virtiofsd: Whitelist fchmod
PATCH 1/1 virtiofsd: Whitelist fchmod
lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.
Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:
On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' foo
Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
capng_setpid(getpid());
capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
}This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().
(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs. utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)
--- tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {SCMP_SYS (exit_group),SCMP_SYS (fallocate),SCMP_SYS (fchdir), +SCMP_SYS (fchmod),SCMP_SYS (fchmodat),SCMP_SYS (fchownat), SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 28 lines · * Max Reitz ([email protected]) wrote:
lo_setattr()invokesfchmod()in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:
On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' fooThen in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least
CAP_FSETID):int
main(int argc, char *argv[]){ capng_setpid(getpid()); capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0); capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0); }This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where
FATTR_FHis set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invokefchmod()instead offchmodat().
Quoted 8 lines
(A similar configuration exists further below with
futimens()vs.utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)Reported-by Qian Cai <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Nicely found!
Quoted 19 lines
--- tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1
-0@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {SCMP_SYS (exit_group),SCMP_SYS (fallocate),SCMP_SYS (fchdir), +SCMP_SYS (fchmod),SCMP_SYS (fchmodat),SCMP_SYS (fchownat), SCMP_SYS(fcntl),Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 28 lines · Max Reitz
lo_setattr()invokesfchmod()in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:
On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' fooThen in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least
CAP_FSETID):int
main(int argc, char *argv[]){ capng_setpid(getpid()); capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0); capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0); }This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where
FATTR_FHis set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invokefchmod()instead offchmodat().
Quoted 8 lines
(A similar configuration exists further below with
futimens()vs.utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)Reported-by Qian Cai <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Nice catch.
Vivek
Quoted 23 lines
--- tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1
-0@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {SCMP_SYS (exit_group),SCMP_SYS (fallocate),SCMP_SYS (fchdir), +SCMP_SYS (fchmod),SCMP_SYS (fchmodat),SCMP_SYS (fchownat), SCMP_SYS(fcntl),Signature · 6 lines
2.26.2 _______________________________________________ Virtio-fs mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
Quoted 28 lines · * Max Reitz ([email protected]) wrote:
lo_setattr()invokesfchmod()in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:
On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' fooThen in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least
CAP_FSETID):int
main(int argc, char *argv[]){ capng_setpid(getpid()); capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0); capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0); }This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where
FATTR_FHis set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invokefchmod()instead offchmodat().
Quoted 8 lines
(A similar configuration exists further below with
futimens()vs.utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)Reported-by Qian Cai <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Queued.
Quoted 20 lines
--- tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1
-0@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {SCMP_SYS (exit_group),SCMP_SYS (fallocate),SCMP_SYS (fchdir), +SCMP_SYS (fchmod),SCMP_SYS (fchmodat),SCMP_SYS (fchownat), SCMP_SYS(fcntl),Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK