ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()
Amir Goldstein
maintainerPATCH 1/1 ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()
syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from open_by_handle_at() with a crafted file handle that looks like this:
{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }
handle_bytes gets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0) => ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)
But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct ovl_fb at fh + 3 is illegal.
---
Miklos,
Another fallout from aligned file handle.
This one seems like a warning that cannot lead to actual harm. As far as I can tell, with:
{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }
kmalloc in handle_to_path() allocates 10 bytes, which means 16 bytes slab object, so all fields accessed by ovl_check_fh_len() should be within the slab object boundaries. And in any case, their value won't change the outcome of EINVAL.
I have added this use case to the xfstest for checking the first bug, but it doesn't trigger any warning on my kernel (without KASAN) and returns EINVAL as expected.
Thanks,
Amir.
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +3 -0
@@ -355,6 +355,9 @@ int ovl_check_fb_len(struct ovl_fb *fb, int fb_len);static inline int ovl_check_fh_len (struct ovl_fh *fh,int fh_len) { +if (fh_len <sizeof (struct ovl_fh )) +return -EINVAL ; +return ovl_check_fb_len (&fh->fb, fh_len -OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Amir Goldstein
maintainerQuoted 12 lines · Amir Goldstein
syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from
open_by_handle_at()with a crafted file handle that looks like this:{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type =
OVL_FILEID_V1}
handle_bytesgets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0)=>ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct
ovl_fbat fh + 3 is illegal.
Quoted 8 lines
Fixes cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Cc <[email protected]> # v5.5Signed-off-by Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>---
Miklos,
Ping.
Quoted 38 lines
Another fallout from aligned file handle.
This one seems like a warning that cannot lead to actual harm. As far as I can tell, with:{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type =
OVL_FILEID_V1}kmalloc in
handle_to_path()allocates 10 bytes, which means 16 bytes slab object, so all fields accessed byovl_check_fh_len()should be within the slab object boundaries. And in any case, their value won't change the outcome of EINVAL.I have added this use case to the xfstest for checking the first bug, but it doesn't trigger any warning on my kernel (without KASAN) and returns EINVAL as expected.
Thanks,
Amir.fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +3
-1@@ -355,6 +355,9 @@ int ovl_check_fb_len(struct ovl_fb *fb, int fb_len);static inline int ovl_check_fh_len (struct ovl_fh *fh,int fh_len) { +if (fh_len <sizeof (struct ovl_fh )) +return -EINVAL ; +return ovl_check_fb_len (&fh->fb, fh_len -OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET ); } --2.17.1
Quoted 20 lines · Amir Goldstein
Quoted 18 lines · Amir Goldstein
syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from
open_by_handle_at()with a crafted file handle that looks like this:{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type =
OVL_FILEID_V1}
handle_bytesgets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0)=>ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct
ovl_fbat fh + 3 is illegal.Fixes cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Cc <[email protected]> # v5.5Signed-off-by Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>---
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Miklos,
Ping.
Quoted 14 lines
Another fallout from aligned file handle.
This one seems like a warning that cannot lead to actual harm. As far as I can tell, with:{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type =
OVL_FILEID_V1}kmalloc in
handle_to_path()allocates 10 bytes, which means 16 bytes slab object, so all fields accessed byovl_check_fh_len()should be within the slab object boundaries. And in any case, their value won't change the outcome of EINVAL.I have added this use case to the xfstest for checking the first bug, but it doesn't trigger any warning on my kernel (without KASAN) and returns EINVAL as expected.
Applied, thanks.
Miklos