package/patch: annote CVE-2018-6951
PATCH 1/5 package/patch: annote CVE-2018-6951
--- package/patch/patch.mk | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ PATCH_SITE = $(BR2_GNU_MIRROR)/patch PATCH_LICENSE = GPL-3.0+ PATCH_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING +# 0001-Fix-segfault-with-mangled-rename-patch.patch +PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951 + ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y) PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 2/5 package/patch: annotate CVE-2018-1000156
--- package/patch/patch.mk | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ PATCH_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING # 0001-Fix-segfault-with-mangled-rename-patch.patch PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951 +# 0003-Fix-arbitrary-command-execution-in-ed-style-patches-.patch +PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156 + ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y) PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 3/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2018-20969
In reply to Fabrice Fontainedo_ed_script in pch.c in GNU patch through 2.7.6 does not block strings beginning with a ! character. NOTE: this is the same commit as for CVE-2019-13638, but the ! syntax is specific to ed, and is unrelated to a shell metacharacter.
--- ...-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ package/patch/patch.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/patch/0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch
package/patch/0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200 +Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell + +* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell +command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities. +[Retrieved from: +https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/pch.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c +index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644 +--- a/src/pch.c ++++ b/src/pch.c +@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + *outname_needs_removal = true; + copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true); + } +- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program, +- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ", +- outname); + fflush (stdout); + + pid = fork(); +@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + else if (pid == 0) + { + dup2 (tmpfd, 0); +- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0); ++ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-'); ++ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL); + _exit (2); + } + else +-- +cgit v1.2.1 +
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951 # 0003-Fix-arbitrary-command-execution-in-ed-style-patches-.patch PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156 +# 0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch +PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969 + ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y) PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 3/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2018-20969
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"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
do_ed_scriptinpch.cin GNU patch through 2.7.6 does not block strings beginning with a ! character. NOTE: this is the same commit as for CVE-2019-13638, but the ! syntax is specific to ed, and is unrelated to a shell metacharacter.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
PATCH 4/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2019-13636
In reply to Fabrice FontaineIn GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects inp.c and util.c.
--- ...nks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch | 111 ++++++++++++++++++ package/patch/patch.mk | 3 + 2 files changed, 114 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/patch/0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch
package/patch/0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch new file +111 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200 +Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given + +* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file, +append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with +the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing +that consistently for input files. +* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them +with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well. +[Retrieved from: +https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + src/inp.c | 12 ++++++++++-- + src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c +index 32d0919..22d7473 100644 +--- a/src/inp.c ++++ b/src/inp.c +@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename) + { + if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode)) + { +- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0); ++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput; + size_t buffered = 0, n; ++ int ifd; ++ ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0); + if (ifd < 0) + pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename)); + +@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename) + static void + plan_b (char const *filename) + { ++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput; + int ifd; + FILE *ifp; + int c; +@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename) + + if (instat.st_size == 0) + filename = NULL_DEVICE; +- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0 ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0 + || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r"))) + pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename)); + if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal) +diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c +index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644 +--- a/src/util.c ++++ b/src/util.c +@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original) + + try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT; + safe_unlink (bakname); +- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0) ++ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0) + { + if (errno != try_makedirs_errno) + pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname)); +@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode, + static void + copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd) + { ++ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY; + int fromfd; + ssize_t i; + +- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0) ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0) + pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from)); + while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0) + { +@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost, + else + { + assert (S_ISREG (mode)); ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode, + to_dir_known_to_exist); + copy_to_fd (from, tofd); +@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost, + void + append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to) + { ++ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY; + int tofd; + +- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0) + pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to)); + copy_to_fd (from, tofd); + if (close (tofd) != 0) +-- +cgit v1.2.1 +
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156 # 0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969 +# 0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch +PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-13636 + ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y) PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 4/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2019-13636
Quoted 6 lines
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"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
In GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects
inp.candutil.c.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
PATCH 5/5 package/patch: annotate CVE-2019-13638
In reply to Fabrice FontaineGNU patch through 2.7.6 is vulnerable to OS shell command injection that can be exploited by opening a crafted patch file that contains an ed style diff payload with shell metacharacters. The ed editor does not need to be present on the vulnerable system. This is different from CVE-2018-1000156.
--- package/patch/patch.mk | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
package/patch/patch.mk +1 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951 PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156 # 0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch -PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969 +PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969 CVE-2019-13638 # 0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-13636
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 1/5 package/patch: annote CVE-2018-6951
In reply to Fabrice FontaineQuoted 4 lines · On Tue, 3 Mar 2020 20:46:59 +0100 Fabrice Fontaine…
Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>--- package/patch/patch.mk | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Series applied to master. Thanks!
Thomas
Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Bootlin Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering https://bootlin.com