package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973
PATCH 1/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973
In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.
--- ...detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch | 71 +++++++++++++++ ...4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk | 4 + 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch new file +71 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Young Xiao <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early + +width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily +valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large +values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack +overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early +as possible. + +This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of +written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length. + +See commit 8ee335227bbc for details. + +Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]> +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height) + { +- OPJ_UINT32 x, y; ++ OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written; + OPJ_UINT8 *pix; + const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond; + + beyond = pData + stride * height; + pix = pData; +- x = y = 0U; ++ x = y = written = 0U; + while (y < height) { + int c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); ++ written++; + } + } else { /* absolute mode */ + c = getc(IN); +@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); + } + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); ++ written++; + } + if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */ + getc(IN); +@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + } + } + } /* while(y < height) */ ++ if (written != width * height) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + return OPJ_TRUE; + } +
package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch new file +86 -0
86 lines not on this page · raw message
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +4 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ OPENJPEG_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause OPENJPEG_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES +# 0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch +# 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch +OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973 + OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 2/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-6851
OpenJPEG through 2.3.1 has a heap-based buffer overflow in opj_t1_clbl_decode_processor in openjp2/t1.c because of lack of opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions validation.
--- ...ions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch | 32 +++++++++++++++++++ package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch
package/openjpeg/0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch new file +32 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 01:51:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose + coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228) + +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c +index 14f6ff41a..922550eb1 100644 +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c +@@ -9221,6 +9221,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image, + l_img_comp = p_image->comps; + for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) { + OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w; ++ if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX || ++ p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX || ++ p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX || ++ p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) { ++ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + + l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0, + (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES # 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973 +# 0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch +OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6851 + OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 2/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-6851
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
OpenJPEG through 2.3.1 has a heap-based buffer overflow in
opj_t1_clbl_decode_processorinopenjp2/t1.cbecause of lack ofopj_j2k_update_image_dimensionsvalidation.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
PATCH 3/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-8112
In reply to Fabrice Fontaineopj_t1_clbl_decode_processor in openjp2/t1.c in OpenJPEG 2.3.1 through 2020-01-28 has a heap-based buffer overflow in the qmfbid==1 case, a different issue than CVE-2020-6851.
--- ...tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch
package/openjpeg/0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch new file +46 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:59:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow + +That could lead to later assertion failures. + +Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112 +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +index deecc4dff..aa419030a 100644 +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no, + /* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000) */ + l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx; + l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy; +- l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx; +- l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy; ++ { ++ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, ++ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx; ++ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) { ++ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp; ++ } ++ { ++ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, ++ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy; ++ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) { ++ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp; ++ } + /*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/ + + l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +3 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973 # 0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6851 +# 0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch +OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-8112 + OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 3/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-8112
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
opj_t1_clbl_decode_processorinopenjp2/t1.cin OpenJPEG 2.3.1 through 2020-01-28 has a heap-based buffer overflow in the qmfbid==1 case, a different issue than CVE-2020-6851.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
PATCH 1/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973
In reply to Fabrice FontaineFabrice, All,
On 2020-02-29 21:24 +0100, Fabrice Fontaine spake thusly:
Quoted 6 lines
In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the
opj_t1_encode_cblksfunction ofopenjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Series applied to master, thanks.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
Quoted 199 lines
--- ...detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch | 71 +++++++++++++++ ...4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk | 4 + 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patchpackage/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch new file +71
-0@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Young Xiao <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early + +width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily +valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large +values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack +overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early +as possible. + +This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of +written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length. + +See commit 8ee335227bbc for details. + +Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]> +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height) + { +- OPJ_UINT32 x, y; ++ OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written; + OPJ_UINT8 *pix; + const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond; + + beyond = pData + stride * height; + pix = pData; +- x = y = 0U; ++ x = y = written = 0U; + while (y < height) { + int c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); ++ written++; + } + } else { /* absolute mode */ + c = getc(IN); +@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); + } + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); ++ written++; + } + if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */ + getc(IN); +@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + } + } + } /* while(y < height) */ ++ if (written != width * height) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + return OPJ_TRUE; + } +package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch new file +86
-0@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Young Xiao <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:09:59 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] bmp_read_rle4_data(): avoid potential infinite loop + +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +index ec34f535b..2fc4e9bc4 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +@@ -632,12 +632,18 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + while (y < height) { + int c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +- break; ++ return OPJ_FALSE; + } + + if (c) { /* encoded mode */ +- int j; +- OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); ++ int j, c1_int; ++ OPJ_UINT8 c1; ++ ++ c1_int = getc(IN); ++ if (c1_int == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int; + + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { +@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + } else { /* absolute mode */ + c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +- break; ++ return OPJ_FALSE; + } + + if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */ +@@ -658,8 +664,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + break; + } else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */ + c = getc(IN); ++ if (c == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + x += (OPJ_UINT32)c; + c = getc(IN); ++ if (c == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + y += (OPJ_UINT32)c; + pix = pData + y * stride + x; + } else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */ +@@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { + if ((j & 1) == 0) { +- c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); ++ int c1_int; ++ c1_int = getc(IN); ++ if (c1_int == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int; + } + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); + written++; + } + if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */ +- getc(IN); ++ c = getc(IN); ++ if (c == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + } + } + }package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +4
-0@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ OPENJPEG_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause OPENJPEG_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES +# 0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch +# 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch +OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973 + OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng) OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)Signature · 6 lines
2.25.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list buildroot at busybox.net http://lists.busybox.net/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
PATCH 1/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973
In reply to Fabrice FontaineQuoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the
opj_t1_encode_cblksfunction ofopenjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard