icu: fix CVE-2020-10531
PATCH 1/2 icu: fix CVE-2020-10531
Signed-off-by Anuj Mittal <[email protected]>
--- .../icu/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch | 122 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/icu/icu_64.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/icu/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch
meta/recipes-support/icu/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch new file +122 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From b7d08bc04a4296982fcef8b6b8a354a9e4e7afca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frank Tang <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2020 02:39:04 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] ICU-20958 Prevent SEGV_MAPERR in append + +See #971 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/unicode-org/icu/commit/b7d08bc04a4296982fcef8b6b8a354a9e4e7afca] +CVE: CVE-2020-10531 +Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <[email protected]> +--- + icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp | 6 ++- + icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp b/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp +index 901bb3358ba..077b4d6ef20 100644 +--- a/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp ++++ b/icu4c/source/common/unistr.cpp +@@ -1563,7 +1563,11 @@ UnicodeString::doAppend(const UChar *srcChars, int32_t srcStart, int32_t srcLeng + } + + int32_t oldLength = length(); +- int32_t newLength = oldLength + srcLength; ++ int32_t newLength; ++ if (uprv_add32_overflow(oldLength, srcLength, &newLength)) { ++ setToBogus(); ++ return *this; ++ } + + // Check for append onto ourself + const UChar* oldArray = getArrayStart(); +diff --git a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp +index b6515ea813c..ad38bdf53a3 100644 +--- a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp ++++ b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ void UnicodeStringTest::runIndexedTest( int32_t index, UBool exec, const char* & + TESTCASE_AUTO(TestWCharPointers); + TESTCASE_AUTO(TestNullPointers); + TESTCASE_AUTO(TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf); ++ TESTCASE_AUTO(TestLargeAppend); + TESTCASE_AUTO_END; + } + +@@ -2310,3 +2311,64 @@ void UnicodeStringTest::TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf() { + str.insert(2, sub); + assertEquals("", u"abbcdcde", str); + } ++ ++void UnicodeStringTest::TestLargeAppend() { ++ if(quick) return; ++ ++ IcuTestErrorCode status(*this, "TestLargeAppend"); ++ // Make a large UnicodeString ++ int32_t len = 0xAFFFFFF; ++ UnicodeString str; ++ char16_t *buf = str.getBuffer(len); ++ // A fast way to set buffer to valid Unicode. ++ // 4E4E is a valid unicode character ++ uprv_memset(buf, 0x4e, len * 2); ++ str.releaseBuffer(len); ++ UnicodeString dest; ++ // Append it 16 times ++ // 0xAFFFFFF times 16 is 0xA4FFFFF1, ++ // which is greater than INT32_MAX, which is 0x7FFFFFFF. ++ int64_t total = 0; ++ for (int32_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { ++ dest.append(str); ++ total += len; ++ if (total <= INT32_MAX) { ++ assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } else { ++ assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } ++ } ++ dest.remove(); ++ total = 0; ++ for (int32_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { ++ dest.append(str); ++ total += len; ++ if (total + len <= INT32_MAX) { ++ assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } else if (total <= INT32_MAX) { ++ // Check that a string of exactly the maximum size works ++ UnicodeString str2; ++ int32_t remain = INT32_MAX - total; ++ char16_t *buf2 = str2.getBuffer(remain); ++ if (buf2 == nullptr) { ++ // if somehow memory allocation fail, return the test ++ return; ++ } ++ uprv_memset(buf2, 0x4e, remain * 2); ++ str2.releaseBuffer(remain); ++ dest.append(str2); ++ total += remain; ++ assertEquals("When a string of exactly the maximum size works", (int64_t)INT32_MAX, total); ++ assertEquals("When a string of exactly the maximum size works", INT32_MAX, dest.length()); ++ assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ ++ // Check that a string size+1 goes bogus ++ str2.truncate(1); ++ dest.append(str2); ++ total++; ++ assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } else { ++ assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } ++ } ++} +diff --git a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h +index 218befdcc68..4a356a92c7a 100644 +--- a/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h ++++ b/icu4c/source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h +@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ class UnicodeStringTest: public IntlTest { + void TestWCharPointers(); + void TestNullPointers(); + void TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf(); ++ void TestLargeAppend(); + }; + + #endif
meta/recipes-support/icu/icu_64.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${BASE_SRC_URI} \ file://fix-install-manx.patch \ file://0001-Fix-big-endian-build.patch \ file://0001-icu-Added-armeb-support.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-10531.patch;striplevel=3 \ " SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/2 screen: fix CVE-2020-9366
Signed-off-by Anuj Mittal <[email protected]>
--- .../screen/screen/CVE-2020-9366.patch | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.6.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2020-9366.patch
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2020-9366.patch new file +48 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 8ce90c1d3d5bece150479d8bc9303fd9d9f45e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Amadeusz=20S=C5=82awi=C5=84ski?= <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 17:56:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix out of bounds access when setting w_xtermosc after OSC 49 +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: =?UTF-8?q?Amadeusz=20S=C5=82awi=C5=84ski?= <[email protected]> +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +echo -e "\e]49\e; \n\ec" +crashes screen. + +This happens because 49 is divided by 10 and used as table index +resulting in access to w_xtermosc[4], which is out of bounds with table +itself being size 4. Increase size of table by 1 to 5, which is enough +for all current uses. + +As this overwrites memory based on user input it is potential security +issue. + +Reported-by: [email protected] +Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?h=v.4.8.0&id=68386dfb1fa33471372a8cd2e74686758a2f527b] +CVE: CVE-2020-9366 +Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <[email protected]> + +--- + window.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/window.h b/window.h +index bd10dcd..a8afa19 100644 +--- a/window.h ++++ b/window.h +@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ struct win + char w_vbwait; + char w_norefresh; /* dont redisplay when switching to that win */ + #ifdef RXVT_OSC +- char w_xtermosc[4][MAXSTR]; /* special xterm/rxvt escapes */ ++ char w_xtermosc[5][MAXSTR]; /* special xterm/rxvt escapes */ + #endif + int w_mouse; /* mouse mode 0,9,1000 */ + #ifdef HAVE_BRAILLE
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.6.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/screen/screen-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-fix-for-multijob-build.patch \ file://0001-configure.ac-fix-configure-failed-while-build-dir-ha.patch \ file://0001-Remove-more-compatibility-stuff.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-9366.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a0f529d3333b128dfaa324d978ba73a8"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1