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package/patch: annote CVE-2018-6951

PATCH New Fabrice Fontaine 3 participants 8 messages Mar 3, 2020 – Mar 15, 2020

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/5 package/patch: annote CVE-2018-6951

---
 package/patch/patch.mk | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
index d581682c70..ca54beab6d 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ PATCH_SITE = $(BR2_GNU_MIRROR)/patch
 PATCH_LICENSE = GPL-3.0+
 PATCH_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
 
+# 0001-Fix-segfault-with-mangled-rename-patch.patch
+PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951
+
 ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y)
 PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr
 PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/5 package/patch: annotate CVE-2018-1000156

---
 package/patch/patch.mk | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
index ca54beab6d..483e2791a3 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ PATCH_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
 # 0001-Fix-segfault-with-mangled-rename-patch.patch
 PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951
 
+# 0003-Fix-arbitrary-command-execution-in-ed-style-patches-.patch
+PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156
+
 ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y)
 PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr
 PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2018-20969

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine

do_ed_script in pch.c in GNU patch through 2.7.6 does not block strings beginning with a ! character. NOTE: this is the same commit as for CVE-2019-13638, but the ! syntax is specific to ed, and is unrelated to a shell metacharacter.

---
 ...-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 package/patch/patch.mk                        |  3 ++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/patch/0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch
package/patch/0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch new file +41 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae64d58b93
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
+Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
+command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
+[Retrieved from:
+https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pch.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ 	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ 	  }
+-	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+-		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+-		 outname);
+ 	fflush (stdout);
+ 
+ 	pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	else if (pid == 0)
+ 	  {
+ 	    dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+-	    execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++	    assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
++	    execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char  *) NULL);
+ 	    _exit (2);
+ 	  }
+ 	else
+-- 
+cgit v1.2.1
+
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
index 483e2791a3..a4f593f3b5 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951
 # 0003-Fix-arbitrary-command-execution-in-ed-style-patches-.patch
 PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156
 
+# 0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch
+PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969
+
 ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y)
 PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr
 PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2018-20969

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

do_ed_script in pch.c in GNU patch through 2.7.6 does not block strings beginning with a ! character. NOTE: this is the same commit as for CVE-2019-13638, but the ! syntax is specific to ed, and is unrelated to a shell metacharacter.

Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2019-13636

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine

In GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects inp.c and util.c.

---
 ...nks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch | 111 ++++++++++++++++++
 package/patch/patch.mk                        |   3 +
 2 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/patch/0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch
package/patch/0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch new file +111 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e07ae0c670
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
+Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+
+* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks.  So far, we were only doing
+that consistently for input files.
+* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+[Retrieved from:
+https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/inp.c  | 12 ++++++++++--
+ src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
+index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
+--- a/src/inp.c
++++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+     {
+       if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+         {
+-	  int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
++	  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ 	  size_t buffered = 0, n;
++	  int ifd;
++
++	  if (! follow_symlinks)
++	    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++	  ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ 	  if (ifd < 0)
+ 	    pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+ 
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
++  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+   int ifd;
+   FILE *ifp;
+   int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ 
+   if (instat.st_size == 0)
+     filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+-  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+       || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+     pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+   if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
+ 
+ 	  try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ 	  safe_unlink (bakname);
+-	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
++	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ 		pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
++  int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+   int fromfd;
+   ssize_t i;
+ 
+-  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+   while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+     {
+@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+   else
+     {
+       assert (S_ISREG (mode));
++      if (! follow_symlinks)
++	to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+       tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ 			  to_dir_known_to_exist);
+       copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
++  int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+   int tofd;
+ 
+-  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+   copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+   if (close (tofd) != 0)
+-- 
+cgit v1.2.1
+
package/patch/patch.mk +3 -0
index a4f593f3b5..ae9b838a62 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156
 # 0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch
 PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969
 
+# 0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch
+PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-13636
+
 ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_ATTR),y)
 PATCH_CONF_OPTS += --enable-xattr
 PATCH_DEPENDENCIES += attr
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH 4/5 package/patch: fix CVE-2019-13636

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

In GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects inp.c and util.c.

Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#6 lore raw

PATCH 5/5 package/patch: annotate CVE-2019-13638

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine

GNU patch through 2.7.6 is vulnerable to OS shell command injection that can be exploited by opening a crafted patch file that contains an ed style diff payload with shell metacharacters. The ed editor does not need to be present on the vulnerable system. This is different from CVE-2018-1000156.

---
 package/patch/patch.mk | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
package/patch/patch.mk +1 -1
index ae9b838a62..b7f5bac05a 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-6951
 PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-1000156
 
 # 0004-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch
-PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969
+PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20969 CVE-2019-13638
 
 # 0005-Don-t-follow-symlinks-unless--follow-symlinks-is-given.patch
 PATCH_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-13636
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH 1/5 package/patch: annote CVE-2018-6951

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine
Quoted 4 lines · On Tue, 3 Mar 2020 20:46:59 +0100 Fabrice Fontaine…
---
 package/patch/patch.mk | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

Series applied to master. Thanks!

Thomas

Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com