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icu: fix CVE-2020-10531

PATCH New Anuj Mittal 1 participant 2 messages Mar 20, 2020

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PATCH 1/2 icu: fix CVE-2020-10531

---
 .../icu/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch              | 122 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/icu/icu_64.2.bb          |   1 +
 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/icu/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch
meta/recipes-support/icu/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch new file +122 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56303fc0f2
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From b7d08bc04a4296982fcef8b6b8a354a9e4e7afca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Frank Tang <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2020 02:39:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] ICU-20958 Prevent SEGV_MAPERR in append
+
+See #971
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/unicode-org/icu/commit/b7d08bc04a4296982fcef8b6b8a354a9e4e7afca]
+CVE: CVE-2020-10531
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <[email protected]>
+---
+ icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp          |  6 ++-
+ icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h   |  1 +
+ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp b/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp
+index 901bb3358ba..077b4d6ef20 100644
+--- a/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp
++++ b/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp
+@@ -1563,7 +1563,11 @@ UnicodeString::doAppend(const UChar *srcChars, int32_t srcStart, int32_t srcLeng
+   }
+ 
+   int32_t oldLength = length();
+-  int32_t newLength = oldLength + srcLength;
++  int32_t newLength;
++  if (uprv_add32_overflow(oldLength, srcLength, &newLength)) {
++    setToBogus();
++    return *this;
++  }
+ 
+   // Check for append onto ourself
+   const UChar* oldArray = getArrayStart();
+diff --git a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp
+index b6515ea813c..ad38bdf53a3 100644
+--- a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp
++++ b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ void UnicodeStringTest::runIndexedTest( int32_t index, UBool exec, const char* &
+     TESTCASE_AUTO(TestWCharPointers);
+     TESTCASE_AUTO(TestNullPointers);
+     TESTCASE_AUTO(TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf);
++    TESTCASE_AUTO(TestLargeAppend);
+     TESTCASE_AUTO_END;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2310,3 +2311,64 @@ void UnicodeStringTest::TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf() {
+     str.insert(2, sub);
+     assertEquals("", u"abbcdcde", str);
+ }
++
++void UnicodeStringTest::TestLargeAppend() {
++    if(quick) return;
++
++    IcuTestErrorCode status(*this, "TestLargeAppend");
++    // Make a large UnicodeString
++    int32_t len = 0xAFFFFFF;
++    UnicodeString str;
++    char16_t *buf = str.getBuffer(len);
++    // A fast way to set buffer to valid Unicode.
++    // 4E4E is a valid unicode character
++    uprv_memset(buf, 0x4e, len * 2);
++    str.releaseBuffer(len);
++    UnicodeString dest;
++    // Append it 16 times
++    // 0xAFFFFFF times 16 is 0xA4FFFFF1,
++    // which is greater than INT32_MAX, which is 0x7FFFFFFF.
++    int64_t total = 0;
++    for (int32_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
++        dest.append(str);
++        total += len;
++        if (total <= INT32_MAX) {
++            assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus());
++        } else {
++            assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus());
++        }
++    }
++    dest.remove();
++    total = 0;
++    for (int32_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
++        dest.append(str);
++        total += len;
++        if (total + len <= INT32_MAX) {
++            assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus());
++        } else if (total <= INT32_MAX) {
++            // Check that a string of exactly the maximum size works
++            UnicodeString str2;
++            int32_t remain = INT32_MAX - total;
++            char16_t *buf2 = str2.getBuffer(remain);
++            if (buf2 == nullptr) {
++                // if somehow memory allocation fail, return the test
++                return;
++            }
++            uprv_memset(buf2, 0x4e, remain * 2);
++            str2.releaseBuffer(remain);
++            dest.append(str2);
++            total += remain;
++            assertEquals("When a string of exactly the maximum size works", (int64_t)INT32_MAX, total);
++            assertEquals("When a string of exactly the maximum size works", INT32_MAX, dest.length());
++            assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus());
++
++            // Check that a string size+1 goes bogus
++            str2.truncate(1);
++            dest.append(str2);
++            total++;
++            assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus());
++        } else {
++            assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus());
++        }
++    }
++}
+diff --git a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h
+index 218befdcc68..4a356a92c7a 100644
+--- a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h
++++ b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ class UnicodeStringTest: public IntlTest {
+     void TestWCharPointers();
+     void TestNullPointers();
+     void TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf();
++    void TestLargeAppend();
+ };
+ 
+ #endif
meta/recipes-support/icu/icu_64.2.bb +1 -0
index 10bac7aac0..2ed807787d 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${BASE_SRC_URI} \
            file://fix-install-manx.patch \
            file://0001-Fix-big-endian-build.patch \
            file://0001-icu-Added-armeb-support.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-10531.patch;striplevel=3 \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 screen: fix CVE-2020-9366

---
 .../screen/screen/CVE-2020-9366.patch         | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.6.2.bb  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2020-9366.patch
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2020-9366.patch new file +48 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a52b9e6e68
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 8ce90c1d3d5bece150479d8bc9303fd9d9f45e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Amadeusz=20S=C5=82awi=C5=84ski?= <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 17:56:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix out of bounds access when setting w_xtermosc after OSC 49
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Amadeusz=20S=C5=82awi=C5=84ski?= <[email protected]>
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+echo -e "\e]49\e;                                    \n\ec"
+crashes screen.
+
+This happens because 49 is divided by 10 and used as table index
+resulting in access to w_xtermosc[4], which is out of bounds with table
+itself being size 4. Increase size of table by 1 to 5, which is enough
+for all current uses.
+
+As this overwrites memory based on user input it is potential security
+issue.
+
+Reported-by: [email protected]
+Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?h=v.4.8.0&id=68386dfb1fa33471372a8cd2e74686758a2f527b]
+CVE: CVE-2020-9366
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ window.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/window.h b/window.h
+index bd10dcd..a8afa19 100644
+--- a/window.h
++++ b/window.h
+@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ struct win
+   char	 w_vbwait;
+   char	 w_norefresh;		/* dont redisplay when switching to that win */
+ #ifdef RXVT_OSC
+-  char	 w_xtermosc[4][MAXSTR];	/* special xterm/rxvt escapes */
++  char	 w_xtermosc[5][MAXSTR];	/* special xterm/rxvt escapes */
+ #endif
+   int    w_mouse;		/* mouse mode 0,9,1000 */
+ #ifdef HAVE_BRAILLE
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.6.2.bb +1 -0
index 21b476ddb0..d00b849021 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/screen/screen-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-fix-for-multijob-build.patch \
            file://0001-configure.ac-fix-configure-failed-while-build-dir-ha.patch \
            file://0001-Remove-more-compatibility-stuff.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-9366.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a0f529d3333b128dfaa324d978ba73a8"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1