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package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973

PATCH New Fabrice Fontaine 3 participants 7 messages Feb 29, 2020 – Mar 14, 2020

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973

In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.

---
 ...detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch | 71 +++++++++++++++
 ...4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch | 86 +++++++++++++++++++
 package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk                  |  4 +
 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch
 create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch new file +71 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c648020bf7
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
+
+width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
+valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
+values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
+overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
+as possible.
+
+This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
+written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
+
+See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
+
+Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
+[Retrieved from:
+https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644
+--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+                                    OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
+ {
+-    OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
++    OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
+     OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
+     const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
+ 
+     beyond = pData + stride * height;
+     pix = pData;
+-    x = y = 0U;
++    x = y = written = 0U;
+     while (y < height) {
+         int c = getc(IN);
+         if (c == EOF) {
+@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+             for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
+                     ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
+                 *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
++                written++;
+             }
+         } else { /* absolute mode */
+             c = getc(IN);
+@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+                         c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
+                     }
+                     *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
++                    written++;
+                 }
+                 if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
+                     getc(IN);
+@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+             }
+         }
+     }  /* while(y < height) */
++    if (written != width * height) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
++        return OPJ_FALSE;
++    }
+     return OPJ_TRUE;
+ }
+ 
package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch new file +86 -0

86 lines not on this page · raw message

package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +4 -0
index 1b119fa5fe..0fe2aed536 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ OPENJPEG_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause
 OPENJPEG_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE
 OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
 
+# 0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch
+# 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
+OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973
+
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-6851

OpenJPEG through 2.3.1 has a heap-based buffer overflow in opj_t1_clbl_decode_processor in openjp2/t1.c because of lack of opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions validation.

---
 ...ions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch | 32 +++++++++++++++++++
 package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk                  |  3 ++
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch
package/openjpeg/0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch new file +32 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe1390a310
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Even Rouault <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 01:51:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose
+ coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228)
+
+[Retrieved from:
+https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
+index 14f6ff41a..922550eb1 100644
+--- a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
+@@ -9221,6 +9221,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image,
+     l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
+     for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) {
+         OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w;
++        if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
++                p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
++                p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
++                p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
++            opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR,
++                          "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n");
++            return OPJ_FALSE;
++        }
+ 
+         l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0,
+                          (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +3 -0
index 0fe2aed536..28d6e97b01 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
 # 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
 OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973
 
+# 0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch
+OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6851
+
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-6851

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

OpenJPEG through 2.3.1 has a heap-based buffer overflow in opj_t1_clbl_decode_processor in openjp2/t1.c because of lack of opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions validation.

Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-8112

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine

opj_t1_clbl_decode_processor in openjp2/t1.c in OpenJPEG 2.3.1 through 2020-01-28 has a heap-based buffer overflow in the qmfbid==1 case, a different issue than CVE-2020-6851.

---
 ...tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk                  |  3 ++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch
package/openjpeg/0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch new file +46 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7d82377d52
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Even Rouault <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:59:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow
+
+That could lead to later assertion failures.
+
+Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112
+[Retrieved from:
+https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
+index deecc4dff..aa419030a 100644
+--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
+@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
+             /* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000)  */
+             l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
+             l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
+-            l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
+-            l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
++            {
++                OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1,
++                                  (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx;
++                if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
++                    opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
++                    return OPJ_FALSE;
++                }
++                l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
++            }
++            {
++                OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1,
++                                  (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy;
++                if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
++                    opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
++                    return OPJ_FALSE;
++                }
++                l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
++            }
+             /*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/
+ 
+             l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +3 -0
index 28d6e97b01..1ff3111d64 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973
 # 0006-opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions-reject-images-whose-coordinates.patch
 OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6851
 
+# 0007-opj_tcd_init_tile-avoid-integer-overflow.patch
+OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-8112
+
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2020-8112

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

opj_t1_clbl_decode_processor in openjp2/t1.c in OpenJPEG 2.3.1 through 2020-01-28 has a heap-based buffer overflow in the qmfbid==1 case, a different issue than CVE-2020-6851.

Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#5 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine

Fabrice, All,

On 2020-02-29 21:24 +0100, Fabrice Fontaine spake thusly:

Quoted 6 lines

In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.

Series applied to master, thanks.

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

Quoted 199 lines
---
 ...detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch | 71 +++++++++++++++
 ...4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch | 86 +++++++++++++++++++
 package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk                  |  4 +
 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch
 create mode 100644 package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
package/openjpeg/0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch new file +71 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c648020bf7
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
+
+width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
+valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
+values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
+overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
+as possible.
+
+This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
+written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
+
+See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
+
+Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
+[Retrieved from:
+https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644
+--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+                                    OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
+ {
+-    OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
++    OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
+     OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
+     const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
+ 
+     beyond = pData + stride * height;
+     pix = pData;
+-    x = y = 0U;
++    x = y = written = 0U;
+     while (y < height) {
+         int c = getc(IN);
+         if (c == EOF) {
+@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+             for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
+                     ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
+                 *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
++                written++;
+             }
+         } else { /* absolute mode */
+             c = getc(IN);
+@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+                         c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
+                     }
+                     *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
++                    written++;
+                 }
+                 if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
+                     getc(IN);
+@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+             }
+         }
+     }  /* while(y < height) */
++    if (written != width * height) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
++        return OPJ_FALSE;
++    }
+     return OPJ_TRUE;
+ }
+ 
package/openjpeg/0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch new file +86 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbaea3c8da
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:09:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] bmp_read_rle4_data(): avoid potential infinite loop
+
+[Retrieved from:
+https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+index ec34f535b..2fc4e9bc4 100644
+--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
+@@ -632,12 +632,18 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+     while (y < height) {
+         int c = getc(IN);
+         if (c == EOF) {
+-            break;
++            return OPJ_FALSE;
+         }
+ 
+         if (c) { /* encoded mode */
+-            int j;
+-            OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
++            int j, c1_int;
++            OPJ_UINT8 c1;
++
++            c1_int = getc(IN);
++            if (c1_int == EOF) {
++                return OPJ_FALSE;
++            }
++            c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
+ 
+             for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
+                     ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
+@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+         } else { /* absolute mode */
+             c = getc(IN);
+             if (c == EOF) {
+-                break;
++                return OPJ_FALSE;
+             }
+ 
+             if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
+@@ -658,8 +664,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+                 break;
+             } else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
+                 c = getc(IN);
++                if (c == EOF) {
++                    return OPJ_FALSE;
++                }
+                 x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
+                 c = getc(IN);
++                if (c == EOF) {
++                    return OPJ_FALSE;
++                }
+                 y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
+                 pix = pData + y * stride + x;
+             } else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
+@@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
+                 for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
+                         ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
+                     if ((j & 1) == 0) {
+-                        c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
++                        int c1_int;
++                        c1_int = getc(IN);
++                        if (c1_int == EOF) {
++                            return OPJ_FALSE;
++                        }
++                        c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
+                     }
+                     *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
+                     written++;
+                 }
+                 if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
+-                    getc(IN);
++                    c = getc(IN);
++                    if (c == EOF) {
++                        return OPJ_FALSE;
++                    }
+                 }
+             }
+         }
package/openjpeg/openjpeg.mk +4 -0
index 1b119fa5fe..0fe2aed536 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ OPENJPEG_LICENSE = BSD-2-Clause
 OPENJPEG_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE
 OPENJPEG_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
 
+# 0004-convertbmp-detect-invalid-file-dimensions-early.patch
+# 0005-bmp_read_rle4_data-avoid-potential-infinite-loop.patch
+OPENJPEG_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-12973
+
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_ZLIB),zlib)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBPNG),libpng)
 OPENJPEG_DEPENDENCIES += $(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_TIFF),tiff)
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|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
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#6 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 package/openjpeg: fix CVE-2019-12973

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
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"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.

Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.

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Bye, Peter Korsgaard