crypto: get rid of ecb(arc4)
Subsystems (9)
cover crypto: get rid of ecb(arc4)
The RC4 algorithm does not fit the sckipher model very well: it is a stream cipher that combines the key and IV into a single vector, which implies that using the same key more than once amounts to stream cipher IV reuse, and therefore catastrophic failure.
So let's replace the remaining legacy users (WEP and TKIP in the staging tree) to the ARC4 library interface, which does not rely on the crypto API at all. Also, remove the obsolete RC4-HMAC-MD5 algorithm from the SUNRPC driver stack.
NOTE: It should not be too difficult to switch the kerberos code over to the ARC4 library interface as well, given that much of it uses a different code path already. But we should only do so if we really need to keep this support around, and it seems that this was only ever intended as a transitional algorithm for Windows NT/2000 clients.
That leaves no remaining users of the ecb(arc4) skcipher, so we can remove any implementations as well.
Ard Biesheuvel (7):
staging/rtl8192e: switch to RC4 library interface staging/rtl8192u: switch to RC4 library interface
SUNRPC: remove RC4-HMAC-MD5 support from KerberosV
crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
crypto: n2 - remove ecb(arc4) support
crypto: bcm-iproc - remove ecb(arc4) support
crypto: tcrypt - remove ecb(arc4) testing/benchmarking support
crypto/Kconfig | 12 - crypto/Makefile | 1 - crypto/arc4.c | 76 ----- crypto/tcrypt.c | 21 +- crypto/testmgr.c | 7 - crypto/testmgr.h | 62 ---- drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c | 96 +----- drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.h | 1 - drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.c | 23 +- drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.h | 1 - drivers/crypto/bcm/spu2.c | 12 +- drivers/crypto/bcm/spu2.h | 1 - drivers/crypto/n2_core.c | 46 --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/staging/rtl8192e/Kconfig | 4 +- drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_tkip.c | 70 +---- drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_wep.c | 72 +---- drivers/staging/rtl8192u/Kconfig | 1 + .../rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_tkip.c | 82 +----- .../rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_wep.c | 64 +--- include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h | 11 - include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h | 9 +- net/sunrpc/Kconfig | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 276 ------------------ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 95 ------ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c | 87 ------ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 65 +---- 30 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 1122 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 crypto/arc4.c
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH 1/7 staging/rtl8192e: switch to RC4 library interface
Switch to the ARC4 library interface, to remove the pointless dependency on the skcipher API, from which we will hopefully be able to drop ecb(arc4) skcipher support.
--- drivers/staging/rtl8192e/Kconfig | 4 +- drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_tkip.c | 70 ++++--------------- drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_wep.c | 72 ++++---------------- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8192e/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ config RTLLIB_CRYPTO_CCMP config RTLLIB_CRYPTO_TKIP tristate "Support for rtllib TKIP crypto" depends on RTLLIB - select CRYPTO_ARC4 + select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 select CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC default y help
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ config RTLLIB_CRYPTO_TKIP config RTLLIB_CRYPTO_WEP tristate "Support for rtllib WEP crypto" - select CRYPTO_ARC4 + select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 depends on RTLLIB default y help
drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_tkip.c +12 -58
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drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_wep.c +14 -58
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/7] staging/rtl8192e: switch to RC4 library interface
Quoted 5 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Switch to the ARC4 library interface, to remove the pointless dependency on the skcipher API, from which we will hopefully be able to drop ecb(arc4) skcipher support.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
RFC PATCH 2/7 staging/rtl8192u: switch to RC4 library interface
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelSwitch to the ARC4 library interface, to remove the pointless dependency on the skcipher API, from which we will hopefully be able to drop ecb(arc4) skcipher support.
--- drivers/staging/rtl8192u/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_tkip.c | 82 ++++---------------- drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_wep.c | 64 +++------------ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8192u/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ config RTL8192U select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_CCM + select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_tkip.c +14 -68
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drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_wep.c +12 -52
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/7] staging/rtl8192u: switch to RC4 library interface
Quoted 5 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Switch to the ARC4 library interface, to remove the pointless dependency on the skcipher API, from which we will hopefully be able to drop ecb(arc4) skcipher support.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
RFC PATCH 3/7 SUNRPC: remove RC4-HMAC-MD5 support from KerberosV
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe RC4-HMAC-MD5 KerberosV algorithm is based on RFC 4757 [0], which was specifically issued for interoperability with Windows 2000, but was never intended to receive the same level of support. The RFC says
The IETF Kerberos community supports publishing this specification as an informational document in order to describe this widely implemented technology. However, while these encryption types provide the operations necessary to implement the base Kerberos specification [RFC4120], they do not provide all the required operations in the Kerberos cryptography framework [RFC3961]. As a result, it is not generally possible to implement potential extensions to Kerberos using these encryption types. The Kerberos encryption type negotiation mechanism [RFC4537] provides one approach for using such extensions even when a Kerberos infrastructure uses long-term RC4 keys. Because this specification does not implement operations required by RFC 3961 and because of security concerns with the use of RC4 and MD4 discussed in Section 8, this specification is not appropriate for publication on the standards track.
The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing Windows NT environments, provide strong cryptography (128-bit key lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government export restriction requirements) encryption. This document describes the implementation of those encryption types.
Furthermore, this RFC was re-classified as 'historic' by RFC 8429 [1] in 2018, stating that 'none of the encryption types it specifies should be used'
Note that other outdated algorithms are left in place (some of which are guarded by CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES), so this should only adversely affect interoperability with Windows NT/2000 systems that have not received any updates since 2008 (but are connected to a network nonetheless)
[0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4757
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8429
--- include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h | 11 - include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h | 9 +- net/sunrpc/Kconfig | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 276 -------------------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 95 ------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c | 87 ------ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 65 +---- 9 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 530 deletions(-)
include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h +0 -11
@@ -141,14 +141,12 @@ enum sgn_alg {SGN_ALG_MD2_5 =0x0001 ,SGN_ALG_DES_MAC =0x0002 ,SGN_ALG_3 =0x0003 ,/* not published */ -SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5 =0x0011 ,/* microsoft w2k; no support */ SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD = 0x0004 };enum seal_alg {SEAL_ALG_NONE =0xffff ,SEAL_ALG_DES =0x0000 ,SEAL_ALG_1 =0x0001 ,/* not published */ -SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 =0x0010 ,/* microsoft w2k; no support */ SEAL_ALG_DES3KD =0x0002 };
@@ -316,14 +314,5 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *plainoffset, u32 *plainlen); -int -krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, -unsigned char *cksum); - -int -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, -s32 seqnum);void gss_krb5_make_confounder (char *p,u32 conflen);
include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h +3 -6
@@ -13,15 +13,13 @@#ifdef CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES /* -* NB: This list includes encryption types that were deprecated -* by RFC 8429 (DES3_CBC_SHA1 and ARCFOUR_HMAC). +* NB: This list includes DES3_CBC_SHA1, which was deprecated by RFC 8429. * * ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 -* ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC */ -#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,23" +#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16"#else /* CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES */
@@ -32,12 +30,11 @@* ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 -* ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC * ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 * ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC * ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 */ -#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,23,3,1,2" +#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,3,1,2"#endif /* CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES */
net/sunrpc/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ config RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5 depends on SUNRPC && CRYPTO depends on CRYPTO_MD5 && CRYPTO_DES && CRYPTO_CBC && CRYPTO_CTS depends on CRYPTO_ECB && CRYPTO_HMAC && CRYPTO_SHA1 && CRYPTO_AES - depends on CRYPTO_ARC4 default y select SUNRPC_GSS help
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +0 -276
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net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c +0 -95
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net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c +0 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,6 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,BUG ();case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW :case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW : -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC :return gss_get_mic_v1 (ctx, text, token);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c +0 -87
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net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c +0 -1
@@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,BUG ();case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW :case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW : -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC :return gss_verify_mic_v1 (ctx, message_buffer, read_token);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +13 -52
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/7] SUNRPC: remove RC4-HMAC-MD5 support from KerberosV
Quoted 801 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
The RC4-HMAC-MD5 KerberosV algorithm is based on RFC 4757 [0], which was specifically issued for interoperability with Windows 2000, but was never intended to receive the same level of support. The RFC says
The IETF Kerberos community supports publishing this specification as an informational document in order to describe this widely implemented technology. However, while these encryption types provide the operations necessary to implement the base Kerberos specification [RFC4120], they do not provide all the required operations in the Kerberos cryptography framework [RFC3961]. As a result, it is not generally possible to implement potential extensions to Kerberos using these encryption types. The Kerberos encryption type negotiation mechanism [RFC4537] provides one approach for using such extensions even when a Kerberos infrastructure uses long-term RC4 keys. Because this specification does not implement operations required by RFC 3961 and because of security concerns with the use of RC4 and MD4 discussed in Section 8, this specification is not appropriate for publication on the standards track.
The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing Windows NT environments, provide strong cryptography (128-bit key lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government export restriction requirements) encryption. This document describes the implementation of those encryption types.
Furthermore, this RFC was re-classified as 'historic' by RFC 8429 [1] in 2018, stating that 'none of the encryption types it specifies should be used'
Note that other outdated algorithms are left in place (some of which are guarded by
CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES), so this should only adversely affect interoperability with Windows NT/2000 systems that have not received any updates since 2008 (but are connected to a network nonetheless)[0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4757
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8429Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h | 11 - include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h | 9 +- net/sunrpc/Kconfig | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 276 -------------------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 95 ------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c | 87 ------ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 1 - net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 65 +---- 9 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 530 deletions(-)include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h +0
-11@@ -141,14 +141,12 @@ enum sgn_alg {SGN_ALG_MD2_5 =0x0001 ,SGN_ALG_DES_MAC =0x0002 ,SGN_ALG_3 =0x0003 ,/* not published */ -SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5 =0x0011 ,/* microsoft w2k; no support */ SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD = 0x0004 };enum seal_alg {SEAL_ALG_NONE =0xffff ,SEAL_ALG_DES =0x0000 ,SEAL_ALG_1 =0x0001 ,/* not published */ -SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 =0x0010 ,/* microsoft w2k; no support */ SEAL_ALG_DES3KD =0x0002 };@@ -316,14 +314,5 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *plainoffset, u32 *plainlen); -int -krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, -unsigned char *cksum); - -int -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, -s32 seqnum);void gss_krb5_make_confounder (char *p,u32 conflen);include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h +3
-6@@ -13,15 +13,13 @@#ifdef CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES /* -* NB: This list includes encryption types that were deprecated -* by RFC 8429 (DES3_CBC_SHA1 and ARCFOUR_HMAC). +* NB: This list includes DES3_CBC_SHA1, which was deprecated by RFC 8429. * * ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 -* ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC */ -#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,23" +#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16"#else /* CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES */ @@ -32,12 +30,11 @@* ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 * ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 -* ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC * ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 * ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC * ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 */ -#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,23,3,1,2" +#define KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES "18,17,16,3,1,2"#endif /* CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES */ net/sunrpc/Kconfig +0
-1@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ config RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5 depends on SUNRPC && CRYPTO depends on CRYPTO_MD5 && CRYPTO_DES && CRYPTO_CBC && CRYPTO_CTS depends on CRYPTO_ECB && CRYPTO_HMAC && CRYPTO_SHA1 && CRYPTO_AES - depends on CRYPTO_ARC4 default y select SUNRPC_GSS helpnet/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +0
-276@@ -138,135 +138,6 @@ checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)return crypto_ahash_update (req); } -static int -arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt (unsigned int usage,u8 salt[4 ]) -{ -unsigned int ms_usage; - -switch (usage) { -case KG_USAGE_SIGN : - ms_usage =15 ; -break ; -case KG_USAGE_SEAL : - ms_usage =13 ; -break ; -default : -return -EINVAL ; - } - salt[0 ] = (ms_usage >>0 ) &0xff ; - salt[1 ] = (ms_usage >>8 ) &0xff ; - salt[2 ] = (ms_usage >>16 ) &0xff ; - salt[3 ] = (ms_usage >>24 ) &0xff ; - -return 0 ; -} - -static u32 -make_checksum_hmac_md5 (struct krb5_ctx *kctx,char *header,int hdrlen, -struct xdr_buf *body,int body_offset,u8 *cksumkey, -unsigned int usage,struct xdr_netobj *cksumout) -{ -struct scatterlist sg[1 ]; -int err =-1 ; -u8 *checksumdata; -u8 *rc4salt; -struct crypto_ahash *md5; -struct crypto_ahash *hmac_md5; -struct ahash_request *req; - -if (cksumkey ==NULL ) -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - -if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) { -dprintk ("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n" , - __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name); -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - } - - rc4salt =kmalloc_array (4 ,sizeof (*rc4salt),GFP_NOFS ); -if (!rc4salt) -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - -if (arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt (usage, rc4salt)) { -dprintk ("%s: invalid usage value %u\n" , __func__, usage); - goto out_free_rc4salt; - } - - checksumdata =kmalloc (GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!checksumdata) - goto out_free_rc4salt; - - md5 =crypto_alloc_ahash ("md5" ,0 ,CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ); -if (IS_ERR (md5)) - goto out_free_cksum; - - hmac_md5 =crypto_alloc_ahash (kctx->gk5e->cksum_name,0 , -CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ); -if (IS_ERR (hmac_md5)) - goto out_free_md5; - - req =ahash_request_alloc (md5,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!req) - goto out_free_hmac_md5; - -ahash_request_set_callback (req,CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ,NULL ,NULL ); - - err =crypto_ahash_init (req); -if (err) - goto out; -sg_init_one (sg, rc4salt,4 ); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, sg,NULL ,4 ); - err =crypto_ahash_update (req); -if (err) - goto out; - -sg_init_one (sg, header, hdrlen); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, sg,NULL , hdrlen); - err =crypto_ahash_update (req); -if (err) - goto out; - err =xdr_process_buf (body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset, - checksummer, req); -if (err) - goto out; -ahash_request_set_crypt (req,NULL , checksumdata,0 ); - err =crypto_ahash_final (req); -if (err) - goto out; - -ahash_request_free (req); - req =ahash_request_alloc (hmac_md5,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!req) - goto out_free_hmac_md5; - -ahash_request_set_callback (req,CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ,NULL ,NULL ); - - err =crypto_ahash_setkey (hmac_md5, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out; - -sg_init_one (sg, checksumdata,crypto_ahash_digestsize (md5)); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, sg, checksumdata, -crypto_ahash_digestsize (md5)); - err =crypto_ahash_digest (req); -if (err) - goto out; - -memcpy (cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); - cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; -out: -ahash_request_free (req); -out_free_hmac_md5: -crypto_free_ahash (hmac_md5); -out_free_md5: -crypto_free_ahash (md5); -out_free_cksum: -kfree (checksumdata); -out_free_rc4salt: -kfree (rc4salt); -return err ?GSS_S_FAILURE :0 ; -} -/* * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header * The checksum is performed over the first 8 bytes of the @@ -284,11 +155,6 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,u8 *checksumdata;unsigned int checksumlen; -if (kctx->gk5e->ctype ==CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR ) -return make_checksum_hmac_md5 (kctx, header, hdrlen, - body, body_offset, - cksumkey, usage, cksumout); -if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {dprintk ("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n" , __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);@@ -942,145 +808,3 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, ret =GSS_S_FAILURE ;return ret; } - -/* -* Compute Kseq given the initial session key and the checksum. -* Set the key of the given cipher. -*/ -int -krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, -unsigned char *cksum) -{ -struct crypto_shash *hmac; -struct shash_desc *desc; -u8 Kseq[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN ]; -u32 zeroconstant =0 ; -int err; - -dprintk ("%s: entered\n" , __func__); - - hmac =crypto_alloc_shash (kctx->gk5e->cksum_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (hmac)) { -dprintk ("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n" , - __func__,PTR_ERR (hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); -return PTR_ERR (hmac); - } - - desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (hmac), -GFP_NOFS ); -if (!desc) { -dprintk ("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n" , - __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); -crypto_free_shash (hmac); -return -ENOMEM ; - } - - desc->tfm = hmac; - -/* Compute intermediate Kseq from session key */ - err =crypto_shash_setkey (hmac, kctx->Ksess, kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =crypto_shash_digest (desc, (u8 *)&zeroconstant,4 , Kseq); -if (err) - goto out_err; - -/* Compute final Kseq from the checksum and intermediate Kseq */ - err =crypto_shash_setkey (hmac, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =crypto_shash_digest (desc, cksum,8 , Kseq); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (cipher, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =0 ; - -out_err: -kzfree (desc); -crypto_free_shash (hmac); -dprintk ("%s: returning %d\n" , __func__, err); -return err; -} - -/* -* Compute Kcrypt given the initial session key and the plaintext seqnum. -* Set the key of cipher kctx->enc. -*/ -int -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, -s32 seqnum) -{ -struct crypto_shash *hmac; -struct shash_desc *desc; -u8 Kcrypt[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN ]; -u8 zeroconstant[4 ] = {0 }; -u8 seqnumarray[4 ]; -int err, i; - -dprintk ("%s: entered, seqnum %u\n" , __func__, seqnum); - - hmac =crypto_alloc_shash (kctx->gk5e->cksum_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (hmac)) { -dprintk ("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n" , - __func__,PTR_ERR (hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); -return PTR_ERR (hmac); - } - - desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (hmac), -GFP_NOFS ); -if (!desc) { -dprintk ("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n" , - __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); -crypto_free_shash (hmac); -return -ENOMEM ; - } - - desc->tfm = hmac; - -/* Compute intermediate Kcrypt from session key */ -for (i =0 ; i < kctx->gk5e->keylength; i++) - Kcrypt[i] = kctx->Ksess[i] ^0xf0 ; - - err =crypto_shash_setkey (hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =crypto_shash_digest (desc, zeroconstant,4 , Kcrypt); -if (err) - goto out_err; - -/* Compute final Kcrypt from the seqnum and intermediate Kcrypt */ - err =crypto_shash_setkey (hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - seqnumarray[0 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>24 ) &0xff ); - seqnumarray[1 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>16 ) &0xff ); - seqnumarray[2 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>8 ) &0xff ); - seqnumarray[3 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>0 ) &0xff ); - - err =crypto_shash_digest (desc, seqnumarray,4 , Kcrypt); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (cipher, Kcrypt, - kctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err; - - err =0 ; - -out_err: -kzfree (desc); -crypto_free_shash (hmac); -dprintk ("%s: returning %d\n" , __func__, err); -return err; -}net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c +0
-95@@ -51,27 +51,6 @@ static const struct gss_krb5_enctype supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[] = { .keyed_cksum = 0, },#endif /* CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES */ -/* -* RC4-HMAC -*/ - { - .etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, - .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR, - .name = "rc4-hmac", - .encrypt_name = "ecb(arc4)", - .cksum_name = "hmac(md5)", - .encrypt = krb5_encrypt, - .decrypt = krb5_decrypt, - .mk_key = NULL, - .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5, - .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4, - .keybytes = 16, - .keylength = 16, - .blocksize = 1, - .conflen = 8, - .cksumlength = 8, - .keyed_cksum = 1, - },/* * 3DES */ @@ -401,78 +380,6 @@ context_derive_keys_des3(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)return -EINVAL ; } -/* -* Note that RC4 depends on deriving keys using the sequence -* number or the checksum of a token. Therefore, the final keys -* cannot be calculated until the token is being constructed! -*/ -static int -context_derive_keys_rc4 (struct krb5_ctx *ctx) -{ -struct crypto_shash *hmac; -char sigkeyconstant[] ="signaturekey" ; -int slen =strlen (sigkeyconstant) +1 ;/* include null terminator */ -struct shash_desc *desc; -int err; - -dprintk ("RPC: %s: entered\n" , __func__); -/* -* derive cksum (aka Ksign) key -*/ - hmac =crypto_alloc_shash (ctx->gk5e->cksum_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (hmac)) { -dprintk ("%s: error %ld allocating hash '%s'\n" , - __func__,PTR_ERR (hmac), ctx->gk5e->cksum_name); - err =PTR_ERR (hmac); - goto out_err; - } - - err =crypto_shash_setkey (hmac, ctx->Ksess, ctx->gk5e->keylength); -if (err) - goto out_err_free_hmac; - - - desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (hmac),GFP_NOFS ); -if (!desc) { -dprintk ("%s: failed to allocate hash descriptor for '%s'\n" , - __func__, ctx->gk5e->cksum_name); - err = -ENOMEM ; - goto out_err_free_hmac; - } - - desc->tfm = hmac; - - err =crypto_shash_digest (desc, sigkeyconstant, slen, ctx->cksum); -kzfree (desc); -if (err) - goto out_err_free_hmac; -/* -* allocate hash, and skciphers for data and seqnum encryption -*/ - ctx->enc =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher (ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (ctx->enc)) { - err =PTR_ERR (ctx->enc); - goto out_err_free_hmac; - } - - ctx->seq =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher (ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (ctx->seq)) { -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (ctx->enc); - err =PTR_ERR (ctx->seq); - goto out_err_free_hmac; - } - -dprintk ("RPC: %s: returning success\n" , __func__); - - err =0 ; - -out_err_free_hmac: -crypto_free_shash (hmac); -out_err: -dprintk ("RPC: %s: returning %d\n" , __func__, err); -return err; -} -static int context_derive_keys_new (struct krb5_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp_mask) {@@ -649,8 +556,6 @@ gss_import_v2_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx,switch (ctx->enctype) {case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW :return context_derive_keys_des3 (ctx, gfp_mask); -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC : -return context_derive_keys_rc4 (ctx);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :return context_derive_keys_new (ctx, gfp_mask);net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c +0
-1@@ -214,7 +214,6 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,BUG ();case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW :case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW : -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC :return gss_get_mic_v1 (ctx, text, token);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c +0
-87@@ -39,42 +39,6 @@# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH#endif -static s32 -krb5_make_rc4_seq_num (struct krb5_ctx *kctx,int direction,s32 seqnum, -unsigned char *cksum,unsigned char *buf) -{ -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; -unsigned char *plain; -s32 code; - -dprintk ("RPC: %s:\n" , __func__); - cipher =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (cipher)) -return PTR_ERR (cipher); - - plain =kmalloc (8 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!plain) -return -ENOMEM ; - - plain[0 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>24 ) &0xff ); - plain[1 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>16 ) &0xff ); - plain[2 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>8 ) &0xff ); - plain[3 ] = (unsigned char ) ((seqnum >>0 ) &0xff ); - plain[4 ] = direction; - plain[5 ] = direction; - plain[6 ] = direction; - plain[7 ] = direction; - - code =krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key (kctx, cipher, cksum); -if (code) - goto out; - - code =krb5_encrypt (cipher, cksum, plain, buf,8 ); -out: -kfree (plain); -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (cipher); -return code; -} s32 krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key,@@ -85,10 +49,6 @@ krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,unsigned char *plain;s32 code; -if (kctx->enctype ==ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC ) -return krb5_make_rc4_seq_num (kctx, direction, seqnum, - cksum, buf); - plain =kmalloc (8 ,GFP_NOFS );if (!plain)return -ENOMEM ;@@ -108,50 +68,6 @@ krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,return code; } -static s32 -krb5_get_rc4_seq_num (struct krb5_ctx *kctx,unsigned char *cksum, -unsigned char *buf,int *direction,s32 *seqnum) -{ -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; -unsigned char *plain; -s32 code; - -dprintk ("RPC: %s:\n" , __func__); - cipher =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (cipher)) -return PTR_ERR (cipher); - - code =krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key (kctx, cipher, cksum); -if (code) - goto out; - - plain =kmalloc (8 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!plain) { - code = -ENOMEM ; - goto out; - } - - code =krb5_decrypt (cipher, cksum, buf, plain,8 ); -if (code) - goto out_plain; - -if ((plain[4 ] != plain[5 ]) || (plain[4 ] != plain[6 ]) - || (plain[4 ] != plain[7 ])) { - code = (s32 )KG_BAD_SEQ ; - goto out_plain; - } - - *direction = plain[4 ]; - - *seqnum = ((plain[0 ] <<24 ) | (plain[1 ] <<16 ) | - (plain[2 ] <<8 ) | (plain[3 ])); -out_plain: -kfree (plain); -out: -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (cipher); -return code; -} - s32 krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum,@@ -164,9 +80,6 @@ krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,dprintk ("RPC: krb5_get_seq_num:\n" ); -if (kctx->enctype ==ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC ) -return krb5_get_rc4_seq_num (kctx, cksum, buf, - direction, seqnum); plain =kmalloc (8 ,GFP_NOFS );if (!plain)return -ENOMEM ;net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c +0
-1@@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,BUG ();case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW :case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW : -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC :return gss_verify_mic_v1 (ctx, message_buffer, read_token);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +13
-52@@ -236,26 +236,9 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)))return GSS_S_FAILURE ; -if (kctx->enctype ==ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC ) { -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; -int err; - cipher =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, -0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (cipher)) -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key (kctx, cipher, seq_send); - - err =gss_encrypt_xdr_buf (cipher, buf, - offset + headlen - conflen, pages); -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (cipher); -if (err) -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - }else { -if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf (kctx->enc, buf, - offset + headlen - conflen, pages)) -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - } +if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf (kctx->enc, buf, + offset + headlen - conflen, pages)) +return GSS_S_FAILURE ;return (kctx->endtime < now) ?GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED :GSS_S_COMPLETE ; }@@ -316,37 +299,9 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0 ].iov_base; -/* -* Need plaintext seqnum to derive encryption key for arcfour-hmac -*/ -if (krb5_get_seq_num (kctx, ptr +GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN , - ptr +8 , &direction, &seqnum)) -return GSS_S_BAD_SIG ; - -if ((kctx->initiate && direction !=0xff ) || - (!kctx->initiate && direction !=0 )) -return GSS_S_BAD_SIG ; - buf->len = len; -if (kctx->enctype ==ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC ) { -struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; -int err; - - cipher =crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, -0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (cipher)) -return GSS_S_FAILURE ; - -krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key (kctx, cipher, seqnum); - - err =gss_decrypt_xdr_buf (cipher, buf, crypt_offset); -crypto_free_sync_skcipher (cipher); -if (err) -return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN ; - }else { -if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf (kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset)) -return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN ; - } +if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf (kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset)) +return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN ;if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) cksumkey = kctx->cksum;@@ -370,6 +325,14 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,/* do sequencing checks */ +if (krb5_get_seq_num (kctx, ptr +GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN , + ptr +8 , &direction, &seqnum)) +return GSS_S_BAD_SIG ; + +if ((kctx->initiate && direction !=0xff ) || + (!kctx->initiate && direction !=0 )) +return GSS_S_BAD_SIG ; +/* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ @@ -605,7 +568,6 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,BUG ();case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW :case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW : -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC :return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1 (kctx, offset, buf, pages);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :@@ -624,7 +586,6 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,BUG ();case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW :case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW : -case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC :return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1 (kctx, offset, len, buf, &gctx->slack, &gctx->align);case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 :Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH 4/7 crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelRemove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
--- crypto/Kconfig | 12 ---- crypto/Makefile | 1 - crypto/arc4.c | 76 -------------------- drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/Kconfig | 1 - 5 files changed, 91 deletions(-)
crypto/Kconfig +0 -12
@@ -1197,18 +1197,6 @@ config CRYPTO_ANUBIS <https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/reports/> <http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/AnubisPage.html> -config CRYPTO_ARC4 - tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm" - select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER - select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 - help - ARC4 cipher algorithm. - - ARC4 is a stream cipher using keys ranging from 8 bits to 2048 - bits in length. This algorithm is required for driver-based - WEP, but it should not be for other purposes because of the - weakness of the algorithm. - config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH tristate "Blowfish cipher algorithm" select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
crypto/Makefile +0 -1
@@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA) += camellia_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON) += cast_common.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST5) += cast5_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST6) += cast6_generic.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARC4) += arc4.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA) += tea.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KHAZAD) += khazad.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANUBIS) += anubis.o
crypto/arc4.c deleted +0 -76
76 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/wireless/intel/ipw2x00/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ config LIBIPW select WIRELESS_EXT select WEXT_SPY select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_ARC4 select CRYPTO_ECB select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ config HOSTAP select WEXT_SPY select WEXT_PRIV select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_ARC4 select CRYPTO_ECB select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/7] crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
[+linux-wireless, Marcel Holtmann, and Denis Kenzior]
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Remove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Last year there was a discussion where it was mentioned that iwd uses "ecb(arc4)" via AF_ALG. So can we really remove it yet?
See https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Note that the code isn't in "iwd" itself but rather in "libell" which iwd depends on: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/
Apparently it also uses md4 and ecb(des) too.
Marcel and Denis, what's your deprecation plan for these obsolete and insecure algorithms?
- Eric
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/7] crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Biggers
[+linux-wireless, Marcel Holtmann, and Denis Kenzior]
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Remove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Last year there was a discussion where it was mentioned that iwd uses "ecb(arc4)" via
AF_ALG. So can we really remove it yet?
See https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Note that the code isn't in "iwd" itself but rather in "libell" which iwd depends on: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/Apparently it also uses md4 and ecb(des) too.
Ah yes, I remember now :-(
Quoted 3 lines
Marcel and Denis, what's your deprecation plan for these obsolete and insecure algorithms?
Given Denis's statement:
It sounds to me like it was broken and should be fixed. So our vote / preference is to have ARC4 fixed to follow the proper semantics. We can deal with the kernel behavioral change on our end easily enough; the required workarounds are the worse evil.
I would think that an ABI break is not the end of the world for them, and given how trivial it is to implement RC4 in C, the workaround should be to simply implement RC4 in user space, and not even bother trying to use AF_ALG to get at ecb(arc4)
(same applies to md4 and ecb(des) btw)
There will always be a long tail of use cases, and at some point, we just have to draw the line and remove obsolete and insecure cruft, especially when it impedes progress on other fronts.
Full implementation of arc4 aka ecb(arc4) below.
void arc4_crypt(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned int len) {
u32 *const S = ctx->S;
u32 x, y, a, b;
u32 ty, ta, tb;
if (len == 0)
return;
x = ctx->x;
y = ctx->y;
a = S[x];
y = (y + a) & 0xff;
b = S[y];
do {
S[y] = a;
a = (a + b) & 0xff;
S[x] = b;
x = (x + 1) & 0xff;
ta = S[x];
ty = (y + ta) & 0xff;
tb = S[ty];
*out++ = *in++ ^ S[a];
if (--len == 0)
break;
y = ty;
a = ta;
b = tb;
} while (true); ctx->x = x;
ctx->y = y;
}
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/7] crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
Quoted 42 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Biggers
[+linux-wireless, Marcel Holtmann, and Denis Kenzior]
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Remove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Quoted 8 lines
Last year there was a discussion where it was mentioned that iwd uses "ecb(arc4)" via
AF_ALG. So can we really remove it yet?
See https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Note that the code isn't in "iwd" itself but rather in "libell" which iwd depends on: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/Apparently it also uses md4 and ecb(des) too.
Ah yes, I remember now :-(
Quoted 3 lines
Marcel and Denis, what's your deprecation plan for these obsolete and insecure algorithms?
Given Denis's statement:
It sounds to me like it was broken and should be fixed. So our vote / preference is to have ARC4 fixed to follow the proper semantics. We can deal with the kernel behavioral change on our end easily enough; the required workarounds are the worse evil.
I would think that an ABI break is not the end of the world for them, and given how trivial it is to implement RC4 in C, the workaround should be to simply implement RC4 in user space, and not even bother trying to use
AF_ALGto get at ecb(arc4)
Quoted 6 lines
(same applies to md4 and ecb(des) btw)
There will always be a long tail of use cases, and at some point, we just have to draw the line and remove obsolete and insecure cruft, especially when it impedes progress on other fronts.
I have ported iwd to Nettle's LGPL 2.1 implementation of ARC4, and the diffstat is
src/crypto.c | 80 ++++++++++++-------- src/main.c | 8 -- unit/test-eapol.c | 3 +- 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/iwd.git/log/?h=arc4-cleanup
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/7] crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
Quoted 54 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 42 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Biggers
[+linux-wireless, Marcel Holtmann, and Denis Kenzior]
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Remove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Quoted 8 lines
Last year there was a discussion where it was mentioned that iwd uses "ecb(arc4)" via
AF_ALG. So can we really remove it yet?
See https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Note that the code isn't in "iwd" itself but rather in "libell" which iwd depends on: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/Apparently it also uses md4 and ecb(des) too.
Ah yes, I remember now :-(
Quoted 3 lines
Marcel and Denis, what's your deprecation plan for these obsolete and insecure algorithms?
Given Denis's statement:
It sounds to me like it was broken and should be fixed. So our vote / preference is to have ARC4 fixed to follow the proper semantics. We can deal with the kernel behavioral change on our end easily enough; the required workarounds are the worse evil.
I would think that an ABI break is not the end of the world for them, and given how trivial it is to implement RC4 in C, the workaround should be to simply implement RC4 in user space, and not even bother trying to use
AF_ALGto get at ecb(arc4)Quoted 6 lines
(same applies to md4 and ecb(des) btw)
There will always be a long tail of use cases, and at some point, we just have to draw the line and remove obsolete and insecure cruft, especially when it impedes progress on other fronts.
I have ported iwd to Nettle's LGPL 2.1 implementation of ARC4, and the diffstat is
Quoted 6 lines
src/crypto.c | 80 ++++++++++++-------- src/main.c | 8 -- unit/test-eapol.c | 3 +- 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/iwd.git/log/?h=arc4-cleanup
Marcel, Denis,
Do you have any objections to the ecb(arc4) skcipher being dropped from the kernel, given the fallback i proposed above (which is a much better way of doing rc4 in user space anyway)?
For libell, I would suggest dropping rc4 entirely, once iwd stops relying on it, as using rc4 for tls is obsolete as well.
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/7] crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
Quoted 63 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 54 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 42 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Biggers
[+linux-wireless, Marcel Holtmann, and Denis Kenzior]
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Remove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Quoted 8 lines
Last year there was a discussion where it was mentioned that iwd uses "ecb(arc4)" via
AF_ALG. So can we really remove it yet?
See https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Note that the code isn't in "iwd" itself but rather in "libell" which iwd depends on: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/Apparently it also uses md4 and ecb(des) too.
Ah yes, I remember now :-(
Quoted 3 lines
Marcel and Denis, what's your deprecation plan for these obsolete and insecure algorithms?
Given Denis's statement:
It sounds to me like it was broken and should be fixed. So our vote / preference is to have ARC4 fixed to follow the proper semantics. We can deal with the kernel behavioral change on our end easily enough; the required workarounds are the worse evil.
I would think that an ABI break is not the end of the world for them, and given how trivial it is to implement RC4 in C, the workaround should be to simply implement RC4 in user space, and not even bother trying to use
AF_ALGto get at ecb(arc4)Quoted 6 lines
(same applies to md4 and ecb(des) btw)
There will always be a long tail of use cases, and at some point, we just have to draw the line and remove obsolete and insecure cruft, especially when it impedes progress on other fronts.
I have ported iwd to Nettle's LGPL 2.1 implementation of ARC4, and the diffstat is
Quoted 6 lines
src/crypto.c | 80 ++++++++++++-------- src/main.c | 8 -- unit/test-eapol.c | 3 +- 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/iwd.git/log/?h=arc4-cleanup
Quoted 8 lines
Marcel, Denis,
Do you have any objections to the ecb(arc4) skcipher being dropped from the kernel, given the fallback i proposed above (which is a much better way of doing rc4 in user space anyway)?
For libell, I would suggest dropping rc4 entirely, once iwd stops relying on it, as using rc4 for tls is obsolete as well.
Ping?
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/7] crypto: remove ARC4 support from the skcipher API
Quoted 67 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 65 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 54 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 42 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Biggers
[+linux-wireless, Marcel Holtmann, and Denis Kenzior]
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Remove the generic ecb(arc4) skcipher, which is slightly cumbersome from a maintenance perspective, since it does not quite behave like other skciphers do in terms of key vs IV lifetime. Since we are leaving the library interface in place, which is used by the various WEP and TKIP implementations we have in the tree, we can safely drop this code now it no longer has any users.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Quoted 8 lines
Last year there was a discussion where it was mentioned that iwd uses "ecb(arc4)" via
AF_ALG. So can we really remove it yet?
See https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Note that the code isn't in "iwd" itself but rather in "libell" which iwd depends on: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/Apparently it also uses md4 and ecb(des) too.
Ah yes, I remember now :-(
Quoted 3 lines
Marcel and Denis, what's your deprecation plan for these obsolete and insecure algorithms?
Given Denis's statement:
It sounds to me like it was broken and should be fixed. So our vote / preference is to have ARC4 fixed to follow the proper semantics. We can deal with the kernel behavioral change on our end easily enough; the required workarounds are the worse evil.
I would think that an ABI break is not the end of the world for them, and given how trivial it is to implement RC4 in C, the workaround should be to simply implement RC4 in user space, and not even bother trying to use
AF_ALGto get at ecb(arc4)Quoted 6 lines
(same applies to md4 and ecb(des) btw)
There will always be a long tail of use cases, and at some point, we just have to draw the line and remove obsolete and insecure cruft, especially when it impedes progress on other fronts.
I have ported iwd to Nettle's LGPL 2.1 implementation of ARC4, and the diffstat is
Quoted 6 lines
src/crypto.c | 80 ++++++++++++-------- src/main.c | 8 -- unit/test-eapol.c | 3 +- 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/iwd.git/log/?h=arc4-cleanup
Marcel, Denis,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Do you have any objections to the ecb(arc4) skcipher being dropped from the kernel, given the fallback i proposed above (which is a much better way of doing rc4 in user space anyway)?
For libell, I would suggest dropping rc4 entirely, once iwd stops relying on it, as using rc4 for tls is obsolete as well.
Ping?
Denis was kind enough to take the changes to iwd and libell that remove all dependencies on the ecb(arc4) skcipher exposed by the kernel, so we can at least deprecate it in the short term, and hopefully remove it entirely at a later stage.
Perhaps we should introduce a Kconfig symbol that needs to be set to enable deprecated algorithms? That way, we can work with the distros to phase out the old junk that is piling up, but in a way that doesn't break people's systems.
RFC PATCH 5/7 crypto: n2 - remove ecb(arc4) support
In reply to Ard Biesheuvel--- drivers/crypto/n2_core.c | 46 -------------------- 1 file changed, 46 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/n2_core.c +0 -46
@@ -662,7 +662,6 @@ struct n2_skcipher_context {u8 aes[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE ];u8 des[DES_KEY_SIZE ];u8 des3[3 *DES_KEY_SIZE ]; -u8 arc4[258 ];/* S-box, X, Y */ } key; };
@@ -789,36 +788,6 @@ static int n2_3des_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key,return 0 ; } -static int n2_arc4_setkey (struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,const u8 *key, -unsigned int keylen) -{ -struct crypto_tfm *tfm =crypto_skcipher_tfm (skcipher); -struct n2_skcipher_context *ctx =crypto_tfm_ctx (tfm); -struct n2_skcipher_alg *n2alg =n2_skcipher_alg (skcipher); -u8 *s = ctx->key.arc4; -u8 *x = s +256 ; -u8 *y = x +1 ; -int i, j, k; - - ctx->enc_type = n2alg->enc_type; - - j = k =0 ; - *x =0 ; - *y =0 ; -for (i =0 ; i <256 ; i++) - s[i] = i; -for (i =0 ; i <256 ; i++) { -u8 a = s[i]; - j = (j + key[k] + a) &0xff ; - s[i] = s[j]; - s[j] = a; -if (++k >= keylen) - k =0 ; - } - -return 0 ; -} -static inline int skcipher_descriptor_len (int nbytes,unsigned int block_size) {int this_len = nbytes;
@@ -1122,21 +1091,6 @@ struct n2_skcipher_tmpl { };static const struct n2_skcipher_tmpl skcipher_tmpls[] = { -/* ARC4: only ECB is supported (chaining bits ignored) */ - { .name ="ecb(arc4)" , - .drv_name ="ecb-arc4" , - .block_size =1 , - .enc_type = (ENC_TYPE_ALG_RC4_STREAM | -ENC_TYPE_CHAINING_ECB ), - .skcipher = { - .min_keysize =1 , - .max_keysize =256 , - .setkey = n2_arc4_setkey, - .encrypt = n2_encrypt_ecb, - .decrypt = n2_decrypt_ecb, - }, - }, -/* DES: ECB CBC and CFB are supported */ { .name ="ecb(des)" , .drv_name ="ecb-des" ,
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH 6/7 crypto: bcm-iproc - remove ecb(arc4) support
In reply to Ard Biesheuvel--- drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c | 96 +------------------- drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.h | 1 - drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.c | 23 +---- drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.h | 1 - drivers/crypto/bcm/spu2.c | 12 +-- drivers/crypto/bcm/spu2.h | 1 - 6 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c +4 -92
@@ -165,10 +165,6 @@ spu_skcipher_rx_sg_create(struct brcm_message *mssg,return -EFAULT ; } -if (ctx->cipher.alg ==CIPHER_ALG_RC4 ) -/* Add buffer to catch 260-byte SUPDT field for RC4 */ -sg_set_buf (sg++, rctx->msg_buf.c.supdt_tweak,SPU_SUPDT_LEN ); -if (stat_pad_len)sg_set_buf (sg++, rctx->msg_buf.rx_stat_pad, stat_pad_len);
@@ -317,7 +313,6 @@ static int handle_skcipher_req(struct iproc_reqctx_s *rctx)u8 local_iv_ctr[MAX_IV_SIZE ];u32 stat_pad_len;/* num bytes to align status field */ u32 pad_len;/* total length of all padding */ -bool update_key = false;struct brcm_message *mssg;/* mailbox message */ /* number of entries in src and dst sg in mailbox message. */
@@ -391,28 +386,6 @@ static int handle_skcipher_req(struct iproc_reqctx_s *rctx) } } -if (ctx->cipher.alg ==CIPHER_ALG_RC4 ) { - rx_frag_num++; -if (chunk_start) { -/* -* for non-first RC4 chunks, use SUPDT from previous -* response as key for this chunk. -*/ - cipher_parms.key_buf = rctx->msg_buf.c.supdt_tweak; - update_key = true; - cipher_parms.type =CIPHER_TYPE_UPDT ; - }else if (!rctx->is_encrypt) { -/* -* First RC4 chunk. For decrypt, key in pre-built msg -* header may have been changed if encrypt required -* multiple chunks. So revert the key to the -* ctx->enckey value. -*/ - update_key = true; - cipher_parms.type =CIPHER_TYPE_INIT ; - } - } -if (ctx->max_payload ==SPU_MAX_PAYLOAD_INF )flow_log ("max_payload infinite\n" );else
@@ -425,14 +398,9 @@ static int handle_skcipher_req(struct iproc_reqctx_s *rctx)memcpy (rctx->msg_buf.bcm_spu_req_hdr, ctx->bcm_spu_req_hdr,sizeof (rctx->msg_buf.bcm_spu_req_hdr)); -/* -* Pass SUPDT field as key. Key field in finish() call is only used -* when update_key has been set above for RC4. Will be ignored in -* all other cases. -*/ spu->spu_cipher_req_finish (rctx->msg_buf.bcm_spu_req_hdr +BCM_HDR_LEN , ctx->spu_req_hdr_len, !(rctx->is_encrypt), - &cipher_parms, update_key, chunksize); + &cipher_parms, chunksize);atomic64_add (chunksize, &iproc_priv.bytes_out);
@@ -527,9 +495,6 @@ static void handle_skcipher_resp(struct iproc_reqctx_s *rctx) __func__, rctx->total_received, payload_len);dump_sg (req->dst, rctx->total_received, payload_len); -if (ctx->cipher.alg ==CIPHER_ALG_RC4 ) -packet_dump (" supdt " , rctx->msg_buf.c.supdt_tweak, -SPU_SUPDT_LEN ); rctx->total_received += payload_len;if (rctx->total_received == rctx->total_todo) {
@@ -1853,26 +1818,6 @@ static int aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, const u8 *key,return 0 ; } -static int rc4_setkey (struct crypto_skcipher *cipher,const u8 *key, -unsigned int keylen) -{ -struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx =crypto_skcipher_ctx (cipher); -int i; - - ctx->enckeylen =ARC4_MAX_KEY_SIZE +ARC4_STATE_SIZE ; - - ctx->enckey[0 ] =0x00 ;/* 0x00 */ - ctx->enckey[1 ] =0x00 ;/* i */ - ctx->enckey[2 ] =0x00 ;/* 0x00 */ - ctx->enckey[3 ] =0x00 ;/* j */ -for (i =0 ; i <ARC4_MAX_KEY_SIZE ; i++) - ctx->enckey[i +ARC4_STATE_SIZE ] = key[i % keylen]; - - ctx->cipher_type =CIPHER_TYPE_INIT ; - -return 0 ; -} -static int skcipher_setkey (struct crypto_skcipher *cipher,const u8 *key,unsigned int keylen) {
@@ -1895,9 +1840,6 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, const u8 *key,case CIPHER_ALG_AES : err =aes_setkey (cipher, key, keylen);break ; -case CIPHER_ALG_RC4 : - err =rc4_setkey (cipher, key, keylen); -break ;default :pr_err ("%s() Error: unknown cipher alg\n" , __func__); err = -EINVAL ;
@@ -1905,11 +1847,9 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, const u8 *key,if (err)return err; -/* RC4 already populated ctx->enkey */ -if (ctx->cipher.alg !=CIPHER_ALG_RC4 ) { -memcpy (ctx->enckey, key, keylen); - ctx->enckeylen = keylen; - } +memcpy (ctx->enckey, key, keylen); + ctx->enckeylen = keylen; +/* SPU needs XTS keys in the reverse order the crypto API presents */ if ((ctx->cipher.alg ==CIPHER_ALG_AES ) && (ctx->cipher.mode ==CIPHER_MODE_XTS )) {
@@ -2872,9 +2812,6 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, goto badkey; }break ; -case CIPHER_ALG_RC4 : - ctx->cipher_type =CIPHER_TYPE_INIT ; -break ;default :pr_err ("%s() Error: Unknown cipher alg\n" , __func__);return -EINVAL ;
@@ -3573,25 +3510,6 @@ static struct iproc_alg_s driver_algs[] = { },/* SKCIPHER algorithms. */ - { - .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, - .alg.skcipher = { - .base.cra_name = "ecb(arc4)", - .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-arc4-iproc", - .base.cra_blocksize = ARC4_BLOCK_SIZE, - .min_keysize = ARC4_MIN_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = ARC4_MAX_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize =0 , - }, - .cipher_info = { - .alg =CIPHER_ALG_RC4 , - .mode = CIPHER_MODE_NONE, - }, - .auth_info = { - .alg =HASH_ALG_NONE , - .mode = HASH_MODE_NONE, - }, - }, { .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, .alg.skcipher = {
@@ -4495,15 +4413,9 @@ static void spu_counters_init(void)static int spu_register_skcipher (struct iproc_alg_s *driver_alg) { -struct spu_hw *spu = &iproc_priv.spu;struct skcipher_alg *crypto = &driver_alg->alg.skcipher;int err; -/* SPU2 does not support RC4 */ -if ((driver_alg->cipher_info.alg ==CIPHER_ALG_RC4 ) && - (spu->spu_type ==SPU_TYPE_SPU2 )) -return 0 ; - crypto->base.cra_module =THIS_MODULE ; crypto->base.cra_priority = cipher_pri; crypto->base.cra_alignmask =0 ;
drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.h +0 -1
@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ struct spu_hw {u16 spu_req_hdr_len, unsigned int is_inbound, struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms, - bool update_key, unsigned int data_size); void (*spu_request_pad)(u8 *pad_start, u32 gcm_padding, u32 hash_pad_len, enum hash_alg auth_alg,
drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.c +1 -22
@@ -222,10 +222,6 @@ void spum_dump_msg_hdr(u8 *buf, unsigned int buf_len) cipher_key_len =24 ; name ="3DES" ;break ; -case CIPHER_ALG_RC4 : - cipher_key_len =260 ; - name ="ARC4" ; -break ;case CIPHER_ALG_AES :switch (cipher_type) {case CIPHER_TYPE_AES128 :
@@ -919,21 +915,16 @@ u16 spum_cipher_req_init(u8 *spu_hdr, struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms)* @spu_req_hdr_len: Length in bytes of the SPU request header * @isInbound: 0 encrypt, 1 decrypt * @cipher_parms: Parameters describing cipher operation to be performed -* @update_key: If true, rewrite the cipher key in SCTX * @data_size: Length of the data in the BD field * * Assumes much of the header was already filled in at setkey() time in * spum_cipher_req_init(). -* spum_cipher_req_init() fills in the encryption key. For RC4, when submitting -* a request for a non-first chunk, we use the 260-byte SUPDT field from the -* previous response as the key. update_key is true for this case. Unused in all -* other cases. +* spum_cipher_req_init() fills in the encryption key. */ void spum_cipher_req_finish (u8 *spu_hdr,u16 spu_req_hdr_len,unsigned int is_inbound,struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms, -bool update_key,unsigned int data_size) {struct SPUHEADER *spuh;
@@ -948,11 +939,6 @@ void spum_cipher_req_finish(u8 *spu_hdr,flow_log (" in: %u\n" , is_inbound);flow_log (" cipher alg: %u, cipher_type: %u\n" , cipher_parms->alg, cipher_parms->type); -if (update_key) { -flow_log (" cipher key len: %u\n" , cipher_parms->key_len); -flow_dump (" key: " , cipher_parms->key_buf, - cipher_parms->key_len); - }/* * In XTS mode, API puts "i" parameter (block tweak) in IV. For
@@ -981,13 +967,6 @@ void spum_cipher_req_finish(u8 *spu_hdr,else cipher_bits &= ~CIPHER_INBOUND ; -/* update encryption key for RC4 on non-first chunk */ -if (update_key) { - spuh->sa.cipher_flags |= - cipher_parms->type <<CIPHER_TYPE_SHIFT ; -memcpy (spuh +1 , cipher_parms->key_buf, cipher_parms->key_len); - } -if (cipher_parms->alg && cipher_parms->iv_buf && cipher_parms->iv_len)/* cipher iv provided so put it in here */ memcpy(bdesc_ptr - cipher_parms->iv_len, cipher_parms->iv_buf,
drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.h +0 -1
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ void spum_cipher_req_finish(u8 *spu_hdr,u16 spu_req_hdr_len, unsigned int is_inbound, struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms, - bool update_key, unsigned int data_size); void spum_request_pad(u8 *pad_start,
drivers/crypto/bcm/spu2.c +1 -11
@@ -1170,21 +1170,16 @@ u16 spu2_cipher_req_init(u8 *spu_hdr, struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms)* @spu_req_hdr_len: Length in bytes of the SPU request header * @isInbound: 0 encrypt, 1 decrypt * @cipher_parms: Parameters describing cipher operation to be performed -* @update_key: If true, rewrite the cipher key in SCTX * @data_size: Length of the data in the BD field * * Assumes much of the header was already filled in at setkey() time in * spu_cipher_req_init(). -* spu_cipher_req_init() fills in the encryption key. For RC4, when submitting a -* request for a non-first chunk, we use the 260-byte SUPDT field from the -* previous response as the key. update_key is true for this case. Unused in all -* other cases. +* spu_cipher_req_init() fills in the encryption key. */ void spu2_cipher_req_finish (u8 *spu_hdr,u16 spu_req_hdr_len,unsigned int is_inbound,struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms, -bool update_key,unsigned int data_size) {struct SPU2_FMD *fmd;
@@ -1196,11 +1191,6 @@ void spu2_cipher_req_finish(u8 *spu_hdr,flow_log (" in: %u\n" , is_inbound);flow_log (" cipher alg: %u, cipher_type: %u\n" , cipher_parms->alg, cipher_parms->type); -if (update_key) { -flow_log (" cipher key len: %u\n" , cipher_parms->key_len); -flow_dump (" key: " , cipher_parms->key_buf, - cipher_parms->key_len); - }flow_log (" iv len: %d\n" , cipher_parms->iv_len);flow_dump (" iv: " , cipher_parms->iv_buf, cipher_parms->iv_len);flow_log (" data_size: %u\n" , data_size);
drivers/crypto/bcm/spu2.h +0 -1
@@ -200,7 +200,6 @@ void spu2_cipher_req_finish(u8 *spu_hdr,u16 spu_req_hdr_len, unsigned int is_inbound, struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms, - bool update_key, unsigned int data_size); void spu2_request_pad(u8 *pad_start, u32 gcm_padding, u32 hash_pad_len, enum hash_alg auth_alg, enum hash_mode auth_mode,
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH 7/7 crypto: tcrypt - remove ecb(arc4) testing/benchmarking support
In reply to Ard Biesheuvel--- crypto/tcrypt.c | 21 +------ crypto/testmgr.c | 7 --- crypto/testmgr.h | 62 -------------------- 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 89 deletions(-)
crypto/tcrypt.c +1 -20
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static char *tvmem[TVMEMSIZE];static const char *check[] = {"des" ,"md5" ,"des3_ede" ,"rot13" ,"sha1" ,"sha224" ,"sha256" ,"sm3" ,"blowfish" ,"twofish" ,"serpent" ,"sha384" ,"sha512" ,"md4" ,"aes" , -"cast6" ,"arc4" ,"michael_mic" ,"deflate" ,"crc32c" ,"tea" ,"xtea" , +"cast6" ,"michael_mic" ,"deflate" ,"crc32c" ,"tea" ,"xtea" ,"khazad" ,"wp512" ,"wp384" ,"wp256" ,"tnepres" ,"xeta" ,"fcrypt" ,"camellia" ,"seed" ,"salsa20" ,"rmd128" ,"rmd160" ,"rmd256" ,"rmd320" ,"lzo" ,"lzo-rle" ,"cts" ,"sha3-224" ,"sha3-256" ,"sha3-384" ,
@@ -1762,10 +1762,6 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb) ret +=tcrypt_test ("xts(cast6)" );break ; -case 16 : - ret +=tcrypt_test ("ecb(arc4)" ); -break ; -case 17 : ret +=tcrypt_test ("michael_mic" );break ;
@@ -2201,11 +2197,6 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb) speed_template_32_64);break ; -case 208 : -test_cipher_speed ("ecb(arc4)" ,ENCRYPT , sec,NULL ,0 , - speed_template_8); -break ; -case 209 :test_cipher_speed ("ecb(cast5)" ,ENCRYPT , sec,NULL ,0 , speed_template_8_16);
@@ -2720,11 +2711,6 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb) speed_template_32_48_64);break ; -case 505 : -test_acipher_speed ("ecb(arc4)" ,ENCRYPT , sec,NULL ,0 , - speed_template_8); -break ; -case 506 :test_acipher_speed ("ecb(cast5)" ,ENCRYPT , sec,NULL ,0 , speed_template_8_16);
@@ -2932,11 +2918,6 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb) speed_template_32_48_64, num_mb);break ; -case 605 : -test_mb_skcipher_speed ("ecb(arc4)" ,ENCRYPT , sec,NULL ,0 , - speed_template_8, num_mb); -break ; -case 606 :test_mb_skcipher_speed ("ecb(cast5)" ,ENCRYPT , sec,NULL ,0 , speed_template_8_16, num_mb);
crypto/testmgr.c +0 -7
@@ -4783,13 +4783,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { .suite = { .cipher = __VECS(anubis_tv_template) } - }, { - .alg = "ecb(arc4)", - .generic_driver = "ecb(arc4)-generic", - .test = alg_test_skcipher, - .suite = { - .cipher = __VECS(arc4_tv_template) - } }, { .alg = "ecb(blowfish)", .test = alg_test_skcipher,
crypto/testmgr.h +0 -62
68 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1