arm64: return address signing
Subsystems (7)
v6 cover arm64: return address signing
Hi,
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Changes since v5 [1]:
- Added a new patch(arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability..) to move cpucapability type helpers in cpufeature.c file. This makes adding new cpucapability easier.
- Moved kernel key restore to function __cpu_setup(proc.S) as suggested by Catalin.
- More comments for as-option Kconfig option for concerns raised by Masahiro.
- Clarified comments for -march=armv8.3-a non-integrated assembler option.
Changes since v4 [2]:
- Rebased the patch series to v5.6-rc2.
- Patch "arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability" updated as per Suzuki's review comments.
Some additional work not implemented below will be taken up separately:
- kdump tools may need some rework to work with ptrauth. The kdump tools may need the ptrauth information to strip PAC bits. This will be sent in a separate patch.
- Few more ptrauth generic lkdtm tests as requested by Kees Cook.
- Generate compile time warnings if requested Kconfig feature not supported by compilers.
This series is based on Linux version v5.6-rc4. This complete series can be found at (git://linux-arm.org/linux-ak.git PAC_mainline_v6) for reference.
Feedback welcome!
Thanks,
Amit Daniel
[1]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-February/711699.html
[2]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-January/707567.html
Amit Daniel Kachhap (9):
arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check
arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
Kristina Martsenko (7):
arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address
Mark Rutland (1):
arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Vincenzo Frascino (1):
kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 27 +++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 11 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 20 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 39 +++++++------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 54 +++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 10 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 16 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 27 +++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 7 +-- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 +++--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 10 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 36 +++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + include/linux/stackprotector.h | 2 +- scripts/Kconfig.include | 6 +++ 26 files changed, 424 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 1/18 arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check
Some existing/future meta cpucaps match need the presence of individual cpucaps. Currently the individual cpucaps checks it via an array based flag and this introduces dependency on the array entry order. This limitation exists only for system scope cpufeature.
This patch introduces an internal helper function (__system_matches_cap) to invoke the matching handler for system scope. This helper has to be used during a narrow window when,
- The system wide safe registers are set with all the SMP CPUs and,
- The SYSTEM_FEATURE cpu_hwcaps may not have been set.
Normal users should use the existing cpus_have_{const_}cap() global function.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +14 -1
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)static void cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap); +static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n); +/* * NOTE: Any changes to the visibility of features should be kept in * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
@@ -2146,6 +2148,17 @@ bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int n)return false; } +static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n) +{ +if (n <ARM64_NCAPS ) { +const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[n]; + +if (cap) +return cap->matches (cap,SCOPE_SYSTEM ); + } +return false; +} +void cpu_set_feature (unsigned int num) {WARN_ON (num >=MAX_CPU_FEATURES );
@@ -2218,7 +2231,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)static bool __maybe_unused cpufeature_pan_not_uao (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); +return (__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); }static void __maybe_unused cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 01/18] arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check
Hi Amit,
Quoted 34 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
Some existing/future meta cpucaps match need the presence of individual cpucaps. Currently the individual cpucaps checks it via an array based flag and this introduces dependency on the array entry order. This limitation exists only for system scope cpufeature.
This patch introduces an internal helper function (
__system_matches_cap) to invoke the matching handler for system scope. This helper has to be used during a narrow window when,
- The system wide safe registers are set with all the SMP CPUs and,
- TheSYSTEM_FEATUREcpu_hwcapsmay not have been set.Normal users should use the existing cpus_have_{const_}cap() global function.
Suggested-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2
-0@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)static void cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap); +static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n); +/* * NOTE: Any changes to the visibility of features should be kept in * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int n) · line 2150
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0
-0@@ -2146,6 +2148,17 @@ bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int n)return false; }
Nit: you might want to add a comment on top of __system_matches_cap() that explains why we introduce this function and when should be used.
Otherwise looks good to me.
Quoted 24 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +12
-1+static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n) +{ +if (n <ARM64_NCAPS ) { +const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[n]; + +if (cap) +return cap->matches (cap,SCOPE_SYSTEM ); + } +return false; +} +void cpu_set_feature (unsigned int num) {WARN_ON (num >=MAX_CPU_FEATURES );@@ -2218,7 +2231,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)static bool __maybe_unused cpufeature_pan_not_uao (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); +return (__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); }static void __maybe_unused cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
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Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 2/18 arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
To enable pointer auth for the kernel, we're going to need to check for the presence of address auth and generic auth using alternative_if. We currently have two cpucaps for each, but alternative_if needs to check a single cpucap. So define meta-capabilities that are present when either of the current two capabilities is present.
Leave the existing four cpucaps in place, as they are still needed to check for mismatched systems where one CPU has the architected algorithm but another has the IMP DEF algorithm.
Note, the meta-capabilities were present before but were removed in commit a56005d32105 ("arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4") and commit 1e013d06120c ("arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps using multi_entry_cap_matches"), as they were not needed then. Note, unlike before, the current patch checks the cpucap values directly, instead of reading the CPU ID register value.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +3 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT_NVHE 48#define ARM64_HAS_E0PD 49#define ARM64_HAS_RNG 50 +#define ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH 51 +#define ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH 52 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 51 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 53#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +2 -4
@@ -590,15 +590,13 @@ static __always_inline bool system_supports_cnp(void)static inline bool system_supports_address_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_supports_generic_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking (void )
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +24 -1
@@ -1323,6 +1323,20 @@ static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); } + +static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +} + +static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +}#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD
@@ -1600,7 +1614,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)",
@@ -1611,6 +1624,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_address_auth, .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, {
@@ -1633,6 +1651,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_generic_auth, + },#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI {
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 02/18] arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
Quoted 12 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
To enable pointer auth for the kernel, we're going to need to check for the presence of address auth and generic auth using
alternative_if. We currently have two cpucaps for each, butalternative_ifneeds to check a single cpucap. So define meta-capabilities that are present when either of the current two capabilities is present.Leave the existing four cpucaps in place, as they are still needed to check for mismatched systems where one CPU has the architected algorithm but another has the IMP DEF algorithm.
Quoted 7 lines
Note, the meta-capabilities were present before but were removed in commit
a56005d32105("arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4") and commit1e013d06120c("arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps usingmulti_entry_cap_matches"), as they were not needed then. Note, unlike before, the current patch checks the cpucap values directly, instead of reading the CPU ID register value.
Quoted 106 lines
Reviewed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>[Amit: commit message and macro rebase, use __system_matches_cap]Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +3
-1@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT_NVHE 48#define ARM64_HAS_E0PD 49#define ARM64_HAS_RNG 50 +#define ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH 51 +#define ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH 52 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 51 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 53#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +2
-4@@ -590,15 +590,13 @@ static __always_inline bool system_supports_cnp(void)static inline bool system_supports_address_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_supports_generic_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking (void )arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +24
-1@@ -1323,6 +1323,20 @@ static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); } + +static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +} + +static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +}#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD @@ -1600,7 +1614,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)",@@ -1611,6 +1624,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_address_auth, .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, {@@ -1633,6 +1651,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_generic_auth, + },#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI {
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Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 3/18 arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.
We currently keep all 5 keys in struct ptrauth_keys. However, as the kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a whole ptrauth_keys struct for every thread.
Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1 key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct (and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific to userspace.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 12 ++++++------ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 8 ++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +6 -6
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct ptrauth_key {* We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*(). */ -struct ptrauth_keys { +struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apia;struct ptrauth_key apib;struct ptrauth_key apda;
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia));
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia);
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ do { \ struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \ - ptrauth_keys_init(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ } while (0)#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct thread_struct {unsigned long fault_code;/* ESR_EL1 value */ struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -struct ptrauth_keys keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user;#endif };
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +4 -4
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg) { -struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user;unsigned long addr_key_mask =PR_PAC_APIAKEY |PR_PAC_APIBKEY |PR_PAC_APDAKEY |PR_PAC_APDBKEY ;unsigned long key_mask = addr_key_mask |PR_PAC_APGAKEY ;
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)return -EINVAL ;if (!arg) { -ptrauth_keys_init (keys); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); +ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys); +ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (arg &PR_PAC_APGAKEY )get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); +ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8 -8
@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ static struct ptrauth_key pac_key_from_user(__uint128_t ukey) }static void pac_address_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apiakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apia); ukeys->apibkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apib);
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static void pac_address_keys_to_user(struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, ukeys->apdbkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apdb); } -static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys) { keys->apia =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apiakey);
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_address_auth ())
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;int ret;
@@ -1056,12 +1056,12 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, }static void pac_generic_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apgakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apga); } -static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys) { keys->apga =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apgakey);
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_generic_auth ())
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;int ret;
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 03/18] arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.
Quoted 9 lines
We currently keep all 5 keys in struct
ptrauth_keys. However, as the kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a wholeptrauth_keysstruct for every thread.Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1 key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct (and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific to userspace.
Quoted 178 lines
Acked-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>[Amit: Re-positioned the patch to reduce the diff]Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 12 ++++++------ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 8 ++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +6
-6@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct ptrauth_key {* We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*(). */ -struct ptrauth_keys { +struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apia;struct ptrauth_key apib;struct ptrauth_key apda;@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia));@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia);@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ do { \ struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \ - ptrauth_keys_init(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ } while (0)#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1
-1@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct thread_struct {unsigned long fault_code;/* ESR_EL1 value */ struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -struct ptrauth_keys keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user;#endif };arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +4
-4@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg) { -struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user;unsigned long addr_key_mask =PR_PAC_APIAKEY |PR_PAC_APIBKEY |PR_PAC_APDAKEY |PR_PAC_APDBKEY ;unsigned long key_mask = addr_key_mask |PR_PAC_APGAKEY ;@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)return -EINVAL ;if (!arg) { -ptrauth_keys_init (keys); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); +ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys); +ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (arg &PR_PAC_APGAKEY )get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); +ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8
-8@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ static struct ptrauth_key pac_key_from_user(__uint128_t ukey) }static void pac_address_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apiakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apia); ukeys->apibkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apib);@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static void pac_address_keys_to_user(struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, ukeys->apdbkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apdb); } -static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys) { keys->apia =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apiakey);@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_address_auth ())@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;int ret;@@ -1056,12 +1056,12 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, }static void pac_generic_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apgakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apga); } -static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys) { keys->apga =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apgakey);@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_generic_auth ())@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;int ret;
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 4/18 arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
As we're going to enable pointer auth within the kernel and use a different APIAKey for the kernel itself, so move the user APIAKey switch to EL0 exception return.
The other 4 keys could remain switched during task switch, but are also moved to keep things consistent.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 23 +-------------- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 11 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 3 -- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 1 - 6 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +49 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H +#define __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H + +#include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +/* + * thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range + * so use the base value of ldp as thread.keys_user and offset as + * keys_user.ap*. + */ + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_USER + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + b .Laddr_auth_skip_\@ +alternative_else_nop_endif + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB] + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA] + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB] + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 +.Laddr_auth_skip_\@: +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA] + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + +#endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +1 -22
@@ -50,19 +50,6 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) -{ -if (system_supports_address_auth ()) { -__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia); -__ptrauth_key_install (APIB , keys->apib); -__ptrauth_key_install (APDA , keys->apda); -__ptrauth_key_install (APDB , keys->apdb); - } - -if (system_supports_generic_auth ()) -__ptrauth_key_install (APGA , keys->apga); -} -extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -78,20 +65,12 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ -do { \ - struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \ - ptrauth_keys_init_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ - ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ -} while (0) - -#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) -#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +11 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ int main(void)#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); +#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0])); DEFINE(S_X2, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[2]));
@@ -128,5 +131,13 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , interrupted_regs));DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , priority));#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apia)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apib)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +BLANK (); +#endif return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/esr.h>
@@ -341,6 +342,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 + apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1 .endif
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +0 -3
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (!arg) {ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys); -ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys);return 0 ; }
@@ -41,7 +40,5 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (arg &PR_PAC_APGAKEY )get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); -ptrauth_keys_switch_user (keys); -return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +0 -1
@@ -512,7 +512,6 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,contextidr_thread_switch (next);entry_task_switch (next);uao_thread_switch (next); -ptrauth_thread_switch (next);ssbs_thread_switch (next);/*
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 04/18] arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
Hi Amit,
Quoted 20 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
As we're going to enable pointer auth within the kernel and use a different APIAKey for the kernel itself, so move the user APIAKey switch to EL0 exception return.
The other 4 keys could remain switched during task switch, but are also moved to keep things consistent.
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +5
-0@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H +#define __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H + +#include <asm/alternative.h>
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h line 14
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +9
-0+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +/* +* thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range +* so use the base value of ldp as thread.keys_user and offset as +* keys_user.ap*.
(Nit: thread.keys_user.ap*)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
Quoted 2 lines
+ */
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +1
-0+ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
Thanks,
James
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Vincenzo Frascino
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v6 04/18] arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
Quoted 32 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
Quoted 28 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
As we're going to enable pointer auth within the kernel and use a different APIAKey for the kernel itself, so move the user APIAKey switch to EL0 exception return.
The other 4 keys could remain switched during task switch, but are also moved to keep things consistent.
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H +#define __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H + +#include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +/* +* thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range +* so use the base value of ldp as thread.keys_user and offset as
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h line 14
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +1
-0+* keys_user.ap*. (Nit: thread.keys_user.ap*)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h line 16
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +2
-0+*/ + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3Reviewed-by James Morse <[email protected]>
A part what James already mentioned:
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
James
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 5/18 arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapA macro early_park_cpu is added to park the faulted cpu in an infinite loop. Currently, this macro is substituted in two instances and may be reused in future.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +13 -12
@@ -761,6 +761,17 @@ ENDPROC(__secondary_too_slow) .endm /* + * Macro to park the cpu in an infinite loop. + */ + .macro early_park_cpu status + update_early_cpu_boot_status \status | CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL, x1, x2 +.Lepc_\@: + wfe + wfi + b .Lepc_\@ + .endm + +/* * Enable the MMU. * * x0 = SCTLR_EL1 value for turning on the MMU.
@@ -808,24 +819,14 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) and x0, x0, #(0xf << ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT) cbnz x0, 2f - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA, x0, x1 -1: wfe - wfi - b 1b - + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA #endif 2: ret ENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) __no_granule_support: /* Indicate that this CPU can't boot and is stuck in the kernel */ - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN, x1, x2 -1: - wfe - wfi - b 1b + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN ENDPROC(__no_granule_support) #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 05/18] arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
A macro
early_park_cpuis added to park the faulted cpu in an infinite loop. Currently, this macro is substituted in two instances and may be reused in future.
Quoted 57 lines
Acked-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +13
-12@@ -761,6 +761,17 @@ ENDPROC(__secondary_too_slow) .endm /* + * Macro to park the cpu in an infinite loop. + */ + .macro early_park_cpu status + update_early_cpu_boot_status \status | CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL, x1, x2 +.Lepc_\@: + wfe + wfi + b .Lepc_\@ + .endm + +/* * Enable the MMU. * * x0 = SCTLR_EL1 value for turning on the MMU.@@ -808,24 +819,14 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) and x0, x0, #(0xf << ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT) cbnz x0, 2f - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA, x0, x1 -1: wfe - wfi - b 1b - + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA #endif 2: ret ENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) __no_granule_support: /* Indicate that this CPU can't boot and is stuck in the kernel */ - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN, x1, x2 -1: - wfe - wfi - b 1b + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN ENDPROC(__no_granule_support) #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
Signature · 7 lines
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PATCH v6 6/18 arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch allows __cpu_setup to be invoked with one of these flags, ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY, ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY or ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.
The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +5 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +/* Options for __cpu_setup */ +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1) +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY (2) +#define ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME (3) +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__#include <asm/percpu.h>
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +2 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ ENTRY(stext) * On return, the CPU will be ready for the MMU to be turned on and * the TCR will have been set. */ + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor b __primary_switch ENDPROC(stext)
@@ -712,6 +713,7 @@ secondary_startup: * Common entry point for secondary CPUs. */ bl __cpu_secondary_check52bitva + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir bl __enable_mmu
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +2 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> .text /*
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ ENDPROC(__cpu_suspend_enter) .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" ENTRY(cpu_resume) bl el2_setup // if in EL2 drop to EL1 cleanly + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME bl __cpu_setup /* enable the MMU early - so we can access sleep_save_stash by va */ adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +15 -11
@@ -408,31 +408,31 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings) /* * __cpu_setup * - * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. Return in x0 the - * value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. + * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. + * + * Input: + * x0 with a flag ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY/ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY/ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. + * Output: + * Return in x0 the value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. */ .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) tlbi vmalle1 // Invalidate local TLB dsb nsh - mov x0, #3 << 20 - msr cpacr_el1, x0 // Enable FP/ASIMD - mov x0, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable - msr mdscr_el1, x0 // access to the DCC from EL0 + mov x1, #3 << 20 + msr cpacr_el1, x1 // Enable FP/ASIMD + mov x1, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable + msr mdscr_el1, x1 // access to the DCC from EL0 isb // Unmask debug exceptions now, enable_dbg // since this is per-cpu - reset_pmuserenr_el0 x0 // Disable PMU access from EL0 + reset_pmuserenr_el0 x1 // Disable PMU access from EL0 /* * Memory region attributes */ mov_q x5, MAIR_EL1_SET msr mair_el1, x5 /* - * Prepare SCTLR - */ - mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET - /* * Set/prepare TCR and TTBR. We use 512GB (39-bit) address range for * both user and kernel. */
@@ -468,5 +468,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + /* + * Prepare SCTLR + */ + mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET ret // return to head.S SYM_FUNC_END(__cpu_setup)
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Re: [PATCH v6 06/18] arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
Hi Amit,
Quoted 11 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch allows
__cpu_setupto be invoked with one of these flags,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARYorARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
(this will conflict with Ionela's AMU series, which will need to not clobber x0 during __cpu_setup.)
Thanks,
James
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Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 06/18] arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
Quoted 11 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
Quoted 8 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch allows
__cpu_setupto be invoked with one of these flags,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARYorARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
Reviewed-by James Morse <[email protected]>(this will conflict with Ionela's AMU series, which will need to not clobber x0 during
__cpu_setup.)
Thanks for the heads-up. I'll fix it up when merging the series.
Signature · 6 lines
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Re: [PATCH v6 06/18] arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapHi Amit,
Quoted 5 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch allows
__cpu_setupto be invoked with one of these flags,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARYorARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.
I could not find any explanation in this patch on what these flags stand for. Could you please add it? Maybe near where you define them.
With this:
Quoted 131 lines
The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
Suggested-by James Morse <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +5
-0@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +/* Options for __cpu_setup */ +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1) +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY (2) +#define ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME (3) +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__#include <asm/percpu.h> arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +2
-0@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ ENTRY(stext) * On return, the CPU will be ready for the MMU to be turned on and * the TCR will have been set. */ + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor b __primary_switch ENDPROC(stext)@@ -712,6 +713,7 @@ secondary_startup: * Common entry point for secondary CPUs. */ bl __cpu_secondary_check52bitva + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir bl __enable_mmuarch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +2
-0@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> .text /*@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ ENDPROC(__cpu_suspend_enter) .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" ENTRY(cpu_resume) bl el2_setup // if in EL2 drop to EL1 cleanly + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME bl __cpu_setup /* enable the MMU early - so we can access sleep_save_stash by va */ adrp x1, swapper_pg_dirarch/arm64/mm/proc.S +15
-11@@ -408,31 +408,31 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings) /* * __cpu_setup * - * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. Return in x0 the - * value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. + * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. + * + * Input: + * x0 with a flag ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY/ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARY/ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. + * Output: + * Return in x0 the value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. */ .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) tlbi vmalle1 // Invalidate local TLB dsb nsh - mov x0, #3 << 20 - msr cpacr_el1, x0 // Enable FP/ASIMD - mov x0, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable - msr mdscr_el1, x0 // access to the DCC from EL0 + mov x1, #3 << 20 + msr cpacr_el1, x1 // Enable FP/ASIMD + mov x1, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable + msr mdscr_el1, x1 // access to the DCC from EL0 isb // Unmask debug exceptions now, enable_dbg // since this is per-cpu - reset_pmuserenr_el0 x0 // Disable PMU access from EL0 + reset_pmuserenr_el0 x1 // Disable PMU access from EL0 /* * Memory region attributes */ mov_q x5, MAIR_EL1_SET msr mair_el1, x5 /* - * Prepare SCTLR - */ - mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET - /* * Set/prepare TCR and TTBR. We use 512GB (39-bit) address range for * both user and kernel. */@@ -468,5 +468,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + /* + * Prepare SCTLR + */ + mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET ret // return to head.S SYM_FUNC_END(__cpu_setup)
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Re: [PATCH v6 06/18] arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
Hi,
Quoted 11 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Hi Amit,
Quoted 5 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch allows
__cpu_setupto be invoked with one of these flags,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY,ARM64_CPU_BOOT_SECONDARYorARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.I could not find any explanation in this patch on what these flags stand for. Could you please add it? Maybe near where you define them.
I will add in my V7 version.
Quoted 4 lines
With this:
Reviewed-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Thanks.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
Suggested-by James Morse <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
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PATCH v6 7/18 arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThese helpers are used only by functions inside cpufeature.c and hence makes sense to be moved from cpufeature.h to cpufeature.c as they are not expected to be used globaly.
This change helps in reducing the header file size as well as to add future cpu capability types without confusion. Only a cpu capability type macro is sufficient to expose those capabilities globally.
---
Changes since v5:
* New patch.
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 ------------ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0 -12
@@ -340,18 +340,6 @@ static inline int cpucap_default_scope(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)return cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK ; } -static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} - -static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} -/* * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit.
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +13 -0
@@ -1363,6 +1363,19 @@ static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, }#endif +/* Internal helper functions to match cpu capability type */ +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +} + +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +} +static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc ="GIC system register CPU interface" ,
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Re: [PATCH v6 07/18] arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
Hi Amit,
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 31 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0
-12-static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} - -static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} -/* * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit. arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +6
-0@@ -1363,6 +1363,19 @@ static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, }#endif +/* Internal helper functions to match cpu capability type */ +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +}
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, · line 1381
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +7
-0+ +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +} +static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc ="GIC system register CPU interface" ,
Seems that the signature of the functions above is changed during the migration. In particular you dropped "inline". Is there any specific reason?
Signature · 7 lines
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Re: [PATCH v6 07/18] arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
Hi Vincenzo,
Quoted 42 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Hi Amit,
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 36 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0
-12-static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} - -static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} -/* * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit. arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +12
-0@@ -1363,6 +1363,19 @@ static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, }#endif +/* Internal helper functions to match cpu capability type */ +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +} + +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +}
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, · line 1381
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1
-0+static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc ="GIC system register CPU interface" ,Seems that the signature of the functions above is changed during the migration. In particular you dropped "inline". Is there any specific reason?
Earlier Catalin pointed me here [1]. I guess its not a hot-path function.
[1]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg789696.html
Cheers,
Amit
Quoted 1 line
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Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 07/18] arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
Quoted 48 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 38 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 34 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0
-12-static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} - -static inline bool -cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) -{ -return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); -} -/* * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit. arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +12
-0@@ -1363,6 +1363,19 @@ static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, }#endif +/* Internal helper functions to match cpu capability type */ +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_optional (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +} + +static bool +cpucap_late_cpu_permitted (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); +}Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1
-0+static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc ="GIC system register CPU interface" ,Seems that the signature of the functions above is changed during the migration. In particular you dropped "inline". Is there any specific reason?
Quoted 3 lines
Earlier Catalin pointed me here [1]. I guess its not a hot-path function.
[1]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg789696.html
Indeed, it had to be static inline in a header but not anymore in a .c file. Also if it's really essential to be inlined and the compiler doesn't do this automatically, use __always_inline. But my preference is not to bother unless you back it up by numbers.
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Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Vincenzo Frascino
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v6 07/18] arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
Quoted 9 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 8 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 6 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Seems that the signature of the functions above is changed during the migration. In particular you dropped "inline". Is there any specific reason?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Earlier Catalin pointed me here [1]. I guess its not a hot-path function.
[1]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg789696.html
Indeed, it had to be static inline in a header but not anymore in a .c file. Also if it's really essential to be inlined and the compiler doesn't do this automatically, use
__always_inline. But my preference is not to bother unless you back it up by numbers.
Ok, fine by me.
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PATCH v6 8/18 arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Each system capability can be of either boot, local, or system scope, depending on when the state of the capability is finalized. When we detect a conflict on a late CPU, we either offline the CPU or panic the system. We currently always panic if the conflict is caused by a boot scope capability, and offline the CPU if the conflict is caused by a local or system scope capability.
We're going to want to add a new capability (for pointer authentication) which needs to be boot scope but doesn't need to panic the system when a conflict is detected. So add a new flag to specify whether the capability requires the system to panic or not. Current boot scope capabilities are updated to set the flag, so there should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
---
Changes since v5:
* Moved cpucap_panic_on_conflict helper function inside cpufeature.c.
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 ++++++++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +10 -2
@@ -208,6 +208,10 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;* In some non-typical cases either both (a) and (b), or neither, * should be permitted. This can be described by including neither * or both flags in the capability's type field. +* +* In case of a conflict, the CPU is prevented from booting. If the +* ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT flag is specified for the capability, +* then a kernel panic is triggered. */
@@ -240,6 +244,8 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;#define ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ((u16)BIT(4))/* Is it safe for a late CPU to miss this capability when system has it */ #define ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU ((u16)BIT(5)) +/* Panic when a conflict is detected */ +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ((u16)BIT(6))/* * CPU errata workarounds that need to be enabled at boot time if one or
@@ -279,9 +285,11 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;/* * CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. All secondary -* CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU. +* CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU. In +* case of a conflict, a kernel panic is triggered. */ -#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ + (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT)struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {const char *desc;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +15 -14
@@ -1376,6 +1376,12 @@ cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU ); } +static bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +} +static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc ="GIC system register CPU interface" ,
@@ -2018,10 +2024,8 @@ static void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask)* Run through the list of capabilities to check for conflicts. * If the system has already detected a capability, take necessary * action on this CPU. -* -* Returns "false" on conflicts. */ -static bool verify_local_cpu_caps (u16 scope_mask) +static void verify_local_cpu_caps (u16 scope_mask) {int i;bool cpu_has_cap, system_has_cap;
@@ -2066,10 +2070,12 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask)pr_crit ("CPU%d: Detected conflict for capability %d (%s), System: %d, CPU: %d\n" ,smp_processor_id (), caps->capability, caps->desc, system_has_cap, cpu_has_cap); -return false; - } -return true; +if (cpucap_panic_on_conflict (caps)) +cpu_panic_kernel (); +else +cpu_die_early (); + } }/*
@@ -2079,12 +2085,8 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask)static void check_early_cpu_features (void ) {verify_cpu_asid_bits (); -/* -* Early features are used by the kernel already. If there -* is a conflict, we cannot proceed further. -*/ -if (!verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_BOOT_CPU )) -cpu_panic_kernel (); + +verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_BOOT_CPU ); } static void
@@ -2132,8 +2134,7 @@ static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void)* check_early_cpu_features(), as they need to be verified * on all secondary CPUs. */ -if (!verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU )) -cpu_die_early (); +verify_local_cpu_caps (SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU );verify_local_elf_hwcaps (arm64_elf_hwcaps);
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Re: [PATCH v6 08/18] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
Hi Amit,
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
[...]
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) · line 1384
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +6
-0+static bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +} +
If there is no specific reason in the previous patch for changing the signature, could you please make "inline" even this function, for symmetry with the others?
[...]
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Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 08/18] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
Quoted 5 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) · line 1384
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +6
-0+static bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +} +If there is no specific reason in the previous patch for changing the signature, could you please make "inline" even this function, for symmetry with the others?
Please don't add new 'inline' unless you have a real justification (in which case __always_inline is better suited). Also symmetry with others is not a good argument.
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#the-inline-disease
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Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Vincenzo Frascino
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v6 08/18] arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 5 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
On 3/6/20 6:35 AM, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
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arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) · line 1384
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arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +6
-0+static bool +cpucap_panic_on_conflict (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) +{ +return !!(cap->type &ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT ); +} +If there is no specific reason in the previous patch for changing the signature, could you please make "inline" even this function, for symmetry with the others?
Quoted 6 lines
Please don't add new 'inline' unless you have a real justification (in which case
__always_inlineis better suited). Also symmetry with others is not a good argument.https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#the-inline-disease
Ok, thanks for the explanation.
With this:
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Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 9/18 arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU needs to start using address auth very early, so change the cpucap to account for this.
Pointer auth must be enabled before we call C functions, because it is not possible to enter a function with pointer auth disabled and exit it with pointer auth enabled. Note, mismatches between architected and IMPDEF algorithms will still be caught by the cpufeature framework (the separate *_ARCH and *_IMP_DEF cpucaps).
Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has address auth and a late CPU does not, then the late CPU is parked by the cpufeature framework. Also, if the boot CPU does not have address auth and the late CPU has then the late cpu will still boot but with ptrauth feature disabled.
Leave generic authentication as a "system scope" cpucap for now, since initially the kernel will only use address authentication.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +++---------- arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -1515,6 +1515,12 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature. + If the feature is present on the boot CPU but not on a late CPU, then + the late CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not have + address auth and the late CPU has then the late CPU will still boot + but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should + not be selected. + endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features"
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +9 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,15 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PANIC_ON_CONFLICT) +/* +* CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. It is safe for a +* late CPU to have this feature even though the boot CPU hasn't enabled it, +* although the feature will not be used by Linux in this case. If the boot CPU +* has enabled this feature already, then every late CPU must have it. +*/ +#define ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \ + (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU) +struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {const char *desc;u16 capability;
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH (UL(4) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)/* Options for __cpu_setup */ #define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -10
@@ -1318,12 +1318,6 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -static void cpu_enable_address_auth (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) -{ -sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | - SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); -} -static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) {
@@ -1627,7 +1621,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Address authentication (architected algorithm)", .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT,
@@ -1637,7 +1631,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)", .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT,
@@ -1646,9 +1640,8 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { }, { .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, .matches = has_address_auth, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Generic authentication (architected algorithm)",
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +2 -0
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support 52-bit VAs\n" , cpu);if (status &CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN )pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support %luK granule \n" , cpu,PAGE_SIZE /SZ_1K ); +if (status &CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH ) +pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support pointer authentication\n" , cpu); cpus_stuck_in_kernel++;break ;case CPU_PANIC_KERNEL :
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +31 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES #define TCR_TG_FLAGS TCR_TG0_64K | TCR_TG1_64K
@@ -468,9 +469,39 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + mov x1, x0 /* * Prepare SCTLR */ mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + /* No ptrauth setup for run time cpus */ + cmp x1, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME + b.eq 3f + + /* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ + mrs x2, id_aa64isar1_el1 + ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 + cbz x2, 3f + + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr + + /* Just enable ptrauth for primary cpu */ + cmp x1, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY + b.eq 2f + + /* if !system_supports_address_auth() then skip enable */ +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + b 3f +alternative_else_nop_endif + +2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ + ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ + SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB + orr x0, x0, x2 +3: +#endif ret // return to head.S SYM_FUNC_END(__cpu_setup)
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Re: [PATCH v6 09/18] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Hi Amit,
Quoted 12 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU needs to start using address auth very early, so change the cpucap to account for this.
Pointer auth must be enabled before we call C functions, because it is not possible to enter a function with pointer auth disabled and exit it with pointer auth enabled. Note, mismatches between architected and IMPDEF algorithms will still be caught by the cpufeature framework (the separate
*_ARCHand*_IMP_DEFcpucaps).
Quoted 9 lines
Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has address auth and a late CPU does not, then the late CPU is parked by the cpufeature framework. Also, if the boot CPU does not have address auth and the late CPU has then the late cpu will still boot but with ptrauth feature disabled.
Leave generic authentication as a "system scope" cpucap for now, since initially the kernel will only use address authentication.
I can't find in this patch were CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH is set. Maybe I am missing something. Please feel free to correct me if I am wrong.
My expectation is that you should call early_park_cpu to do that if the secondary does not support PTRAUTH similar to what you did in v2 of this series:
ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
/* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */
mrs x2, id_aa64isar1_el1
ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8
cbnz x2, 1falternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
mov x3, 1alternative_else
mov x3, 0alternative_endif
cbz x3, 1f
/* Park the mismatched secondary CPU */
early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH
#endif
1: retENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)
and then check it during the secondary_startup, similar to what happens for 52BIT_VA for example.
In this way "update_early_cpu_boot_status" would update the CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH flag.
[...]
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Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 09/18] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Quoted 49 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Hi Amit,
Quoted 12 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU needs to start using address auth very early, so change the cpucap to account for this.
Pointer auth must be enabled before we call C functions, because it is not possible to enter a function with pointer auth disabled and exit it with pointer auth enabled. Note, mismatches between architected and IMPDEF algorithms will still be caught by the cpufeature framework (the separate
*_ARCHand*_IMP_DEFcpucaps).Quoted 9 lines
Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has address auth and a late CPU does not, then the late CPU is parked by the cpufeature framework. Also, if the boot CPU does not have address auth and the late CPU has then the late cpu will still boot but with ptrauth feature disabled.
Leave generic authentication as a "system scope" cpucap for now, since initially the kernel will only use address authentication.
I can't find in this patch were
CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHis set. Maybe I am missing something. Please feel free to correct me if I am wrong.My expectation is that you should call
early_park_cputo do that if the secondary does not support PTRAUTH similar to what you did in v2 of this series:
ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH /* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ mrs x2, id_aa64isar1_el1 ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbnz x2, 1f
alternative_ifARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
mov x3, 1alternative_else
mov x3, 0alternative_endif
cbz x3, 1f
/* Park the mismatched secondary CPU */early_park_cpuCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH
#endif
1: retENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)
Quoted 5 lines
and then check it during the
secondary_startup, similar to what happens for 52BIT_VA for example.In this way "
update_early_cpu_boot_status" would update theCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHflag.
This way it was implemented earlier. Catalin suggested the pointer auth variation in cpus is not critical enough and cpufeature framework can park it little later [1].
Agree that I should have removed all definitions of CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH and prevent unnecessary confusions.
[1] : https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg780766.html
Quoted 3 lines
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Re: [PATCH v6 09/18] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Hi Amit,
On 3/11/20 6:26 AM, Amit Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 22 lines
My expectation is that you should call
early_park_cputo do that if the secondary does not support PTRAUTH similar to what you did in v2 of this series:
ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)
#ifdefCONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
/* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ mrs x2,id_aa64isar1_el1
ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbnz x2, 1falternative_ifARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
mov x3, 1alternative_else
mov x3, 0alternative_endif
cbz x3, 1f
/* Park the mismatched secondary CPU */early_park_cpuCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH#endif
1: retENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)Quoted 5 lines
and then check it during the
secondary_startup, similar to what happens for 52BIT_VA for example.In this way "
update_early_cpu_boot_status" would update theCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHflag.
Quoted 8 lines
This way it was implemented earlier. Catalin suggested the pointer auth variation in cpus is not critical enough and cpufeature framework can park it little later [1].
Agree that I should have removed all definitions of
CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHand prevent unnecessary confusions.[1] : https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg780766.html
It was either or :) Sorry I did not see Catalin's comment, please go ahead and remove the definition of CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH and the code that uses it in this case.
Maybe you want to expand as well your commit message (which already seems covering this case) to explain why it is possible to let the cpu framework deal with this case. This should make things clear according to me.
Another question that still remains is: do we need to introduce early_park_cpu as part of this series? Since it does not seem you are using it anywhere.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
[...]
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Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 09/18] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Hi Vincenzo,
Quoted 38 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Hi Amit,
On 3/11/20 6:26 AM, Amit Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 22 lines
My expectation is that you should call
early_park_cputo do that if the secondary does not support PTRAUTH similar to what you did in v2 of this series:
ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)
#ifdefCONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
/* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ mrs x2,id_aa64isar1_el1
ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbnz x2, 1falternative_ifARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
mov x3, 1alternative_else
mov x3, 0alternative_endif
cbz x3, 1f
/* Park the mismatched secondary CPU */early_park_cpuCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH
#endif
1: retENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)Quoted 5 lines
and then check it during the
secondary_startup, similar to what happens for 52BIT_VA for example.In this way "
update_early_cpu_boot_status" would update theCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHflag.This way it was implemented earlier. Catalin suggested the pointer auth variation in cpus is not critical enough and cpufeature framework can park it little later [1].
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Agree that I should have removed all definitions of
CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHand prevent unnecessary confusions.[1] : https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg780766.html
It was either or :) Sorry I did not see Catalin's comment, please go ahead and remove the definition of
CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHand the code that uses it in this case.
ok
Quoted 4 lines
Maybe you want to expand as well your commit message (which already seems covering this case) to explain why it is possible to let the cpu framework deal with this case. This should make things clear according to me.
sure.
Quoted 3 lines
Another question that still remains is: do we need to introduce
early_park_cpuas part of this series? Since it does not seem you are using it anywhere.
I should probably drop this cleanup patch from this series and may be send it separately.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
[...]
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Vincenzo Frascino
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v6 09/18] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Hi Amit,
Quoted 58 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi Vincenzo,
Quoted 39 lines · Vincenzo Frascino
Hi Amit,
On 3/11/20 6:26 AM, Amit Kachhap wrote:
[...]
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 23 lines
My expectation is that you should call
early_park_cputo do that if the secondary does not support PTRAUTH similar to what you did in v2 of this series:
ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)
#ifdefCONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
/* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ mrs x2,id_aa64isar1_el1
ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbnz x2, 1falternative_ifARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
mov x3, 1alternative_else
mov x3, 0alternative_endif
cbz x3, 1f
/* Park the mismatched secondary CPU */early_park_cpuCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH#endif
1: retENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth)Quoted 5 lines
and then check it during the
secondary_startup, similar to what happens for 52BIT_VA for example.In this way "
update_early_cpu_boot_status" would update theCPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHflag.This way it was implemented earlier. Catalin suggested the pointer auth variation in cpus is not critical enough and cpufeature framework can park it little later [1].
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Agree that I should have removed all definitions of
CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHand prevent unnecessary confusions.[1] : https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg780766.html
It was either or :) Sorry I did not see Catalin's comment, please go ahead and remove the definition of
CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTHand the code that uses it in this case.ok
Quoted 4 lines
Maybe you want to expand as well your commit message (which already seems covering this case) to explain why it is possible to let the cpu framework deal with this case. This should make things clear according to me.
Quoted 9 lines
sure.
Quoted 3 lines
Another question that still remains is: do we need to introduce
early_park_cpuas part of this series? Since it does not seem you are using it anywhere.I should probably drop this cleanup patch from this series and may be send it separately.
Thanks!
With this comments addressed:
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[...]
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Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 10/18 arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from EL0.
The keys for idle threads need to be set before calling any C functions, because it is not possible to enter and exit a function with different keys.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 12 ++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +14 -0
@@ -39,11 +39,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +13 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel { +struct ptrauth_key apia; +}; +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {
@@ -50,6 +54,12 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -66,11 +76,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct thread_struct {struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel;#endif };
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +4 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/threads.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY (int, cpu_number);
@@ -93,6 +94,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void);struct secondary_data {void *stack;struct task_struct *task; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel ptrauth_key; +#endif long status; };
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));
@@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ int main(void)BLANK ();DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_STACK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , stack));DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_TASK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , task)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY , offsetof(struct secondary_data , ptrauth_key)); +#endif BLANK ();#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_ARM_HOST DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt));
@@ -137,6 +141,7 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel , apia));BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ alternative_cb_end apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_current_task tsk
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + /* No kernel C function calls after this as user keys are set. */ ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1
@@ -898,6 +900,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_switch_to) ldr lr, [x8] mov sp, x9 msr sp_el0, x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 ret ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +2 -0
@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,*/ fpsimd_flush_task_state (p); +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (p); +if (likely (!(p->flags &PF_KTHREAD ))) { *childregs = *current_pt_regs (); childregs->regs[0 ] =0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +8 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)*/ secondary_data.task = idle; secondary_data.stack =task_stack_page (idle) +THREAD_SIZE ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.lo; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.hi; +#endif update_cpu_boot_status (CPU_MMU_OFF );__flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data));
@@ -138,6 +142,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) secondary_data.task =NULL ; secondary_data.stack =NULL ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo =0 ; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi =0 ; +#endif __flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data)); status =READ_ONCE (secondary_data.status);if (ret && status) {
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +12 -0
@@ -485,6 +485,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbz x2, 3f + /* + * The primary cpu keys are reset here and can be + * re-initialised with some proper values later. + */ msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr
@@ -497,6 +501,14 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH b 3f alternative_else_nop_endif + /* Install ptrauth key for secondary cpus */ + adr_l x2, secondary_data + ldr x3, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_TASK] // get secondary_data.task + cbz x3, 2f // check for slow booting cpus + ldp x3, x4, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, x3 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, x4 + 2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 10/18] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
Quoted 8 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from EL0.
Quoted 4 lines
The keys for idle threads need to be set before calling any C functions, because it is not possible to enter and exit a function with different keys.
Quoted 252 lines
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>[Amit: Modified secondary cores key structure, comments]Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 12 ++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 62 insertions(+)arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +14
-0@@ -39,11 +39,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +13
-0@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel { +struct ptrauth_key apia; +}; +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {@@ -50,6 +54,12 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/* @@ -66,11 +76,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1
-0@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct thread_struct {struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel;#endif };arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +4
-0@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/threads.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY (int, cpu_number);@@ -93,6 +94,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void);struct secondary_data {void *stack;struct task_struct *task; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel ptrauth_key; +#endif long status; };arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5
-0@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));@@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ int main(void)BLANK ();DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_STACK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , stack));DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_TASK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , task)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY , offsetof(struct secondary_data , ptrauth_key)); +#endif BLANK ();#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_ARM_HOST DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt));@@ -137,6 +141,7 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel , apia));BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3
-0@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ alternative_cb_end apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_current_task tsk@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + /* No kernel C function calls after this as user keys are set. */ ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1@@ -898,6 +900,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_switch_to) ldr lr, [x8] mov sp, x9 msr sp_el0, x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 ret ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +2
-0@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,*/ fpsimd_flush_task_state (p); +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (p); +if (likely (!(p->flags &PF_KTHREAD ))) { *childregs = *current_pt_regs (); childregs->regs[0 ] =0 ;arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +8
-0@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)*/ secondary_data.task = idle; secondary_data.stack =task_stack_page (idle) +THREAD_SIZE ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.lo; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.hi; +#endif update_cpu_boot_status (CPU_MMU_OFF );__flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data));@@ -138,6 +142,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) secondary_data.task =NULL ; secondary_data.stack =NULL ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo =0 ; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi =0 ; +#endif __flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data)); status =READ_ONCE (secondary_data.status);if (ret && status) {arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +12
-0@@ -485,6 +485,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbz x2, 3f + /* + * The primary cpu keys are reset here and can be + * re-initialised with some proper values later. + */ msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr@@ -497,6 +501,14 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH b 3f alternative_else_nop_endif + /* Install ptrauth key for secondary cpus */ + adr_l x2, secondary_data + ldr x3, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_TASK] // get secondary_data.task + cbz x3, 2f // check for slow booting cpus + ldp x3, x4, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, x3 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, x4 + 2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 11/18 arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch uses the existing boot_init_stack_canary arch function to initialize the ptrauth keys for the booting task in the primary core. The requirement here is that it should be always inline and the caller must never return.
As pointer authentication too detects a subset of stack corruption so it makes sense to place this code here.
Both pointer authentication and stack canary codes are protected by their respective config option.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 11 ++++++++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/stackprotector.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +10 -1
@@ -54,12 +54,18 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ }while (0 ) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ())get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); } +static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -78,12 +84,15 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk)#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h +5 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/version.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;*/ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) { +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR )unsigned long canary;/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
@@ -36,6 +38,9 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) current->stack_canary = canary;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )) __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; +#endif +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current); + ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel(current); }#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
include/linux/stackprotector.h +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR ) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )# include <asm/stackprotector.h> #else static inline void boot_init_stack_canary (void )
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 11/18] arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
Quoted 11 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch uses the existing
boot_init_stack_canaryarch function to initialize the ptrauth keys for the booting task in the primary core. The requirement here is that it should be always inline and the caller must never return.As pointer authentication too detects a subset of stack corruption so it makes sense to place this code here.
Both pointer authentication and stack canary codes are protected by their respective config option.
Quoted 93 lines
Suggested-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 11 ++++++++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/stackprotector.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +10
-1@@ -54,12 +54,18 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ }while (0 ) -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ())get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); } +static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/* @@ -78,12 +84,15 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk)#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */ arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h +5
-0@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/version.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;*/ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) { +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR )unsigned long canary;/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */ @@ -36,6 +38,9 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) current->stack_canary = canary;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )) __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; +#endif +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current); + ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel(current); }#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */ include/linux/stackprotector.h +1
-1@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR ) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )# include <asm/stackprotector.h> #else static inline void boot_init_stack_canary (void )
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 12/18 arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis redefines __builtin_return_address to mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As __builtin_return_address is used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.
This patch adds a new file (asm/compiler.h) and is transitively included (via include/compiler_types.h) on the compiler command line so it is guaranteed to be loaded and the users of this macro will not find a wrong version.
A helper macro ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask is created for this purpose and added in this file. A similar macro ptrauth_user_pac_mask exists in pointer_auth.h and is now moved here for the sake of consistency.
This change fixes the utilities like cat /proc/vmallocinfo to show correct symbol names.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 13 +++++-------- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +20 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_COMPILER_H + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + +/* +* The EL0/EL1 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. +* This is dependent on TBI0/TBI1 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. +*/ +#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(54, vabits_actual) +#define ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(63, vabits_actual) + +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask()) + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + +#endif /* __ASM_COMPILER_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +5 -8
@@ -68,16 +68,13 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerneextern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg); -/* -* The EL0 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. -* This is dependent on TBI0 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. -*/ -#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK(54, vabits_actual) - -/* Only valid for EL0 TTBR0 instruction pointers */ +/* Valid for EL0 TTBR0 and EL1 TTBR1 instruction pointers */ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (unsigned long ptr) { -return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); +if (ptr &BIT_ULL (55 )) +return ptr |ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask (); +else +return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 12/18] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
Hi Amit,
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.
I'm not entirely sure what problem you are trying to solve from this paragraph.
Quoted 11 lines
This patch adds a new file (
asm/compiler.h) and is transitively included (viainclude/compiler_types.h) on the compiler command line so it is guaranteed to be loaded and the users of this macro will not find a wrong version.A helper macro
ptrauth_kernel_pac_maskis created for this purpose and added in this file. A similar macroptrauth_user_pac_maskexists inpointer_auth.hand is now moved here for the sake of consistency.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto show correct symbol names.
This is to avoid things like:
| 0x(____ptrval____)-0x(____ptrval____) 20480 0xb8b8000100f75fc pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 | 0x(____ptrval____)-0x(____ptrval____) 20480 0xc0f28000100f75fc pages=4 vmalloc N0=4
Where those 64bit values should be the same symbol name, not different LR values.
Could you phrase the commit message to describe the problem, then how you fix it. something like:
| Functions like vmap() record how much memory has been allocated by their callers, | callers are identified using __builtin_return_address(). Once the kernel is using | pointer-auth the return address will be signed. This means it will not match any kernel | symbol, and will vary between threads even for the same caller. | | Use the pre-processor to add logic to strip the PAC to __builtin_return_address() | callers.
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +6
-0@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_COMPILER_H + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) +
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 16
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +10
-0+/* +* The EL0/EL1 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. +* This is dependent on TBI0/TBI1 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. +*/ +#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(54, vabits_actual) +#define ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(63, vabits_actual) + +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask())
This is pretty manky, ideally we would have some __arch_return_address() hook for this, but this works, and lets us postpone any tree-wide noise until its absolutely necessary. (I assume if this does ever break, it will be a build error)
You add ptrauth_strip_insn_pac() in this patch, but don't use it until the next one. However... could you use it here?
This would go wrong if __builtin_return_address() legitimately returned a value that was mapped by TTBR0, we would force the top bits to be set instead of clearing the PAC bits. This would corrupt the value instead of corrupting it.
I don't think there is anywhere this could happen today, but passing callbacks into UEFI runtime services or making kernel calls from an idmap may both do this.
With that:
Thanks!
James
Quoted 15 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +1
-7@@ -68,16 +68,13 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerneextern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg); -/* -* The EL0 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. -* This is dependent on TBI0 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. -*/ -#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK(54, vabits_actual) - -/* Only valid for EL0 TTBR0 instruction pointers */ +/* Valid for EL0 TTBR0 and EL1 TTBR1 instruction pointers */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerne · line 80
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +4
-1static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (unsigned long ptr) { -return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); +if (ptr &BIT_ULL (55 )) +return ptr |ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask (); +else +return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \
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Re: [PATCH v6 12/18] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
Hi James,
Quoted 31 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.I'm not entirely sure what problem you are trying to solve from this paragraph.
Quoted 11 lines
This patch adds a new file (
asm/compiler.h) and is transitively included (viainclude/compiler_types.h) on the compiler command line so it is guaranteed to be loaded and the users of this macro will not find a wrong version.A helper macro
ptrauth_kernel_pac_maskis created for this purpose and added in this file. A similar macroptrauth_user_pac_maskexists inpointer_auth.hand is now moved here for the sake of consistency.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto show correct symbol names.This is to avoid things like:
| 0x(____ptrval____)-0x(____ptrval____) 20480 0xb8b8000100f75fc pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 | 0x(____ptrval____)-0x(____ptrval____) 20480 0xc0f28000100f75fc pages=4 vmalloc N0=4Where those 64bit values should be the same symbol name, not different LR values.
Could you phrase the commit message to describe the problem, then how you fix it. something like:
Quoted 8 lines
| Functions like vmap() record how much memory has been allocated by their callers, | callers are identified using __builtin_return_address(). Once the kernel is using | pointer-auth the return address will be signed. This means it will not match any kernel | symbol, and will vary between threads even for the same caller. | | Use the pre-processor to add logic to strip the PAC to __builtin_return_address() | callers.
Thanks for the detailed description. I will update my commit message.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_COMPILER_H + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + +/* +* The EL0/EL1 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. +* This is dependent on TBI0/TBI1 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. +*/ +#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(54, vabits_actual) +#define ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(63, vabits_actual) +
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 16
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +3
-0+#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask())This is pretty manky, ideally we would have some
__arch_return_address()hook for this, but this works, and lets us postpone any tree-wide noise until its absolutely necessary. (I assume if this does ever break, it will be a build error)
ok.
Quoted 4 lines
You add
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()in this patch, but don't use it until the next one. However... could you use it here?
Yes ptrauth_strip_insn_pac can be used here not as a C function but as a macro. I will post in my next version.
Quoted 7 lines
This would go wrong if
__builtin_return_address()legitimately returned a value that was mapped by TTBR0, we would force the top bits to be set instead of clearing the PAC bits. This would corrupt the value instead of corrupting it.I don't think there is anywhere this could happen today, but passing callbacks into UEFI runtime services or making kernel calls from an idmap may both do this.
I didnt thought about this scenario so did this way.
Quoted 4 lines
With that:
Reviewed-by James Morse <[email protected]>
Thankyou.
Cheers,
Amit
Quoted 31 lines
Thanks!
James
Quoted 23 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +5
-8@@ -68,16 +68,13 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerneextern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg); -/* -* The EL0 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. -* This is dependent on TBI0 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. -*/ -#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK(54, vabits_actual) - -/* Only valid for EL0 TTBR0 instruction pointers */ +/* Valid for EL0 TTBR0 and EL1 TTBR1 instruction pointers */ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (unsigned long ptr) { -return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); +if (ptr &BIT_ULL (55 )) +return ptr |ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask (); +else +return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); }
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerne · line 80
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +0
-0#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \
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PATCH v6 13/18 arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
@@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame) }#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ + frame->pc =ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (frame->pc); +/* * Frames created upon entry from EL0 have NULL FP and PC values, so * don't bother reporting these. Frames created by __noreturn functions
Signature · 7 lines
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Re: [PATCH v6 13/18] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Hi Amit,
Quoted 7 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
This patch had me looking at the wider pointer-auth + ftrace interaction...
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame)
Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> @@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame)
There is an earlier reader of frame->pc:
| #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
| if (tsk->ret_stack &&
| (frame->pc == (unsigned long)return_to_handler)) {Which leads down the rat-hole of: does this need ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()?
The version of GCC on my desktop supports patchable-function-entry, the function pre-amble has two nops for use by ftrace[0]. This means if prepare_ftrace_return() re-writes the saved LR, it does it before the caller paciasp's it.
I think that means if you stack-trace from a function that had been hooked by the function_graph_tracer, you will see the LR with a PAC, meaning the above == won't match.
The version of LLVM on my desktop however doesn't support patchable-function-entry, it uses _mcount() to do the ftrace stuff[1]. Here prepare_ftrace_return() overwrites a paciasp'd LR with one that isn't, which will fail.
Could the ptrauth_strip_insn_pac() call move above the CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER block, and could we add something like:
| depends on (!FTRACE || HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)
to the Kconfig to prevent both FTRACE and PTR_AUTH being enabled unless the compiler has support for patchable-function-entry?
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame) · line 109
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +2
-0}#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ + frame->pc =ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (frame->pc); +/* * Frames created upon entry from EL0 have NULL FP and PC values, so * don't bother reporting these. Frames created by __noreturn functions
Thanks,
James
[0] gcc (Debian 9.2.1-28) 9.2.1 20200203
0000000000000048 <sync_icache_aliases>:
48: d503201f nop 4c: d503201f nop 50: 90000002 adrp x2, 0 <__icache_flags> 54: d503233f paciasp 58: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 5c: 910003fd mov x29, sp 60: f9400044 ldr x4, [x2] 64: 36000124 tbz w4, #0, 88 <sync_icache_al
[1] clang version 9.0.0-1 (tags/RELEASE_900/final) 0000000000000000 <sync_icache_aliases>:
0: d503233f paciasp 4: a9be4ff4 stp x20, x19, [sp, #-32]! 8: a9017bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #16] c: 910043fd add x29, sp, #0x10 10: aa0103f4 mov x20, x1 14: aa0003f3 mov x19, x0 18: 94000000 bl 0 <_mcount> 1c: 90000008 adrp x8, 0 <__icache_flags> 20: f9400108 ldr x8, [x8] 24: 370000a8 tbnz w8, #0, 38 <sync_icache_aliases+0x38>
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Re: [PATCH v6 13/18] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Hi James,
Quoted 5 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
Quoted 2 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
This patch had me looking at the wider pointer-auth + ftrace interaction...
Thanks for your effort.
Quoted 32 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame)
Quoted 15 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> @@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame)There is an earlier reader of
frame->pc:| #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER | if (tsk->ret_stack && | (frame->pc == (unsigned long)return_to_handler)) {Which leads down the rat-hole of: does this need
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()?The version of GCC on my desktop supports patchable-function-entry, the function pre-amble has two nops for use by ftrace[0]. This means if
prepare_ftrace_return()re-writes the saved LR, it does it before the caller paciasp's it.I think that means if you stack-trace from a function that had been hooked by the
function_graph_tracer, you will see the LR with a PAC, meaning the above == won't match.
Quoted 6 lines
The version of LLVM on my desktop however doesn't support patchable-function-entry, it uses
_mcount()to do the ftrace stuff[1]. Hereprepare_ftrace_return()overwrites a paciasp'd LR with one that isn't, which will fail.Could the
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()call move above theCONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACERblock,
This may not be required as we never explicitly sign return_to_handler and frame->pc may store it without any PAC signature for patchable-function-entry.
While testing patchable-function-entry, I had an observation regarding WARN messages,
[ 541.030265] Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT) [ 541.033500] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 541.036880] pc : change_pac_parameters+0x40/0x4c [ 541.040279] lr : return_to_handler+0x0/0x3c [ 541.043373] sp : ffff8000126e3d00
Here lr may need some logic to display correct return address although it is unrelated to this ptrauth series. (arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +264)
Quoted 5 lines
and could we add something like:
| depends on (!FTRACE ||HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)to the
Kconfigto prevent both FTRACE andPTR_AUTHbeing enabled unless the compiler has support for patchable-function-entry?
Yes this is a good condition to have. I feel below condition is more suitable as there is issue only with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER,
depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)
Thanks,
Amit Daniel
Quoted 30 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame) · line 109
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +2
-0}#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ + frame->pc =ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (frame->pc); +/* * Frames created upon entry from EL0 have NULL FP and PC values, so * don't bother reporting these. Frames created by __noreturn functions Thanks,
James
[0] gcc (Debian 9.2.1-28) 9.2.1 20200203
0000000000000048 <sync_icache_aliases>:48: d503201f nop 4c: d503201f nop 50: 90000002 adrp x2, 0 <__icache_flags> 54: d503233f paciasp 58: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 5c: 910003fd mov x29, sp 60: f9400044 ldr x4, [x2] 64: 36000124 tbz w4, #0, 88 <sync_icache_al[1] clang version 9.0.0-1 (tags/RELEASE_900/final) 0000000000000000 <
sync_icache_aliases>:
Quoted 11 lines
0: d503233f paciasp
4: a9be4ff4 stp x20, x19, [sp, #-32]!
8: a9017bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #16]
c: 910043fd add x29, sp, #0x10
10: aa0103f4 mov x20, x1
14: aa0003f3 mov x19, x0
18: 94000000 bl 0 <_mcount>
1c: 90000008 adrp x8, 0 <__icache_flags>
20: f9400108 ldr x8, [x8]
24: 370000a8 tbnz w8, #0, 38 <sync_icache_aliases+0x38>_______________________________________________
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Re: [PATCH v6 13/18] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Hi Amit,
Quoted 41 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 40 lines · James Morse
Quoted 7 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
This patch had me looking at the wider pointer-auth + ftrace interaction...
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>Quoted 2 lines
@@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace
unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame)There is an earlier reader of
frame->pc:| #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER | if (tsk->ret_stack && | (frame->pc == (unsigned long)return_to_handler)) {Which leads down the rat-hole of: does this need
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()?The version of GCC on my desktop supports patchable-function-entry, the function pre-amble has two nops for use by ftrace[0]. This means if
prepare_ftrace_return()re-writes the saved LR, it does it before the caller paciasp's it.I think that means if you stack-trace from a function that had been hooked by the
function_graph_tracer, you will see the LR with a PAC, meaning the above == won't match.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The version of LLVM on my desktop however doesn't support patchable-function-entry, it uses
_mcount()to do the ftrace stuff[1]. Hereprepare_ftrace_return()overwrites a paciasp'd LR with one that isn't, which will fail.Could the
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()call move above theCONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACERblock,This may not be required as we never explicitly sign
return_to_handler
Doesn't the original caller sign it? (I agree that assembly is tricky to work out)
ftrace_graph_caller passes 'parent' to prepare_ftrace_return() as the LR in regs:
| add x1, sp, #S_LR
prepare_ftrace_return() may overwrite it with an unsigned value.
ftrace_common_return restores this location to x30:
| ldr x30, [sp, #S_LR]
Then returns to the first real instruction of the original caller: paciasp.
(when navigating that assembly, there are two stack frames, each with an LR, and one LR in the regs...)
Quoted 2 lines
and
frame->pcmay
store it without any PAC signature for patchable-function-entry.
How does return_to_handler() run? Surely when the original caller pulls the LR off the stack, it runs:
| autiasp
| ret
Wouldn't autiasp transform an unsigned return_to_handler() to be a bogus address?
I agree the 'unsigned' case does happen if you're using _mcount(), this will be caught by autiasp, hence we need to depend on HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS.
Quoted 7 lines
While testing patchable-function-entry, I had an observation regarding WARN messages,
[ 541.030265] Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT) [ 541.033500] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 541.036880] pc :
change_pac_parameters+0x40/0x4c[ 541.040279] lr :return_to_handler+0x0/0x3c[ 541.043373] sp :ffff8000126e3d00
(a WARN()ing?, where?! Ah, you mean triggered deliberately to check they look right...)
Quoted 2 lines
Here lr may need some logic to display correct return address although it is unrelated to this ptrauth series. (
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c+264)
Yes, this happens when a function that has been hooked by ftrace, hits a WARN_ON(), show_regs() will report the real LR. I don't think that's a problem, its helpful to know that ftrace has hooked this call.
Presumably return_to_handler() doesn't appear in the call-trace? (that would be a problem)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
and could we add something like:
| depends on (!FTRACE ||HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)to the
Kconfigto prevent both FTRACE andPTR_AUTHbeing enabled unless the compiler has support for patchable-function-entry?Yes this is a good condition to have. I feel below condition is more suitable as there is issue only with
FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER,
Er, yes!
Because its callers of prepare_ftrace_return() that have the problem, and that is behind #ifdef FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER.
Thanks,
James
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Re: [PATCH v6 13/18] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Hi,
Quoted 69 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
Quoted 41 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 40 lines · James Morse
Quoted 7 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
This patch had me looking at the wider pointer-auth + ftrace interaction...
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c line 20
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> @@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, structstackframe *frame)There is an earlier reader of
frame->pc:| #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER | if (tsk->ret_stack && | (frame->pc == (unsigned long)return_to_handler)) {Which leads down the rat-hole of: does this need
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()?The version of GCC on my desktop supports patchable-function-entry, the function pre-amble has two nops for use by ftrace[0]. This means if
prepare_ftrace_return()re-writes the saved LR, it does it before the caller paciasp's it.I think that means if you stack-trace from a function that had been hooked by the
function_graph_tracer, you will see the LR with a PAC, meaning the above == won't match.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The version of LLVM on my desktop however doesn't support patchable-function-entry, it uses
_mcount()to do the ftrace stuff[1]. Hereprepare_ftrace_return()overwrites a paciasp'd LR with one that isn't, which will fail.Could the
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()call move above theCONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACERblock,This may not be required as we never explicitly sign
return_to_handlerDoesn't the original caller sign it? (I agree that assembly is tricky to work out)
ftrace_graph_callerpasses 'parent' toprepare_ftrace_return()as the LR in regs:
| add x1, sp, #S_LR
prepare_ftrace_return()may overwrite it with an unsigned value.
ftrace_common_returnrestores this location to x30:
| ldr x30, [sp, #S_LR]Then returns to the first real instruction of the original caller: paciasp.
(when navigating that assembly, there are two stack frames, each with an LR, and one LR in the regs...)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
and
frame->pcmay
store it without any PAC signature for patchable-function-entry.How does
return_to_handler()run? Surely when the original caller pulls the LR off the stack, it runs:
| autiasp
| ret
I used dump_stack() instead of WARN_ON and able to reproduce the issue. Yes ptrauth_strip_insn_pac needs to move up to fix this. Thanks for the details.
Quoted 18 lines
Wouldn't autiasp transform an unsigned
return_to_handler()to be a bogus address?I agree the 'unsigned' case does happen if you're using
_mcount(), this will be caught by autiasp, hence we need to depend onHAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS.Quoted 7 lines
While testing patchable-function-entry, I had an observation regarding WARN messages,
[ 541.030265] Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT) [ 541.033500] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 541.036880] pc :
change_pac_parameters+0x40/0x4c[ 541.040279] lr :return_to_handler+0x0/0x3c[ 541.043373] sp :ffff8000126e3d00(a WARN()ing?, where?! Ah, you mean triggered deliberately to check they look right...)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Here lr may need some logic to display correct return address although it is unrelated to this ptrauth series. (
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c+264)Yes, this happens when a function that has been hooked by ftrace, hits a
WARN_ON(),show_regs()will report the real LR. I don't think that's a problem, its helpful to know that ftrace has hooked this call.
ok
Quoted 2 lines
Presumably
return_to_handler()doesn't appear in the call-trace? (that would be a problem)
No it doesn't appear.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
and could we add something like:
| depends on (!FTRACE ||HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)to the
Kconfigto prevent both FTRACE andPTR_AUTHbeing enabled unless the compiler has support for patchable-function-entry?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Yes this is a good condition to have. I feel below condition is more suitable as there is issue only with
FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER,Er, yes!
Because its callers ofprepare_ftrace_return()that have the problem, and that is behind #ifdefFUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER.
ok
Cheers,
Amit
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks,
James
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James Morse
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v6 13/18] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
Hi Amit,
Quoted 40 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 39 lines · James Morse
Quoted 37 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 36 lines · James Morse
Quoted 8 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to
the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
This patch had me looking at the wider pointer-auth + ftrace interaction...
Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>Quoted 3 lines
@@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct
task_struct*tsk, struct
stackframe *frame)There is an earlier reader of
frame->pc:| #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER | if (tsk->ret_stack && | (frame->pc == (unsigned long)return_to_handler)) {Could the
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()call move above theCONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACERblock,
Quoted 8 lines
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This may not be required as we never explicitly sign
return_to_handlerDoesn't the original caller sign it? (I agree that assembly is tricky to work out)
I used
dump_stack()instead ofWARN_ONand able to reproduce the issue. Yesptrauth_strip_insn_pacneeds to move up to fix this. Thanks for the details.
Great!
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and could we add something like:
| depends on (!FTRACE ||HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)to the
Kconfigto prevent both FTRACE andPTR_AUTHbeing enabled unless the compiler has
support for patchable-function-entry?
Quoted 8 lines
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Yes this is a good condition to have. I feel below condition is more suitable as there is
issue only withFUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER,Er, yes!
Because its callers ofprepare_ftrace_return()that have the problem, and that is behind
#ifdefFUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER.
With the ptrauth_strip_insn_pac() moved, and your better version of that Kconfig suggestion:
Thanks!
James
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PATCH v6 14/18 arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
In reply to Amit Daniel Kachhaplr is printed with %pS which will try to find an entry in kallsyms. After enabling pointer authentication, this match will fail due to PAC present in the lr.
Strip PAC from the lr to display the correct symbol name.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)if (!user_mode (regs)) {printk ("pc : %pS\n" , (void *)regs->pc); -printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)lr); +printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr)); }else {printk ("pc : %016llx\n" , regs->pc);printk ("lr : %016llx\n" , lr);
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 14/18] arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
lr is printed with %pS which will try to find an entry in kallsyms. After enabling pointer authentication, this match will fail due to PAC present in the lr.
Strip PAC from the lr to display the correct symbol name.
Quoted 21 lines
Suggested-by James Morse <[email protected]>Acked-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +1
-1@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)if (!user_mode (regs)) {printk ("pc : %pS\n" , (void *)regs->pc); -printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)lr); +printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr)); }else {printk ("pc : %016llx\n" , regs->pc);printk ("lr : %016llx\n" , lr);
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 15/18 arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch restores the kernel keys from current task during cpu resume after the mmu is turned on and ptrauth is enabled.
A flag is added in macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel to check if isb instruction needs to executed.
---
Changes since v5:
* Moved ptrauth_keys_install_kernel inside function cpu_do_resume.
* Added a flag in ptrauth_keys_install_kernel to provide options for isb instruction.
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 6 ++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +4 -2
@@ -39,14 +39,16 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, sync, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + .if \sync == 1 isb + .endif alternative_else_nop_endif .endm
@@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, sync, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -2
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ alternative_cb_end apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 - ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, 1, x20, x22, x23 .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_current_task tsk
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_switch_to) ldr lr, [x8] mov sp, x9 msr sp_el0, x1 - ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, 1, x8, x9, x10 ret ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/hwcap.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN msr_s SYS_DISR_EL1, xzr alternative_else_nop_endif + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x14, 0, x1, x2, x3 isb ret SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_do_resume)
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 15/18] arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch restores the kernel keys from current task during cpu resume after the mmu is turned on and ptrauth is enabled.
A flag is added in macro
ptrauth_keys_install_kernelto check if isb instruction needs to executed.
Nit: s/needs to executed/needs to be executed/
With this:
Quoted 86 lines
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* Movedptrauth_keys_install_kernelinside functioncpu_do_resume.
* Added a flag inptrauth_keys_install_kernelto provide options for isb instruction.arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 6 ++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +4
-2@@ -39,14 +39,16 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, sync, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + .if \sync == 1 isb + .endif alternative_else_nop_endif .endm@@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, sync, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2
-2@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ alternative_cb_end apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 - ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, 1, x20, x22, x23 .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_current_task tsk@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_switch_to) ldr lr, [x8] mov sp, x9 msr sp_el0, x1 - ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, 1, x8, x9, x10 ret ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +2
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/hwcap.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN msr_s SYS_DISR_EL1, xzr alternative_else_nop_endif + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x14, 0, x1, x2, x3 isb ret SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_do_resume)
Signature · 7 lines
Regards, Vincenzo _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v6 16/18 kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of Kconfig:
config X
def_bool $(as-option,...)---
Changes since v5:
* More descriptions for using /dev/zero.
scripts/Kconfig.include | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
scripts/Kconfig.include +6 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ cc-option = $(success,$(CC) -Werror $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -S -x c /dev/null -o /de # Return y if the linker supports <flag>, n otherwise ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) +# $(as-option,<flag>) +# /dev/zero is used as output instead of /dev/null as some assembler cribs when +# both input and output are same. Also both of them have same write behaviour so +# can be easily substituted. +as-option = $(success, $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/zero) + # $(as-instr,<instr>) # Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -)
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Re: [PATCH v6 16/18] kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
Quoted 11 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of
Kconfig:config X def_bool $(as-option,...)
Quoted 8 lines
Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Acked-by Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* More descriptions for using/dev/zero.
FYI:
This has been fixed:
https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=3c968de5c7d1719b2f9b538f2f7f5f5922e5f311
So, this will not be a problem for the
future release of binutils.
Anyway, we need to take care of the released ones, so I am fine with /dev/zero.
Quoted 23 lines
scripts/Kconfig.include | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)scripts/Kconfig.include +6
-1@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ cc-option = $(success,$(CC) -Werror $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -S -x c /dev/null -o /de # Return y if the linker supports <flag>, n otherwise ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1)) +# $(as-option,<flag>) +# /dev/zero is used as output instead of /dev/null as some assembler cribs when +# both input and output are same. Also both of them have same write behaviour so +# can be easily substituted. +as-option = $(success, $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/zero) + # $(as-instr,<instr>) # Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -) --2.7.4
Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards Masahiro Yamada
Re: [PATCH v6 16/18] kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
Hi Masahiro,
Quoted 26 lines · Masahiro Yamada
Quoted 11 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Currently kconfig does not have a feature that allows to detect if the used assembler supports a specific compilation option.
Introduce 'as-option' to serve this purpose in the context of
Kconfig:config X def_bool $(as-option,...)Quoted 8 lines
Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Acked-by Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* More descriptions for using/dev/zero.FYI:
This has been fixed:
Quoted 9 lines
https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=3c968de5c7d1719b2f9b538f2f7f5f5922e5f311
So, this will not be a problem for the
future release of binutils.Anyway, we need to take care of the released ones, so I am fine with
/dev/zero.
Thank you for letting us know.
I did not realize it was a compiler issue otherwise I would have reported it. I thought it was a mechanism to prevent people from trashing their code, but thinking at it more carefully, for devices does not make sense hence it is good that there is a fix already.
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Vincenzo
PATCH v6 17/18 arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Compile all functions with two ptrauth instructions: PACIASP in the prologue to sign the return address, and AUTIASP in the epilogue to authenticate the return address (from the stack). If authentication fails, the return will cause an instruction abort to be taken, followed by an oops and killing the task.
This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming. As ptrauth protects the return address, it can also serve as a replacement for CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, although note that it does not protect other parts of the stack.
The new instructions are in the HINT encoding space, so on a system without ptrauth they execute as NOPs.
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH now not only enables ptrauth for userspace and KVM guests, but also automatically builds the kernel with ptrauth instructions if the compiler supports it. If there is no compiler support, we do not warn that the kernel was built without ptrauth instructions.
GCC 7 and 8 support the -msign-return-address option, while GCC 9 deprecates that option and replaces it with -mbranch-protection. Support both options.
Clang uses an external assembler hence this patch makes sure that the correct parameters (-march=armv8.3-a) are passed down to help it recognize the ptrauth instructions.
---
Changes since v5:
* Clarified assembler option for GNU toochain.
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +19 -1
@@ -1499,6 +1499,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC help Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
@@ -1506,11 +1507,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH and other attacks. This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace). - Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. + If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or + -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option + will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address + protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to + support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be + disabled with minimal loss of protection. + The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
@@ -1522,6 +1529,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should not be selected. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf) + +config CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS + # GCC 7, 8 + def_bool $(cc-option,-msign-return-address=all) + +config AS_HAS_PAC + def_bool $(as-option,-Wa$(comma)-march=armv8.3-a) + endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features"
arch/arm64/Makefile +11 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,17 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the +# compiler to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract +# we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non +# integrated assemblers. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endif + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__
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Re: [PATCH v6 17/18] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
Quoted 22 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Compile all functions with two ptrauth instructions: PACIASP in the prologue to sign the return address, and AUTIASP in the epilogue to authenticate the return address (from the stack). If authentication fails, the return will cause an instruction abort to be taken, followed by an oops and killing the task.
This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming. As ptrauth protects the return address, it can also serve as a replacement for
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, although note that it does not protect other parts of the stack.The new instructions are in the HINT encoding space, so on a system without ptrauth they execute as NOPs.
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTHnow not only enables ptrauth for userspace and KVM guests, but also automatically builds the kernel with ptrauth instructions if the compiler supports it. If there is no compiler support, we do not warn that the kernel was built without ptrauth instructions.
Quoted 8 lines
GCC 7 and 8 support the -msign-return-address option, while GCC 9 deprecates that option and replaces it with -mbranch-protection. Support both options.
Clang uses an external assembler hence this patch makes sure that the correct parameters (-march=armv8.3-a) are passed down to help it recognize the ptrauth instructions.
Quoted 89 lines
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>[Amit: Cover leaf function, comments]Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* Clarified assembler option for GNU toochain.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +19
-1@@ -1499,6 +1499,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC help Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret@@ -1506,11 +1507,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH and other attacks. This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace). - Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. + If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or + -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option + will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address + protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to + support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be + disabled with minimal loss of protection. + The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence@@ -1522,6 +1529,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should not be selected. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf) + +config CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS + # GCC 7, 8 + def_bool $(cc-option,-msign-return-address=all) + +config AS_HAS_PAC + def_bool $(as-option,-Wa$(comma)-march=armv8.3-a) + endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features"arch/arm64/Makefile +11
-0@@ -65,6 +65,17 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +# -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the +# compiler to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract +# we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non +# integrated assemblers. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) +endif + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__
Signature · 7 lines
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PATCH v6 18/18 lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If any parameters used to generate the pac (<key, sp, lr>) is modified then this will fail in the authentication stage and will lead to abort.
This test changes the input parameter APIA kernel keys to cause abort. The pac computed from the new key can be same as last due to hash collision so this is retried for few times as there is no reliable way to compare the pacs. Even though this test may fail even after retries but this may cause authentication failure at a later stage in earlier function returns.
This test can be invoked as,
echo CORRUPT_PAC > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
or as below if inserted as a module,
insmod lkdtm.ko cpoint_name=DIRECT cpoint_type=CORRUPT_PAC cpoint_count=1
[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
--- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +36 -0
@@ -378,3 +378,39 @@ void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT(void)pr_err ("XFAIL: this test is ia32-only\n" );#endif } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +static noinline void change_pac_parameters(void) +{ +/* Reset the keys of current task */ +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current); +ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (current); +} + +#define CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE 10 +noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void) +{ +int i; + +if (!system_supports_address_auth ()) { +pr_err ("FAIL: arm64 pointer authentication feature not present\n" ); +return ; + } + +pr_info ("Change the PAC parameters to force function return failure\n" ); +/* +* Pac is a hash value computed from input keys, return address and +* stack pointer. As pac has fewer bits so there is a chance of +* collision, so iterate few times to reduce the collision probability. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i <CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE ; i++) +change_pac_parameters (); + +pr_err ("FAIL: %s test failed. Kernel may be unstable from here\n" , __func__); +} +#else /* !CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void) +{ +pr_err ("FAIL: arm64 pointer authentication config disabled\n" ); +} +#endif
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +1 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING ),CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING ),CRASHTYPE (UNSET_SMEP ), +CRASHTYPE (CORRUPT_PAC ),CRASHTYPE (UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE ),CRASHTYPE (OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION ), CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void);#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT (void );#endif +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void );/* lkdtm_heap.c */ void __init lkdtm_heap_init (void );
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Hello,
Quoted 4 lines · Le perjantaina 6. maaliskuuta 2020, 8.35.07 EET Amit Daniel Kachhap a écrit :
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Is there any notion what the runtime overhead will be?
We tried to estimate PAuth-based return address signing and an attempt of ours to improve it (ArXiv:1912.04145, to be presented at DAC 2020), but we lacked proper hardware.
Signature · 10 lines
Rémi Denis-Courmont http://www.remlab.net/ _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Hi Amit,
(CC: +Marc)
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
(insert cross-tree headache here)
Thanks,
James
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Hi James,
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
(CC: +Marc)
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Quoted 4 lines
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?
Yes
Quoted 3 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
Cheers,
Amit Daniel
Quoted 8 lines
(insert cross-tree headache here)
Thanks,
James
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Hi James,
Quoted 18 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
(CC: +Marc)
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Quoted 4 lines
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?
Quoted 7 lines
Yes
Quoted 3 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
I suppose we can only skip non-A keys save/restore for host context. If we skip non-A keys for guest context then guest with old implementation will break. Let me know your opinion.
//Amit
Quoted 12 lines
Cheers,
Amit DanielQuoted 8 lines
(insert cross-tree headache here)
Thanks,
James
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Marc Zyngier
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 00/18] (as long a
Hi Amit,
Quoted 24 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 21 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
(CC: +Marc)
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Quoted 4 lines
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?Yes
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
I suppose we can only skip non-A keys save/restore for host context. If we skip non-A keys for guest context then guest with old implementation will break. Let me know your opinion.
I don't think you can skip anything as far as the guest is concerned. But being able to skip the B keys (which is what I expect you call the non-A keys) on the host would certainly be useful.
I assume you have a way to hide them from userspace, though.
Thanks,
M.
Signature · 6 lines
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny... _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v6 00/18] (as long a
Hi Marc,
Quoted 32 lines · Marc Zyngier
Hi Amit,
Quoted 29 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 25 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
(CC: +Marc)
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Quoted 4 lines
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?Yes
Quoted 3 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I suppose we can only skip non-A keys save/restore for host context. If we skip non-A keys for guest context then guest with old implementation will break. Let me know your opinion.
I don't think you can skip anything as far as the guest is concerned. But being able to skip the B keys (which is what I expect you call the non-A keys) on the host would certainly be useful.
Thanks for the clarification.
Quoted 2 lines
I assume you have a way to hide them from userspace, though.
You mean hide all the keys from userspace like below,
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +1 -1
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static bool trap_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,static unsigned int ptrauth_visibility (const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,const struct sys_reg_desc *rd) { -return vcpu_has_ptrauth (vcpu) ?0 :REG_HIDDEN_USER |REG_HIDDEN_GUEST ; +return vcpu_has_ptrauth (vcpu) ?REG_HIDDEN_USER :REG_HIDDEN_USER |REG_HIDDEN_GUEST ; }#define __PTRAUTH_KEY (k)
I don't remember why it was not done this way last time.
Cheers,
Amit
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks,
M.
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Marc Zyngier
maintainer[Somehow I managed to butcher the subject line. no idea how...]
Quoted 64 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi Marc,
Quoted 32 lines · Marc Zyngier
Hi Amit,
Quoted 29 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 25 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi James,
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit,
(CC: +Marc)
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
Quoted 4 lines
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?Yes
Quoted 3 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I suppose we can only skip non-A keys save/restore for host context. If we skip non-A keys for guest context then guest with old implementation will break. Let me know your opinion.
I don't think you can skip anything as far as the guest is concerned. But being able to skip the B keys (which is what I expect you call the non-A keys) on the host would certainly be useful.
Thanks for the clarification.
Quoted 2 lines
I assume you have a way to hide them from userspace, though.
You mean hide all the keys from userspace like below,
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +1
-1@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static bool trap_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,static unsigned int ptrauth_visibility (const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,const struct sys_reg_desc *rd) { -return vcpu_has_ptrauth (vcpu) ?0 :REG_HIDDEN_USER |REG_HIDDEN_GUEST ; +return vcpu_has_ptrauth (vcpu) ?REG_HIDDEN_USER :REG_HIDDEN_USER |REG_HIDDEN_GUEST ; }
Quoted 3 lines
#define
__PTRAUTH_KEY(k)I don't remember why it was not done this way last time.
No, that's not what I meant. What you're describing is preventing keys from being exposed to the VMM controlling the guest, and that'd be pretty bad (you need to be able to save/restore them for migration).
But if KVM doesn't save/restore the host's B-keys in the world switch, then you must make sure that no host userspace can make use of them, as they would be the guest's keys.
M.
Signature · 6 lines
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny... _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Hi Amit, Marc,
Quoted 28 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 27 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 26 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 24 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 12 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?Quoted 7 lines
Yes
Quoted 2 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
I suppose we can only skip non-A keys save/restore for host context. If we skip non-A keys for guest context then guest with old implementation will break. Let me know your opinion.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't think you can skip anything as far as the guest is concerned. But being able to skip the B keys (which is what I expect you call the non-A keys) on the host would certainly be useful.
But if KVM doesn't save/restore the host's B-keys in the world switch, then you must make sure that no host userspace can make use of them, as they would be the guest's keys.
Yes, the arch code entry.S changes cover this with ptrauth_keys_install_user. It restores 4 keys, and the generic key.
We always need to save/restore all the guest keys (as we do today).
But when ptrauth_restore_state restores the host keys, it only needs to restore the one the kernel uses. (possibly using the same macro's so it stays up to date?!)
If we return to user-space, the arch code's entry code does the right thing. KVM's user-space peeking at the keys will see the saved values.
My original question was more around: do we need to do this now, or can we clean it up in a later kernel version?
(and a sanity check that it doesn't lead to a correctness problem)
Thanks,
James
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Marc Zyngier
maintainerHi James,
Quoted 53 lines · James Morse
Hi Amit, Marc,
Quoted 28 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 27 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 26 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 24 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 12 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 10 lines · James Morse
Quoted 4 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
(as it looks like there may be another version of this:)
Am I right in thinking that after your patch 10 changing
cpu_switch_to(), only the A key is live during kernel execution?Quoted 7 lines
Yes
Quoted 2 lines
KVM is still save/restoring 4 extra keys around guest-entry/exit. As you restore all the keys on return to user-space, is this still necessary?
Yes Its a good optimization to skip 4 non-A keys. I was wondering whether to do it in this series or send it separately.
I suppose we can only skip non-A keys save/restore for host context. If we skip non-A keys for guest context then guest with old implementation will break. Let me know your opinion.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't think you can skip anything as far as the guest is concerned. But being able to skip the B keys (which is what I expect you call the non-A keys) on the host would certainly be useful.
But if KVM doesn't save/restore the host's B-keys in the world switch, then you must make sure that no host userspace can make use of them, as they would be the guest's keys.
Yes, the arch code
entry.Schanges cover this withptrauth_keys_install_user. It restores
4 keys, and the generic key.We always need to save/restore all the guest keys (as we do today). But when
ptrauth_restore_staterestores the host keys, it only needs to restore the one
the kernel uses. (possibly using the same macro's so it stays up to date?!)If we return to user-space, the arch code's entry code does the right thing. KVM's user-space peeking at the keys will see the saved values.
Quoted 5 lines
My original question was more around: do we need to do this now, or can we clean it up in
a later kernel version?(and a sanity check that it doesn't lead to a correctness problem)
I think what we have now is sane, and doesn't seem to lead to any issue (at least that I can see). We can always optimize this at a later point.
Thanks,
M.
Signature · 6 lines
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny... _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel