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virtiofsd: Whitelist fchmod

PATCH In review Max Reitz 3 participants 4 messages Jun 8, 2020 – Jun 17, 2020

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Max Reitz

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 virtiofsd: Whitelist fchmod

lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.

Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:

On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' foo

Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

{
    capng_setpid(getpid());
    capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
    capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
    capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);

    ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
}

This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().

(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs. utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)

---
 tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1 -0
index bd9e7b083c..3b1522acdd 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {
     SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
     SCMP_SYS(fallocate),
     SCMP_SYS(fchdir),
+    SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
     SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
     SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
     SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · * Max Reitz ([email protected]) wrote:

lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.

Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:

On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' foo

Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

{
    capng_setpid(getpid());
    capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
    capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
    capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);

    ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
}

This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().

Quoted 8 lines

(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs. utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)

Nicely found!

Quoted 19 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1 -0
index bd9e7b083c..3b1522acdd 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {
     SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
     SCMP_SYS(fallocate),
     SCMP_SYS(fchdir),
+    SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
     SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
     SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
     SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2

--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK

Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Max Reitz
Quoted 28 lines · Max Reitz

lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.

Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:

On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' foo

Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

{
    capng_setpid(getpid());
    capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
    capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
    capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);

    ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
}

This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().

Quoted 8 lines

(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs. utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)

Nice catch.

Vivek

Quoted 23 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1 -0
index bd9e7b083c..3b1522acdd 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {
     SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
     SCMP_SYS(fallocate),
     SCMP_SYS(fchdir),
+    SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
     SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
     SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
     SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
Signature · 6 lines
2.26.2

_______________________________________________
Virtio-fs mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
#3 lore raw
In reply to Max Reitz
Quoted 28 lines · * Max Reitz ([email protected]) wrote:

lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.

Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:

On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' foo

Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

{
    capng_setpid(getpid());
    capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
    capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
    capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);

    ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
}

This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().

Quoted 8 lines

(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs. utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)

Queued.

Quoted 20 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.c +1 -0
index bd9e7b083c..3b1522acdd 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const int syscall_whitelist[] = {
     SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
     SCMP_SYS(fallocate),
     SCMP_SYS(fchdir),
+    SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
     SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
     SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
     SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2

--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK