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virtiofsd: Add a unprivileged passthrough mode

PATCH In review Vivek Goyal 3 participants 14 messages Jul 30, 2020 – Aug 7, 2020

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover virtiofsd: Add a unprivileged passthrough mode

Hi,

This is V2 of patches. Only change since last version is handling of lock/pid file creation as per the comments from Daniel Berrange.

I can't think of any more changes needed. As a unpriviliged user inside VM I can do simple operations like create/remove/read/write files.

For more testing, I probably need a testsuite which runs as unpriviliged user. pjdfstests needs to run as root and this does not work in this setup as creation of files as root fails. (On host, daemon tries to switch to root uid and that fails).

So as of now, I think these are the minimum changes needed to support unprivileged passthrough mode of virtiofsd.

Thanks
Vivek

Vivek Goyal (5):
virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode
virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir
virtiofsd: open /proc/self/fd/ in sandbox=NONE mode
virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode
virtiofsd: Skip setup_capabilities() in sandbox=NONE mode

 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c    | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/5 virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode

At startup if we are running as non-root user, then internally set unpriviliged mode set. Also add a notion of sandbox NONE and set that internally in unprivileged mode. setting up namespaces and chroot() fails in unpriviliged mode.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +8 -0
index e2fbc614fd..cd91c4a831 100644
@@ -147,11 +147,13 @@ enum {
 enum {
     SANDBOX_NAMESPACE,
     SANDBOX_CHROOT,
+    SANDBOX_NONE,
 };
 
 struct lo_data {
     pthread_mutex_t mutex;
     int sandbox;
+    bool unprivileged;
     int debug;
     int writeback;
     int flock;
@@ -3288,6 +3290,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     lo_map_init(&lo.dirp_map);
     lo_map_init(&lo.fd_map);
 
+    if (geteuid() != 0) {
+       lo.unprivileged = true;
+       lo.sandbox = SANDBOX_NONE;
+       fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "Running in unprivileged passthrough mode.\n");
+    }
+
     if (fuse_parse_cmdline(&args, &opts) != 0) {
         goto err_out1;
     }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode

Quoted 29 lines · * Vivek Goyal ([email protected]) wrote:

At startup if we are running as non-root user, then internally set unpriviliged mode set. Also add a notion of sandbox NONE and set that internally in unprivileged mode. setting up namespaces and chroot() fails in unpriviliged mode.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +2 -0
index e2fbc614fd..cd91c4a831 100644
@@ -147,11 +147,13 @@ enum {
 enum {
     SANDBOX_NAMESPACE,
     SANDBOX_CHROOT,
+    SANDBOX_NONE,
 };
 
 struct lo_data {
     pthread_mutex_t mutex;
     int sandbox;
+    bool unprivileged;
     int debug;
     int writeback;
     int flock;

tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 3297

Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +5 -0
@@ -3288,6 +3290,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     lo_map_init(&lo.dirp_map);
     lo_map_init(&lo.fd_map);
 
+    if (geteuid() != 0) {
+       lo.unprivileged = true;
+       lo.sandbox = SANDBOX_NONE;
+       fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "Running in unprivileged passthrough mode.\n");
+    }

I don't like this being automatic; to switch to a less secure mode, the user should have to explicitly ask for it; we don't want people accidentally ending up with less security.

Also, I'm not sure that checking for geteuid() != 0 is the right test - wouldn't the current virtiofsd run with a non-root user as long as it had the correct capabilities?

I was doing to suggest we match cloud-hypervisor where we added --disable-sandbox; but with this we now have a trinary switch; so sandbox=none is probably the right way.

Dave

Quoted 6 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
     if (fuse_parse_cmdline(&args, &opts) != 0) {
         goto err_out1;
     }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/5 virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir

In reply to Vivek Goyal

Right now we create lock/pid file in /usr/local/var/... and unprivliged user does not have access to create files there.

Hence, in unprivileged mode, create this file in per user cache dir as specified by environment variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +14 -1
index 6b21a93841..1551a94757 100644
@@ -972,8 +972,21 @@ static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se)
     g_autofree gchar *pidfile = NULL;
     g_autofree gchar *dir = NULL;
     Error *local_err = NULL;
+    gboolean unprivileged = false;
 
-    dir = qemu_get_local_state_pathname("run/virtiofsd");
+    if (geteuid() != 0)
+        unprivileged = true;
+
+    /*
+     * Unpriviliged users don't have access to /usr/local/var. Hence
+     * store lock/pid file in per user cache directory. Use environment
+     * variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.
+     */
+    if (unprivileged) {
+        dir = g_strdup_printf("%s/virtiofsd", g_get_user_runtime_dir());
+    } else {
+        dir = qemu_get_local_state_pathname("run/virtiofsd");
+    }
 
     if (g_mkdir_with_parents(dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) {
         fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s",
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Reviewed-by on v2 2/5
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir

Quoted 2 lines · * Vivek Goyal ([email protected]) wrote:

Right now we create lock/pid file in /usr/local/var/... and unprivliged user does not have access to create files there.

I *think* the /usr/local there is coming from the build config of your qemu; but I'm not 100% sure whether it's just it's --preifx

Quoted 2 lines

Hence, in unprivileged mode, create this file in per user cache dir as specified by environment variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.

Yes; it's interesting that qemu daemons are somewhat inconsistent in this; most of them ask for a --pidfile to say where you want it; but not all.

Quoted 10 lines
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +0 -0
index 6b21a93841..1551a94757 100644

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) · line 978

Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +3 -1
@@ -972,8 +972,21 @@ static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se)
     g_autofree gchar *pidfile = NULL;
     g_autofree gchar *dir = NULL;
     Error *local_err = NULL;
+    gboolean unprivileged = false;
 
-    dir = qemu_get_local_state_pathname("run/virtiofsd");
+    if (geteuid() != 0)
+        unprivileged = true;

Note qemu style guides need {'s on that.

tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) · line 989

Quoted 10 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +10 -0
+    /*
+     * Unpriviliged users don't have access to /usr/local/var. Hence
+     * store lock/pid file in per user cache directory. Use environment
+     * variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.
+     */
+    if (unprivileged) {
+        dir = g_strdup_printf("%s/virtiofsd", g_get_user_runtime_dir());
+    } else {
+        dir = qemu_get_local_state_pathname("run/virtiofsd");
+    }

Yeh that's OK, so with the { fixed;

A few other possible thoughts:
a) Just always use g_get_runtime_dir as the top; even for root - it
seems to come out as /root/.cache for root, which isn't terrible.
b) Maybe put this code in qemu_get_local_state_pathname?

Dave

Quoted 6 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +0 -0
     if (g_mkdir_with_parents(dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) {
         fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s",
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/5 virtiofsd: open /proc/self/fd/ in sandbox=NONE mode

In reply to Vivek Goyal

We need /proc/self/fd descriptor even in sandbox=NONE mode.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +12 -1
index cd91c4a831..76ef891105 100644
@@ -2969,6 +2969,15 @@ static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in)
     pthread_mutex_unlock(&cap.mutex);
 }
 
+static void setup_none(struct lo_data *lo)
+{
+    lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc/self/fd", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(\"/proc/self/fd\", O_PATH): %m\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Use chroot as a weaker sandbox for environments where the process is
  * launched without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
@@ -3014,8 +3023,10 @@ static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se,
     if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NAMESPACE) {
         setup_namespaces(lo, se);
         setup_mounts(lo->source);
-    } else {
+    } else if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_CHROOT) {
         setup_chroot(lo);
+    } else {
+        setup_none(lo);
     }
 
     setup_seccomp(enable_syslog);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] virtiofsd: open /proc/self/fd/ in sandbox=NONE mode

Quoted 12 lines · * Vivek Goyal ([email protected]) wrote:

We need /proc/self/fd descriptor even in sandbox=NONE mode.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
index cd91c4a831..76ef891105 100644

tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in) · line 2972

Quoted 4 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +1 -0
@@ -2969,6 +2969,15 @@ static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in)
     pthread_mutex_unlock(&cap.mutex);
 }
 
+static void setup_none(struct lo_data *lo)

'setup_none' is not the most obvious name; setup_sandbox_none ?

Quoted 26 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +11 -1
+{
+    lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc/self/fd", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(\"/proc/self/fd\", O_PATH): %m\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Use chroot as a weaker sandbox for environments where the process is
  * launched without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
@@ -3014,8 +3023,10 @@ static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se,
     if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NAMESPACE) {
         setup_namespaces(lo, se);
         setup_mounts(lo->source);
-    } else {
+    } else if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_CHROOT) {
         setup_chroot(lo);
+    } else {
+        setup_none(lo);
     }
 
     setup_seccomp(enable_syslog);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/5 virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode

In reply to Vivek Goyal

In sandbox=NONE mode, lo->source points to the directory which is being exported. We have not done any chroot()/pivot_root(). So open lo->source.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +4 -1
index 76ef891105..a6fa816b6c 100644
@@ -3209,7 +3209,10 @@ static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root)
     int fd, res;
     struct stat stat;
 
-    fd = open("/", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NONE)
+        fd = open(lo->source, O_PATH);
+    else
+        fd = open("/", O_PATH);
     if (fd == -1) {
         fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", lo->source);
         exit(1);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode

Quoted 13 lines · Vivek Goyal

In sandbox=NONE mode, lo->source points to the directory which is being exported. We have not done any chroot()/pivot_root(). So open lo->source.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
index 76ef891105..a6fa816b6c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root) · line 3215

Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +4 -1
@@ -3209,7 +3209,10 @@ static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root)
     int fd, res;
     struct stat stat;
 
-    fd = open("/", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NONE)
+        fd = open(lo->source, O_PATH);
+    else
+        fd = open("/", O_PATH);

Up until now virtiofsd has been able to assume that path traversal has the shared directory as "/".

Now this is no longer true and it is necessary to audit all syscalls that take path arguments. They must ensure that:
1. Path components are safe (no ".." or "/" allowed)
2. Symlinks are not followed.

Did you audit all syscalls made by passthrough_ll.c?

virtiofsd still needs to restrict the client to the shared directory for two reasons:
1. The guest may not be trusted. An unprivileged sandbox=none mount can be used with a malicious guest.
2. If accidental escapes are possible then the guest could accidentally corrupt or delete files outside the shared directory.

Stefan

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode

Quoted 26 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 13 lines · Vivek Goyal

In sandbox=NONE mode, lo->source points to the directory which is being exported. We have not done any chroot()/pivot_root(). So open lo->source.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
index 76ef891105..a6fa816b6c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root) · line 3215

Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +4 -1
@@ -3209,7 +3209,10 @@ static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root)
     int fd, res;
     struct stat stat;
 
-    fd = open("/", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NONE)
+        fd = open(lo->source, O_PATH);
+    else
+        fd = open("/", O_PATH);

Up until now virtiofsd has been able to assume that path traversal has the shared directory as "/".

Quoted 4 lines

Now this is no longer true and it is necessary to audit all syscalls that take path arguments. They must ensure that:
1. Path components are safe (no ".." or "/" allowed)
2. Symlinks are not followed.

This code does not change the path client is passing in and we are already doing the checks on passed in paths/names. So existing checks should work even for this case, isn't it?

lo_lookup() {
    if (strchr(name, '/')) {
        fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
        return;
    }
}
lo_do_lookup() {
    /* Do not allow escaping root directory */
    if (dir == &lo->root && strcmp(name, "..") == 0) {
        name = ".";
    }
}
Quoted 9 lines

Did you audit all syscalls made by passthrough_ll.c?

virtiofsd still needs to restrict the client to the shared directory for two reasons:
1. The guest may not be trusted. An unprivileged sandbox=none mount can be used with a malicious guest.
2. If accidental escapes are possible then the guest could accidentally corrupt or delete files outside the shared directory.

Even if escape is possible, its no different than a malicious user application running. Given sandbox=none can be used in case of unpriviliged mode, that means user app can only affect files owned by that user.

Given we are not doing chroot()/pivot_root(), key question will be what additional path we are enabling using which one can escape out of this shared directory.

Having said that, In case of unpriviliged mode, it feels that chroot() is more of a nice to have kind of functionality. Even if guest manages to break out of shared directory, impact is equivalent to user running a malicious app directly.

If doing chroot/pivot_root is must, then we need additional capabilities. And that probably means we need to launch virtiofsd in a user namespace with required caps. And that will fall back into the territory of running virtiofsd in a user namespace. That indeed is an important use case which needs to be solved.

Thanks
Vivek

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode

Quoted 43 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 26 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
Quoted 13 lines · Vivek Goyal

In sandbox=NONE mode, lo->source points to the directory which is being exported. We have not done any chroot()/pivot_root(). So open lo->source.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
index 76ef891105..a6fa816b6c 100644

tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root) · line 3215

Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +4 -1
@@ -3209,7 +3209,10 @@ static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root)
     int fd, res;
     struct stat stat;
 
-    fd = open("/", O_PATH);
+    if (lo->sandbox == SANDBOX_NONE)
+        fd = open(lo->source, O_PATH);
+    else
+        fd = open("/", O_PATH);

Up until now virtiofsd has been able to assume that path traversal has the shared directory as "/".

Quoted 4 lines

Now this is no longer true and it is necessary to audit all syscalls that take path arguments. They must ensure that:
1. Path components are safe (no ".." or "/" allowed)
2. Symlinks are not followed.

This code does not change the path client is passing in and we are already doing the checks on passed in paths/names. So existing checks should work even for this case, isn't it?

lo_lookup() {
    if (strchr(name, '/')) {
        fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
        return;
    }
}
Quoted 6 lines
lo_do_lookup() {
    /* Do not allow escaping root directory */
    if (dir == &lo->root && strcmp(name, "..") == 0) {
        name = ".";
    }
}

Yes, hopefully paths are already checked and syscalls do not follow symlinks. However, we wouldn't have noticed if either of those were missing since the pivot_root(2) ensured that path traversal stays within the shared directory.

Now that a layer of protection has been removed it's necessary to check again whether everything is really alright.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines

Did you audit all syscalls made by passthrough_ll.c?

virtiofsd still needs to restrict the client to the shared directory for two reasons:
1. The guest may not be trusted. An unprivileged sandbox=none mount can be used with a malicious guest.
2. If accidental escapes are possible then the guest could accidentally corrupt or delete files outside the shared directory.

Quoted 4 lines

Even if escape is possible, its no different than a malicious user application running. Given sandbox=none can be used in case of unpriviliged mode, that means user app can only affect files owned by that user.

Users may run untrusted guests. Those guests should not gain access to the user's files outside the shared directory.

Quoted 1 line

If doing chroot/pivot_root is must, then we need additional capabilities.

I think it's not a must, but just an extra layer of security. What I don't know 100% is whether virtiofsd accidentally relies on that extra layer of security today since it never ran without it :).

Stefan

#11 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/5 virtiofsd: Skip setup_capabilities() in sandbox=NONE mode

In reply to Vivek Goyal

setup_capabilites() tries to give some of the required capabilities to act as a full fledged file server in priviliged mode. In unpriviliged mode we can't get those capabilities and setup_capabilities() will fail.

So don't setup capabilities when sandbox=NONE.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +2 -1
index a6fa816b6c..1a0b24cbf2 100644
@@ -3030,7 +3030,8 @@ static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se,
     }
 
     setup_seccomp(enable_syslog);
-    setup_capabilities(g_strdup(lo->modcaps));
+    if (lo->sandbox != SANDBOX_NONE)
+       setup_capabilities(g_strdup(lo->modcaps));
 }
 
 /* Set the maximum number of open file descriptors */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] virtiofsd: Skip setup_capabilities() in sandbox=NONE mode

Quoted 16 lines · * Vivek Goyal ([email protected]) wrote:

setup_capabilites() tries to give some of the required capabilities to act as a full fledged file server in priviliged mode. In unpriviliged mode we can't get those capabilities and setup_capabilities() will fail.

So don't setup capabilities when sandbox=NONE.

---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
index a6fa816b6c..1a0b24cbf2 100644

tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se, · line 3035

Quoted 7 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +2 -1
@@ -3030,7 +3030,8 @@ static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se,
     }
 
     setup_seccomp(enable_syslog);
-    setup_capabilities(g_strdup(lo->modcaps));
+    if (lo->sandbox != SANDBOX_NONE)
+       setup_capabilities(g_strdup(lo->modcaps));
 }

I'd rather keep capabilities and sandboxing separate. Since I already added modcaps= how about just letting that take a varient as '-o modcaps=keep'

Dave

Quoted 4 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +0 -0
 /* Set the maximum number of open file descriptors */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
#13 lore raw
In reply to Vivek Goyal
Quoted 9 lines · Vivek Goyal

Hi,

This is V2 of patches. Only change since last version is handling of lock/pid file creation as per the comments from Daniel Berrange.

I can't think of any more changes needed. As a unpriviliged user inside VM I can do simple operations like create/remove/read/write files.

Quoted 7 lines

For more testing, I probably need a testsuite which runs as unpriviliged user. pjdfstests needs to run as root and this does not work in this setup as creation of files as root fails. (On host, daemon tries to switch to root uid and that fails).

So as of now, I think these are the minimum changes needed to support unprivileged passthrough mode of virtiofsd.

Ideas for testing user file I/O:

  $ git clone https://git.qemu.org/git/qemu.git
  $ find qemu -name \*.c
  $ grep -r vhost_user_fs qemu
  $ rm -rf qemu
  $ pip install --user Django
  $ .local/bin/django-admin

Stefan