basic exit reason is 41, for "VM-entry failure due to machine-check event".

Explicitly handle EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY as a one-off case in vmx_vcpu_run() instead of binning it into vmx_complete_atomic_exit(). Doing so allows vmx_vcpu_run() to handle VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY in a sane fashion and also simplifies vmx_complete_atomic_exit() since VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO is guaranteed to be fresh.

Fixes b060ca3b2e9e7 ("kvm: vmx: Handle VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 20 ++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +8 -12
index e4bba840a0708..82253d31842a2 100644
@@ -10438,28 +10438,21 @@ static void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
-	u32 exit_intr_info = 0;
-	u16 basic_exit_reason = (u16)vmx->exit_reason;
-
-	if (!(basic_exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
-	      || basic_exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI))
+	if (vmx->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
 		return;
 
-	if (!(vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY))
-		exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
-	vmx->exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
+	vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
 
 	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
-	if (is_page_fault(exit_intr_info))
+	if (is_page_fault(vmx->exit_intr_info))
 		vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_reason = kvm_read_and_reset_pf_reason();
 
 	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
-	if (basic_exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY ||
-	    is_machine_check(exit_intr_info))
+	if (is_machine_check(vmx->exit_intr_info))
 		kvm_machine_check();
 
 	/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
-	if (is_nmi(exit_intr_info)) {
+	if (is_nmi(vmx->exit_intr_info)) {
 		kvm_before_interrupt(&vmx->vcpu);
 		asm("int $2");
 		kvm_after_interrupt(&vmx->vcpu);
@@ -10980,6 +10973,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
 
 	vmx->exit_reason = vmx->fail ? 0xdead : vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+	if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY)
+		kvm_machine_check();
+
 	if (vmx->fail || (vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY))
 		return;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 135/167 KVM: VMX: check CPUID before allowing read/write of IA32_XSS

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d763b168e9c5c366b05812c7bba7662e5ea3669 ]

Raise #GP when guest read/write IA32_XSS, but the CPUID bits say that it shouldn't exist.

Fixes 203000993de5 (kvm: vmx: add MSR logic for XSAVES)
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +8 -2
index 82253d31842a2..2938b4bcc9684 100644
@@ -4135,7 +4135,10 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
 				       &msr_info->data);
 	case MSR_IA32_XSS:
-		if (!vmx_xsaves_supported())
+		if (!vmx_xsaves_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+		       guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))))
 			return 1;
 		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
 		break;
@@ -4302,7 +4305,10 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			return 1;
 		return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
 	case MSR_IA32_XSS:
-		if (!vmx_xsaves_supported())
+		if (!vmx_xsaves_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+		       guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))))
 			return 1;
 		/*
 		 * The only supported bit as of Skylake is bit 8, but
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 136/167 KVM: PPC: Use ccr field in pt_regs struct embedded in vcpu struct

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fd0944baad806dfb4c777124ec712c55b714ff51 ]

When the 'regs' field was added to struct kvm_vcpu_arch, the code was changed to use several of the fields inside regs (e.g., gpr, lr, etc.) but not the ccr field, because the ccr field in struct pt_regs is 64 bits on 64-bit platforms, but the cr field in kvm_vcpu_arch is only 32 bits. This changes the code to use the regs.ccr field instead of cr, and changes the assembly code on 64-bit platforms to use 64-bit loads and stores instead of 32-bit ones.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s.h    |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_64.h |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_booke.h     |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h      |  2 --
 arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c        |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_emulate.c        | 12 ++++++------
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c             |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S  |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c          |  6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c  |  5 +++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c             |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/bookehv_interrupts.S    |  8 ++++----
 arch/powerpc/kvm/emulate_loadstore.c     |  1 -
 13 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s.h +2 -2
index 83a9aa3cf6891..dd18d8174504f 100644
@@ -301,12 +301,12 @@ static inline ulong kvmppc_get_gpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int num)
 
 static inline void kvmppc_set_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 val)
 {
-	vcpu->arch.cr = val;
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = val;
 }
 
 static inline u32 kvmppc_get_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return vcpu->arch.cr;
+	return vcpu->arch.regs.ccr;
 }
 
 static inline void kvmppc_set_xer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong val)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_64.h +2 -2
index dc435a5af7d6c..14fa07c73f44d 100644
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ static inline u64 sanitize_msr(u64 msr)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
 static inline void copy_from_checkpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	vcpu->arch.cr  = vcpu->arch.cr_tm;
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr  = vcpu->arch.cr_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.xer = vcpu->arch.xer_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.link  = vcpu->arch.lr_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.ctr = vcpu->arch.ctr_tm;
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static inline void copy_from_checkpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static inline void copy_to_checkpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	vcpu->arch.cr_tm  = vcpu->arch.cr;
+	vcpu->arch.cr_tm  = vcpu->arch.regs.ccr;
 	vcpu->arch.xer_tm = vcpu->arch.regs.xer;
 	vcpu->arch.lr_tm  = vcpu->arch.regs.link;
 	vcpu->arch.ctr_tm = vcpu->arch.regs.ctr;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_booke.h +2 -2
index d513e3ed1c659..f0cef625f17ce 100644
@@ -46,12 +46,12 @@ static inline ulong kvmppc_get_gpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int num)
 
 static inline void kvmppc_set_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 val)
 {
-	vcpu->arch.cr = val;
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = val;
 }
 
 static inline u32 kvmppc_get_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return vcpu->arch.cr;
+	return vcpu->arch.regs.ccr;
 }
 
 static inline void kvmppc_set_xer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong val)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0 -2
index 2b6049e839706..2f95e38f05491 100644
@@ -538,8 +538,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 	ulong tar;
 #endif
 
-	u32 cr;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S
 	ulong hflags;
 	ulong guest_owned_ext;
arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -2
index 89cf15566c4e8..7c3738d890e8b 100644
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ int main(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S
 	OFFSET(VCPU_TAR, kvm_vcpu, arch.tar);
 #endif
-	OFFSET(VCPU_CR, kvm_vcpu, arch.cr);
+	OFFSET(VCPU_CR, kvm_vcpu, arch.regs.ccr);
 	OFFSET(VCPU_PC, kvm_vcpu, arch.regs.nip);
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
 	OFFSET(VCPU_MSR, kvm_vcpu, arch.shregs.msr);
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ int main(void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
 
 #else /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S */
-	OFFSET(VCPU_CR, kvm_vcpu, arch.cr);
+	OFFSET(VCPU_CR, kvm_vcpu, arch.regs.ccr);
 	OFFSET(VCPU_XER, kvm_vcpu, arch.regs.xer);
 	OFFSET(VCPU_LR, kvm_vcpu, arch.regs.link);
 	OFFSET(VCPU_CTR, kvm_vcpu, arch.regs.ctr);
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_emulate.c +6 -6
index 36b11c5a0dbb9..2654df220d054 100644
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static inline void kvmppc_copyto_vcpu_tm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.ctr_tm = vcpu->arch.regs.ctr;
 	vcpu->arch.tar_tm = vcpu->arch.tar;
 	vcpu->arch.lr_tm = vcpu->arch.regs.link;
-	vcpu->arch.cr_tm = vcpu->arch.cr;
+	vcpu->arch.cr_tm = vcpu->arch.regs.ccr;
 	vcpu->arch.xer_tm = vcpu->arch.regs.xer;
 	vcpu->arch.vrsave_tm = vcpu->arch.vrsave;
 }
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline void kvmppc_copyfrom_vcpu_tm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.regs.ctr = vcpu->arch.ctr_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.tar = vcpu->arch.tar_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.link = vcpu->arch.lr_tm;
-	vcpu->arch.cr = vcpu->arch.cr_tm;
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = vcpu->arch.cr_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.xer = vcpu->arch.xer_tm;
 	vcpu->arch.vrsave = vcpu->arch.vrsave_tm;
 }
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void kvmppc_emulate_treclaim(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int ra_val)
 	uint64_t texasr;
 
 	/* CR0 = 0 | MSR[TS] | 0 */
-	vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & ~(CR0_MASK << CR0_SHIFT)) |
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & ~(CR0_MASK << CR0_SHIFT)) |
 		(((guest_msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> (MSR_TS_S_LG - 1))
 		 << CR0_SHIFT);
 
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ void kvmppc_emulate_tabort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int ra_val)
 	tm_abort(ra_val);
 
 	/* CR0 = 0 | MSR[TS] | 0 */
-	vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & ~(CR0_MASK << CR0_SHIFT)) |
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & ~(CR0_MASK << CR0_SHIFT)) |
 		(((guest_msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> (MSR_TS_S_LG - 1))
 		 << CR0_SHIFT);
 
@@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ int kvmppc_core_emulate_op_pr(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 			if (!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_PR)) {
 				preempt_disable();
-				vcpu->arch.cr = (CR0_TBEGIN_FAILURE |
-				  (vcpu->arch.cr & ~(CR0_MASK << CR0_SHIFT)));
+				vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (CR0_TBEGIN_FAILURE |
+				  (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & ~(CR0_MASK << CR0_SHIFT)));
 
 				vcpu->arch.texasr = (TEXASR_FS | TEXASR_EXACT |
 					(((u64)(TM_CAUSE_EMULATE | TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT))
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +2 -2
index 9595db30e6b87..05b32cc12e417 100644
@@ -410,8 +410,8 @@ static void kvmppc_dump_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	       vcpu->arch.shregs.sprg0, vcpu->arch.shregs.sprg1);
 	pr_err("sprg2 = %.16llx sprg3 = %.16llx\n",
 	       vcpu->arch.shregs.sprg2, vcpu->arch.shregs.sprg3);
-	pr_err("cr = %.8x  xer = %.16lx  dsisr = %.8x\n",
-	       vcpu->arch.cr, vcpu->arch.regs.xer, vcpu->arch.shregs.dsisr);
+	pr_err("cr = %.8lx  xer = %.16lx  dsisr = %.8x\n",
+	       vcpu->arch.regs.ccr, vcpu->arch.regs.xer, vcpu->arch.shregs.dsisr);
 	pr_err("dar = %.16llx\n", vcpu->arch.shregs.dar);
 	pr_err("fault dar = %.16lx dsisr = %.8x\n",
 	       vcpu->arch.fault_dar, vcpu->arch.fault_dsisr);
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +2 -2
index 5902a60f92268..68c7591f2b5f7 100644
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
 END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
 
 	ld	r5, VCPU_LR(r4)
-	lwz	r6, VCPU_CR(r4)
+	ld	r6, VCPU_CR(r4)
 	mtlr	r5
 	mtcr	r6
 
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ kvmppc_interrupt_hv:
 	std	r3, VCPU_GPR(R12)(r9)
 	/* CR is in the high half of r12 */
 	srdi	r4, r12, 32
-	stw	r4, VCPU_CR(r9)
+	std	r4, VCPU_CR(r9)
 BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
 	ld	r3, HSTATE_CFAR(r13)
 	std	r3, VCPU_CFAR(r9)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c +3 -3
index 008285058f9b5..888e2609e3f15 100644
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			return RESUME_GUEST;
 		}
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
-		vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & 0x0fffffff) |
+		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
 			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
 		/* L=1 => tresume, L=0 => tsuspend */
 		if (instr & (1 << 21)) {
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		copy_from_checkpoint(vcpu);
 
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
-		vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & 0x0fffffff) |
+		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
 			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		copy_to_checkpoint(vcpu);
 
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
-		vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & 0x0fffffff) |
+		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
 			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = msr | MSR_TS_S;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c +3 -2
index b2c7c6fca4f96..3cf5863bc06e8 100644
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		if (instr & (1 << 21))
 			vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = (msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK) | MSR_TS_T;
 		/* Set CR0 to 0b0010 */
-		vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & 0x0fffffff) | 0x20000000;
+		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
+			0x20000000;
 		return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -105,5 +106,5 @@ void kvmhv_emulate_tm_rollback(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.shregs.msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;	/* go to N state */
 	vcpu->arch.regs.nip = vcpu->arch.tfhar;
 	copy_from_checkpoint(vcpu);
-	vcpu->arch.cr = (vcpu->arch.cr & 0x0fffffff) | 0xa0000000;
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) | 0xa0000000;
 }
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c +2 -2
index 614ebb4261f76..de9702219dee9 100644
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ void kvmppc_copy_to_svcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svcpu->gpr[11] = vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[11];
 	svcpu->gpr[12] = vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[12];
 	svcpu->gpr[13] = vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[13];
-	svcpu->cr  = vcpu->arch.cr;
+	svcpu->cr  = vcpu->arch.regs.ccr;
 	svcpu->xer = vcpu->arch.regs.xer;
 	svcpu->ctr = vcpu->arch.regs.ctr;
 	svcpu->lr  = vcpu->arch.regs.link;
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ void kvmppc_copy_from_svcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[11] = svcpu->gpr[11];
 	vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[12] = svcpu->gpr[12];
 	vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[13] = svcpu->gpr[13];
-	vcpu->arch.cr  = svcpu->cr;
+	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr  = svcpu->cr;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.xer = svcpu->xer;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.ctr = svcpu->ctr;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.link  = svcpu->lr;
arch/powerpc/kvm/bookehv_interrupts.S +4 -4
index 612b7f6a887f8..4e5081e584098 100644
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
 	 */
 	PPC_LL	r4, PACACURRENT(r13)
 	PPC_LL	r4, (THREAD + THREAD_KVM_VCPU)(r4)
-	stw	r10, VCPU_CR(r4)
+	PPC_STL	r10, VCPU_CR(r4)
 	PPC_STL r11, VCPU_GPR(R4)(r4)
 	PPC_STL	r5, VCPU_GPR(R5)(r4)
 	PPC_STL	r6, VCPU_GPR(R6)(r4)
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ _GLOBAL(kvmppc_handler_\intno\()_\srr1)
 	PPC_STL	r4, VCPU_GPR(R4)(r11)
 	PPC_LL	r4, THREAD_NORMSAVE(0)(r10)
 	PPC_STL	r5, VCPU_GPR(R5)(r11)
-	stw	r13, VCPU_CR(r11)
+	PPC_STL	r13, VCPU_CR(r11)
 	mfspr	r5, \srr0
 	PPC_STL	r3, VCPU_GPR(R10)(r11)
 	PPC_LL	r3, THREAD_NORMSAVE(2)(r10)
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ _GLOBAL(kvmppc_handler_\intno\()_\srr1)
 	PPC_STL	r4, VCPU_GPR(R4)(r11)
 	PPC_LL	r4, GPR9(r8)
 	PPC_STL	r5, VCPU_GPR(R5)(r11)
-	stw	r9, VCPU_CR(r11)
+	PPC_STL	r9, VCPU_CR(r11)
 	mfspr	r5, \srr0
 	PPC_STL	r3, VCPU_GPR(R8)(r11)
 	PPC_LL	r3, GPR10(r8)
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ lightweight_exit:
 	PPC_LL	r3, VCPU_LR(r4)
 	PPC_LL	r5, VCPU_XER(r4)
 	PPC_LL	r6, VCPU_CTR(r4)
-	lwz	r7, VCPU_CR(r4)
+	PPC_LL	r7, VCPU_CR(r4)
 	PPC_LL	r8, VCPU_PC(r4)
 	PPC_LD(r9, VCPU_SHARED_MSR, r11)
 	PPC_LL	r0, VCPU_GPR(R0)(r4)
arch/powerpc/kvm/emulate_loadstore.c +0 -1
index 75dce1ef3bc83..f91b1309a0a86 100644
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ int kvmppc_emulate_loadstore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	emulated = EMULATE_FAIL;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.msr = vcpu->arch.shared->msr;
-	vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = vcpu->arch.cr;
 	if (analyse_instr(&op, &vcpu->arch.regs, inst) = 0) {
 		int type = op.type & INSTR_TYPE_MASK;
 		int size = GETSIZE(op.type);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 137/167 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix CR0 setting in TM emulation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3fefd1cd95df04da67c83c1cb93b663f04b3324f ]

When emulating tsr, treclaim and trechkpt, we incorrectly set CR0. The code currently sets:

    CR0 <- 00 || MSR[TS]
but according to the ISA it should be:
    CR0 <-  0 || MSR[TS] || 0

This fixes the bit shift to put the bits in the correct location.

This is a data integrity issue as CR0 is corrupted.

Fixes 4bb3c7a0208f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9")
Cc [email protected] # v4.17+
---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c +3 -3
index 888e2609e3f15..31cd0f327c8a2 100644
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		}
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
 		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
-			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
+			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 29);
 		/* L=1 => tresume, L=0 => tsuspend */
 		if (instr & (1 << 21)) {
 			if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(msr))
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
 		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
-			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
+			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 29);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
 		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
-			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
+			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 29);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = msr | MSR_TS_S;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 138/167 ARM: dts: gemini: Set DIR-685 SPI CS as active low

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f90b8fda3a9d72a9422ea80ae95843697f94ea4a ]

The SPI to the display on the DIR-685 is active low, we were just saved by the SPI library enforcing active low on everything before, so set it as active low to avoid ambiguity.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/gemini-dlink-dir-685.dts | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/gemini-dlink-dir-685.dts +1 -1
index 502a361d1fe90..15d6157b661db 100644
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 		gpio-miso = <&gpio1 8 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		gpio-mosi = <&gpio1 7 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		/* Collides with pflash CE1, not so cool */
-		cs-gpios = <&gpio0 20 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		cs-gpios = <&gpio0 20 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 		num-chipselects = <1>;
 
 		panel: display@0 {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 139/167 RDMA/srp: Document srp_parse_in() arguments

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e37df2d5b569390e3b80ebed9a73fd5b9dcda010 ]

This patch avoids that a warning is reported when building with W=1.

---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +3 -0
index 2c1114ee0c6da..9da30d88a615e 100644
@@ -3401,6 +3401,9 @@ static const match_table_t srp_opt_tokens = {
 
 /**
  * srp_parse_in - parse an IP address and port number combination
+ * @net:	   [in]  Network namespace.
+ * @sa:		   [out] Address family, IP address and port number.
+ * @addr_port_str: [in]  IP address and port number.
  *
  * Parse the following address formats:
  * - IPv4: <ip_address>:<port>, e.g. 1.2.3.4:5.
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 140/167 RDMA/srp: Accept again source addresses that do not have a port number

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bcef5b7215681250c4bf8961dfe15e9e4fef97d0 ]

The function srp_parse_in() is used both for parsing source address specifications and for target address specifications. Target addresses must have a port number. Having to specify a port number for source addresses is inconvenient. Make sure that srp_parse_in() supports again parsing addresses with no port number.

Fixes c62adb7def71 ("IB/srp: Fix IPv6 address parsing")
---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +15 -6
index 9da30d88a615e..bc6a44a16445c 100644
@@ -3404,13 +3404,14 @@ static const match_table_t srp_opt_tokens = {
  * @net:	   [in]  Network namespace.
  * @sa:		   [out] Address family, IP address and port number.
  * @addr_port_str: [in]  IP address and port number.
+ * @has_port:	   [out] Whether or not @addr_port_str includes a port number.
  *
  * Parse the following address formats:
  * - IPv4: <ip_address>:<port>, e.g. 1.2.3.4:5.
  * - IPv6: \[<ipv6_address>\]:<port>, e.g. [1::2:3%4]:5.
  */
 static int srp_parse_in(struct net *net, struct sockaddr_storage *sa,
-			const char *addr_port_str)
+			const char *addr_port_str, bool *has_port)
 {
 	char *addr_end, *addr = kstrdup(addr_port_str, GFP_KERNEL);
 	char *port_str;
@@ -3419,9 +3420,12 @@ static int srp_parse_in(struct net *net, struct sockaddr_storage *sa,
 	if (!addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	port_str = strrchr(addr, ':');
-	if (!port_str)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	*port_str++ = '\0';
+	if (port_str && strchr(port_str, ']'))
+		port_str = NULL;
+	if (port_str)
+		*port_str++ = '\0';
+	if (has_port)
+		*has_port = port_str != NULL;
 	ret = inet_pton_with_scope(net, AF_INET, addr, port_str, sa);
 	if (ret && addr[0]) {
 		addr_end = addr + strlen(addr) - 1;
@@ -3443,6 +3447,7 @@ static int srp_parse_options(struct net *net, const char *buf,
 	char *p;
 	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 	unsigned long long ull;
+	bool has_port;
 	int opt_mask = 0;
 	int token;
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -3541,7 +3546,8 @@ static int srp_parse_options(struct net *net, const char *buf,
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 				goto out;
 			}
-			ret = srp_parse_in(net, &target->rdma_cm.src.ss, p);
+			ret = srp_parse_in(net, &target->rdma_cm.src.ss, p,
+					   NULL);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				pr_warn("bad source parameter '%s'\n", p);
 				kfree(p);
@@ -3557,7 +3563,10 @@ static int srp_parse_options(struct net *net, const char *buf,
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 				goto out;
 			}
-			ret = srp_parse_in(net, &target->rdma_cm.dst.ss, p);
+			ret = srp_parse_in(net, &target->rdma_cm.dst.ss, p,
+					   &has_port);
+			if (!has_port)
+				ret = -EINVAL;
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				pr_warn("bad dest parameter '%s'\n", p);
 				kfree(p);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 141/167 btrfs: correctly validate compression type

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa53e3bfac7205fb3a8815ac1c937fd6ed01b41e ]

Nikolay reported the following KASAN splat when running btrfs/048:

[ 1843.470920] ==================================================================
[ 1843.471971] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strncmp+0x66/0xb0
[ 1843.472775] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111e369e2 by task btrfs/3979
[ 1843.473904] CPU: 3 PID: 3979 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3-default #536
[ 1843.475009] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 1843.476322] Call Trace:
[ 1843.476674]  dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb
[ 1843.477132]  ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0
[ 1843.477587]  print_address_description+0x114/0x320
[ 1843.478256]  ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0
[ 1843.478740]  ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0
[ 1843.479185]  __kasan_report+0x14e/0x192
[ 1843.479759]  ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0
[ 1843.480209]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 1843.480679]  strncmp+0x66/0xb0
[ 1843.481105]  prop_compression_validate+0x24/0x70
[ 1843.481798]  btrfs_xattr_handler_set_prop+0x65/0x160
[ 1843.482509]  __vfs_setxattr+0x71/0x90
[ 1843.483012]  __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x84/0x130
[ 1843.483606]  vfs_setxattr+0xac/0xb0
[ 1843.484085]  setxattr+0x18c/0x230
[ 1843.484546]  ? vfs_setxattr+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1843.485048]  ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xa0
[ 1843.485672]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40
[ 1843.486233]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x988/0x1290
[ 1843.486823]  ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0
[ 1843.487330]  ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0
[ 1843.487842]  ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80
[ 1843.488442]  ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x22/0x40
[ 1843.489089]  ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0xe/0x70
[ 1843.489707]  ? __sb_start_write+0x158/0x200
[ 1843.490278]  ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80
[ 1843.490855]  ? __mnt_want_write+0x98/0xe0
[ 1843.491397]  __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0
[ 1843.492201]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 1843.493201]  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230
[ 1843.493988]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 1843.495041] RIP: 0033:0x7fa7a8a7707a
[ 1843.495819] Code: 48 8b 0d 21 de 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 be 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ee dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 1843.499203] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb73bca38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000be
[ 1843.500210] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RCX: 00007fa7a8a7707a
[ 1843.501170] RDX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RSI: 00000000006dc050 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 1843.502152] RBP: 00000000006dc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1843.503109] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcb73bda91
[ 1843.504055] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007ffcb73bda82 R15: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1843.505268] Allocated by task 3979:
[ 1843.505771]  save_stack+0x19/0x80
[ 1843.506211]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.5+0xa0/0xd0
[ 1843.506836]  setxattr+0xeb/0x230
[ 1843.507264]  __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0
[ 1843.507886]  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230
[ 1843.508429]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 1843.509558] Freed by task 0:
[ 1843.510188] (stack is not available)
[ 1843.511309] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111e369e0
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
[ 1843.514095] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of
                8-byte region [ffff888111e369e0, ffff888111e369e8)
[ 1843.516524] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 1843.517561] page:ffff88813f478d80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88811940c300 index:0xffff888111e373b8 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 1843.519993] flags: 0x4404000010200(slab|head)
[ 1843.520951] raw: 0004404000010200 ffff88813f48b008 ffff888119403d50 ffff88811940c300
[ 1843.522616] raw: ffff888111e373b8 000000000016000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 1843.524281] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 1843.525936] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 1843.526975]  ffff888111e36880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1843.528479]  ffff888111e36900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1843.530138] >ffff888111e36980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
[ 1843.531877]                                                        ^
[ 1843.533287]  ffff888111e36a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1843.534874]  ffff888111e36a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1843.536468] ==================================================================

This is caused by supplying a too short compression value ('lz') in the test-case and comparing it to 'lzo' with strncmp() and a length of 3. strncmp() read past the 'lz' when looking for the 'o' and thus caused an out-of-bounds read.

Introduce a new check 'btrfs_compress_is_valid_type()' which not only checks the user-supplied value against known compression types, but also employs checks for too short values.

Fixes 272e5326c783 ("btrfs: prop: fix vanished compression property after failed set")
---
 fs/btrfs/compression.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/compression.h |  1 +
 fs/btrfs/props.c       |  6 +-----
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/compression.c +16 -0
index 9bfa66592aa7b..c71e534ca7ef6 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,22 @@ const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(btrfs_compress_types); i++) {
+		size_t comp_len = strlen(btrfs_compress_types[i]);
+
+		if (len < comp_len)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!strncmp(btrfs_compress_types[i], str, comp_len))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int btrfs_decompress_bio(struct compressed_bio *cb);
 
 static inline int compressed_bio_size(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
fs/btrfs/compression.h +1 -0
index ddda9b80bf204..f97d90a1fa531 100644
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_lzo_compress;
 extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_zstd_compress;
 
 const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type);
+bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len);
 
 int btrfs_compress_heuristic(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end);
 
fs/btrfs/props.c +1 -5
index 61d22a56c0ba4..6980a0e13f18e 100644
@@ -366,11 +366,7 @@ int btrfs_subvol_inherit_props(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 
 static int prop_compression_validate(const char *value, size_t len)
 {
-	if (!strncmp("lzo", value, 3))
-		return 0;
-	else if (!strncmp("zlib", value, 4))
-		return 0;
-	else if (!strncmp("zstd", value, 4))
+	if (btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(value, len))
 		return 0;
 
 	return -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 142/167 resource: Include resource end in walk_*() interfaces

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a98959fdbda1849a01b2150bb635ed559ec06700 ]

find_next_iomem_res() finds an iomem resource that covers part of a range described by "start, end". All callers expect that range to be inclusive, i.e., both start and end are included, but find_next_iomem_res() doesn't handle the end address correctly.

If it finds an iomem resource that contains exactly the end address, it skips it, e.g., if "start, end" is [0x0-0x10000] and there happens to be an iomem resource [mem 0x10000-0x10000] (the single byte at 0x10000), we skip it:

  find_next_iomem_res(...)
  {
    start = 0x0;
    end = 0x10000;
    for (p = next_resource(...)) {
      # p->start = 0x10000;
      # p->end = 0x10000;
      # we *should* return this resource, but this condition is false:
      if ((p->end >= start) && (p->start < end))
        break;

Adjust find_next_iomem_res() so it allows a resource that includes the single byte at the end of the range. This is a corner case that we probably don't see in practice.

Fixes 58c1b5b07907 ("[PATCH] memory hotadd fixes: find_next_system_ram catch range fix")
CC Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
CC Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
CC Dan Williams <[email protected]>
CC H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
CC Lianbo Jiang <[email protected]>
CC Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CC Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CC Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
CC Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
CC Yaowei Bai <[email protected]>
CC x86-ml <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/resource.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/resource.c +2 -2
index 30e1bc68503b5..155ec873ea4d1 100644
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ int release_resource(struct resource *old)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_resource);
 
 /*
- * Finds the lowest iomem resource existing within [res->start.res->end).
+ * Finds the lowest iomem resource existing within [res->start..res->end].
  * The caller must specify res->start, res->end, res->flags, and optionally
  * desc.  If found, returns 0, res is overwritten, if not found, returns -1.
  * This function walks the whole tree and not just first level children until
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
 			p = NULL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if ((p->end >= start) && (p->start < end))
+		if ((p->end >= start) && (p->start <= end))
 			break;
 	}
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 143/167 resource: Fix find_next_iomem_res() iteration issue

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 010a93bf97c72f43aac664d0a685942f83d1a103 ]

Previously find_next_iomem_res() used "*res" as both an input parameter for the range to search and the type of resource to search for, and an output parameter for the resource we found, which makes the interface confusing.

The current callers use find_next_iomem_res() incorrectly because they allocate a single struct resource and use it for repeated calls to find_next_iomem_res(). When find_next_iomem_res() returns a resource, it overwrites the start, end, flags, and desc members of the struct. If we call find_next_iomem_res() again, we must update or restore these fields. The previous code restored res.start and res.end, but not res.flags or res.desc.

Since the callers did not restore res.flags, if they searched for flags IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY and found a resource with flags IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSRAM, the next search would incorrectly skip resources unless they were also marked as IORESOURCE_SYSRAM.

Fix this by restructuring the interface so it takes explicit "start, end, flags" parameters and uses "*res" only as an output parameter.

Based on a patch by Lianbo Jiang <[email protected]>.

[ bp: While at it:
- make comments kernel-doc style.
-

---
 kernel/resource.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
kernel/resource.c +42 -54
index 155ec873ea4d1..38b8d11c9eaf4 100644
@@ -318,24 +318,27 @@ int release_resource(struct resource *old)
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_resource);
 
-/*
- * Finds the lowest iomem resource existing within [res->start..res->end].
- * The caller must specify res->start, res->end, res->flags, and optionally
- * desc.  If found, returns 0, res is overwritten, if not found, returns -1.
- * This function walks the whole tree and not just first level children until
- * and unless first_level_children_only is true.
+/**
+ * Finds the lowest iomem resource that covers part of [start..end].  The
+ * caller must specify start, end, flags, and desc (which may be
+ * IORES_DESC_NONE).
+ *
+ * If a resource is found, returns 0 and *res is overwritten with the part
+ * of the resource that's within [start..end]; if none is found, returns
+ * -1.
+ *
+ * This function walks the whole tree and not just first level children
+ * unless @first_level_children_only is true.
  */
-static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
-			       bool first_level_children_only)
+static int find_next_iomem_res(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t end,
+			       unsigned long flags, unsigned long desc,
+			       bool first_level_children_only,
+			       struct resource *res)
 {
-	resource_size_t start, end;
 	struct resource *p;
 	bool sibling_only = false;
 
 	BUG_ON(!res);
-
-	start = res->start;
-	end = res->end;
 	BUG_ON(start >= end);
 
 	if (first_level_children_only)
@@ -344,7 +347,7 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
 	read_lock(&resource_lock);
 
 	for (p = iomem_resource.child; p; p = next_resource(p, sibling_only)) {
-		if ((p->flags & res->flags) != res->flags)
+		if ((p->flags & flags) != flags)
 			continue;
 		if ((desc != IORES_DESC_NONE) && (desc != p->desc))
 			continue;
@@ -359,32 +362,31 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
 	read_unlock(&resource_lock);
 	if (!p)
 		return -1;
+
 	/* copy data */
-	if (res->start < p->start)
-		res->start = p->start;
-	if (res->end > p->end)
-		res->end = p->end;
+	res->start = max(start, p->start);
+	res->end = min(end, p->end);
 	res->flags = p->flags;
 	res->desc = p->desc;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int __walk_iomem_res_desc(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
-				 bool first_level_children_only,
-				 void *arg,
+static int __walk_iomem_res_desc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t end,
+				 unsigned long flags, unsigned long desc,
+				 bool first_level_children_only, void *arg,
 				 int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
 {
-	u64 orig_end = res->end;
+	struct resource res;
 	int ret = -1;
 
-	while ((res->start < res->end) &&
-	       !find_next_iomem_res(res, desc, first_level_children_only)) {
-		ret = (*func)(res, arg);
+	while (start < end &&
+	       !find_next_iomem_res(start, end, flags, desc,
+				    first_level_children_only, &res)) {
+		ret = (*func)(&res, arg);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
-		res->start = res->end + 1;
-		res->end = orig_end;
+		start = res.end + 1;
 	}
 
 	return ret;
@@ -407,13 +409,7 @@ static int __walk_iomem_res_desc(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
 int walk_iomem_res_desc(unsigned long desc, unsigned long flags, u64 start,
 		u64 end, void *arg, int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
 {
-	struct resource res;
-
-	res.start = start;
-	res.end = end;
-	res.flags = flags;
-
-	return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, desc, false, arg, func);
+	return __walk_iomem_res_desc(start, end, flags, desc, false, arg, func);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(walk_iomem_res_desc);
 
@@ -427,13 +423,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(walk_iomem_res_desc);
 int walk_system_ram_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
 				int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
 {
-	struct resource res;
+	unsigned long flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
 
-	res.start = start;
-	res.end = end;
-	res.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
-
-	return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
+	return __walk_iomem_res_desc(start, end, flags, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
 				     arg, func);
 }
 
@@ -444,13 +436,9 @@ int walk_system_ram_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
 int walk_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
 		 int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
 {
-	struct resource res;
+	unsigned long flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
 
-	res.start = start;
-	res.end = end;
-	res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
-
-	return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
+	return __walk_iomem_res_desc(start, end, flags, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
 				     arg, func);
 }
 
@@ -464,25 +452,25 @@ int walk_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
 int walk_system_ram_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
 		void *arg, int (*func)(unsigned long, unsigned long, void *))
 {
+	resource_size_t start, end;
+	unsigned long flags;
 	struct resource res;
 	unsigned long pfn, end_pfn;
-	u64 orig_end;
 	int ret = -1;
 
-	res.start = (u64) start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
-	res.end = ((u64)(start_pfn + nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
-	res.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
-	orig_end = res.end;
-	while ((res.start < res.end) &&
-		(find_next_iomem_res(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true) >= 0)) {
+	start = (u64) start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	end = ((u64)(start_pfn + nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
+	flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
+	while (start < end &&
+	       !find_next_iomem_res(start, end, flags, IORES_DESC_NONE,
+				    true, &res)) {
 		pfn = (res.start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 		end_pfn = (res.end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 		if (end_pfn > pfn)
 			ret = (*func)(pfn, end_pfn - pfn, arg);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
-		res.start = res.end + 1;
-		res.end = orig_end;
+		start = res.end + 1;
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 7 lines
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 144/167 resource: fix locking in find_next_iomem_res()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 49f17c26c123b60fd1c74629eef077740d16ffc2 ]

Since resources can be removed, locking should ensure that the resource is not removed while accessing it. However, find_next_iomem_res() does not hold the lock while copying the data of the resource.

Keep holding the lock while the data is copied. While at it, change the return value to a more informative value. It is disregarded by the callers.

[[email protected]: fix find_next_iomem_res() documentation]
Fixes ff3cc952d3f00 ("resource: Add remove_resource interface")
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Toshi Kani <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/resource.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
kernel/resource.c +10 -10
index 38b8d11c9eaf4..bce773cc5e416 100644
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_resource);
  *
  * If a resource is found, returns 0 and *res is overwritten with the part
  * of the resource that's within [start..end]; if none is found, returns
- * -1.
+ * -ENODEV.  Returns -EINVAL for invalid parameters.
  *
  * This function walks the whole tree and not just first level children
  * unless @first_level_children_only is true.
@@ -359,16 +359,16 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t end,
 			break;
 	}
 
+	if (p) {
+		/* copy data */
+		res->start = max(start, p->start);
+		res->end = min(end, p->end);
+		res->flags = p->flags;
+		res->desc = p->desc;
+	}
+
 	read_unlock(&resource_lock);
-	if (!p)
-		return -1;
-
-	/* copy data */
-	res->start = max(start, p->start);
-	res->end = min(end, p->end);
-	res->flags = p->flags;
-	res->desc = p->desc;
-	return 0;
+	return p ? 0 : -ENODEV;
 }
 
 static int __walk_iomem_res_desc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t end,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 145/167 pstore: Fix double-free in pstore_mkfile() failure path

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Norbert Manthey <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c6d80e1144bdf48cae6b602ae30d41f3e5c76a9 ]

The pstore_mkfile() function is passed a pointer to a struct pstore_record. On success it consumes this 'record' pointer and references it from the created inode.

On failure, however, it may or may not free the record. There are even two different code paths which return -ENOMEM -- one of which does and the other doesn't free the record.

Make the behaviour deterministic by never consuming and freeing the record when returning failure, allowing the caller to do the cleanup consistently.

Fixes 83f70f0769ddd ("pstore: Do not duplicate record metadata")
Fixes 1dfff7dd67d1a ("pstore: Pass record contents instead of copying")
[kees: also move "private" allocation location, rename inode cleanup label]
---
 fs/pstore/inode.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/pstore/inode.c +6 -6
index 8cf2218b46a75..6f90d91a8733a 100644
@@ -330,10 +330,6 @@ int pstore_mkfile(struct dentry *root, struct pstore_record *record)
 		goto fail;
 	inode->i_mode = S_IFREG | 0444;
 	inode->i_fop = &pstore_file_operations;
-	private = kzalloc(sizeof(*private), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!private)
-		goto fail_alloc;
-	private->record = record;
 
 	switch (record->type) {
 	case PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG:
@@ -383,12 +379,16 @@ int pstore_mkfile(struct dentry *root, struct pstore_record *record)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	private = kzalloc(sizeof(*private), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!private)
+		goto fail_inode;
+
 	dentry = d_alloc_name(root, name);
 	if (!dentry)
 		goto fail_private;
 
+	private->record = record;
 	inode->i_size = private->total_size = size;
-
 	inode->i_private = private;
 
 	if (record->time.tv_sec)
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ int pstore_mkfile(struct dentry *root, struct pstore_record *record)
 
 fail_private:
 	free_pstore_private(private);
-fail_alloc:
+fail_inode:
 	iput(inode);
 
 fail:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 146/167 dm thin metadata: check if in fail_io mode when setting needs_check

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54fa16ee532705985e6c946da455856f18f63ee1 ]

Check if in fail_io mode at start of dm_pool_metadata_set_needs_check(). Otherwise dm_pool_metadata_set_needs_check()'s superblock_lock() can crash in dm_bm_write_lock() while accessing the block manager object that was previously destroyed as part of a failed dm_pool_abort_metadata() that ultimately set fail_io to begin with.

Also, update DMERR() message to more accurately describe superblock_lock() failure.

---
 drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +5 -2
index ed3caceaed07c..6a26afcc1fd6b 100644
@@ -2001,16 +2001,19 @@ int dm_pool_register_metadata_threshold(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,
 
 int dm_pool_metadata_set_needs_check(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd)
 {
-	int r;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
 	struct dm_block *sblock;
 	struct thin_disk_superblock *disk_super;
 
 	down_write(&pmd->root_lock);
+	if (pmd->fail_io)
+		goto out;
+
 	pmd->flags |= THIN_METADATA_NEEDS_CHECK_FLAG;
 
 	r = superblock_lock(pmd, &sblock);
 	if (r) {
-		DMERR("couldn't read superblock");
+		DMERR("couldn't lock superblock");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 147/167 drm/panel: Add support for Armadeus ST0700 Adapt

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sébastien Szymanski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c479450f61c7f1f248c9a54aedacd2a6ca521ff8 ]

This patch adds support for the Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. It comes with a Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT and an adapter board so that it can be connected on the TFT header of Armadeus Dev boards.

---
 .../display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt   |  9 ++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-simple.c          | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt new file +9 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..a30d63db3c8f7
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. A Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT with
+an adapter board.
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible: "armadeus,st0700-adapt"
+- power-supply: see panel-common.txt
+
+Optional properties:
+- backlight: see panel-common.txt
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-simple.c +29 -0
index b1d41c4921dd5..5fd94e2060297 100644
@@ -436,6 +436,32 @@ static const struct panel_desc ampire_am800480r3tmqwa1h = {
 	.bus_format = MEDIA_BUS_FMT_RGB666_1X18,
 };
 
+static const struct display_timing santek_st0700i5y_rbslw_f_timing = {
+	.pixelclock = { 26400000, 33300000, 46800000 },
+	.hactive = { 800, 800, 800 },
+	.hfront_porch = { 16, 210, 354 },
+	.hback_porch = { 45, 36, 6 },
+	.hsync_len = { 1, 10, 40 },
+	.vactive = { 480, 480, 480 },
+	.vfront_porch = { 7, 22, 147 },
+	.vback_porch = { 22, 13, 3 },
+	.vsync_len = { 1, 10, 20 },
+	.flags = DISPLAY_FLAGS_HSYNC_LOW | DISPLAY_FLAGS_VSYNC_LOW |
+		DISPLAY_FLAGS_DE_HIGH | DISPLAY_FLAGS_PIXDATA_POSEDGE
+};
+
+static const struct panel_desc armadeus_st0700_adapt = {
+	.timings = &santek_st0700i5y_rbslw_f_timing,
+	.num_timings = 1,
+	.bpc = 6,
+	.size = {
+		.width = 154,
+		.height = 86,
+	},
+	.bus_format = MEDIA_BUS_FMT_RGB666_1X18,
+	.bus_flags = DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_HIGH | DRM_BUS_FLAG_PIXDATA_POSEDGE,
+};
+
 static const struct drm_display_mode auo_b101aw03_mode = {
 	.clock = 51450,
 	.hdisplay = 1024,
@@ -2330,6 +2356,9 @@ static const struct of_device_id platform_of_match[] = {
 	}, {
 		.compatible = "ampire,am800480r3tmqwa1h",
 		.data = &ampire_am800480r3tmqwa1h,
+	}, {
+		.compatible = "armadeus,st0700-adapt",
+		.data = &armadeus_st0700_adapt,
 	}, {
 		.compatible = "auo,b101aw03",
 		.data = &auo_b101aw03,
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
#172 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 147/167] drm/panel: Add support for Armadeus ST0700 Adapt

Quoted 15 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Sébastien Szymanski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c479450f61c7f1f248c9a54aedacd2a6ca521ff8 ]

This patch adds support for the Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. It comes with a Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT and an adapter board so that it can be connected on the TFT header of Armadeus Dev boards.

Quoted 5 lines
---
 .../display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt   |  9 ++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-simple.c          | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt

Looks like a new feature, not stable material. Not sure why it got tagged for stable.

Rob

#173 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 147/167] drm/panel: Add support for Armadeus ST0700 Adapt

Quoted 22 lines · Rob Herring
Quoted 15 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Sébastien Szymanski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c479450f61c7f1f248c9a54aedacd2a6ca521ff8 ]

This patch adds support for the Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. It comes with a Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT and an adapter board so that it can be connected on the TFT header of Armadeus Dev boards.

Quoted 5 lines
---
 .../display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt   |  9 ++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-simple.c          | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
Quoted 2 lines

Looks like a new feature, not stable material. Not sure why it got tagged for stable.

New device ids/tables are able to be added to stable kernels, since, well, forever :)

thanks,

greg k-h

#174 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 147/167] drm/panel: Add support for Armadeus ST0700 Adapt

Quoted 24 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 22 lines · Rob Herring
Quoted 20 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Sébastien Szymanski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c479450f61c7f1f248c9a54aedacd2a6ca521ff8 ]

This patch adds support for the Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. It comes with a Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT and an adapter board so that it can be connected on the TFT header of Armadeus Dev boards.

---
 .../display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt   |  9 ++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-simple.c          | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Looks like a new feature, not stable material. Not sure why it got tagged for stable.

New device ids/tables are able to be added to stable kernels, since, well, forever :)

Yes I know, but I wouldn't put new panels in that category though I guess it's just data. If we are, then you should be picking up just about every single commit to panel-simple.c for stable.

Rob

author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 148/167 ALSA: hda - Fix intermittent CORB/RIRB stall on Intel chips

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2756d9143aa517b97961e85412882b8ce31371a6 ]

It turned out that the recent Intel HD-audio controller chips show a significant stall during the system PM resume intermittently. It doesn't happen so often and usually it may read back successfully after one or more seconds, but in some rare worst cases the driver went into fallback mode.

After trial-and-error, we found out that the communication stall seems covered by issuing the sync after each verb write, as already done for AMD and other chipsets. So this patch enables the write-sync flag for the recent Intel chips, Skylake and onward, as a workaround.

Also, since Broxton and co have the very same driver flags as Skylake, refer to the Skylake driver flags instead of defining the same contents again for simplification.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +2 -4
index 7a3e34b120b33..c3e3d80ff7203 100644
@@ -329,13 +329,11 @@ enum {
 
 #define AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_SKYLAKE \
 	(AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_PCH_BASE | AZX_DCAPS_PM_RUNTIME |\
+	 AZX_DCAPS_SYNC_WRITE |\
 	 AZX_DCAPS_SEPARATE_STREAM_TAG | AZX_DCAPS_I915_COMPONENT |\
 	 AZX_DCAPS_I915_POWERWELL)
 
-#define AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_BROXTON \
-	(AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_PCH_BASE | AZX_DCAPS_PM_RUNTIME |\
-	 AZX_DCAPS_SEPARATE_STREAM_TAG | AZX_DCAPS_I915_COMPONENT |\
-	 AZX_DCAPS_I915_POWERWELL)
+#define AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_BROXTON			AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_SKYLAKE
 
 /* quirks for ATI SB / AMD Hudson */
 #define AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB \
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 149/167 powerpc/mm: Limit rma_size to 1TB when running without HV mode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit da0ef93310e67ae6902efded60b6724dab27a5d1 ]

The virtual real mode addressing (VRMA) mechanism is used when a partition is using HPT (Hash Page Table) translation and performs real mode accesses (MSR[IR|DR] = 0) in non-hypervisor mode. In this mode effective address bits 0:23 are treated as zero (i.e. the access is aliased to 0) and the access is performed using an implicit 1TB SLB entry.

The size of the RMA (Real Memory Area) is communicated to the guest as the size of the first memory region in the device tree. And because of the mechanism described above can be expected to not exceed 1TB. In the event that the host erroneously represents the RMA as being larger than 1TB, guest accesses in real mode to memory addresses above 1TB will be aliased down to below 1TB. This means that a memory access performed in real mode may differ to one performed in virtual mode for the same memory address, which would likely have unintended consequences.

To avoid this outcome have the guest explicitly limit the size of the RMA to the current maximum, which is 1TB. This means that even if the first memory block is larger than 1TB, only the first 1TB should be accessed in real mode.

---
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c +9 -0
index f23a89d8e4ce6..29fd8940867e5 100644
@@ -1859,11 +1859,20 @@ void hash__setup_initial_memory_limit(phys_addr_t first_memblock_base,
 	 *
 	 * For guests on platforms before POWER9, we clamp the it limit to 1G
 	 * to avoid some funky things such as RTAS bugs etc...
+	 *
+	 * On POWER9 we limit to 1TB in case the host erroneously told us that
+	 * the RMA was >1TB. Effective address bits 0:23 are treated as zero
+	 * (meaning the access is aliased to zero i.e. addr = addr % 1TB)
+	 * for virtual real mode addressing and so it doesn't make sense to
+	 * have an area larger than 1TB as it can't be addressed.
 	 */
 	if (!early_cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
 		ppc64_rma_size = first_memblock_size;
 		if (!early_cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
 			ppc64_rma_size = min_t(u64, ppc64_rma_size, 0x40000000);
+		else
+			ppc64_rma_size = min_t(u64, ppc64_rma_size,
+					       1UL << SID_SHIFT_1T);
 
 		/* Finally limit subsequent allocations */
 		memblock_set_current_limit(ppc64_rma_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 150/167 iommu/iova: Remove stale cached32_node

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9eed17d37c77171cf5ffb95c4257f87df3cd4c8f ]

Since the cached32_node is allowed to be advanced above dma_32bit_pfn (to provide a shortcut into the limited range), we need to be careful to remove the to be freed node if it is the cached32_node.

[   48.477773] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110
[   48.477812] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88870fc19020 by task kworker/u8:1/37
[   48.477843]
[   48.477879] CPU: 1 PID: 37 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G     U            5.2.0+ #735
[   48.477915] Hardware name: Intel Corporation NUC7i5BNK/NUC7i5BNB, BIOS BNKBL357.86A.0052.2017.0918.1346 09/18/2017
[   48.478047] Workqueue: i915 __i915_gem_free_work [i915]
[   48.478075] Call Trace:
[   48.478111]  dump_stack+0x5b/0x90
[   48.478137]  print_address_description+0x67/0x237
[   48.478178]  ? __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110
[   48.478212]  __kasan_report.cold.3+0x1c/0x38
[   48.478240]  ? __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110
[   48.478280]  ? __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110
[   48.478308]  __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110
[   48.478344]  private_free_iova+0x2b/0x60
[   48.478378]  iova_magazine_free_pfns+0x46/0xa0
[   48.478403]  free_iova_fast+0x277/0x340
[   48.478443]  fq_ring_free+0x15a/0x1a0
[   48.478473]  queue_iova+0x19c/0x1f0
[   48.478597]  cleanup_page_dma.isra.64+0x62/0xb0 [i915]
[   48.478712]  __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x63/0x80 [i915]
[   48.478826]  __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x42/0x80 [i915]
[   48.478940]  __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x433/0x4b0 [i915]
[   48.479053]  __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x462/0x4b0 [i915]
[   48.479081]  ? __sg_free_table+0x9e/0xf0
[   48.479116]  ? kfree+0x7f/0x150
[   48.479234]  i915_vma_unbind+0x1e2/0x240 [i915]
[   48.479352]  i915_vma_destroy+0x3a/0x280 [i915]
[   48.479465]  __i915_gem_free_objects+0xf0/0x2d0 [i915]
[   48.479579]  __i915_gem_free_work+0x41/0xa0 [i915]
[   48.479607]  process_one_work+0x495/0x710
[   48.479642]  worker_thread+0x4c7/0x6f0
[   48.479687]  ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[   48.479724]  kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0
[   48.479774]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xa0/0xa0
[   48.479820]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[   48.479864]
[   48.479907] Allocated by task 631:
[   48.479944]  save_stack+0x19/0x80
[   48.479994]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.6+0xc1/0xd0
[   48.480038]  kmem_cache_alloc+0x91/0xf0
[   48.480082]  alloc_iova+0x2b/0x1e0
[   48.480125]  alloc_iova_fast+0x58/0x376
[   48.480166]  intel_alloc_iova+0x90/0xc0
[   48.480214]  intel_map_sg+0xde/0x1f0
[   48.480343]  i915_gem_gtt_prepare_pages+0xb8/0x170 [i915]
[   48.480465]  huge_get_pages+0x232/0x2b0 [i915]
[   48.480590]  ____i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x40/0xb0 [i915]
[   48.480712]  __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x90/0xa0 [i915]
[   48.480834]  i915_gem_object_prepare_write+0x2d6/0x330 [i915]
[   48.480955]  create_test_object.isra.54+0x1a9/0x3e0 [i915]
[   48.481075]  igt_shared_ctx_exec+0x365/0x3c0 [i915]
[   48.481210]  __i915_subtests.cold.4+0x30/0x92 [i915]
[   48.481341]  __run_selftests.cold.3+0xa9/0x119 [i915]
[   48.481466]  i915_live_selftests+0x3c/0x70 [i915]
[   48.481583]  i915_pci_probe+0xe7/0x220 [i915]
[   48.481620]  pci_device_probe+0xe0/0x180
[   48.481665]  really_probe+0x163/0x4e0
[   48.481710]  device_driver_attach+0x85/0x90
[   48.481750]  __driver_attach+0xa5/0x180
[   48.481796]  bus_for_each_dev+0xda/0x130
[   48.481831]  bus_add_driver+0x205/0x2e0
[   48.481882]  driver_register+0xca/0x140
[   48.481927]  do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x1af
[   48.481970]  do_init_module+0x106/0x350
[   48.482010]  load_module+0x3d2c/0x3ea0
[   48.482058]  __do_sys_finit_module+0x110/0x180
[   48.482102]  do_syscall_64+0x62/0x1f0
[   48.482147]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   48.482190]
[   48.482224] Freed by task 37:
[   48.482273]  save_stack+0x19/0x80
[   48.482318]  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
[   48.482363]  kmem_cache_free+0x70/0x140
[   48.482406]  __free_iova+0x1d/0x30
[   48.482445]  fq_ring_free+0x15a/0x1a0
[   48.482490]  queue_iova+0x19c/0x1f0
[   48.482624]  cleanup_page_dma.isra.64+0x62/0xb0 [i915]
[   48.482749]  __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x63/0x80 [i915]
[   48.482873]  __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x42/0x80 [i915]
[   48.482999]  __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x433/0x4b0 [i915]
[   48.483123]  __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x462/0x4b0 [i915]
[   48.483250]  i915_vma_unbind+0x1e2/0x240 [i915]
[   48.483378]  i915_vma_destroy+0x3a/0x280 [i915]
[   48.483500]  __i915_gem_free_objects+0xf0/0x2d0 [i915]
[   48.483622]  __i915_gem_free_work+0x41/0xa0 [i915]
[   48.483659]  process_one_work+0x495/0x710
[   48.483704]  worker_thread+0x4c7/0x6f0
[   48.483748]  kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0
[   48.483787]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[   48.483831]
[   48.483868] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88870fc19000
[   48.483868]  which belongs to the cache iommu_iova of size 40
[   48.483920] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[   48.483920]  40-byte region [ffff88870fc19000, ffff88870fc19028)
[   48.483964] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[   48.484006] page:ffffea001c3f0600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8888181a91c0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[   48.484045] flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head)
[   48.484096] raw: 8000000000010200 ffffea001c421a08 ffffea001c447e88 ffff8888181a91c0
[   48.484141] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000120012 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   48.484188] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   48.484230]
[   48.484265] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   48.484314]  ffff88870fc18f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   48.484361]  ffff88870fc18f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   48.484406] >ffff88870fc19000: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   48.484451]                                ^
[   48.484494]  ffff88870fc19080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   48.484530]  ffff88870fc19100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108602

Fixes e60aa7b53845 ("iommu/iova: Extend rbtree node caching")
Cc Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> # v4.15+
---
 drivers/iommu/iova.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/iova.c +3 -2
index 60348d707b993..9a576ae837dcb 100644
@@ -148,8 +148,9 @@ __cached_rbnode_delete_update(struct iova_domain *iovad, struct iova *free)
 	struct iova *cached_iova;
 
 	cached_iova = rb_entry(iovad->cached32_node, struct iova, node);
-	if (free->pfn_hi < iovad->dma_32bit_pfn &&
-	    free->pfn_lo >= cached_iova->pfn_lo)
+	if (free == cached_iova ||
+	    (free->pfn_hi < iovad->dma_32bit_pfn &&
+	     free->pfn_lo >= cached_iova->pfn_lo))
 		iovad->cached32_node = rb_next(&free->node);
 
 	cached_iova = rb_entry(iovad->cached_node, struct iova, node);
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1

_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 151/167 gpio: don't WARN() on NULL descs if gpiolib is disabled

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ffe0bbabb0cffceceae07484fde1ec2a63b1537c ]

If gpiolib is disabled, we use the inline stubs from gpio/consumer.h instead of regular definitions of GPIO API. The stubs for 'optional' variants of gpiod_get routines return NULL in this case as if the relevant GPIO wasn't found. This is correct so far.

Calling other (non-gpio_get) stubs from this header triggers a warning because the GPIO descriptor couldn't have been requested. The warning however is unconditional (WARN_ON(1)) and is emitted even if the passed descriptor pointer is NULL.

We don't want to force the users of 'optional' gpio_get to check the returned pointer before calling e.g. gpiod_set_value() so let's only WARN on non-NULL descriptors.

---
 include/linux/gpio/consumer.h | 62 +++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
include/linux/gpio/consumer.h +31 -31
index acc4279ad5e3f..412098b24f58b 100644
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static inline void gpiod_put(struct gpio_desc *desc)
 	might_sleep();
 
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 }
 
 static inline void gpiod_put_array(struct gpio_descs *descs)
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static inline void gpiod_put_array(struct gpio_descs *descs)
 	might_sleep();
 
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(descs);
 }
 
 static inline struct gpio_desc *__must_check
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static inline void devm_gpiod_put(struct device *dev, struct gpio_desc *desc)
 	might_sleep();
 
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 }
 
 static inline void devm_gpiod_put_array(struct device *dev,
@@ -292,32 +292,32 @@ static inline void devm_gpiod_put_array(struct device *dev,
 	might_sleep();
 
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(descs);
 }
 
 
 static inline int gpiod_get_direction(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_direction_input(struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_direction_output(struct gpio_desc *desc, int value)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_direction_output_raw(struct gpio_desc *desc, int value)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static inline int gpiod_direction_output_raw(struct gpio_desc *desc, int value)
 static inline int gpiod_get_value(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_get_array_value(unsigned int array_size,
@@ -333,25 +333,25 @@ static inline int gpiod_get_array_value(unsigned int array_size,
 					int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline void gpiod_set_value(struct gpio_desc *desc, int value)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 }
 static inline void gpiod_set_array_value(unsigned int array_size,
 					 struct gpio_desc **desc_array,
 					 int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 }
 static inline int gpiod_get_raw_value(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_get_raw_array_value(unsigned int array_size,
@@ -359,27 +359,27 @@ static inline int gpiod_get_raw_array_value(unsigned int array_size,
 					    int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline void gpiod_set_raw_value(struct gpio_desc *desc, int value)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 }
 static inline int gpiod_set_raw_array_value(unsigned int array_size,
 					     struct gpio_desc **desc_array,
 					     int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int gpiod_get_value_cansleep(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_get_array_value_cansleep(unsigned int array_size,
@@ -387,25 +387,25 @@ static inline int gpiod_get_array_value_cansleep(unsigned int array_size,
 				     int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline void gpiod_set_value_cansleep(struct gpio_desc *desc, int value)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 }
 static inline void gpiod_set_array_value_cansleep(unsigned int array_size,
 					    struct gpio_desc **desc_array,
 					    int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 }
 static inline int gpiod_get_raw_value_cansleep(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_get_raw_array_value_cansleep(unsigned int array_size,
@@ -413,55 +413,55 @@ static inline int gpiod_get_raw_array_value_cansleep(unsigned int array_size,
 					       int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline void gpiod_set_raw_value_cansleep(struct gpio_desc *desc,
 						int value)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 }
 static inline int gpiod_set_raw_array_value_cansleep(unsigned int array_size,
 						struct gpio_desc **desc_array,
 						int *value_array)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc_array);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int gpiod_set_debounce(struct gpio_desc *desc, unsigned debounce)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
 static inline int gpiod_set_transitory(struct gpio_desc *desc, bool transitory)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
 static inline int gpiod_is_active_low(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline int gpiod_cansleep(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int gpiod_to_irq(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static inline int gpiod_set_consumer_name(struct gpio_desc *desc,
 					  const char *name)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ static inline struct gpio_desc *gpio_to_desc(unsigned gpio)
 static inline int desc_to_gpio(const struct gpio_desc *desc)
 {
 	/* GPIO can never have been requested */
-	WARN_ON(1);
+	WARN_ON(desc);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 152/167 i2c: at91: disable TXRDY interrupt after sending data

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michał Mirosław <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d12e3aae160fb26b534c4496b211d6e60a5179ed ]

Driver was not disabling TXRDY interrupt after last TX byte. This caused interrupt storm until transfer timeouts for slow or broken device on the bus. The patch fixes the interrupt storm on my SAMA5D2-based board.

[v5.2 introduced file split; the patch should apply to i2c-at91.c before the split]
Fixes fac368a04048 ("i2c: at91: add new driver")
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91.c +5 -4
index 3f3e8b3bf5ff9..0998a388d2ed5 100644
@@ -270,9 +270,11 @@ static void at91_twi_write_next_byte(struct at91_twi_dev *dev)
 	writeb_relaxed(*dev->buf, dev->base + AT91_TWI_THR);
 
 	/* send stop when last byte has been written */
-	if (--dev->buf_len == 0)
+	if (--dev->buf_len == 0) {
 		if (!dev->use_alt_cmd)
 			at91_twi_write(dev, AT91_TWI_CR, AT91_TWI_STOP);
+		at91_twi_write(dev, AT91_TWI_IDR, AT91_TWI_TXRDY);
+	}
 
 	dev_dbg(dev->dev, "wrote 0x%x, to go %zu\n", *dev->buf, dev->buf_len);
 
@@ -690,9 +692,8 @@ static int at91_do_twi_transfer(struct at91_twi_dev *dev)
 		} else {
 			at91_twi_write_next_byte(dev);
 			at91_twi_write(dev, AT91_TWI_IER,
-				       AT91_TWI_TXCOMP |
-				       AT91_TWI_NACK |
-				       AT91_TWI_TXRDY);
+				       AT91_TWI_TXCOMP | AT91_TWI_NACK |
+				       (dev->buf_len ? AT91_TWI_TXRDY : 0));
 		}
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 153/167 i2c: at91: fix clk_offset for sama5d2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michał Mirosław <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b1ac6704493fa14b5dc19eb6b69a73932361a131 ]

In SAMA5D2 datasheet, TWIHS_CWGR register rescription mentions clock offset of 3 cycles (compared to 4 in eg. SAMA5D3).

[needs applying to i2c-at91.c instead for earlier kernels]
Fixes 0ef6f3213dac ("i2c: at91: add support for new alternative command mode")
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-at91.c +1 -1
index 0998a388d2ed5..d51bf536bdf75 100644
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ static struct at91_twi_pdata sama5d4_config = {
 
 static struct at91_twi_pdata sama5d2_config = {
 	.clk_max_div = 7,
-	.clk_offset = 4,
+	.clk_offset = 3,
 	.has_unre_flag = true,
 	.has_alt_cmd = true,
 	.has_hold_field = true,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 154/167 mm/migrate.c: initialize pud_entry in migrate_vma()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ralph Campbell <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7b358c6f12dc82364f6d317f8c8f1d794adbc3f5 ]

When CONFIG_MIGRATE_VMA_HELPER is enabled, migrate_vma() calls migrate_vma_collect() which initializes a struct mm_walk but didn't initialize mm_walk.pud_entry. (Found by code inspection) Use a C structure initialization to make sure it is set to NULL.

Fixes 8763cb45ab967 ("mm/migrate: new memory migration helper for use with device memory")
Cc "Jérôme Glisse" <[email protected]>
Cc Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
---
 mm/migrate.c | 17 +++++++----------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
mm/migrate.c +7 -10
index b2ea7d1e6f248..0c48191a90368 100644
@@ -2328,16 +2328,13 @@ static int migrate_vma_collect_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp,
  */
 static void migrate_vma_collect(struct migrate_vma *migrate)
 {
-	struct mm_walk mm_walk;
-
-	mm_walk.pmd_entry = migrate_vma_collect_pmd;
-	mm_walk.pte_entry = NULL;
-	mm_walk.pte_hole = migrate_vma_collect_hole;
-	mm_walk.hugetlb_entry = NULL;
-	mm_walk.test_walk = NULL;
-	mm_walk.vma = migrate->vma;
-	mm_walk.mm = migrate->vma->vm_mm;
-	mm_walk.private = migrate;
+	struct mm_walk mm_walk = {
+		.pmd_entry = migrate_vma_collect_pmd,
+		.pte_hole = migrate_vma_collect_hole,
+		.vma = migrate->vma,
+		.mm = migrate->vma->vm_mm,
+		.private = migrate,
+	};
 
 	mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm_walk.mm,
 					    migrate->start,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 155/167 iio: adc: gyroadc: fix uninitialized return code

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90c6260c1905a68fb596844087f2223bd4657fee ]

gcc-9 complains about a blatant uninitialized variable use that all earlier compiler versions missed:

drivers/iio/adc/rcar-gyroadc.c:510:5: warning: 'ret' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]

Return -EINVAL instead here and a few lines above it where we accidentally return 0 on failure.

Fixes 059c53b32329 ("iio: adc: Add Renesas GyroADC driver")
---
 drivers/iio/adc/rcar-gyroadc.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/rcar-gyroadc.c +2 -2
index dcb50172186f4..f3a966ab35dcb 100644
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static int rcar_gyroadc_parse_subdevs(struct iio_dev *indio_dev)
 				dev_err(dev,
 					"Only %i channels supported with %s, but reg = <%i>.\n",
 					num_channels, child->name, reg);
-				return ret;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static int rcar_gyroadc_parse_subdevs(struct iio_dev *indio_dev)
 			dev_err(dev,
 				"Channel %i uses different ADC mode than the rest.\n",
 				reg);
-			return ret;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		/* Channel is valid, grab the regulator. */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 156/167 NFSv4: Fix delegation state recovery

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5eb8d18ca0e001c6055da2b7f30d8f6dca23a44f ]

Once we clear the NFS_DELEGATED_STATE flag, we're telling nfs_delegation_claim_opens() that we're done recovering all open state for that stateid, so we really need to ensure that we test for all open modes that are currently cached and recover them before exiting nfs4_open_delegation_recall().

Fixes 24311f884189d ("NFSv4: Recovery of recalled read delegations...")
---
 fs/nfs/delegation.c |  2 +-
 fs/nfs/delegation.h |  2 +-
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c   | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/delegation.c +1 -1
index 75fe92eaa6818..1624618c2bc72 100644
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int nfs_delegation_claim_opens(struct inode *inode,
 		/* Block nfs4_proc_unlck */
 		mutex_lock(&sp->so_delegreturn_mutex);
 		seq = raw_seqcount_begin(&sp->so_reclaim_seqcount);
-		err = nfs4_open_delegation_recall(ctx, state, stateid, type);
+		err = nfs4_open_delegation_recall(ctx, state, stateid);
 		if (!err)
 			err = nfs_delegation_claim_locks(ctx, state, stateid);
 		if (!err && read_seqcount_retry(&sp->so_reclaim_seqcount, seq))
fs/nfs/delegation.h +1 -1
index bb1ef8c37af42..c95477823fa6b 100644
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void nfs_reap_expired_delegations(struct nfs_client *clp);
 
 /* NFSv4 delegation-related procedures */
 int nfs4_proc_delegreturn(struct inode *inode, struct rpc_cred *cred, const nfs4_stateid *stateid, int issync);
-int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid, fmode_t type);
+int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid);
 int nfs4_lock_delegation_recall(struct file_lock *fl, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid);
 bool nfs4_copy_delegation_stateid(struct inode *inode, fmode_t flags, nfs4_stateid *dst, struct rpc_cred **cred);
 bool nfs4_refresh_delegation_stateid(nfs4_stateid *dst, struct inode *inode);
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +12 -13
index 31ae3bd5d9d20..621e3cf90f4eb 100644
@@ -2113,12 +2113,10 @@ static int nfs4_handle_delegation_recall_error(struct nfs_server *server, struct
 		case -NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT:
 		case -NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION:
 		case -NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION:
-			set_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
 			nfs4_schedule_session_recovery(server->nfs_client->cl_session, err);
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
 		case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
-			set_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
 			/* Don't recall a delegation if it was lost */
 			nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery(server->nfs_client);
 			return -EAGAIN;
@@ -2139,7 +2137,6 @@ static int nfs4_handle_delegation_recall_error(struct nfs_server *server, struct
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
 		case -NFS4ERR_GRACE:
-			set_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
 			ssleep(1);
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		case -ENOMEM:
@@ -2155,8 +2152,7 @@ static int nfs4_handle_delegation_recall_error(struct nfs_server *server, struct
 }
 
 int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx,
-		struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid,
-		fmode_t type)
+		struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid)
 {
 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
 	struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
@@ -2167,20 +2163,23 @@ int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx,
 	if (IS_ERR(opendata))
 		return PTR_ERR(opendata);
 	nfs4_stateid_copy(&opendata->o_arg.u.delegation, stateid);
-	nfs_state_clear_delegation(state);
-	switch (type & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE)) {
-	case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
-	case FMODE_WRITE:
+	if (!test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags)) {
 		err = nfs4_open_recover_helper(opendata, FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
 		if (err)
-			break;
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (!test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags)) {
 		err = nfs4_open_recover_helper(opendata, FMODE_WRITE);
 		if (err)
-			break;
-		/* Fall through */
-	case FMODE_READ:
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (!test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags)) {
 		err = nfs4_open_recover_helper(opendata, FMODE_READ);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
+	nfs_state_clear_delegation(state);
+out:
 	nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
 	return nfs4_handle_delegation_recall_error(server, state, stateid, NULL, err);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 157/167 bcache: only clear BTREE_NODE_dirty bit when it is set

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Coly Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e5ec5f4765ada9c75fb3eee93a6e72f0e50599d5 ]

In bch_btree_cache_free() and btree_node_free(), BTREE_NODE_dirty is always set no matter btree node is dirty or not. The code looks like this,

	if (btree_node_dirty(b))
		btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b));
	clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags);

Indeed if btree_node_dirty(b) returns false, it means BTREE_NODE_dirty bit is cleared, then it is unnecessary to clear the bit again.

This patch only clears BTREE_NODE_dirty when btree_node_dirty(b) is true (the bit is set), to save a few CPU cycles.

---
 drivers/md/bcache/btree.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +6 -5
index 3f4211b5cd334..8c80833e73a9a 100644
@@ -772,10 +772,10 @@ void bch_btree_cache_free(struct cache_set *c)
 	while (!list_empty(&c->btree_cache)) {
 		b = list_first_entry(&c->btree_cache, struct btree, list);
 
-		if (btree_node_dirty(b))
+		if (btree_node_dirty(b)) {
 			btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b));
-		clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags);
-
+			clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags);
+		}
 		mca_data_free(b);
 	}
 
@@ -1063,9 +1063,10 @@ static void btree_node_free(struct btree *b)
 
 	mutex_lock(&b->write_lock);
 
-	if (btree_node_dirty(b))
+	if (btree_node_dirty(b)) {
 		btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b));
-	clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags);
+		clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags);
+	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&b->write_lock);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 158/167 bcache: add comments for mutex_lock(&b->write_lock)

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Coly Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 41508bb7d46b74dba631017e5a702a86caf1db8c ]

When accessing or modifying BTREE_NODE_dirty bit, it is not always necessary to acquire b->write_lock. In bch_btree_cache_free() and mca_reap() acquiring b->write_lock is necessary, and this patch adds comments to explain why mutex_lock(&b->write_lock) is necessary for checking or clearing BTREE_NODE_dirty bit there.

---
 drivers/md/bcache/btree.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +10 -0
index 8c80833e73a9a..e0468fd41b6ea 100644
@@ -649,6 +649,11 @@ static int mca_reap(struct btree *b, unsigned int min_order, bool flush)
 		up(&b->io_mutex);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * BTREE_NODE_dirty might be cleared in btree_flush_btree() by
+	 * __bch_btree_node_write(). To avoid an extra flush, acquire
+	 * b->write_lock before checking BTREE_NODE_dirty bit.
+	 */
 	mutex_lock(&b->write_lock);
 	if (btree_node_dirty(b))
 		__bch_btree_node_write(b, &cl);
@@ -772,6 +777,11 @@ void bch_btree_cache_free(struct cache_set *c)
 	while (!list_empty(&c->btree_cache)) {
 		b = list_first_entry(&c->btree_cache, struct btree, list);
 
+		/*
+		 * This function is called by cache_set_free(), no I/O
+		 * request on cache now, it is unnecessary to acquire
+		 * b->write_lock before clearing BTREE_NODE_dirty anymore.
+		 */
 		if (btree_node_dirty(b)) {
 			btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b));
 			clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 159/167 bcache: fix race in btree_flush_write()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Coly Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 50a260e859964002dab162513a10f91ae9d3bcd3 ]

There is a race between mca_reap(), btree_node_free() and journal code btree_flush_write(), which results very rare and strange deadlock or panic and are very hard to reproduce.

Let me explain how the race happens. In btree_flush_write() one btree node with oldest journal pin is selected, then it is flushed to cache device, the select-and-flush is a two steps operation. Between these two steps, there are something may happen inside the race window,
- The selected btree node was reaped by mca_reap() and allocated to other requesters for other btree node.
- The slected btree node was selected, flushed and released by mca shrink callback bch_mca_scan().
When btree_flush_write() tries to flush the selected btree node, firstly b->write_lock is held by mutex_lock(). If the race happens and the memory of selected btree node is allocated to other btree node, if that btree node's write_lock is held already, a deadlock very probably happens here. A worse case is the memory of the selected btree node is released, then all references to this btree node (e.g. b->write_lock) will trigger NULL pointer deference panic.

This race was introduced in commit cafe56359144 ("bcache: A block layer cache"), and enlarged by commit c4dc2497d50d ("bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal"), which selected 128 btree nodes and flushed them one-by-one in a quite long time period.

Such race is not easy to reproduce before. On a Lenovo SR650 server with 48 Xeon cores, and configure 1 NVMe SSD as cache device, a MD raid0 device assembled by 3 NVMe SSDs as backing device, this race can be observed around every 10,000 times btree_flush_write() gets called. Both deadlock and kernel panic all happened as aftermath of the race.

The idea of the fix is to add a btree flag BTREE_NODE_journal_flush. It is set when selecting btree nodes, and cleared after btree nodes flushed. Then when mca_reap() selects a btree node with this bit set, this btree node will be skipped. Since mca_reap() only reaps btree node without BTREE_NODE_journal_flush flag, such race is avoided.

Once corner case should be noticed, that is btree_node_free(). It might be called in some error handling code path. For example the following code piece from btree_split(),

        2149 err_free2:
        2150         bkey_put(b->c, &n2->key);
        2151         btree_node_free(n2);
        2152         rw_unlock(true, n2);
        2153 err_free1:
        2154         bkey_put(b->c, &n1->key);
        2155         btree_node_free(n1);
        2156         rw_unlock(true, n1);

At line 2151 and 2155, the btree node n2 and n1 are released without mac_reap(), so BTREE_NODE_journal_flush also needs to be checked here. If btree_node_free() is called directly in such error handling path, and the selected btree node has BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit set, just delay for 1 us and retry again. In this case this btree node won't be skipped, just retry until the BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit cleared, and free the btree node memory.

Fixes cafe56359144 ("bcache: A block layer cache")
---
 drivers/md/bcache/btree.c   | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/md/bcache/btree.h   |  2 ++
 drivers/md/bcache/journal.c |  7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +27 -1
index e0468fd41b6ea..45f684689c357 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
-
+#include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <trace/events/bcache.h>
 
 /*
@@ -649,12 +649,25 @@ static int mca_reap(struct btree *b, unsigned int min_order, bool flush)
 		up(&b->io_mutex);
 	}
 
+retry:
 	/*
 	 * BTREE_NODE_dirty might be cleared in btree_flush_btree() by
 	 * __bch_btree_node_write(). To avoid an extra flush, acquire
 	 * b->write_lock before checking BTREE_NODE_dirty bit.
 	 */
 	mutex_lock(&b->write_lock);
+	/*
+	 * If this btree node is selected in btree_flush_write() by journal
+	 * code, delay and retry until the node is flushed by journal code
+	 * and BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit cleared by btree_flush_write().
+	 */
+	if (btree_node_journal_flush(b)) {
+		pr_debug("bnode %p is flushing by journal, retry", b);
+		mutex_unlock(&b->write_lock);
+		udelay(1);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
 	if (btree_node_dirty(b))
 		__bch_btree_node_write(b, &cl);
 	mutex_unlock(&b->write_lock);
@@ -1071,7 +1084,20 @@ static void btree_node_free(struct btree *b)
 
 	BUG_ON(b == b->c->root);
 
+retry:
 	mutex_lock(&b->write_lock);
+	/*
+	 * If the btree node is selected and flushing in btree_flush_write(),
+	 * delay and retry until the BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit cleared,
+	 * then it is safe to free the btree node here. Otherwise this btree
+	 * node will be in race condition.
+	 */
+	if (btree_node_journal_flush(b)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&b->write_lock);
+		pr_debug("bnode %p journal_flush set, retry", b);
+		udelay(1);
+		goto retry;
+	}
 
 	if (btree_node_dirty(b)) {
 		btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b));
drivers/md/bcache/btree.h +2 -0
index a68d6c55783bd..4d0cca145f699 100644
@@ -158,11 +158,13 @@ enum btree_flags {
 	BTREE_NODE_io_error,
 	BTREE_NODE_dirty,
 	BTREE_NODE_write_idx,
+	BTREE_NODE_journal_flush,
 };
 
 BTREE_FLAG(io_error);
 BTREE_FLAG(dirty);
 BTREE_FLAG(write_idx);
+BTREE_FLAG(journal_flush);
 
 static inline struct btree_write *btree_current_write(struct btree *b)
 {
drivers/md/bcache/journal.c +7 -0
index ec1e35a62934d..7bb15cddca5ec 100644
@@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ static void btree_flush_write(struct cache_set *c)
 retry:
 	best = NULL;
 
+	mutex_lock(&c->bucket_lock);
 	for_each_cached_btree(b, c, i)
 		if (btree_current_write(b)->journal) {
 			if (!best)
@@ -416,9 +417,14 @@ static void btree_flush_write(struct cache_set *c)
 		}
 
 	b = best;
+	if (b)
+		set_btree_node_journal_flush(b);
+	mutex_unlock(&c->bucket_lock);
+
 	if (b) {
 		mutex_lock(&b->write_lock);
 		if (!btree_current_write(b)->journal) {
+			clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_journal_flush, &b->flags);
 			mutex_unlock(&b->write_lock);
 			/* We raced */
 			atomic_long_inc(&c->retry_flush_write);
@@ -426,6 +432,7 @@ static void btree_flush_write(struct cache_set *c)
 		}
 
 		__bch_btree_node_write(b, NULL);
+		clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_journal_flush, &b->flags);
 		mutex_unlock(&b->write_lock);
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 160/167 drm/i915/userptr: Acquire the page lock around set_page_dirty()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa56a292ce623734ddd30f52d73f527d1f3529b5 ]

set_page_dirty says:

For pages with a mapping this should be done under the page lock for the benefit of asynchronous memory errors who prefer a consistent dirty state. This rule can be broken in some special cases, but should be better not to.

Under those rules, it is only safe for us to use the plain set_page_dirty calls for shmemfs/anonymous memory. Userptr may be used with real mappings and so needs to use the locked version (set_page_dirty_lock).

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203317

Fixes 5cc9ed4b9a7a ("drm/i915: Introduce mapping of user pages into video memory (userptr) ioctl")

References: 6dcc693bc57f ("ext4: warn when page is dirtied without buffers")

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c +9 -1
index 2c9b284036d10..e13ea2ecd669c 100644
@@ -692,7 +692,15 @@ i915_gem_userptr_put_pages(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
 
 	for_each_sgt_page(page, sgt_iter, pages) {
 		if (obj->mm.dirty)
-			set_page_dirty(page);
+			/*
+			 * As this may not be anonymous memory (e.g. shmem)
+			 * but exist on a real mapping, we have to lock
+			 * the page in order to dirty it -- holding
+			 * the page reference is not sufficient to
+			 * prevent the inode from being truncated.
+			 * Play safe and take the lock.
+			 */
+			set_page_dirty_lock(page);
 
 		mark_page_accessed(page);
 		put_page(page);
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 161/167 drm/i915: Make sure cdclk is high enough for DP audio on VLV/CHV

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a8f196a0fa6391a436f63f360a1fb57031fdf26c ]

On VLV/CHV there is some kind of linkage between the cdclk frequency and the DP link frequency. The spec says:
"For DP audio configuration, cdclk frequency shall be set to
meet the following requirements:

 DP Link Frequency(MHz) | Cdclk frequency(MHz)
 270                    | 320 or higher
 162                    | 200 or higher"

I suspect that would more accurately be expressed as "cdclk >= DP link clock", and in any case we can express it like that in the code because of the limited set of cdclk (200, 266, 320, 400 MHz) and link frequencies (162 and 270 MHz) we support.

Without this we can end up in a situation where the cdclk is too low and enabling DP audio will kill the pipe. Happens eg. with 2560x1440 modes where the 266MHz cdclk is sufficient to pump the pixels (241.5 MHz dotclock) but is too low for the DP audio due to the link frequency being 270 MHz.

v2: Spell out the cdclk and link frequencies we actually support

Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111149

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_cdclk.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_cdclk.c +11 -0
index 29075c7634280..7b4906ede148b 100644
@@ -2208,6 +2208,17 @@ int intel_crtc_compute_min_cdclk(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state)
 	if (INTEL_GEN(dev_priv) >= 9)
 		min_cdclk = max(2 * 96000, min_cdclk);
 
+	/*
+	 * "For DP audio configuration, cdclk frequency shall be set to
+	 *  meet the following requirements:
+	 *  DP Link Frequency(MHz) | Cdclk frequency(MHz)
+	 *  270                    | 320 or higher
+	 *  162                    | 200 or higher"
+	 */
+	if ((IS_VALLEYVIEW(dev_priv) || IS_CHERRYVIEW(dev_priv)) &&
+	    intel_crtc_has_dp_encoder(crtc_state) && crtc_state->has_audio)
+		min_cdclk = max(crtc_state->port_clock, min_cdclk);
+
 	/*
 	 * On Valleyview some DSI panels lose (v|h)sync when the clock is lower
 	 * than 320000KHz.
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1

_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 162/167 virtio/s390: fix race on airq_areas[]

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Halil Pasic <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4f419eb14272e0698e8c55bb5f3f266cc2a21c81 ]

The access to airq_areas was racy ever since the adapter interrupts got introduced to virtio-ccw, but since commit 39c7dcb15892 ("virtio/s390:
make airq summary indicators DMA") this became an issue in practice as well. Namely before that commit the airq_info that got overwritten was still functional. After that commit however the two infos share a summary_indicator, which aggravates the situation. Which means auto-online mechanism occasionally hangs the boot with virtio_blk.

Fixes 96b14536d935 ("virtio-ccw: virtio-ccw adapter interrupt support.")
---
 drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c +3 -0
index ec54538f7ae1c..67efdf25657f3 100644
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ struct airq_info {
 	struct airq_iv *aiv;
 };
 static struct airq_info *airq_areas[MAX_AIRQ_AREAS];
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(airq_areas_lock);
 
 #define CCW_CMD_SET_VQ 0x13
 #define CCW_CMD_VDEV_RESET 0x33
@@ -244,9 +245,11 @@ static unsigned long get_airq_indicator(struct virtqueue *vqs[], int nvqs,
 	unsigned long bit, flags;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_AIRQ_AREAS && !indicator_addr; i++) {
+		mutex_lock(&airq_areas_lock);
 		if (!airq_areas[i])
 			airq_areas[i] = new_airq_info();
 		info = airq_areas[i];
+		mutex_unlock(&airq_areas_lock);
 		if (!info)
 			return 0;
 		write_lock_irqsave(&info->lock, flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 163/167 drm/atomic_helper: Allow DPMS On<->Off changes for unregistered connectors

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 34ca26a98ad67edd6e4870fe2d4aa047d41a51dd ]

It appears when testing my previous fix for some of the legacy modesetting issues with MST, I misattributed some kernel splats that started appearing on my machine after a rebase as being from upstream. But it appears they actually came from my patch series:

[    2.980512] [drm:drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset [drm_kms_helper]] Updating routing for [CONNECTOR:65:eDP-1]
[    2.980516] [drm:drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset [drm_kms_helper]] [CONNECTOR:65:eDP-1] is not registered
[    2.980516] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    2.980519] Could not determine valid watermarks for inherited state
[    2.980553] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 551 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c:14983 intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915]
[    2.980556] Modules linked in: i915(O+) i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper(O) syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm(O) intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal iTCO_wdt wmi_bmof coretemp crc32_pclmul psmouse i2c_i801 mei_me mei i2c_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm_tis_core wmi tpm thinkpad_acpi pcc_cpufreq video ehci_pci crc32c_intel serio_raw ehci_hcd xhci_pci xhci_hcd
[    2.980577] CPU: 3 PID: 551 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G           O      4.19.0-rc7Lyude-Test+ #1
[    2.980579] Hardware name: LENOVO 20BWS1KY00/20BWS1KY00, BIOS JBET63WW (1.27 ) 11/10/2016
[    2.980605] RIP: 0010:intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915]
[    2.980607] Code: 89 df e8 ec 27 02 00 e9 24 f2 ff ff be 03 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 da 27 02 00 e9 26 f2 ff ff 48 c7 c7 c8 d1 34 a0 e8 23 cf dc e0 <0f> 0b e9 7c fd ff ff f6 c4 04 0f 85 37 f7 ff ff 48 8b 83 60 08 00
[    2.980611] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000287988 EFLAGS: 00010282
[    2.980614] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88031b488000 RCX: 0000000000000006
[    2.980617] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff880321ad54d0
[    2.980620] RBP: ffffc90000287a10 R08: 000000000000040a R09: 0000000000000065
[    2.980623] R10: ffff88030ebb8f00 R11: ffffffff81416590 R12: ffff88031b488000
[    2.980626] R13: ffff88031b4883a0 R14: ffffc900002879a8 R15: ffff880319099800
[    2.980630] FS:  00007f475620d180(0000) GS:ffff880321ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.980633] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.980636] CR2: 00007f9ef28018a0 CR3: 000000031b72c001 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[    2.980639] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    2.980642] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    2.980645] Call Trace:
[    2.980675]  i915_driver_load+0xb0e/0xdc0 [i915]
[    2.980681]  ? kernfs_add_one+0xe7/0x130
[    2.980709]  i915_pci_probe+0x46/0x60 [i915]
[    2.980715]  pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x150
[    2.980719]  really_probe+0x243/0x3b0
[    2.980722]  driver_probe_device+0xba/0x100
[    2.980726]  __driver_attach+0xe4/0x110
[    2.980729]  ? driver_probe_device+0x100/0x100
[    2.980733]  bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xb0
[    2.980736]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
[    2.980739]  bus_add_driver+0x159/0x230
[    2.980743]  ? 0xffffffffa0393000
[    2.980746]  driver_register+0x70/0xc0
[    2.980749]  ? 0xffffffffa0393000
[    2.980753]  __pci_register_driver+0x57/0x60
[    2.980780]  i915_init+0x55/0x58 [i915]
[    2.980785]  do_one_initcall+0x4a/0x1c4
[    2.980789]  ? do_init_module+0x27/0x210
[    2.980793]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x131/0x190
[    2.980797]  do_init_module+0x60/0x210
[    2.980800]  load_module+0x2063/0x22e0
[    2.980804]  ? vfs_read+0x116/0x140
[    2.980807]  ? vfs_read+0x116/0x140
[    2.980811]  __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
[    2.980814]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
[    2.980818]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20
[    2.980821]  do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
[    2.980824]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    2.980826] RIP: 0033:0x7f4754e32879
[    2.980828] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f7 45 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[    2.980831] RSP: 002b:00007fff43fd97d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[    2.980834] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559a44ca64f0 RCX: 00007f4754e32879
[    2.980836] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f475599f4cd RDI: 0000000000000018
[    2.980838] RBP: 00007f475599f4cd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.980839] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[    2.980841] R13: 0000559a44c92fd0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    2.980881] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 551 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c:14983 intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915]
[    2.980884] ---[ end trace 5eb47a76277d4731 ]---

The cause of this appears to be due to the fact that if there's pre-existing display state that was set by the BIOS when i915 loads, it will attempt to perform a modeset before the driver is registered with userspace. Since this happens before the driver's registered with userspace, it's connectors are also unregistered and thus-states which would turn on DPMS on a connector end up getting rejected since the connector isn't registered.

These bugs managed to get past Intel's CI partially due to the fact it never ran a full test on my patches for some reason, but also because all of the tests unload the GPU once before running. Since this bug is only really triggered when the drivers tries to perform a modeset before it's been fully registered with userspace when coming from whatever display configuration the firmware left us with, it likely would never have been picked up by CI in the first place.

After some discussion with vsyrjala, we decided the best course of action would be to just move the unregistered connector checks out of update_connector_routing() and into drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector(). The reason for this being that legacy modesetting isn't going to be expecting failures anywhere (at least this is the case with X), so ideally we want to ensure that any DPMS changes will still work even on unregistered connectors. Instead, we now only reject new modesets which would change the current CRTC assigned to an unregistered connector unless no new CRTC is being assigned to replace the connector's previous one.

Fixes 4d80273976bf ("drm/atomic_helper: Disallow new modesets on unregistered connectors")
Cc Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit b5d29843d8ef86d4cde4742e095b81b7fd41e688)
Fixes e96550956fbc ("drm/atomic_helper: Disallow new modesets on unregistered connectors")
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic.c        | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c | 21 +--------------------
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic.c +21 -0
index 281cf9cbb44c4..1a4b44923aeca 100644
@@ -1702,6 +1702,27 @@ drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector(struct drm_connector_state *conn_state,
 	struct drm_connector *connector = conn_state->connector;
 	struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state;
 
+	/*
+	 * For compatibility with legacy users, we want to make sure that
+	 * we allow DPMS On<->Off modesets on unregistered connectors, since
+	 * legacy modesetting users will not be expecting these to fail. We do
+	 * not however, want to allow legacy users to assign a connector
+	 * that's been unregistered from sysfs to another CRTC, since doing
+	 * this with a now non-existent connector could potentially leave us
+	 * in an invalid state.
+	 *
+	 * Since the connector can be unregistered at any point during an
+	 * atomic check or commit, this is racy. But that's OK: all we care
+	 * about is ensuring that userspace can't use this connector for new
+	 * configurations after it's been notified that the connector is no
+	 * longer present.
+	 */
+	if (!READ_ONCE(connector->registered) && crtc) {
+		DRM_DEBUG_ATOMIC("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] is not registered\n",
+				 connector->base.id, connector->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (conn_state->crtc == crtc)
 		return 0;
 
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c +1 -20
index 71c70a031a043..c22062cc99923 100644
@@ -307,26 +307,6 @@ update_connector_routing(struct drm_atomic_state *state,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	crtc_state = drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state(state,
-						   new_connector_state->crtc);
-	/*
-	 * For compatibility with legacy users, we want to make sure that
-	 * we allow DPMS On->Off modesets on unregistered connectors. Modesets
-	 * which would result in anything else must be considered invalid, to
-	 * avoid turning on new displays on dead connectors.
-	 *
-	 * Since the connector can be unregistered at any point during an
-	 * atomic check or commit, this is racy. But that's OK: all we care
-	 * about is ensuring that userspace can't do anything but shut off the
-	 * display on a connector that was destroyed after its been notified,
-	 * not before.
-	 */
-	if (!READ_ONCE(connector->registered) && crtc_state->active) {
-		DRM_DEBUG_ATOMIC("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] is not registered\n",
-				 connector->base.id, connector->name);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	funcs = connector->helper_private;
 
 	if (funcs->atomic_best_encoder)
@@ -371,6 +351,7 @@ update_connector_routing(struct drm_atomic_state *state,
 
 	set_best_encoder(state, new_connector_state, new_encoder);
 
+	crtc_state = drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state(state, new_connector_state->crtc);
 	crtc_state->connectors_changed = true;
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_ATOMIC("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] using [ENCODER:%d:%s] on [CRTC:%d:%s]\n",
Signature · 6 lines
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[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 164/167 ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0a944e8a6c66ca04c7afbaa17e22bf208a8b37f0 ]

Since the journal inode is already checked when we added it to the block validity's system zone, if we check it again, we'll just trigger a failure.

This was causing failures like this:

[   53.897001] EXT4-fs error (device sda): ext4_find_extent:909: inode
#8: comm jbd2/sda-8: pblk 121667583 bad header/extent: invalid extent entries - magic f30a, entries 8, max 340(340), depth 0(0)
[   53.931430] jbd2_journal_bmap: journal block not found at offset 49 on sda-8
[   53.938480] Aborting journal on device sda-8.

... but only if the system was under enough memory pressure that logical->physical mapping for the journal inode gets pushed out of the extent cache. (This is why it wasn't noticed earlier.)

Fixes 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
---
 fs/ext4/extents.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/extents.c +8 -4
index 45aea792d22a0..00bf0b67aae87 100644
@@ -518,10 +518,14 @@ __read_extent_tree_block(const char *function, unsigned int line,
 	}
 	if (buffer_verified(bh) && !(flags & EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE))
 		return bh;
-	err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode,
-			       ext_block_hdr(bh), depth, pblk);
-	if (err)
-		goto errout;
+	if (!ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) ||
+	    (inode->i_ino !=
+	     le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum))) {
+		err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode,
+				       ext_block_hdr(bh), depth, pblk);
+		if (err)
+			goto errout;
+	}
 	set_buffer_verified(bh);
 	/*
 	 * If this is a leaf block, cache all of its entries
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 165/167 ext4: fix block validity checks for journal inodes using indirect blocks

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 170417c8c7bb2cbbdd949bf5c443c0c8f24a203b ]

Commit 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") failed to add an exception for the journal inode in ext4_check_blockref(), which is the function used by ext4_get_branch() for indirect blocks. This caused attempts to read from the ext3-style journals to fail with:

[  848.968550] EXT4-fs error (device sdb7): ext4_get_branch:171: inode #8: block 30343695: comm jbd2/sdb7-8: invalid block

Fix this by adding the missing exception check.

Fixes 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
---
 fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/block_validity.c +5 -0
index 9409b1e11a22e..cd7129b622f85 100644
@@ -275,6 +275,11 @@ int ext4_check_blockref(const char *function, unsigned int line,
 	__le32 *bref = p;
 	unsigned int blk;
 
+	if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
+	    (inode->i_ino ==
+	     le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+		return 0;
+
 	while (bref < p+max) {
 		blk = le32_to_cpu(*bref++);
 		if (blk &&
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 166/167 ext4: unsigned int compared against zero

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fbbbbd2f28aec991f3fbc248df211550fbdfd58c ]

There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0")

Fixes 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
---
 fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/block_validity.c +2 -1
index cd7129b622f85..e8e27cdc2f677 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(struct super_block *sb, u32 ino)
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
 	struct ext4_map_blocks map;
-	u32 i = 0, err = 0, num, n;
+	u32 i = 0, num;
+	int err = 0, n;
 
 	if ((ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO) ||
 	    (ino > le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 167/167 PCI: Reset both NVIDIA GPU and HDA in ThinkPad P50 workaround

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ad54567ad5d8e938ee6cf02e4f3867f18835ae6e ]

quirk_reset_lenovo_thinkpad_50_nvgpu() resets NVIDIA GPUs to work around an apparent BIOS defect. It previously used pci_reset_function(), and the available method was a bus reset, which was fine because there was only one function on the bus. After b516ea586d71 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers"), there are now two functions (the HDA controller and the GPU itself) on the bus, so the reset fails.

Use pci_reset_bus() explicitly instead of pci_reset_function() since it's OK to reset both devices.

[bhelgaas: commit log, add e0547c81bfcf]
Fixes b516ea586d71 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers")
Fixes e0547c81bfcf ("PCI: Reset Lenovo ThinkPad P50 nvgpu at boot if necessary")
Cc Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Drake <[email protected]>
Cc Aaron Plattner <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Wu <[email protected]>
Cc Ilia Mirkin <[email protected]>
Cc Karol Herbst <[email protected]>
Cc Maik Freudenberg <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/pci/quirks.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/quirks.c +1 -1
index 311f8a33e62ff..06be52912dcdb 100644
@@ -5162,7 +5162,7 @@ static void quirk_reset_lenovo_thinkpad_p50_nvgpu(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	 */
 	if (ioread32(map + 0x2240c) & 0x2) {
 		pci_info(pdev, FW_BUG "GPU left initialized by EFI, resetting\n");
-		ret = pci_reset_function(pdev);
+		ret = pci_reset_bus(pdev);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			pci_err(pdev, "Failed to reset GPU: %d\n", ret);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1