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ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()

PATCH Applied Amir Goldstein 2 participants 3 messages May 23, 2020 – Jun 2, 2020 Overlay filesystem

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Amir Goldstein

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()

syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from open_by_handle_at() with a crafted file handle that looks like this:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

handle_bytes gets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0) => ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)

But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct ovl_fb at fh + 3 is illegal.

Fixes cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.5

---

Miklos,

Another fallout from aligned file handle.
This one seems like a warning that cannot lead to actual harm. As far as I can tell, with:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

kmalloc in handle_to_path() allocates 10 bytes, which means 16 bytes slab object, so all fields accessed by ovl_check_fh_len() should be within the slab object boundaries. And in any case, their value won't change the outcome of EINVAL.

I have added this use case to the xfstest for checking the first bug, but it doesn't trigger any warning on my kernel (without KASAN) and returns EINVAL as expected.

Thanks,
Amir.

 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +3 -0
index 76747f5b0517..ffbb57b2d7f6 100644
@@ -355,6 +355,9 @@ int ovl_check_fb_len(struct ovl_fb *fb, int fb_len);
 
 static inline int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)
 {
+	if (fh_len < sizeof(struct ovl_fh))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return ovl_check_fb_len(&fh->fb, fh_len - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Amir Goldstein

syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from open_by_handle_at() with a crafted file handle that looks like this:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

handle_bytes gets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0) => ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)

But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct ovl_fb at fh + 3 is illegal.

Quoted 8 lines
Fixes cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.5

---

Miklos,

Ping.

Quoted 38 lines

Another fallout from aligned file handle.
This one seems like a warning that cannot lead to actual harm. As far as I can tell, with:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

kmalloc in handle_to_path() allocates 10 bytes, which means 16 bytes slab object, so all fields accessed by ovl_check_fh_len() should be within the slab object boundaries. And in any case, their value won't change the outcome of EINVAL.

I have added this use case to the xfstest for checking the first bug, but it doesn't trigger any warning on my kernel (without KASAN) and returns EINVAL as expected.

Thanks,
Amir.

 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +3 -1
index 76747f5b0517..ffbb57b2d7f6 100644
@@ -355,6 +355,9 @@ int ovl_check_fb_len(struct ovl_fb *fb, int fb_len);
 
 static inline int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)
 {
+       if (fh_len < sizeof(struct ovl_fh))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        return ovl_check_fb_len(&fh->fb, fh_len - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
 }
 
--

2.17.1

maintainer Applied
#2 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Amir Goldstein
Quoted 18 lines · Amir Goldstein

syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from open_by_handle_at() with a crafted file handle that looks like this:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

handle_bytes gets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0) => ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)

But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct ovl_fb at fh + 3 is illegal.

Fixes cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.5

---

Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Miklos,

Ping.

Quoted 14 lines

Another fallout from aligned file handle.
This one seems like a warning that cannot lead to actual harm. As far as I can tell, with:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

kmalloc in handle_to_path() allocates 10 bytes, which means 16 bytes slab object, so all fields accessed by ovl_check_fh_len() should be within the slab object boundaries. And in any case, their value won't change the outcome of EINVAL.

I have added this use case to the xfstest for checking the first bug, but it doesn't trigger any warning on my kernel (without KASAN) and returns EINVAL as expected.

Applied, thanks.

Miklos