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selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded

PATCH In review Sasha Levin 4 participants 209 messages Sep 18, 2020 Page 1 of 2

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Sasha Levin

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/206 selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded

From: Jonathan Lebon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ]

Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the security.selinux xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy.

This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files.

Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem.

This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow setxattr if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as LABEL_INVALID so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time

Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted.

[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +12 -0
index 452254fd89f87..250b725f5754c 100644
@@ -3304,6 +3304,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 	}
 
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
+		return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
+
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3387,6 +3390,15 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
+		/* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
+		 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
+		 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
+		 * we've since initialized.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+
 	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
 					   &newsid);
 	if (rc) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/206 media: mc-device.c: fix memleak in media_device_register_entity

From: zhengbin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 713f871b30a66dc4daff4d17b760c9916aaaf2e1 ]

In media_device_register_entity, if media_graph_walk_init fails, need to free the previously memory.

---
 drivers/media/media-device.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
drivers/media/media-device.c +33 -32
index ed518b1f82e4a..d04ed438a45de 100644
@@ -568,6 +568,38 @@ static void media_device_release(struct media_devnode *devnode)
 	dev_dbg(devnode->parent, "Media device released\n");
 }
 
+static void __media_device_unregister_entity(struct media_entity *entity)
+{
+	struct media_device *mdev = entity->graph_obj.mdev;
+	struct media_link *link, *tmp;
+	struct media_interface *intf;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	ida_free(&mdev->entity_internal_idx, entity->internal_idx);
+
+	/* Remove all interface links pointing to this entity */
+	list_for_each_entry(intf, &mdev->interfaces, graph_obj.list) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(link, tmp, &intf->links, list) {
+			if (link->entity == entity)
+				__media_remove_intf_link(link);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Remove all data links that belong to this entity */
+	__media_entity_remove_links(entity);
+
+	/* Remove all pads that belong to this entity */
+	for (i = 0; i < entity->num_pads; i++)
+		media_gobj_destroy(&entity->pads[i].graph_obj);
+
+	/* Remove the entity */
+	media_gobj_destroy(&entity->graph_obj);
+
+	/* invoke entity_notify callbacks to handle entity removal?? */
+
+	entity->graph_obj.mdev = NULL;
+}
+
 /**
  * media_device_register_entity - Register an entity with a media device
  * @mdev:	The media device
@@ -625,6 +657,7 @@ int __must_check media_device_register_entity(struct media_device *mdev,
 		 */
 		ret = media_graph_walk_init(&new, mdev);
 		if (ret) {
+			__media_device_unregister_entity(entity);
 			mutex_unlock(&mdev->graph_mutex);
 			return ret;
 		}
@@ -637,38 +670,6 @@ int __must_check media_device_register_entity(struct media_device *mdev,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(media_device_register_entity);
 
-static void __media_device_unregister_entity(struct media_entity *entity)
-{
-	struct media_device *mdev = entity->graph_obj.mdev;
-	struct media_link *link, *tmp;
-	struct media_interface *intf;
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	ida_free(&mdev->entity_internal_idx, entity->internal_idx);
-
-	/* Remove all interface links pointing to this entity */
-	list_for_each_entry(intf, &mdev->interfaces, graph_obj.list) {
-		list_for_each_entry_safe(link, tmp, &intf->links, list) {
-			if (link->entity == entity)
-				__media_remove_intf_link(link);
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Remove all data links that belong to this entity */
-	__media_entity_remove_links(entity);
-
-	/* Remove all pads that belong to this entity */
-	for (i = 0; i < entity->num_pads; i++)
-		media_gobj_destroy(&entity->pads[i].graph_obj);
-
-	/* Remove the entity */
-	media_gobj_destroy(&entity->graph_obj);
-
-	/* invoke entity_notify callbacks to handle entity removal?? */
-
-	entity->graph_obj.mdev = NULL;
-}
-
 void media_device_unregister_entity(struct media_entity *entity)
 {
 	struct media_device *mdev = entity->graph_obj.mdev;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/206 dma-fence: Serialise signal enabling (dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling)

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9c98f021e4e717ffd9948fa65340ea3ef12b7935 ]

Make dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling() behave like its dma_fence_add_callback() and dma_fence_default_wait() counterparts and perform the test to enable signaling under the fence->lock, along with the action to do so. This ensure that should an implementation be trying to flush the cb_list (by signaling) on retirement before freeing the fence, it can do so in a race-free manner.

See also 0fc89b6802ba ("dma-fence: Simply wrap dma_fence_signal_locked with dma_fence_signal").

v2: Refactor all 3 enable_signaling paths to use a common function.
v3: Don't argue, just keep the tracepoint in the existing spot.

---
 drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c +35 -43
index 1551ca7df3941..8586cc05def17 100644
@@ -244,6 +244,30 @@ void dma_fence_free(struct dma_fence *fence)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_fence_free);
 
+static bool __dma_fence_enable_signaling(struct dma_fence *fence)
+{
+	bool was_set;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(fence->lock);
+
+	was_set = test_and_set_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_ENABLE_SIGNAL_BIT,
+				   &fence->flags);
+
+	if (test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!was_set && fence->ops->enable_signaling) {
+		trace_dma_fence_enable_signal(fence);
+
+		if (!fence->ops->enable_signaling(fence)) {
+			dma_fence_signal_locked(fence);
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /**
  * dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling - enable signaling on fence
  * @fence: the fence to enable
@@ -256,19 +280,12 @@ void dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling(struct dma_fence *fence)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (!test_and_set_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_ENABLE_SIGNAL_BIT,
-			      &fence->flags) &&
-	    !test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags) &&
-	    fence->ops->enable_signaling) {
-		trace_dma_fence_enable_signal(fence);
-
-		spin_lock_irqsave(fence->lock, flags);
-
-		if (!fence->ops->enable_signaling(fence))
-			dma_fence_signal_locked(fence);
+	if (test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags))
+		return;
 
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(fence->lock, flags);
-	}
+	spin_lock_irqsave(fence->lock, flags);
+	__dma_fence_enable_signaling(fence);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(fence->lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling);
 
@@ -302,7 +319,6 @@ int dma_fence_add_callback(struct dma_fence *fence, struct dma_fence_cb *cb,
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret = 0;
-	bool was_set;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!fence || !func))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -314,25 +330,14 @@ int dma_fence_add_callback(struct dma_fence *fence, struct dma_fence_cb *cb,
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(fence->lock, flags);
 
-	was_set = test_and_set_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_ENABLE_SIGNAL_BIT,
-				   &fence->flags);
-
-	if (test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags))
-		ret = -ENOENT;
-	else if (!was_set && fence->ops->enable_signaling) {
-		trace_dma_fence_enable_signal(fence);
-
-		if (!fence->ops->enable_signaling(fence)) {
-			dma_fence_signal_locked(fence);
-			ret = -ENOENT;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (!ret) {
+	if (__dma_fence_enable_signaling(fence)) {
 		cb->func = func;
 		list_add_tail(&cb->node, &fence->cb_list);
-	} else
+	} else {
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cb->node);
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+	}
+
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(fence->lock, flags);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -432,7 +437,6 @@ dma_fence_default_wait(struct dma_fence *fence, bool intr, signed long timeout)
 	struct default_wait_cb cb;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	signed long ret = timeout ? timeout : 1;
-	bool was_set;
 
 	if (test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags))
 		return ret;
@@ -444,21 +448,9 @@ dma_fence_default_wait(struct dma_fence *fence, bool intr, signed long timeout)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	was_set = test_and_set_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_ENABLE_SIGNAL_BIT,
-				   &fence->flags);
-
-	if (test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags))
+	if (!__dma_fence_enable_signaling(fence))
 		goto out;
 
-	if (!was_set && fence->ops->enable_signaling) {
-		trace_dma_fence_enable_signal(fence);
-
-		if (!fence->ops->enable_signaling(fence)) {
-			dma_fence_signal_locked(fence);
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
-
 	if (!timeout) {
 		ret = 0;
 		goto out;
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#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/206 ath10k: fix array out-of-bounds access

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Miaoqing Pan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5329b2d5b8b4e41be14d31ee8505b4f5607bf9b ]

If firmware reports rate_max > WMI_TPC_RATE_MAX(WMI_TPC_FINAL_RATE_MAX) or num_tx_chain > WMI_TPC_TX_N_CHAIN, it will cause array out-of-bounds access, so print a warning and reset to avoid memory corruption.

Tested HW: QCA9984
Tested FW: 10.4-3.9.0.2-00035

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/debug.c |  2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c   | 49 ++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/debug.c +1 -1
index 0baaad90b8d18..aa333110eaba6 100644
@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ static void ath10k_tpc_stats_print(struct ath10k_tpc_stats *tpc_stats,
 	*len += scnprintf(buf + *len, buf_len - *len,
 			  "No.  Preamble Rate_code ");
 
-	for (i = 0; i < WMI_TPC_TX_N_CHAIN; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < tpc_stats->num_tx_chain; i++)
 		*len += scnprintf(buf + *len, buf_len - *len,
 				  "tpc_value%d ", i);
 
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c +31 -18

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#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/206 ath10k: fix memory leak for tpc_stats_final

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Miaoqing Pan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 486a8849843455298d49e694cca9968336ce2327 ]

The memory of ar->debug.tpc_stats_final is reallocated every debugfs reading, it should be freed in ath10k_debug_destroy() for the last allocation.

Tested HW: QCA9984
Tested FW: 10.4-3.9.0.2-00035

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/debug.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/debug.c +1 -0
index aa333110eaba6..4e980e78ba95c 100644
@@ -2365,6 +2365,7 @@ void ath10k_debug_destroy(struct ath10k *ar)
 	ath10k_debug_fw_stats_reset(ar);
 
 	kfree(ar->debug.tpc_stats);
+	kfree(ar->debug.tpc_stats_final);
 }
 
 int ath10k_debug_register(struct ath10k *ar)
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#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/206 mm: fix double page fault on arm64 if PTE_AF is cleared

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jia He <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 83d116c53058d505ddef051e90ab27f57015b025 ]

When we tested pmdk unit test [1] vmmalloc_fork TEST3 on arm64 guest, there will be a double page fault in __copy_from_user_inatomic of cow_user_page.

To reproduce the bug, the cmd is as follows after you deployed everything:
make -C src/test/vmmalloc_fork/ TEST_TIME=60m check

Below call trace is from arm64 do_page_fault for debugging purpose:

[  110.016195] Call trace:
[  110.016826]  do_page_fault+0x5a4/0x690
[  110.017812]  do_mem_abort+0x50/0xb0
[  110.018726]  el1_da+0x20/0xc4
[  110.019492]  __arch_copy_from_user+0x180/0x280
[  110.020646]  do_wp_page+0xb0/0x860
[  110.021517]  __handle_mm_fault+0x994/0x1338
[  110.022606]  handle_mm_fault+0xe8/0x180
[  110.023584]  do_page_fault+0x240/0x690
[  110.024535]  do_mem_abort+0x50/0xb0
[  110.025423]  el0_da+0x20/0x24

The pte info before __copy_from_user_inatomic is (PTE_AF is cleared):
[ffff9b007000] pgd=000000023d4f8003, pud=000000023da9b003,

               pmd=000000023d4b3003, pte=360000298607bd3

As told by Catalin: "On arm64 without hardware Access Flag, copying from user will fail because the pte is old and cannot be marked young. So we always end up with zeroed page after fork() + CoW for pfn mappings. we don't always have a hardware-managed access flag on arm64."

This patch fixes it by calling pte_mkyoung. Also, the parameter is changed because vmf should be passed to cow_user_page()

Add a WARN_ON_ONCE when __copy_from_user_inatomic() returns error in case there can be some obscure use-case (by Kirill).

[1] https://github.com/pmem/pmdk/tree/master/src/test/vmmalloc_fork

---
 mm/memory.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +89 -15
index bbf0cc4066c84..fcad8a0d943d3 100644
@@ -116,6 +116,18 @@ int randomize_va_space __read_mostly =
 					2;
 #endif
 
+#ifndef arch_faults_on_old_pte
+static inline bool arch_faults_on_old_pte(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Those arches which don't have hw access flag feature need to
+	 * implement their own helper. By default, "true" means pagefault
+	 * will be hit on old pte.
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int __init disable_randmaps(char *s)
 {
 	randomize_va_space = 0;
@@ -2335,32 +2347,82 @@ static inline int pte_unmap_same(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
 	return same;
 }
 
-static inline void cow_user_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src, unsigned long va, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+static inline bool cow_user_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src,
+				 struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
+	bool ret;
+	void *kaddr;
+	void __user *uaddr;
+	bool force_mkyoung;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+	unsigned long addr = vmf->address;
+
 	debug_dma_assert_idle(src);
 
+	if (likely(src)) {
+		copy_user_highpage(dst, src, addr, vma);
+		return true;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If the source page was a PFN mapping, we don't have
 	 * a "struct page" for it. We do a best-effort copy by
 	 * just copying from the original user address. If that
 	 * fails, we just zero-fill it. Live with it.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(!src)) {
-		void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(dst);
-		void __user *uaddr = (void __user *)(va & PAGE_MASK);
+	kaddr = kmap_atomic(dst);
+	uaddr = (void __user *)(addr & PAGE_MASK);
+
+	/*
+	 * On architectures with software "accessed" bits, we would
+	 * take a double page fault, so mark it accessed here.
+	 */
+	force_mkyoung = arch_faults_on_old_pte() && !pte_young(vmf->orig_pte);
+	if (force_mkyoung) {
+		pte_t entry;
+
+		vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, vmf->pmd, addr, &vmf->ptl);
+		if (!likely(pte_same(*vmf->pte, vmf->orig_pte))) {
+			/*
+			 * Other thread has already handled the fault
+			 * and we don't need to do anything. If it's
+			 * not the case, the fault will be triggered
+			 * again on the same address.
+			 */
+			ret = false;
+			goto pte_unlock;
+		}
 
+		entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte);
+		if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, addr, vmf->pte, entry, 0))
+			update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, vmf->pte);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This really shouldn't fail, because the page is there
+	 * in the page tables. But it might just be unreadable,
+	 * in which case we just give up and fill the result with
+	 * zeroes.
+	 */
+	if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(kaddr, uaddr, PAGE_SIZE)) {
 		/*
-		 * This really shouldn't fail, because the page is there
-		 * in the page tables. But it might just be unreadable,
-		 * in which case we just give up and fill the result with
-		 * zeroes.
+		 * Give a warn in case there can be some obscure
+		 * use-case
 		 */
-		if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(kaddr, uaddr, PAGE_SIZE))
-			clear_page(kaddr);
-		kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
-		flush_dcache_page(dst);
-	} else
-		copy_user_highpage(dst, src, va, vma);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		clear_page(kaddr);
+	}
+
+	ret = true;
+
+pte_unlock:
+	if (force_mkyoung)
+		pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
+	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+	flush_dcache_page(dst);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static gfp_t __get_fault_gfp_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
@@ -2514,7 +2576,19 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 				vmf->address);
 		if (!new_page)
 			goto oom;
-		cow_user_page(new_page, old_page, vmf->address, vma);
+
+		if (!cow_user_page(new_page, old_page, vmf)) {
+			/*
+			 * COW failed, if the fault was solved by other,
+			 * it's fine. If not, userspace would re-fault on
+			 * the same address and we will handle the fault
+			 * from the second attempt.
+			 */
+			put_page(new_page);
+			if (old_page)
+				put_page(old_page);
+			return 0;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (mem_cgroup_try_charge_delay(new_page, mm, GFP_KERNEL, &memcg, false))
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#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/206 scsi: aacraid: fix illegal IO beyond last LBA

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Balsundar P <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c86fbe484c10b2cd1e770770db2d6b2c88801c1d ]

The driver fails to handle data when read or written beyond device reported LBA, which triggers kernel panic

---
 drivers/scsi/aacraid/aachba.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/aacraid/aachba.c +4 -4
index 6e356325d8d98..54717fb84a54c 100644
@@ -2481,13 +2481,13 @@ static int aac_read(struct scsi_cmnd * scsicmd)
 		scsicmd->result = DID_OK << 16 | COMMAND_COMPLETE << 8 |
 			SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION;
 		set_sense(&dev->fsa_dev[cid].sense_data,
-			  HARDWARE_ERROR, SENCODE_INTERNAL_TARGET_FAILURE,
+			  ILLEGAL_REQUEST, SENCODE_LBA_OUT_OF_RANGE,
 			  ASENCODE_INTERNAL_TARGET_FAILURE, 0, 0);
 		memcpy(scsicmd->sense_buffer, &dev->fsa_dev[cid].sense_data,
 		       min_t(size_t, sizeof(dev->fsa_dev[cid].sense_data),
 			     SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE));
 		scsicmd->scsi_done(scsicmd);
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	dprintk((KERN_DEBUG "aac_read[cpu %d]: lba = %llu, t = %ld.\n",
@@ -2573,13 +2573,13 @@ static int aac_write(struct scsi_cmnd * scsicmd)
 		scsicmd->result = DID_OK << 16 | COMMAND_COMPLETE << 8 |
 			SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION;
 		set_sense(&dev->fsa_dev[cid].sense_data,
-			  HARDWARE_ERROR, SENCODE_INTERNAL_TARGET_FAILURE,
+			  ILLEGAL_REQUEST, SENCODE_LBA_OUT_OF_RANGE,
 			  ASENCODE_INTERNAL_TARGET_FAILURE, 0, 0);
 		memcpy(scsicmd->sense_buffer, &dev->fsa_dev[cid].sense_data,
 		       min_t(size_t, sizeof(dev->fsa_dev[cid].sense_data),
 			     SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE));
 		scsicmd->scsi_done(scsicmd);
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	dprintk((KERN_DEBUG "aac_write[cpu %d]: lba = %llu, t = %ld.\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/206 m68k: q40: Fix info-leak in rtc_ioctl

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Fuqian Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7cf78b6b12fd5550545e4b73b35dca18bd46b44c ]

When the option is RTC_PLL_GET, pll will be copied to userland via copy_to_user. pll is initialized using mach_get_rtc_pll indirect call and mach_get_rtc_pll is only assigned with function q40_get_rtc_pll in arch/m68k/q40/config.c.
In function q40_get_rtc_pll, the field pll_ctrl is not initialized. This will leak uninitialized stack content to userland. Fix this by zeroing the uninitialized field.

---
 arch/m68k/q40/config.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/m68k/q40/config.c +1 -0
index 96810d91da2bd..4a25ce6a1823d 100644
@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ static int q40_get_rtc_pll(struct rtc_pll_info *pll)
 {
 	int tmp = Q40_RTC_CTRL;
 
+	pll->pll_ctrl = 0;
 	pll->pll_value = tmp & Q40_RTC_PLL_MASK;
 	if (tmp & Q40_RTC_PLL_SIGN)
 		pll->pll_value = -pll->pll_value;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/206 gma/gma500: fix a memory disclosure bug due to uninitialized bytes

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 57a25a5f754ce27da2cfa6f413cfd366f878db76 ]

best_clock is an object that may be sent out. Object clock contains uninitialized bytes that are copied to best_clock, which leads to memory disclosure and information leak.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/cdv_intel_display.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/cdv_intel_display.c +2 -0
index 17db4b4749d5a..2e8479744ca4a 100644
@@ -415,6 +415,8 @@ static bool cdv_intel_find_dp_pll(const struct gma_limit_t *limit,
 	struct gma_crtc *gma_crtc = to_gma_crtc(crtc);
 	struct gma_clock_t clock;
 
+	memset(&clock, 0, sizeof(clock));
+
 	switch (refclk) {
 	case 27000:
 		if (target < 200000) {
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/206 ASoC: kirkwood: fix IRQ error handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 175fc928198236037174e5c5c066fe3c4691903e ]

Propagate the error code from request_irq(), rather than returning -EBUSY.

---
 sound/soc/kirkwood/kirkwood-dma.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/kirkwood/kirkwood-dma.c +1 -1
index c6a58520d377a..255cc45905b81 100644
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int kirkwood_dma_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
 		err = request_irq(priv->irq, kirkwood_dma_irq, IRQF_SHARED,
 				  "kirkwood-i2s", priv);
 		if (err)
-			return -EBUSY;
+			return err;
 
 		/*
 		 * Enable Error interrupts. We're only ack'ing them but
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/206 media: smiapp: Fix error handling at NVM reading

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5b1d5413534607b05fb34470ff62bf395f5c8d0 ]

If NVM reading failed, the device was left powered on. Fix that.

---
 drivers/media/i2c/smiapp/smiapp-core.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/i2c/smiapp/smiapp-core.c +2 -1
index 4731e1c72f960..0a434bdce3b3b 100644
@@ -2337,11 +2337,12 @@ smiapp_sysfs_nvm_read(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		if (rval < 0) {
 			if (rval != -EBUSY && rval != -EAGAIN)
 				pm_runtime_set_active(&client->dev);
-			pm_runtime_put(&client->dev);
+			pm_runtime_put_noidle(&client->dev);
 			return -ENODEV;
 		}
 
 		if (smiapp_read_nvm(sensor, sensor->nvm)) {
+			pm_runtime_put(&client->dev);
 			dev_err(&client->dev, "nvm read failed\n");
 			return -ENODEV;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/206 ata: sata_mv, avoid trigerrable BUG_ON

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9f691d899188679746eeb96e6cb520459eda9b4 ]

There are several reports that the BUG_ON on unsupported command in mv_qc_prep can be triggered under some circumstances:
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1110252
https://serverfault.com/questions/888897/raid-problems-after-power-outage
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1652185
https://bugs.centos.org/view.php?id=14998

Let sata_mv handle the failure gracefully: warn about that incl. the failed command number and return an AC_ERR_INVALID error. We can do that now thanks to the previous patch.

Remove also the long-standing FIXME.

[v2] use %.2x as commands are defined as hexa.

---
 drivers/ata/sata_mv.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/sata_mv.c +3 -5
index ab2e9f62ddc1a..25d24ed3385ab 100644
@@ -2111,12 +2111,10 @@ static void mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 		 * non-NCQ mode are: [RW] STREAM DMA and W DMA FUA EXT, none
 		 * of which are defined/used by Linux.  If we get here, this
 		 * driver needs work.
-		 *
-		 * FIXME: modify libata to give qc_prep a return value and
-		 * return error here.
 		 */
-		BUG_ON(tf->command);
-		break;
+		ata_port_err(ap, "%s: unsupported command: %.2x\n", __func__,
+				tf->command);
+		return AC_ERR_INVALID;
 	}
 	mv_crqb_pack_cmd(cw++, tf->nsect, ATA_REG_NSECT, 0);
 	mv_crqb_pack_cmd(cw++, tf->hob_lbal, ATA_REG_LBAL, 0);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/206 leds: mlxreg: Fix possible buffer overflow

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Oleh Kravchenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7c6082b903ac28dc3f383fba57c6f9e7e2594178 ]

Error was detected by PVS-Studio:
V512 A call of the 'sprintf' function will lead to overflow of the buffer 'led_data->led_cdev_name'.

---
 drivers/leds/leds-mlxreg.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/leds/leds-mlxreg.c +2 -2
index 1ee48cb21df95..022e973dc7c31 100644
@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ static int mlxreg_led_config(struct mlxreg_led_priv_data *priv)
 			brightness = LED_OFF;
 			led_data->base_color = MLXREG_LED_GREEN_SOLID;
 		}
-		sprintf(led_data->led_cdev_name, "%s:%s", "mlxreg",
-			data->label);
+		snprintf(led_data->led_cdev_name, sizeof(led_data->led_cdev_name),
+			 "mlxreg:%s", data->label);
 		led_cdev->name = led_data->led_cdev_name;
 		led_cdev->brightness = brightness;
 		led_cdev->max_brightness = LED_ON;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/206 PM / devfreq: tegra30: Fix integer overflow on CPU's freq max out

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 53b4b2aeee26f42cde5ff2a16dd0d8590c51a55a ]

There is another kHz-conversion bug in the code, resulting in integer overflow. Although, this time the resulting value is 4294966296 and it's close to ULONG_MAX, which is okay in this case.

---
 drivers/devfreq/tegra-devfreq.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/devfreq/tegra-devfreq.c +3 -1
index 06768074d2d82..479d9575e1245 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
 
 #define KHZ							1000
 
+#define KHZ_MAX						(ULONG_MAX / KHZ)
+
 /* Assume that the bus is saturated if the utilization is 25% */
 #define BUS_SATURATION_RATIO					25
 
@@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ struct tegra_actmon_emc_ratio {
 };
 
 static struct tegra_actmon_emc_ratio actmon_emc_ratios[] = {
-	{ 1400000, ULONG_MAX },
+	{ 1400000,    KHZ_MAX },
 	{ 1200000,    750000 },
 	{ 1100000,    600000 },
 	{ 1000000,    500000 },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/206 scsi: fnic: fix use after free

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ec990306f77fd4c58c3b27cc3b3c53032d6e6670 ]

The memory chunk io_req is released by mempool_free. Accessing io_req->start_time will result in a use after free bug. The variable start_time is a backup of the timestamp. So, use start_time here to avoid use after free.

---
 drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c +2 -1
index 73ffc16ec0225..b521fc7650cb9 100644
@@ -1034,7 +1034,8 @@ static void fnic_fcpio_icmnd_cmpl_handler(struct fnic *fnic,
 		atomic64_inc(&fnic_stats->io_stats.io_completions);
 
 
-	io_duration_time = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies) - jiffies_to_msecs(io_req->start_time);
+	io_duration_time = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies) -
+						jiffies_to_msecs(start_time);
 
 	if(io_duration_time <= 10)
 		atomic64_inc(&fnic_stats->io_stats.io_btw_0_to_10_msec);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/206 scsi: lpfc: Fix kernel crash at lpfc_nvme_info_show during remote port bounce

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: James Smart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c1e803eac846f886cd35131e6516fc51a8414b9 ]

When reading sysfs nvme_info file while a remote port leaves and comes back, a NULL pointer is encountered. The issue is due to ndlp list corruption as the the nvme_info_show does not use the same lock as the rest of the code.

Correct by removing the rcu_xxx_lock calls and replace by the host_lock and phba->hbaLock spinlocks that are used by the rest of the driver. Given we're called from sysfs, we are safe to use _irq rather than _irqsave.

---
 drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c +18 -17
index fe084d47ed9e5..3447d19d4147a 100644
@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ lpfc_nvme_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	if (strlcat(buf, "\nNVME Initiator Enabled\n", PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		goto buffer_done;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
 	scnprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
 		  "XRI Dist lpfc%d Total %d NVME %d SCSI %d ELS %d\n",
 		  phba->brd_no,
@@ -341,7 +340,7 @@ lpfc_nvme_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		  phba->sli4_hba.scsi_xri_max,
 		  lpfc_sli4_get_els_iocb_cnt(phba));
 	if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+		goto buffer_done;
 
 	/* Port state is only one of two values for now. */
 	if (localport->port_id)
@@ -357,7 +356,9 @@ lpfc_nvme_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		  wwn_to_u64(vport->fc_nodename.u.wwn),
 		  localport->port_id, statep);
 	if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+		goto buffer_done;
+
+	spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock);
 
 	list_for_each_entry(ndlp, &vport->fc_nodes, nlp_listp) {
 		nrport = NULL;
@@ -384,39 +385,39 @@ lpfc_nvme_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 
 		/* Tab in to show lport ownership. */
 		if (strlcat(buf, "NVME RPORT       ", PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-			goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+			goto unlock_buf_done;
 		if (phba->brd_no >= 10) {
 			if (strlcat(buf, " ", PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-				goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+				goto unlock_buf_done;
 		}
 
 		scnprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "WWPN x%llx ",
 			  nrport->port_name);
 		if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-			goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+			goto unlock_buf_done;
 
 		scnprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "WWNN x%llx ",
 			  nrport->node_name);
 		if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-			goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+			goto unlock_buf_done;
 
 		scnprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "DID x%06x ",
 			  nrport->port_id);
 		if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-			goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+			goto unlock_buf_done;
 
 		/* An NVME rport can have multiple roles. */
 		if (nrport->port_role & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_INITIATOR) {
 			if (strlcat(buf, "INITIATOR ", PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-				goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+				goto unlock_buf_done;
 		}
 		if (nrport->port_role & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET) {
 			if (strlcat(buf, "TARGET ", PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-				goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+				goto unlock_buf_done;
 		}
 		if (nrport->port_role & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_DISCOVERY) {
 			if (strlcat(buf, "DISCSRVC ", PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-				goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+				goto unlock_buf_done;
 		}
 		if (nrport->port_role & ~(FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_INITIATOR |
 					  FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET |
@@ -424,14 +425,14 @@ lpfc_nvme_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			scnprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "UNKNOWN ROLE x%x",
 				  nrport->port_role);
 			if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-				goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+				goto unlock_buf_done;
 		}
 
 		scnprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s\n", statep);
 		if (strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE) >= PAGE_SIZE)
-			goto rcu_unlock_buf_done;
+			goto unlock_buf_done;
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	spin_unlock_irq(shost->host_lock);
 
 	if (!lport)
 		goto buffer_done;
@@ -491,11 +492,11 @@ lpfc_nvme_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		  atomic_read(&lport->cmpl_fcp_err));
 	strlcat(buf, tmp, PAGE_SIZE);
 
-	/* RCU is already unlocked. */
+	/* host_lock is already unlocked. */
 	goto buffer_done;
 
- rcu_unlock_buf_done:
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+ unlock_buf_done:
+	spin_unlock_irq(shost->host_lock);
 
  buffer_done:
 	len = strnlen(buf, PAGE_SIZE);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/206 net: silence data-races on sk_backlog.tail

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9ed498c6280a2f2b51d02df96df53037272ede49 ]

sk->sk_backlog.tail might be read without holding the socket spinlock, we need to add proper READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to silence the warnings.

KCSAN reported :

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in tcp_add_backlog / tcp_recvmsg

write to 0xffff8881265109f8 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:

 __sk_add_backlog include/net/sock.h:907 [inline]
 sk_add_backlog include/net/sock.h:938 [inline]
 tcp_add_backlog+0x476/0xce0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1759
 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1a70/0x1bd0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1947
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4d/0x420 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x110/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x133/0x210 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
 ip_rcv_finish+0x121/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0x18f/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xa7/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:4929
 __netif_receive_skb+0x37/0xf0 net/core/dev.c:5043
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x59/0x190 net/core/dev.c:5133
 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:5596 [inline]
 napi_gro_receive+0x28f/0x330 net/core/dev.c:5629
 receive_buf+0x284/0x30b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1061
 virtnet_receive drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1323 [inline]
 virtnet_poll+0x436/0x7d0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1428
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6311 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x3ae/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:6379
 __do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
 irq_exit+0xbb/0xe0 kernel/softirq.c:413
 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
 do_IRQ+0xa6/0x180 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:263
 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x19
 native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:71
 arch_cpu_idle+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:571
 default_idle_call+0x1e/0x40 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
 do_idle+0x1af/0x280 kernel/sched/idle.c:263
 cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:355
 start_secondary+0x208/0x260 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:264
 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241

read to 0xffff8881265109f8 of 8 bytes by task 8057 on cpu 0:

 tcp_recvmsg+0x46e/0x1b40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2050
 inet_recvmsg+0xbb/0x250 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:838
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:871 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:889 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:885
 sock_read_iter+0x15f/0x1e0 net/socket.c:967
 call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1889 [inline]
 new_sync_read+0x389/0x4f0 fs/read_write.c:414
 __vfs_read+0xb1/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:427
 vfs_read fs/read_write.c:461 [inline]
 vfs_read+0x143/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:446
 ksys_read+0xd5/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:587
 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:597 [inline]
 __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
 __x64_sys_read+0x4c/0x60 fs/read_write.c:595
 do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:

CPU: 0 PID: 8057 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
---
 drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_io.c | 10 +++++-----
 include/net/sock.h                      |  4 ++--
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                          |  2 +-
 net/llc/af_llc.c                        |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_io.c +5 -5
index 1e0cc96306dd7..2c1f3ddb0cc79 100644
@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ static int chtls_pt_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 				      csk->wr_max_credits))
 			sk->sk_write_space(sk);
 
-		if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
+		if (copied >= target && !READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail))
 			break;
 
 		if (copied) {
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ static int chtls_pt_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		if (sk->sk_backlog.tail) {
+		if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail)) {
 			release_sock(sk);
 			lock_sock(sk);
 			chtls_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
@@ -1627,7 +1627,7 @@ static int peekmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (sk->sk_backlog.tail) {
+		if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail)) {
 			/* Do not sleep, just process backlog. */
 			release_sock(sk);
 			lock_sock(sk);
@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ int chtls_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 				      csk->wr_max_credits))
 			sk->sk_write_space(sk);
 
-		if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
+		if (copied >= target && !READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail))
 			break;
 
 		if (copied) {
@@ -1790,7 +1790,7 @@ int chtls_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 			}
 		}
 
-		if (sk->sk_backlog.tail) {
+		if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail)) {
 			release_sock(sk);
 			lock_sock(sk);
 			chtls_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
include/net/sock.h +2 -2
index 77f36257cac97..bc752237dff3f 100644
@@ -900,11 +900,11 @@ static inline void __sk_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	skb_dst_force(skb);
 
 	if (!sk->sk_backlog.tail)
-		sk->sk_backlog.head = skb;
+		WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.head, skb);
 	else
 		sk->sk_backlog.tail->next = skb;
 
-	sk->sk_backlog.tail = skb;
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail, skb);
 	skb->next = NULL;
 }
 
net/ipv4/tcp.c +1 -1
index 616ff2970f4fc..4ce3397e6fcf7 100644
@@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ int tcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int nonblock,
 
 		/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
 
-		if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
+		if (copied >= target && !READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail))
 			break;
 
 		if (copied) {
net/llc/af_llc.c +1 -1
index 6ead3c39f3566..bcba579e292ff 100644
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 		}
 		/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
 
-		if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
+		if (copied >= target && !READ_ONCE(sk->sk_backlog.tail))
 			break;
 
 		if (copied) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/206 clk/ti/adpll: allocate room for terminating null

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Stephen Kitt <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f6ac72946b88b89ee44c1c527aa8591ac5ffcbe ]

The buffer allocated in ti_adpll_clk_get_name doesn't account for the terminating null. This patch switches to devm_kasprintf to avoid overflowing.

---
 drivers/clk/ti/adpll.c | 11 ++---------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/ti/adpll.c +2 -9
index 688e403333b91..14926e07d09ae 100644
@@ -193,15 +193,8 @@ static const char *ti_adpll_clk_get_name(struct ti_adpll_data *d,
 		if (err)
 			return NULL;
 	} else {
-		const char *base_name = "adpll";
-		char *buf;
-
-		buf = devm_kzalloc(d->dev, 8 + 1 + strlen(base_name) + 1 +
-				    strlen(postfix), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!buf)
-			return NULL;
-		sprintf(buf, "%08lx.%s.%s", d->pa, base_name, postfix);
-		name = buf;
+		name = devm_kasprintf(d->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%08lx.adpll.%s",
+				      d->pa, postfix);
 	}
 
 	return name;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/206 drm/amdgpu/powerplay: fix AVFS handling with custom powerplay table

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 53dbc27ad5a93932ff1892a8e4ef266827d74a0f ]

When a custom powerplay table is provided, we need to update the OD VDDC flag to avoid AVFS being enabled when it shouldn't be.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/vega10_hwmgr.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/vega10_hwmgr.c +7 -0
index ce459ea4ec3ad..da9e6923fa659 100644
@@ -3591,6 +3591,13 @@ static int vega10_set_power_state_tasks(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr,
 	PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE(!result,
 			"Failed to upload PPtable!", return result);
 
+	/*
+	 * If a custom pp table is loaded, set DPMTABLE_OD_UPDATE_VDDC flag.
+	 * That effectively disables AVFS feature.
+	 */
+	if(hwmgr->hardcode_pp_table != NULL)
+		data->need_update_dpm_table |= DPMTABLE_OD_UPDATE_VDDC;
+
 	vega10_update_avfs(hwmgr);
 
 	data->need_update_dpm_table &= DPMTABLE_OD_UPDATE_VDDC;
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/206 mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: don't free cfi->cfiq in error path of cfi_amdstd_setup()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03976af89e3bd9489d542582a325892e6a8cacc0 ]

Else there may be a double-free problem, because cfi->cfiq will be freed by mtd_do_chip_probe() if both the two invocations of check_cmd_set() return failure.

---
 drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +0 -1
index 1dbc9554a0786..3ab75d3e2ce32 100644
@@ -727,7 +727,6 @@ static struct mtd_info *cfi_amdstd_setup(struct mtd_info *mtd)
 	kfree(mtd->eraseregions);
 	kfree(mtd);
 	kfree(cfi->cmdset_priv);
-	kfree(cfi->cfiq);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1


______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/206 mfd: mfd-core: Protect against NULL call-back function pointer

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Lee Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b195e101580db390f50b0d587b7f66f241d2bc88 ]

If a child device calls mfd_cell_{en,dis}able() without an appropriate call-back being set, we are likely to encounter a panic. Avoid this by adding suitable checking.

---
 drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c +10 -0
index 182973df1aed4..77c965c6a65f1 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ int mfd_cell_enable(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	const struct mfd_cell *cell = mfd_get_cell(pdev);
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!cell->enable) {
+		dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "No .enable() call-back registered\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* only call enable hook if the cell wasn't previously enabled */
 	if (atomic_inc_return(cell->usage_count) == 1)
 		err = cell->enable(pdev);
@@ -49,6 +54,11 @@ int mfd_cell_disable(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	const struct mfd_cell *cell = mfd_get_cell(pdev);
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!cell->disable) {
+		dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "No .disable() call-back registered\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* only disable if no other clients are using it */
 	if (atomic_dec_return(cell->usage_count) == 0)
 		err = cell->disable(pdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/206 drm/amdgpu/powerplay/smu7: fix AVFS handling with custom powerplay table

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 901245624c7812b6c95d67177bae850e783b5212 ]

When a custom powerplay table is provided, we need to update the OD VDDC flag to avoid AVFS being enabled when it shouldn't be.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c +7 -0
index 219440bebd052..420f7d15511a7 100644
@@ -3969,6 +3969,13 @@ static int smu7_set_power_state_tasks(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, const void *input)
 			"Failed to populate and upload SCLK MCLK DPM levels!",
 			result = tmp_result);
 
+	/*
+	 * If a custom pp table is loaded, set DPMTABLE_OD_UPDATE_VDDC flag.
+	 * That effectively disables AVFS feature.
+	 */
+	if (hwmgr->hardcode_pp_table != NULL)
+		data->need_update_smu7_dpm_table |= DPMTABLE_OD_UPDATE_VDDC;
+
 	tmp_result = smu7_update_avfs(hwmgr);
 	PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((0 == tmp_result),
 			"Failed to update avfs voltages!",
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 23/206 USB: serial: mos7840: fix probe error handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 960fbd1ca584a5b4cd818255769769d42bfc6dbe ]

The driver would return success and leave the port structures half-initialised if any of the register accesses during probe fails.

This would specifically leave the port control urb unallocated, something which could trigger a NULL pointer dereference on interrupt events.

Fortunately the interrupt implementation is completely broken and has never even been enabled...

Note that the zero-length-enable register write used to set the zle-flag for all ports is moved to attach.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/mos7840.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/mos7840.c +28 -20
index 4a7bd26841af0..45f1e0e772494 100644
@@ -2119,6 +2119,23 @@ static int mos7840_calc_num_ports(struct usb_serial *serial,
 	return num_ports;
 }
 
+static int mos7840_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
+{
+	struct device *dev = &serial->interface->dev;
+	int status;
+	u16 val;
+
+	/* Zero Length flag enable */
+	val = 0x0f;
+	status = mos7840_set_reg_sync(serial->port[0], ZLP_REG5, val);
+	if (status < 0)
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Writing ZLP_REG5 failed status-0x%x\n", status);
+	else
+		dev_dbg(dev, "ZLP_REG5 Writing success status%d\n", status);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
 static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 {
 	struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
@@ -2182,7 +2199,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 			mos7840_port->ControlRegOffset, &Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Reading ControlReg failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ControlReg Reading success val is %x, status%d\n", Data, status);
 	Data |= 0x08;	/* setting driver done bit */
@@ -2194,7 +2211,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 			mos7840_port->ControlRegOffset, Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing ControlReg failed(rx_disable) status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ControlReg Writing success(rx_disable) status%d\n", status);
 
@@ -2205,7 +2222,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 			(__u16) (mos7840_port->DcrRegOffset + 0), Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing DCR0 failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "DCR0 Writing success status%d\n", status);
 
@@ -2214,7 +2231,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 			(__u16) (mos7840_port->DcrRegOffset + 1), Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing DCR1 failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "DCR1 Writing success status%d\n", status);
 
@@ -2223,7 +2240,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 			(__u16) (mos7840_port->DcrRegOffset + 2), Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing DCR2 failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "DCR2 Writing success status%d\n", status);
 
@@ -2232,7 +2249,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 	status = mos7840_set_reg_sync(port, CLK_START_VALUE_REGISTER, Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing CLK_START_VALUE_REGISTER failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "CLK_START_VALUE_REGISTER Writing success status%d\n", status);
 
@@ -2249,7 +2266,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 	status = mos7840_set_uart_reg(port, SCRATCH_PAD_REGISTER, Data);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing SCRATCH_PAD_REGISTER failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-		goto out;
+		goto error;
 	} else
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "SCRATCH_PAD_REGISTER Writing success status%d\n", status);
 
@@ -2263,7 +2280,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 				(__u16)(ZLP_REG1 + ((__u16) mos7840_port->port_num)));
 		if (status < 0) {
 			dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing ZLP_REG%d failed status-0x%x\n", pnum + 2, status);
-			goto out;
+			goto error;
 		} else
 			dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ZLP_REG%d Writing success status%d\n", pnum + 2, status);
 	} else {
@@ -2275,7 +2292,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 				(__u16)(ZLP_REG1 + ((__u16) mos7840_port->port_num) - 0x1));
 		if (status < 0) {
 			dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing ZLP_REG%d failed status-0x%x\n", pnum + 1, status);
-			goto out;
+			goto error;
 		} else
 			dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ZLP_REG%d Writing success status%d\n", pnum + 1, status);
 
@@ -2315,17 +2332,7 @@ static int mos7840_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 		/* Turn off LED */
 		mos7840_set_led_sync(port, MODEM_CONTROL_REGISTER, 0x0300);
 	}
-out:
-	if (pnum == serial->num_ports - 1) {
-		/* Zero Length flag enable */
-		Data = 0x0f;
-		status = mos7840_set_reg_sync(serial->port[0], ZLP_REG5, Data);
-		if (status < 0) {
-			dev_dbg(&port->dev, "Writing ZLP_REG5 failed status-0x%x\n", status);
-			goto error;
-		} else
-			dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ZLP_REG5 Writing success status%d\n", status);
-	}
+
 	return 0;
 error:
 	kfree(mos7840_port->led_dr);
@@ -2381,6 +2388,7 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver moschip7840_4port_device = {
 	.unthrottle = mos7840_unthrottle,
 	.calc_num_ports = mos7840_calc_num_ports,
 	.probe = mos7840_probe,
+	.attach = mos7840_attach,
 	.ioctl = mos7840_ioctl,
 	.set_termios = mos7840_set_termios,
 	.break_ctl = mos7840_break,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 24/206 tpm_crb: fix fTPM on AMD Zen+ CPUs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ivan Lazeev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3ef193822b25e9ee629974f66dc1ff65167f770c ]

Bug link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195657

cmd/rsp buffers are expected to be in the same ACPI region. For Zen+ CPUs BIOS's might report two different regions, some of them also report region sizes inconsistent with values from TPM registers.

Memory configuration on ASRock x470 ITX:

db0a0000-dc59efff : Reserved

        dc57e000-dc57efff : MSFT0101:00
        dc582000-dc582fff : MSFT0101:00

Work around the issue by storing ACPI regions declared for the device in a fixed array and adding an array for pointers to corresponding possibly allocated resources in crb_map_io function. This data was previously held for a single resource
in struct crb_priv (iobase field) and local variable io_res in crb_map_io function. ACPI resources array is used to find index of corresponding region for each buffer and make the buffer size consistent with region's length. Array of pointers to allocated resources is used to map the region at most once.

---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c +90 -33
index 763fc7e6c0058..20f27100708bd 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "tpm.h"
 
 #define ACPI_SIG_TPM2 "TPM2"
+#define TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES 3
 
 static const guid_t crb_acpi_start_guid =
 	GUID_INIT(0x6BBF6CAB, 0x5463, 0x4714,
@@ -95,7 +96,6 @@ enum crb_status {
 struct crb_priv {
 	u32 sm;
 	const char *hid;
-	void __iomem *iobase;
 	struct crb_regs_head __iomem *regs_h;
 	struct crb_regs_tail __iomem *regs_t;
 	u8 __iomem *cmd;
@@ -438,21 +438,27 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_crb = {
 
 static int crb_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data)
 {
-	struct resource *io_res = data;
+	struct resource *iores_array = data;
 	struct resource_win win;
 	struct resource *res = &(win.res);
+	int i;
 
 	if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, res) ||
 	    acpi_dev_resource_address_space(ares, &win)) {
-		*io_res = *res;
-		io_res->name = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; i < TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES + 1; ++i) {
+			if (resource_type(iores_array + i) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
+				iores_array[i] = *res;
+				iores_array[i].name = NULL;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static void __iomem *crb_map_res(struct device *dev, struct crb_priv *priv,
-				 struct resource *io_res, u64 start, u32 size)
+static void __iomem *crb_map_res(struct device *dev, struct resource *iores,
+				 void __iomem **iobase_ptr, u64 start, u32 size)
 {
 	struct resource new_res = {
 		.start	= start,
@@ -464,10 +470,16 @@ static void __iomem *crb_map_res(struct device *dev, struct crb_priv *priv,
 	if (start != new_res.start)
 		return (void __iomem *) ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	if (!resource_contains(io_res, &new_res))
+	if (!iores)
 		return devm_ioremap_resource(dev, &new_res);
 
-	return priv->iobase + (new_res.start - io_res->start);
+	if (!*iobase_ptr) {
+		*iobase_ptr = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, iores);
+		if (IS_ERR(*iobase_ptr))
+			return *iobase_ptr;
+	}
+
+	return *iobase_ptr + (new_res.start - iores->start);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -494,9 +506,13 @@ static u64 crb_fixup_cmd_size(struct device *dev, struct resource *io_res,
 static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 		      struct acpi_table_tpm2 *buf)
 {
-	struct list_head resources;
-	struct resource io_res;
+	struct list_head acpi_resource_list;
+	struct resource iores_array[TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES + 1] = { {0} };
+	void __iomem *iobase_array[TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES] = {NULL};
 	struct device *dev = &device->dev;
+	struct resource *iores;
+	void __iomem **iobase_ptr;
+	int i;
 	u32 pa_high, pa_low;
 	u64 cmd_pa;
 	u32 cmd_size;
@@ -505,21 +521,41 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 	u32 rsp_size;
 	int ret;
 
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resources);
-	ret = acpi_dev_get_resources(device, &resources, crb_check_resource,
-				     &io_res);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&acpi_resource_list);
+	ret = acpi_dev_get_resources(device, &acpi_resource_list,
+				     crb_check_resource, iores_array);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
-	acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resources);
+	acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&acpi_resource_list);
 
-	if (resource_type(&io_res) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
+	if (resource_type(iores_array) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
 		dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (resource_type(iores_array + TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES) ==
+		IORESOURCE_MEM) {
+		dev_warn(dev, "TPM2 ACPI table defines too many memory resources\n");
+		memset(iores_array + TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES,
+		       0, sizeof(*iores_array));
+		iores_array[TPM_CRB_MAX_RESOURCES].flags = 0;
 	}
 
-	priv->iobase = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, &io_res);
-	if (IS_ERR(priv->iobase))
-		return PTR_ERR(priv->iobase);
+	iores = NULL;
+	iobase_ptr = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; resource_type(iores_array + i) == IORESOURCE_MEM; ++i) {
+		if (buf->control_address >= iores_array[i].start &&
+		    buf->control_address + sizeof(struct crb_regs_tail) - 1 <=
+		    iores_array[i].end) {
+			iores = iores_array + i;
+			iobase_ptr = iobase_array + i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv->regs_t = crb_map_res(dev, iores, iobase_ptr, buf->control_address,
+				   sizeof(struct crb_regs_tail));
+
+	if (IS_ERR(priv->regs_t))
+		return PTR_ERR(priv->regs_t);
 
 	/* The ACPI IO region starts at the head area and continues to include
 	 * the control area, as one nice sane region except for some older
@@ -527,9 +563,10 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 	 */
 	if ((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER) ||
 	    (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)) {
-		if (buf->control_address == io_res.start +
+		if (iores &&
+		    buf->control_address == iores->start +
 		    sizeof(*priv->regs_h))
-			priv->regs_h = priv->iobase;
+			priv->regs_h = *iobase_ptr;
 		else
 			dev_warn(dev, FW_BUG "Bad ACPI memory layout");
 	}
@@ -538,13 +575,6 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	priv->regs_t = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, buf->control_address,
-				   sizeof(struct crb_regs_tail));
-	if (IS_ERR(priv->regs_t)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->regs_t);
-		goto out_relinquish_locality;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * PTT HW bug w/a: wake up the device to access
 	 * possibly not retained registers.
@@ -556,13 +586,26 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 	pa_high = ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_cmd_pa_high);
 	pa_low  = ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_cmd_pa_low);
 	cmd_pa = ((u64)pa_high << 32) | pa_low;
-	cmd_size = crb_fixup_cmd_size(dev, &io_res, cmd_pa,
-				      ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_cmd_size));
+	cmd_size = ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_cmd_size);
+
+	iores = NULL;
+	iobase_ptr = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; iores_array[i].end; ++i) {
+		if (cmd_pa >= iores_array[i].start &&
+		    cmd_pa <= iores_array[i].end) {
+			iores = iores_array + i;
+			iobase_ptr = iobase_array + i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (iores)
+		cmd_size = crb_fixup_cmd_size(dev, iores, cmd_pa, cmd_size);
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "cmd_hi = %X cmd_low = %X cmd_size %X\n",
 		pa_high, pa_low, cmd_size);
 
-	priv->cmd = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, cmd_pa, cmd_size);
+	priv->cmd = crb_map_res(dev, iores, iobase_ptr,	cmd_pa, cmd_size);
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->cmd)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->cmd);
 		goto out;
@@ -570,11 +613,25 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&__rsp_pa, &priv->regs_t->ctrl_rsp_pa, 8);
 	rsp_pa = le64_to_cpu(__rsp_pa);
-	rsp_size = crb_fixup_cmd_size(dev, &io_res, rsp_pa,
-				      ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_rsp_size));
+	rsp_size = ioread32(&priv->regs_t->ctrl_rsp_size);
+
+	iores = NULL;
+	iobase_ptr = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; resource_type(iores_array + i) == IORESOURCE_MEM; ++i) {
+		if (rsp_pa >= iores_array[i].start &&
+		    rsp_pa <= iores_array[i].end) {
+			iores = iores_array + i;
+			iobase_ptr = iobase_array + i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (iores)
+		rsp_size = crb_fixup_cmd_size(dev, iores, rsp_pa, rsp_size);
 
 	if (cmd_pa != rsp_pa) {
-		priv->rsp = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, rsp_pa, rsp_size);
+		priv->rsp = crb_map_res(dev, iores, iobase_ptr,
+					rsp_pa, rsp_size);
 		ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(priv->rsp);
 		goto out;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 25/206 tracing: Adding NULL checks for trace_array descriptor pointer

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Divya Indi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 953ae45a0c25e09428d4a03d7654f97ab8a36647 ]

As part of commit f45d1225adb0 ("tracing: Kernel access to Ftrace instances") we exported certain functions. Here, we are adding some additional NULL checks to ensure safe usage by users of these APIs.

---
 kernel/trace/trace.c        | 3 +++
 kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/trace/trace.c +3 -0
index 4966410bb0f4d..17505a22d800b 100644
@@ -3037,6 +3037,9 @@ int trace_array_printk(struct trace_array *tr,
 	if (!(global_trace.trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK))
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!tr)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
 	va_start(ap, fmt);
 	ret = trace_array_vprintk(tr, ip, fmt, ap);
 	va_end(ap);
kernel/trace/trace_events.c +2 -0
index 27726121d332c..0fc06a7da87fb 100644
@@ -800,6 +800,8 @@ static int ftrace_set_clr_event(struct trace_array *tr, char *buf, int set)
 	char *event = NULL, *sub = NULL, *match;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!tr)
+		return -ENOENT;
 	/*
 	 * The buf format can be <subsystem>:<event-name>
 	 *  *:<event-name> means any event by that name.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 26/206 bcache: fix a lost wake-up problem caused by mca_cannibalize_lock

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Guoju Fang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 34cf78bf34d48dddddfeeadb44f9841d7864997a ]

This patch fix a lost wake-up problem caused by the race between mca_cannibalize_lock and bch_cannibalize_unlock.

Consider two processes, A and B. Process A is executing mca_cannibalize_lock, while process B takes c->btree_cache_alloc_lock and is executing bch_cannibalize_unlock. The problem happens that after process A executes cmpxchg and will execute prepare_to_wait. In this timeslice process B executes wake_up, but after that process A executes prepare_to_wait and set the state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. Then process A goes to sleep but no one will wake up it. This problem may cause bcache device to dead.

---
 drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h |  1 +
 drivers/md/bcache/btree.c  | 12 ++++++++----
 drivers/md/bcache/super.c  |  1 +
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h +1 -0
index 1cc6ae3e058c6..6a380ed4919a0 100644
@@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ struct cache_set {
 	 */
 	wait_queue_head_t	btree_cache_wait;
 	struct task_struct	*btree_cache_alloc_lock;
+	spinlock_t		btree_cannibalize_lock;
 
 	/*
 	 * When we free a btree node, we increment the gen of the bucket the
drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +8 -4
index d320574b9a4c8..e388e7bb7b5db 100644
@@ -876,15 +876,17 @@ out:
 
 static int mca_cannibalize_lock(struct cache_set *c, struct btree_op *op)
 {
-	struct task_struct *old;
-
-	old = cmpxchg(&c->btree_cache_alloc_lock, NULL, current);
-	if (old && old != current) {
+	spin_lock(&c->btree_cannibalize_lock);
+	if (likely(c->btree_cache_alloc_lock == NULL)) {
+		c->btree_cache_alloc_lock = current;
+	} else if (c->btree_cache_alloc_lock != current) {
 		if (op)
 			prepare_to_wait(&c->btree_cache_wait, &op->wait,
 					TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+		spin_unlock(&c->btree_cannibalize_lock);
 		return -EINTR;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&c->btree_cannibalize_lock);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -919,10 +921,12 @@ static struct btree *mca_cannibalize(struct cache_set *c, struct btree_op *op,
  */
 static void bch_cannibalize_unlock(struct cache_set *c)
 {
+	spin_lock(&c->btree_cannibalize_lock);
 	if (c->btree_cache_alloc_lock == current) {
 		c->btree_cache_alloc_lock = NULL;
 		wake_up(&c->btree_cache_wait);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&c->btree_cannibalize_lock);
 }
 
 static struct btree *mca_alloc(struct cache_set *c, struct btree_op *op,
drivers/md/bcache/super.c +1 -0
index 825bfde10c694..7787ec42f81e1 100644
@@ -1737,6 +1737,7 @@ struct cache_set *bch_cache_set_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb)
 	sema_init(&c->sb_write_mutex, 1);
 	mutex_init(&c->bucket_lock);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&c->btree_cache_wait);
+	spin_lock_init(&c->btree_cannibalize_lock);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&c->bucket_wait);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&c->gc_wait);
 	sema_init(&c->uuid_write_mutex, 1);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 27/206 dmaengine: mediatek: hsdma_probe: fixed a memory leak when devm_request_irq fails

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Satendra Singh Thakur <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1ff95243257fad07290dcbc5f7a6ad79d6e703e2 ]

When devm_request_irq fails, currently, the function dma_async_device_unregister gets called. This doesn't free the resources allocated by of_dma_controller_register. Therefore, we have called of_dma_controller_free for this purpose.

---
 drivers/dma/mediatek/mtk-hsdma.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/mediatek/mtk-hsdma.c +3 -1
index b7ec56ae02a6e..fca232b1d4a64 100644
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ static int mtk_hsdma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"request_irq failed with err %d\n", err);
-		goto err_unregister;
+		goto err_free;
 	}
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, hsdma);
@@ -1006,6 +1006,8 @@ static int mtk_hsdma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	return 0;
 
+err_free:
+	of_dma_controller_free(pdev->dev.of_node);
 err_unregister:
 	dma_async_device_unregister(dd);
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
Linux-mediatek mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mediatek
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 28/206 RDMA/qedr: Fix potential use after free

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 960657b732e1ce21b07be5ab48a7ad3913d72ba4 ]

Move the release operation after error log to avoid possible use after free.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr_iw_cm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/qedr_iw_cm.c +1 -1
index 2566715773675..e908dfbaa1378 100644
@@ -460,10 +460,10 @@ qedr_addr6_resolve(struct qedr_dev *dev,
 
 	if ((!dst) || dst->error) {
 		if (dst) {
-			dst_release(dst);
 			DP_ERR(dev,
 			       "ip6_route_output returned dst->error = %d\n",
 			       dst->error);
+			dst_release(dst);
 		}
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 29/206 RDMA/i40iw: Fix potential use after free

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit da046d5f895fca18d63b15ac8faebd5bf784e23a ]

Release variable dst after logging dst->error to avoid possible use after free.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_cm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_cm.c +1 -1
index 4321b9e3dbb4b..0273d0404e740 100644
@@ -2071,9 +2071,9 @@ static int i40iw_addr_resolve_neigh_ipv6(struct i40iw_device *iwdev,
 	dst = i40iw_get_dst_ipv6(&src_addr, &dst_addr);
 	if (!dst || dst->error) {
 		if (dst) {
-			dst_release(dst);
 			i40iw_pr_err("ip6_route_output returned dst->error = %d\n",
 				     dst->error);
+			dst_release(dst);
 		}
 		return rc;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 30/206 fix dget_parent() fastpath race

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e84009336711d2bba885fc9cea66348ddfce3758 ]

We are overoptimistic about taking the fast path there; seeing the same value in ->d_parent after having grabbed a reference to that parent does *not* mean that it has remained our parent all along.

That wouldn't be a big deal (in the end it is our parent and we have grabbed the reference we are about to return), but... the situation with barriers is messed up.

We might have hit the following sequence:

d is a dentry of /tmp/a/b
CPU1: CPU2:
parent = d->d_parent (i.e. dentry of /tmp/a)
rename /tmp/a/b to /tmp/b rmdir /tmp/a, making its dentry negative
grab reference to parent,
end up with cached parent->d_inode (NULL)
mkdir /tmp/a, rename /tmp/b to /tmp/a/b
recheck d->d_parent, which is back to original
decide that everything's fine and return the reference we'd got.

The trouble is, caller (on CPU1) will observe dget_parent() returning an apparently negative dentry. It actually is positive, but CPU1 has stale ->d_inode cached.

Use d->d_seq to see if it has been moved instead of rechecking ->d_parent.
NOTE: we are *NOT* going to retry on any kind of ->d_seq mismatch; we just go into the slow path in such case. We don't wait for ->d_seq to become even either - again, if we are racing with renames, we can bloody well go to slow path anyway.

---
 fs/dcache.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/dcache.c +3 -1
index 6e0022326afe3..20370a0997bf9 100644
@@ -864,17 +864,19 @@ struct dentry *dget_parent(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int gotref;
 	struct dentry *ret;
+	unsigned seq;
 
 	/*
 	 * Do optimistic parent lookup without any
 	 * locking.
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
+	seq = raw_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
 	ret = READ_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
 	gotref = lockref_get_not_zero(&ret->d_lockref);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (likely(gotref)) {
-		if (likely(ret == READ_ONCE(dentry->d_parent)))
+		if (!read_seqcount_retry(&dentry->d_seq, seq))
 			return ret;
 		dput(ret);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 31/206 xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size underflow

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a2b5932db67586bacc560cc065d62faece5b996 ]

The leaf format xattr addition helper xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work() adjusts the block freemap in a couple places. The first update drops the size of the freemap that the caller had already selected to place the xattr name/value data. Before the function returns, it also checks whether the entries array has encroached on a freemap range by virtue of the new entry addition. This is necessary because the entries array grows from the start of the block (but end of the block header) towards the end of the block while the name/value data grows from the end of the block in the opposite direction. If the associated freemap is already empty, however, size is zero and the subtraction underflows the field and causes corruption.

This is reproduced rarely by generic/070. The observed behavior is that a smaller sized freemap is aligned to the end of the entries list, several subsequent xattr additions land in larger freemaps and the entries list expands into the smaller freemap until it is fully consumed and then underflows. Note that it is not otherwise a corruption for the entries array to consume an empty freemap because the nameval list (i.e. the firstused pointer in the xattr header) starts beyond the end of the corrupted freemap.

Update the freemap size modification to account for the fact that the freemap entry can be empty and thus stale.

---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c +3 -1
index 087a5715cf20e..28e1ff09c6c77 100644
@@ -1438,7 +1438,9 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work(
 	for (i = 0; i < XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE; i++) {
 		if (ichdr->freemap[i].base == tmp) {
 			ichdr->freemap[i].base += sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
-			ichdr->freemap[i].size -= sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
+			ichdr->freemap[i].size -=
+				min_t(uint16_t, ichdr->freemap[i].size,
+						sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t));
 		}
 	}
 	ichdr->usedbytes += xfs_attr_leaf_entsize(leaf, args->index);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 32/206 RDMA/iw_cgxb4: Fix an error handling path in 'c4iw_connect()'

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9067f2f0b41d7e817fc8c5259bab1f17512b0147 ]

We should jump to fail3 in order to undo the 'xa_insert_irq()' call.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c +2 -2
index 16145b0a14583..3fd3dfa3478b7 100644
@@ -3293,7 +3293,7 @@ int c4iw_connect(struct iw_cm_id *cm_id, struct iw_cm_conn_param *conn_param)
 		if (raddr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY)) {
 			err = pick_local_ipaddrs(dev, cm_id);
 			if (err)
-				goto fail2;
+				goto fail3;
 		}
 
 		/* find a route */
@@ -3315,7 +3315,7 @@ int c4iw_connect(struct iw_cm_id *cm_id, struct iw_cm_conn_param *conn_param)
 		if (ipv6_addr_type(&raddr6->sin6_addr) == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
 			err = pick_local_ip6addrs(dev, cm_id);
 			if (err)
-				goto fail2;
+				goto fail3;
 		}
 
 		/* find a route */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 33/206 ubi: Fix producing anchor PEBs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f9c34bb529975fe9f85b870a80c53a83a3c5a182 ]

When a new fastmap is about to be written UBI must make sure it has a free block for a fastmap anchor available. For this ubi_update_fastmap() calls ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs(). This stopped working with 2e8f08deabbc ("ubi: Fix races around ubi_refill_pools()"), with this commit the wear leveling code is blocked and can no longer produce free PEBs. UBI then more often than not falls back to write the new fastmap anchor to the same block it was already on which means the same erase block gets erased during each fastmap write and wears out quite fast.

As the locking prevents us from producing the anchor PEB when we actually need it, this patch changes the strategy for creating the anchor PEB. We no longer create it on demand right before we want to write a fastmap, but instead we create an anchor PEB right after we have written a fastmap. This gives us enough time to produce a new anchor PEB before it is needed. To make sure we have an anchor PEB for the very first fastmap write we call ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs() during initialisation as well.

Fixes 2e8f08deabbc ("ubi: Fix races around ubi_refill_pools()")
---
 drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
 drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c    | 14 +++++---------
 drivers/mtd/ubi/ubi.h        |  6 ++++--
 drivers/mtd/ubi/wl.c         | 32 ++++++++++++++------------------
 drivers/mtd/ubi/wl.h         |  1 -
 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c +18 -13
index 98f7d6be8d1fc..13efebb400225 100644
@@ -66,18 +66,6 @@ static void return_unused_pool_pebs(struct ubi_device *ubi,
 	}
 }
 
-static int anchor_pebs_available(struct rb_root *root)
-{
-	struct rb_node *p;
-	struct ubi_wl_entry *e;
-
-	ubi_rb_for_each_entry(p, e, root, u.rb)
-		if (e->pnum < UBI_FM_MAX_START)
-			return 1;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * ubi_wl_get_fm_peb - find a physical erase block with a given maximal number.
  * @ubi: UBI device description object
@@ -286,8 +274,26 @@ static struct ubi_wl_entry *get_peb_for_wl(struct ubi_device *ubi)
 int ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs(struct ubi_device *ubi)
 {
 	struct ubi_work *wrk;
+	struct ubi_wl_entry *anchor;
 
 	spin_lock(&ubi->wl_lock);
+
+	/* Do we already have an anchor? */
+	if (ubi->fm_anchor) {
+		spin_unlock(&ubi->wl_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* See if we can find an anchor PEB on the list of free PEBs */
+	anchor = ubi_wl_get_fm_peb(ubi, 1);
+	if (anchor) {
+		ubi->fm_anchor = anchor;
+		spin_unlock(&ubi->wl_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* No luck, trigger wear leveling to produce a new anchor PEB */
+	ubi->fm_do_produce_anchor = 1;
 	if (ubi->wl_scheduled) {
 		spin_unlock(&ubi->wl_lock);
 		return 0;
@@ -303,7 +309,6 @@ int ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs(struct ubi_device *ubi)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	wrk->anchor = 1;
 	wrk->func = &wear_leveling_worker;
 	__schedule_ubi_work(ubi, wrk);
 	return 0;
drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c +5 -9
index 8e292992f84c7..b88ef875236cc 100644
@@ -1552,14 +1552,6 @@ int ubi_update_fastmap(struct ubi_device *ubi)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs(ubi);
-	if (ret) {
-		up_write(&ubi->fm_eba_sem);
-		up_write(&ubi->work_sem);
-		up_write(&ubi->fm_protect);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
 	new_fm = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_fm), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new_fm) {
 		up_write(&ubi->fm_eba_sem);
@@ -1630,7 +1622,8 @@ int ubi_update_fastmap(struct ubi_device *ubi)
 	}
 
 	spin_lock(&ubi->wl_lock);
-	tmp_e = ubi_wl_get_fm_peb(ubi, 1);
+	tmp_e = ubi->fm_anchor;
+	ubi->fm_anchor = NULL;
 	spin_unlock(&ubi->wl_lock);
 
 	if (old_fm) {
@@ -1682,6 +1675,9 @@ out_unlock:
 	up_write(&ubi->work_sem);
 	up_write(&ubi->fm_protect);
 	kfree(old_fm);
+
+	ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs(ubi);
+
 	return ret;
 
 err:
drivers/mtd/ubi/ubi.h +4 -2
index d47b9e436e673..d248ec371cc17 100644
@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ struct ubi_debug_info {
  * @fm_work: fastmap work queue
  * @fm_work_scheduled: non-zero if fastmap work was scheduled
  * @fast_attach: non-zero if UBI was attached by fastmap
+ * @fm_anchor: The next anchor PEB to use for fastmap
+ * @fm_do_produce_anchor: If true produce an anchor PEB in wl
  *
  * @used: RB-tree of used physical eraseblocks
  * @erroneous: RB-tree of erroneous used physical eraseblocks
@@ -612,6 +614,8 @@ struct ubi_device {
 	struct work_struct fm_work;
 	int fm_work_scheduled;
 	int fast_attach;
+	struct ubi_wl_entry *fm_anchor;
+	int fm_do_produce_anchor;
 
 	/* Wear-leveling sub-system's stuff */
 	struct rb_root used;
@@ -802,7 +806,6 @@ struct ubi_attach_info {
  * @vol_id: the volume ID on which this erasure is being performed
  * @lnum: the logical eraseblock number
  * @torture: if the physical eraseblock has to be tortured
- * @anchor: produce a anchor PEB to by used by fastmap
  *
  * The @func pointer points to the worker function. If the @shutdown argument is
  * not zero, the worker has to free the resources and exit immediately as the
@@ -818,7 +821,6 @@ struct ubi_work {
 	int vol_id;
 	int lnum;
 	int torture;
-	int anchor;
 };
 
 #include "debug.h"
drivers/mtd/ubi/wl.c +14 -18
index 6f2ac865ff05e..80d64d7e7a8be 100644
@@ -331,13 +331,6 @@ static struct ubi_wl_entry *find_wl_entry(struct ubi_device *ubi,
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* If no fastmap has been written and this WL entry can be used
-	 * as anchor PEB, hold it back and return the second best WL entry
-	 * such that fastmap can use the anchor PEB later. */
-	if (prev_e && !ubi->fm_disabled &&
-	    !ubi->fm && e->pnum < UBI_FM_MAX_START)
-		return prev_e;
-
 	return e;
 }
 
@@ -648,9 +641,6 @@ static int wear_leveling_worker(struct ubi_device *ubi, struct ubi_work *wrk,
 {
 	int err, scrubbing = 0, torture = 0, protect = 0, erroneous = 0;
 	int erase = 0, keep = 0, vol_id = -1, lnum = -1;
-#ifdef CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP
-	int anchor = wrk->anchor;
-#endif
 	struct ubi_wl_entry *e1, *e2;
 	struct ubi_vid_io_buf *vidb;
 	struct ubi_vid_hdr *vid_hdr;
@@ -690,11 +680,7 @@ static int wear_leveling_worker(struct ubi_device *ubi, struct ubi_work *wrk,
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP
-	/* Check whether we need to produce an anchor PEB */
-	if (!anchor)
-		anchor = !anchor_pebs_available(&ubi->free);
-
-	if (anchor) {
+	if (ubi->fm_do_produce_anchor) {
 		e1 = find_anchor_wl_entry(&ubi->used);
 		if (!e1)
 			goto out_cancel;
@@ -705,6 +691,7 @@ static int wear_leveling_worker(struct ubi_device *ubi, struct ubi_work *wrk,
 		self_check_in_wl_tree(ubi, e1, &ubi->used);
 		rb_erase(&e1->u.rb, &ubi->used);
 		dbg_wl("anchor-move PEB %d to PEB %d", e1->pnum, e2->pnum);
+		ubi->fm_do_produce_anchor = 0;
 	} else if (!ubi->scrub.rb_node) {
 #else
 	if (!ubi->scrub.rb_node) {
@@ -1037,7 +1024,6 @@ static int ensure_wear_leveling(struct ubi_device *ubi, int nested)
 		goto out_cancel;
 	}
 
-	wrk->anchor = 0;
 	wrk->func = &wear_leveling_worker;
 	if (nested)
 		__schedule_ubi_work(ubi, wrk);
@@ -1079,8 +1065,15 @@ static int __erase_worker(struct ubi_device *ubi, struct ubi_work *wl_wrk)
 	err = sync_erase(ubi, e, wl_wrk->torture);
 	if (!err) {
 		spin_lock(&ubi->wl_lock);
-		wl_tree_add(e, &ubi->free);
-		ubi->free_count++;
+
+		if (!ubi->fm_anchor && e->pnum < UBI_FM_MAX_START) {
+			ubi->fm_anchor = e;
+			ubi->fm_do_produce_anchor = 0;
+		} else {
+			wl_tree_add(e, &ubi->free);
+			ubi->free_count++;
+		}
+
 		spin_unlock(&ubi->wl_lock);
 
 		/*
@@ -1724,6 +1717,9 @@ int ubi_wl_init(struct ubi_device *ubi, struct ubi_attach_info *ai)
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP
+	ubi_ensure_anchor_pebs(ubi);
+#endif
 	return 0;
 
 out_free:
drivers/mtd/ubi/wl.h +0 -1
index a9e2d669acd81..c93a532937863 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 #ifndef UBI_WL_H
 #define UBI_WL_H
 #ifdef CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP
-static int anchor_pebs_available(struct rb_root *root);
 static void update_fastmap_work_fn(struct work_struct *wrk);
 static struct ubi_wl_entry *find_anchor_wl_entry(struct rb_root *root);
 static struct ubi_wl_entry *get_peb_for_wl(struct ubi_device *ubi);
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1


______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 34/206 mmc: core: Fix size overflow for mmc partitions

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bradley Bolen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3d7c2292d104519195fdb11192daec13229c219 ]

With large eMMC cards, it is possible to create general purpose partitions that are bigger than 4GB. The size member of the mmc_part struct is only an unsigned int which overflows for gp partitions larger than 4GB. Change this to a u64 to handle the overflow.

---
 drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c   | 9 ++++-----
 include/linux/mmc/card.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c +4 -5
index 5ca53e225382d..4b18034537f53 100644
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static void mmc_manage_enhanced_area(struct mmc_card *card, u8 *ext_csd)
 	}
 }
 
-static void mmc_part_add(struct mmc_card *card, unsigned int size,
+static void mmc_part_add(struct mmc_card *card, u64 size,
 			 unsigned int part_cfg, char *name, int idx, bool ro,
 			 int area_type)
 {
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void mmc_manage_gp_partitions(struct mmc_card *card, u8 *ext_csd)
 {
 	int idx;
 	u8 hc_erase_grp_sz, hc_wp_grp_sz;
-	unsigned int part_size;
+	u64 part_size;
 
 	/*
 	 * General purpose partition feature support --
@@ -346,8 +346,7 @@ static void mmc_manage_gp_partitions(struct mmc_card *card, u8 *ext_csd)
 				(ext_csd[EXT_CSD_GP_SIZE_MULT + idx * 3 + 1]
 				<< 8) +
 				ext_csd[EXT_CSD_GP_SIZE_MULT + idx * 3];
-			part_size *= (size_t)(hc_erase_grp_sz *
-				hc_wp_grp_sz);
+			part_size *= (hc_erase_grp_sz * hc_wp_grp_sz);
 			mmc_part_add(card, part_size << 19,
 				EXT_CSD_PART_CONFIG_ACC_GP0 + idx,
 				"gp%d", idx, false,
@@ -365,7 +364,7 @@ static void mmc_manage_gp_partitions(struct mmc_card *card, u8 *ext_csd)
 static int mmc_decode_ext_csd(struct mmc_card *card, u8 *ext_csd)
 {
 	int err = 0, idx;
-	unsigned int part_size;
+	u64 part_size;
 	struct device_node *np;
 	bool broken_hpi = false;
 
include/linux/mmc/card.h +1 -1
index 8ef330027b134..3f8e84a80b4ad 100644
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ struct mmc_queue_req;
  * MMC Physical partitions
  */
 struct mmc_part {
-	unsigned int	size;	/* partition size (in bytes) */
+	u64		size;	/* partition size (in bytes) */
 	unsigned int	part_cfg;	/* partition type */
 	char	name[MAX_MMC_PART_NAME_LEN];
 	bool	force_ro;	/* to make boot parts RO by default */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 35/206 gfs2: clean up iopen glock mess in gfs2_create_inode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bob Peterson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2c47c1be51fbded1f7baa2ceaed90f97932f79be ]

Before this patch, gfs2_create_inode had a use-after-free for the iopen glock in some error paths because it did this:

	gfs2_glock_put(io_gl);
fail_gunlock2:
	if (io_gl)
		clear_bit(GLF_INODE_CREATING, &io_gl->gl_flags);

In some cases, the io_gl was used for create and only had one reference, so the glock might be freed before the clear_bit(). This patch tries to straighten it out by only jumping to the error paths where iopen is properly set, and moving the gfs2_glock_put after the clear_bit.

---
 fs/gfs2/inode.c | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/gfs2/inode.c +7 -6
index d968b5c5df217..a52b8b0dceeb9 100644
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	error = gfs2_trans_begin(sdp, blocks, 0);
 	if (error)
-		goto fail_gunlock2;
+		goto fail_free_inode;
 
 	if (blocks > 1) {
 		ip->i_eattr = ip->i_no_addr + 1;
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	error = gfs2_glock_get(sdp, ip->i_no_addr, &gfs2_iopen_glops, CREATE, &io_gl);
 	if (error)
-		goto fail_gunlock2;
+		goto fail_free_inode;
 
 	BUG_ON(test_and_set_bit(GLF_INODE_CREATING, &io_gl->gl_flags));
 
@@ -735,7 +735,6 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		goto fail_gunlock2;
 
 	glock_set_object(ip->i_iopen_gh.gh_gl, ip);
-	gfs2_glock_put(io_gl);
 	gfs2_set_iop(inode);
 	insert_inode_hash(inode);
 
@@ -768,6 +767,8 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	mark_inode_dirty(inode);
 	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+	/* After instantiate, errors should result in evict which will destroy
+	 * both inode and iopen glocks properly. */
 	if (file) {
 		file->f_mode |= FMODE_CREATED;
 		error = finish_open(file, dentry, gfs2_open_common);
@@ -775,15 +776,15 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(ghs);
 	gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(ghs + 1);
 	clear_bit(GLF_INODE_CREATING, &io_gl->gl_flags);
+	gfs2_glock_put(io_gl);
 	return error;
 
 fail_gunlock3:
 	glock_clear_object(io_gl, ip);
 	gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&ip->i_iopen_gh);
-	gfs2_glock_put(io_gl);
 fail_gunlock2:
-	if (io_gl)
-		clear_bit(GLF_INODE_CREATING, &io_gl->gl_flags);
+	clear_bit(GLF_INODE_CREATING, &io_gl->gl_flags);
+	gfs2_glock_put(io_gl);
 fail_free_inode:
 	if (ip->i_gl) {
 		glock_clear_object(ip->i_gl, ip);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 36/206 scsi: pm80xx: Cleanup command when a reset times out

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: peter chang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 51c1c5f6ed64c2b65a8cf89dac136273d25ca540 ]

Added the fix so the if driver properly sent the abort it tries to remove it from the firmware's list of outstanding commands regardless of the abort status. This means that the task gets freed 'now' rather than possibly getting freed later when the scsi layer thinks it's leaked but still valid.

---
 drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm8001_sas.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm8001_sas.c +37 -13
index 5be4212312cb0..49cf2b65de223 100644
@@ -1184,8 +1184,8 @@ int pm8001_abort_task(struct sas_task *task)
 	pm8001_ha = pm8001_find_ha_by_dev(dev);
 	device_id = pm8001_dev->device_id;
 	phy_id = pm8001_dev->attached_phy;
-	rc = pm8001_find_tag(task, &tag);
-	if (rc == 0) {
+	ret = pm8001_find_tag(task, &tag);
+	if (ret == 0) {
 		pm8001_printk("no tag for task:%p\n", task);
 		return TMF_RESP_FUNC_FAILED;
 	}
@@ -1223,26 +1223,50 @@ int pm8001_abort_task(struct sas_task *task)
 
 			/* 2. Send Phy Control Hard Reset */
 			reinit_completion(&completion);
+			phy->port_reset_status = PORT_RESET_TMO;
 			phy->reset_success = false;
 			phy->enable_completion = &completion;
 			phy->reset_completion = &completion_reset;
 			ret = PM8001_CHIP_DISP->phy_ctl_req(pm8001_ha, phy_id,
 				PHY_HARD_RESET);
-			if (ret)
-				goto out;
-			PM8001_MSG_DBG(pm8001_ha,
-				pm8001_printk("Waiting for local phy ctl\n"));
-			wait_for_completion(&completion);
-			if (!phy->reset_success)
+			if (ret) {
+				phy->enable_completion = NULL;
+				phy->reset_completion = NULL;
 				goto out;
+			}
 
-			/* 3. Wait for Port Reset complete / Port reset TMO */
+			/* In the case of the reset timeout/fail we still
+			 * abort the command at the firmware. The assumption
+			 * here is that the drive is off doing something so
+			 * that it's not processing requests, and we want to
+			 * avoid getting a completion for this and either
+			 * leaking the task in libsas or losing the race and
+			 * getting a double free.
+			 */
 			PM8001_MSG_DBG(pm8001_ha,
+				pm8001_printk("Waiting for local phy ctl\n"));
+			ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&completion,
+					PM8001_TASK_TIMEOUT * HZ);
+			if (!ret || !phy->reset_success) {
+				phy->enable_completion = NULL;
+				phy->reset_completion = NULL;
+			} else {
+				/* 3. Wait for Port Reset complete or
+				 * Port reset TMO
+				 */
+				PM8001_MSG_DBG(pm8001_ha,
 				pm8001_printk("Waiting for Port reset\n"));
-			wait_for_completion(&completion_reset);
-			if (phy->port_reset_status) {
-				pm8001_dev_gone_notify(dev);
-				goto out;
+				ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(
+					&completion_reset,
+					PM8001_TASK_TIMEOUT * HZ);
+				if (!ret)
+					phy->reset_completion = NULL;
+				WARN_ON(phy->port_reset_status ==
+						PORT_RESET_TMO);
+				if (phy->port_reset_status == PORT_RESET_TMO) {
+					pm8001_dev_gone_notify(dev);
+					goto out;
+				}
 			}
 
 			/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 37/206 debugfs: Fix !DEBUG_FS debugfs_create_automount

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kusanagi Kouichi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4250b047039d324e0ff65267c8beb5bad5052a86 ]

If DEBUG_FS=n, compile fails with the following error:

kernel/trace/trace.c: In function 'tracing_init_dentry':
kernel/trace/trace.c:8658:9: error: passing argument 3 of 'debugfs_create_automount' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]

 8658 |         trace_automount, NULL);
      |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      |         |
      |         struct vfsmount * (*)(struct dentry *, void *)
In file included from kernel/trace/trace.c:24:
./include/linux/debugfs.h:206:25: note: expected 'struct vfsmount * (*)(void *)' but argument is of type 'struct vfsmount * (*)(struct dentry *, void *)'
  206 |      struct vfsmount *(*f)(void *),
      |      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~
---
 include/linux/debugfs.h | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/debugfs.h +3 -2
index 3b0ba54cc4d5b..3bc1034c57e66 100644
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ static const struct file_operations __fops = {				\
 	.llseek  = no_llseek,						\
 }
 
+typedef struct vfsmount *(*debugfs_automount_t)(struct dentry *, void *);
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS)
 
 struct dentry *debugfs_lookup(const char *name, struct dentry *parent);
@@ -75,7 +77,6 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent);
 struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent,
 				      const char *dest);
 
-typedef struct vfsmount *(*debugfs_automount_t)(struct dentry *, void *);
 struct dentry *debugfs_create_automount(const char *name,
 					struct dentry *parent,
 					debugfs_automount_t f,
@@ -204,7 +205,7 @@ static inline struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name,
 
 static inline struct dentry *debugfs_create_automount(const char *name,
 					struct dentry *parent,
-					struct vfsmount *(*f)(void *),
+					debugfs_automount_t f,
 					void *data)
 {
 	return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 38/206 CIFS: Properly process SMB3 lease breaks

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9bd4540836684013aaad6070a65d6fcdd9006625 ]

Currenly we doesn't assume that a server may break a lease from RWH to RW which causes us setting a wrong lease state on a file and thus mistakenly flushing data and byte-range locks and purging cached data on the client. This leads to performance degradation because subsequent IOs go directly to the server.

Fix this by propagating new lease state and epoch values to the oplock break handler through cifsFileInfo structure and removing the use of cifsInodeInfo flags for that. It allows to avoid some races of several lease/oplock breaks using those flags in parallel.

---
 fs/cifs/cifsglob.h |  9 ++++++---
 fs/cifs/file.c     | 10 +++++++---
 fs/cifs/misc.c     | 17 +++--------------
 fs/cifs/smb1ops.c  |  8 +++-----
 fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 32 +++++++-------------------------
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c  | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h  |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +6 -3
index 71c2dd0c7f038..2c632793c88c5 100644
@@ -259,8 +259,9 @@ struct smb_version_operations {
 	int (*check_message)(char *, unsigned int, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
 	bool (*is_oplock_break)(char *, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
 	int (*handle_cancelled_mid)(char *, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
-	void (*downgrade_oplock)(struct TCP_Server_Info *,
-					struct cifsInodeInfo *, bool);
+	void (*downgrade_oplock)(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+				 struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode, __u32 oplock,
+				 unsigned int epoch, bool *purge_cache);
 	/* process transaction2 response */
 	bool (*check_trans2)(struct mid_q_entry *, struct TCP_Server_Info *,
 			     char *, int);
@@ -1160,6 +1161,8 @@ struct cifsFileInfo {
 	unsigned int f_flags;
 	bool invalidHandle:1;	/* file closed via session abend */
 	bool oplock_break_cancelled:1;
+	unsigned int oplock_epoch; /* epoch from the lease break */
+	__u32 oplock_level; /* oplock/lease level from the lease break */
 	int count;
 	spinlock_t file_info_lock; /* protects four flag/count fields above */
 	struct mutex fh_mutex; /* prevents reopen race after dead ses*/
@@ -1300,7 +1303,7 @@ struct cifsInodeInfo {
 	unsigned int epoch;		/* used to track lease state changes */
 #define CIFS_INODE_PENDING_OPLOCK_BREAK   (0) /* oplock break in progress */
 #define CIFS_INODE_PENDING_WRITERS	  (1) /* Writes in progress */
-#define CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2 (2) /* Downgrade oplock to L2 */
+#define CIFS_INODE_FLAG_UNUSED		  (2) /* Unused flag */
 #define CIFS_INO_DELETE_PENDING		  (3) /* delete pending on server */
 #define CIFS_INO_INVALID_MAPPING	  (4) /* pagecache is invalid */
 #define CIFS_INO_LOCK			  (5) /* lock bit for synchronization */
fs/cifs/file.c +7 -3
index 128cbd69911b4..e78b52c582f18 100644
@@ -4185,12 +4185,13 @@ void cifs_oplock_break(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(cfile->tlink);
 	struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
 	int rc = 0;
+	bool purge_cache = false;
 
 	wait_on_bit(&cinode->flags, CIFS_INODE_PENDING_WRITERS,
 			TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
 
-	server->ops->downgrade_oplock(server, cinode,
-		test_bit(CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2, &cinode->flags));
+	server->ops->downgrade_oplock(server, cinode, cfile->oplock_level,
+				      cfile->oplock_epoch, &purge_cache);
 
 	if (!CIFS_CACHE_WRITE(cinode) && CIFS_CACHE_READ(cinode) &&
 						cifs_has_mand_locks(cinode)) {
@@ -4205,18 +4206,21 @@ void cifs_oplock_break(struct work_struct *work)
 		else
 			break_lease(inode, O_WRONLY);
 		rc = filemap_fdatawrite(inode->i_mapping);
-		if (!CIFS_CACHE_READ(cinode)) {
+		if (!CIFS_CACHE_READ(cinode) || purge_cache) {
 			rc = filemap_fdatawait(inode->i_mapping);
 			mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
 			cifs_zap_mapping(inode);
 		}
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "Oplock flush inode %p rc %d\n", inode, rc);
+		if (CIFS_CACHE_WRITE(cinode))
+			goto oplock_break_ack;
 	}
 
 	rc = cifs_push_locks(cfile);
 	if (rc)
 		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Push locks rc = %d\n", rc);
 
+oplock_break_ack:
 	/*
 	 * releasing stale oplock after recent reconnect of smb session using
 	 * a now incorrect file handle is not a data integrity issue but do
fs/cifs/misc.c +3 -14
index e45f8e321371c..dd67f56ea61e5 100644
@@ -477,21 +477,10 @@ is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *srv)
 				set_bit(CIFS_INODE_PENDING_OPLOCK_BREAK,
 					&pCifsInode->flags);
 
-				/*
-				 * Set flag if the server downgrades the oplock
-				 * to L2 else clear.
-				 */
-				if (pSMB->OplockLevel)
-					set_bit(
-					   CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2,
-					   &pCifsInode->flags);
-				else
-					clear_bit(
-					   CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2,
-					   &pCifsInode->flags);
-
-				cifs_queue_oplock_break(netfile);
+				netfile->oplock_epoch = 0;
+				netfile->oplock_level = pSMB->OplockLevel;
 				netfile->oplock_break_cancelled = false;
+				cifs_queue_oplock_break(netfile);
 
 				spin_unlock(&tcon->open_file_lock);
 				spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
fs/cifs/smb1ops.c +3 -5
index c7f0c85664425..0b7f924512848 100644
@@ -381,12 +381,10 @@ coalesce_t2(char *second_buf, struct smb_hdr *target_hdr)
 
 static void
 cifs_downgrade_oplock(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
-			struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode, bool set_level2)
+		      struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode, __u32 oplock,
+		      unsigned int epoch, bool *purge_cache)
 {
-	if (set_level2)
-		cifs_set_oplock_level(cinode, OPLOCK_READ);
-	else
-		cifs_set_oplock_level(cinode, 0);
+	cifs_set_oplock_level(cinode, oplock);
 }
 
 static bool
fs/cifs/smb2misc.c +7 -25
index 2fc96f7923ee5..7d875a47d0226 100644
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ smb2_tcon_has_lease(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb2_lease_break *rsp)
 
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "found in the open list\n");
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "lease key match, lease break 0x%x\n",
-			 le32_to_cpu(rsp->NewLeaseState));
+			 lease_state);
 
 		if (ack_req)
 			cfile->oplock_break_cancelled = false;
@@ -559,17 +559,8 @@ smb2_tcon_has_lease(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb2_lease_break *rsp)
 
 		set_bit(CIFS_INODE_PENDING_OPLOCK_BREAK, &cinode->flags);
 
-		/*
-		 * Set or clear flags depending on the lease state being READ.
-		 * HANDLE caching flag should be added when the client starts
-		 * to defer closing remote file handles with HANDLE leases.
-		 */
-		if (lease_state & SMB2_LEASE_READ_CACHING_HE)
-			set_bit(CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2,
-				&cinode->flags);
-		else
-			clear_bit(CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2,
-				  &cinode->flags);
+		cfile->oplock_epoch = le16_to_cpu(rsp->Epoch);
+		cfile->oplock_level = lease_state;
 
 		cifs_queue_oplock_break(cfile);
 		return true;
@@ -599,7 +590,7 @@ smb2_tcon_find_pending_open_lease(struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "found in the pending open list\n");
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "lease key match, lease break 0x%x\n",
-			 le32_to_cpu(rsp->NewLeaseState));
+			 lease_state);
 
 		open->oplock = lease_state;
 	}
@@ -732,18 +723,9 @@ smb2_is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 				set_bit(CIFS_INODE_PENDING_OPLOCK_BREAK,
 					&cinode->flags);
 
-				/*
-				 * Set flag if the server downgrades the oplock
-				 * to L2 else clear.
-				 */
-				if (rsp->OplockLevel)
-					set_bit(
-					   CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2,
-					   &cinode->flags);
-				else
-					clear_bit(
-					   CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2,
-					   &cinode->flags);
+				cfile->oplock_epoch = 0;
+				cfile->oplock_level = rsp->OplockLevel;
+
 				spin_unlock(&cfile->file_info_lock);
 
 				cifs_queue_oplock_break(cfile);
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +30 -14

73 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h +1 -1
index 308c682fa4d3b..44501f8cbd75e 100644
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ struct smb2_oplock_break {
 struct smb2_lease_break {
 	struct smb2_sync_hdr sync_hdr;
 	__le16 StructureSize; /* Must be 44 */
-	__le16 Reserved;
+	__le16 Epoch;
 	__le32 Flags;
 	__u8   LeaseKey[16];
 	__le32 CurrentLeaseState;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 39/206 ASoC: max98090: remove msleep in PLL unlocked workaround

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit acb874a7c049ec49d8fc66c893170fb42c01bdf7 ]

It was observed Baytrail-based chromebooks could cause continuous PLL unlocked when using playback stream and capture stream simultaneously. Specifically, starting a capture stream after started a playback stream. As a result, the audio data could corrupt or turn completely silent.

As the datasheet suggested, the maximum PLL lock time should be 7 msec. The workaround resets the codec softly by toggling SHDN off and on if PLL failed to lock for 10 msec. Notably, there is no suggested hold time for SHDN off.

On Baytrail-based chromebooks, it would easily happen continuous PLL unlocked if there is a 10 msec delay between SHDN off and on. Removes the msleep().

---
 sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c +7 -1
index 89b6e187ac235..a5b0c40ee545f 100644
@@ -2130,10 +2130,16 @@ static void max98090_pll_work(struct max98090_priv *max98090)
 
 	dev_info_ratelimited(component->dev, "PLL unlocked\n");
 
+	/*
+	 * As the datasheet suggested, the maximum PLL lock time should be
+	 * 7 msec.  The workaround resets the codec softly by toggling SHDN
+	 * off and on if PLL failed to lock for 10 msec.  Notably, there is
+	 * no suggested hold time for SHDN off.
+	 */
+
 	/* Toggle shutdown OFF then ON */
 	snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, M98090_REG_DEVICE_SHUTDOWN,
 			    M98090_SHDNN_MASK, 0);
-	msleep(10);
 	snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, M98090_REG_DEVICE_SHUTDOWN,
 			    M98090_SHDNN_MASK, M98090_SHDNN_MASK);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 40/206 kernel/sys.c: avoid copying possible padding bytes in copy_to_user

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Joe Perches <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e1aada08cd19ea652b2d32a250501d09b02ff2e ]

Initialization is not guaranteed to zero padding bytes so use an explicit memset instead to avoid leaking any kernel content in any possible padding bytes.

---
 kernel/sys.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sys.c +3 -1
index 096932a450466..baf60a3aa34b7 100644
@@ -1275,11 +1275,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
 {
-	struct oldold_utsname tmp = {};
+	struct oldold_utsname tmp;
 
 	if (!name)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
 	memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
 	memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 41/206 KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix potential double free dist->spis in __kvm_vgic_destroy()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0bda9498dd45280e334bfe88b815ebf519602cc3 ]

In kvm_vgic_dist_init() called from kvm_vgic_map_resources(), if dist->vgic_model is invalid, dist->spis will be freed without set dist->spis = NULL. And in vgicv2 resources clean up path, __kvm_vgic_destroy() will be called to free allocated resources. And dist->spis will be freed again in clean up chain because we forget to set dist->spis = NULL in kvm_vgic_dist_init() failed path. So double free would happen.

---
 virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-init.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-init.c +1 -0
index cd75df25fe140..2fc1777da50d2 100644
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ static int kvm_vgic_dist_init(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int nr_spis)
 			break;
 		default:
 			kfree(dist->spis);
+			dist->spis = NULL;
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 42/206 xfs: fix log reservation overflows when allocating large rt extents

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b1de6fc7520fe12949c070af0e8c0e4044cd3420 ]

Omar Sandoval reported that a 4G fallocate on the realtime device causes filesystem shutdowns due to a log reservation overflow that happens when we log the rtbitmap updates. Factor rtbitmap/rtsummary updates into the the tr_write and tr_itruncate log reservation calculation.

"The following reproducer results in a transaction log overrun warning for me:

mkfs.xfs -f -r rtdev=/dev/vdc -d rtinherit=1 -m reflink=0 /dev/vdb mount -o rtdev=/dev/vdc /dev/vdb /mnt
fallocate -l 4G /mnt/foo

---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_trans_resv.c +77 -19
index f99a7aefe4184..2b3cc5a8ced1b 100644
@@ -197,6 +197,24 @@ xfs_calc_inode_chunk_res(
 	return res;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Per-extent log reservation for the btree changes involved in freeing or
+ * allocating a realtime extent.  We have to be able to log as many rtbitmap
+ * blocks as needed to mark inuse MAXEXTLEN blocks' worth of realtime extents,
+ * as well as the realtime summary block.
+ */
+unsigned int
+xfs_rtalloc_log_count(
+	struct xfs_mount	*mp,
+	unsigned int		num_ops)
+{
+	unsigned int		blksz = XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1);
+	unsigned int		rtbmp_bytes;
+
+	rtbmp_bytes = (MAXEXTLEN / mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize) / NBBY;
+	return (howmany(rtbmp_bytes, blksz) + 1) * num_ops;
+}
+
 /*
  * Various log reservation values.
  *
@@ -219,13 +237,21 @@ xfs_calc_inode_chunk_res(
 
 /*
  * In a write transaction we can allocate a maximum of 2
- * extents.  This gives:
+ * extents.  This gives (t1):
  *    the inode getting the new extents: inode size
  *    the inode's bmap btree: max depth * block size
  *    the agfs of the ags from which the extents are allocated: 2 * sector
  *    the superblock free block counter: sector size
  *    the allocation btrees: 2 exts * 2 trees * (2 * max depth - 1) * block size
- * And the bmap_finish transaction can free bmap blocks in a join:
+ * Or, if we're writing to a realtime file (t2):
+ *    the inode getting the new extents: inode size
+ *    the inode's bmap btree: max depth * block size
+ *    the agfs of the ags from which the extents are allocated: 2 * sector
+ *    the superblock free block counter: sector size
+ *    the realtime bitmap: ((MAXEXTLEN / rtextsize) / NBBY) bytes
+ *    the realtime summary: 1 block
+ *    the allocation btrees: 2 trees * (2 * max depth - 1) * block size
+ * And the bmap_finish transaction can free bmap blocks in a join (t3):
  *    the agfs of the ags containing the blocks: 2 * sector size
  *    the agfls of the ags containing the blocks: 2 * sector size
  *    the super block free block counter: sector size
@@ -235,40 +261,72 @@ STATIC uint
 xfs_calc_write_reservation(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp)
 {
-	return XFS_DQUOT_LOGRES(mp) +
-		max((xfs_calc_inode_res(mp, 1) +
+	unsigned int		t1, t2, t3;
+	unsigned int		blksz = XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1);
+
+	t1 = xfs_calc_inode_res(mp, 1) +
+	     xfs_calc_buf_res(XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS(mp, XFS_DATA_FORK), blksz) +
+	     xfs_calc_buf_res(3, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
+	     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 2), blksz);
+
+	if (xfs_sb_version_hasrealtime(&mp->m_sb)) {
+		t2 = xfs_calc_inode_res(mp, 1) +
 		     xfs_calc_buf_res(XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS(mp, XFS_DATA_FORK),
-				      XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1)) +
+				     blksz) +
 		     xfs_calc_buf_res(3, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
-		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 2),
-				      XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))),
-		    (xfs_calc_buf_res(5, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
-		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 2),
-				      XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))));
+		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_rtalloc_log_count(mp, 1), blksz) +
+		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 1), blksz);
+	} else {
+		t2 = 0;
+	}
+
+	t3 = xfs_calc_buf_res(5, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
+	     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 2), blksz);
+
+	return XFS_DQUOT_LOGRES(mp) + max3(t1, t2, t3);
 }
 
 /*
- * In truncating a file we free up to two extents at once.  We can modify:
+ * In truncating a file we free up to two extents at once.  We can modify (t1):
  *    the inode being truncated: inode size
  *    the inode's bmap btree: (max depth + 1) * block size
- * And the bmap_finish transaction can free the blocks and bmap blocks:
+ * And the bmap_finish transaction can free the blocks and bmap blocks (t2):
  *    the agf for each of the ags: 4 * sector size
  *    the agfl for each of the ags: 4 * sector size
  *    the super block to reflect the freed blocks: sector size
  *    worst case split in allocation btrees per extent assuming 4 extents:
  *		4 exts * 2 trees * (2 * max depth - 1) * block size
+ * Or, if it's a realtime file (t3):
+ *    the agf for each of the ags: 2 * sector size
+ *    the agfl for each of the ags: 2 * sector size
+ *    the super block to reflect the freed blocks: sector size
+ *    the realtime bitmap: 2 exts * ((MAXEXTLEN / rtextsize) / NBBY) bytes
+ *    the realtime summary: 2 exts * 1 block
+ *    worst case split in allocation btrees per extent assuming 2 extents:
+ *		2 exts * 2 trees * (2 * max depth - 1) * block size
  */
 STATIC uint
 xfs_calc_itruncate_reservation(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp)
 {
-	return XFS_DQUOT_LOGRES(mp) +
-		max((xfs_calc_inode_res(mp, 1) +
-		     xfs_calc_buf_res(XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS(mp, XFS_DATA_FORK) + 1,
-				      XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))),
-		    (xfs_calc_buf_res(9, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
-		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 4),
-				      XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1))));
+	unsigned int		t1, t2, t3;
+	unsigned int		blksz = XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, 1);
+
+	t1 = xfs_calc_inode_res(mp, 1) +
+	     xfs_calc_buf_res(XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS(mp, XFS_DATA_FORK) + 1, blksz);
+
+	t2 = xfs_calc_buf_res(9, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
+	     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 4), blksz);
+
+	if (xfs_sb_version_hasrealtime(&mp->m_sb)) {
+		t3 = xfs_calc_buf_res(5, mp->m_sb.sb_sectsize) +
+		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_rtalloc_log_count(mp, 2), blksz) +
+		     xfs_calc_buf_res(xfs_allocfree_log_count(mp, 2), blksz);
+	} else {
+		t3 = 0;
+	}
+
+	return XFS_DQUOT_LOGRES(mp) + max3(t1, t2, t3);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 43/206 neigh_stat_seq_next() should increase position index

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1e3f9f073c47bee7c23e77316b07bc12338c5bba ]

if seq_file .next fuction does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

---
 net/core/neighbour.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/core/neighbour.c +1 -0
index bf738ec68cb53..6e890f51b7d86 100644
@@ -2844,6 +2844,7 @@ static void *neigh_stat_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 		*pos = cpu+1;
 		return per_cpu_ptr(tbl->stats, cpu);
 	}
+	(*pos)++;
 	return NULL;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 44/206 rt_cpu_seq_next should increase position index

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a3ea86739f1bc7e121d921842f0f4a8ab1af94d9 ]

if seq_file .next fuction does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

---
 net/ipv4/route.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/ipv4/route.c +1 -0
index f752d22cc8a59..248bfaf82fe06 100644
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ static void *rt_cpu_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 		*pos = cpu+1;
 		return &per_cpu(rt_cache_stat, cpu);
 	}
+	(*pos)++;
 	return NULL;
 
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 45/206 ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4fc427e0515811250647d44de38d87d7b0e0790f ]

if seq_file .next fuction does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +2 -5
index 5e8979c1f76d8..28b51f4aa6418 100644
@@ -2372,14 +2372,13 @@ static void *ipv6_route_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 	struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
 	struct ipv6_route_iter *iter = seq->private;
 
+	++(*pos);
 	if (!v)
 		goto iter_table;
 
 	n = rcu_dereference_bh(((struct fib6_info *)v)->fib6_next);
-	if (n) {
-		++*pos;
+	if (n)
 		return n;
-	}
 
 iter_table:
 	ipv6_route_check_sernum(iter);
@@ -2387,8 +2386,6 @@ iter_table:
 	r = fib6_walk_continue(&iter->w);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&iter->tbl->tb6_lock);
 	if (r > 0) {
-		if (v)
-			++*pos;
 		return iter->w.leaf;
 	} else if (r < 0) {
 		fib6_walker_unlink(net, &iter->w);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 46/206 seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Marco Elver <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bf07132f96d426bcbf2098227fb680915cf44498 ]

This patch proposes to require marked atomic accesses surrounding raw_write_seqcount_barrier. We reason that otherwise there is no way to guarantee propagation nor atomicity of writes before/after the barrier [1]. For example, consider the compiler tears stores either before or after the barrier; in this case, readers may observe a partial value, and because readers are unaware that writes are going on (writes are not in a seq-writer critical section), will complete the seq-reader critical section while having observed some partial state.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/

This came up when designing and implementing KCSAN, because KCSAN would flag these accesses as data-races. After careful analysis, our reasoning as above led us to conclude that the best thing to do is to propose an amendment to the raw_seqcount_barrier usage.

---
 include/linux/seqlock.h | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/seqlock.h +9 -2
index bcf4cf26b8c89..a42a29952889c 100644
@@ -243,6 +243,13 @@ static inline void raw_write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
  * usual consistency guarantee. It is one wmb cheaper, because we can
  * collapse the two back-to-back wmb()s.
  *
+ * Note that, writes surrounding the barrier should be declared atomic (e.g.
+ * via WRITE_ONCE): a) to ensure the writes become visible to other threads
+ * atomically, avoiding compiler optimizations; b) to document which writes are
+ * meant to propagate to the reader critical section. This is necessary because
+ * neither writes before and after the barrier are enclosed in a seq-writer
+ * critical section that would ensure readers are aware of ongoing writes.
+ *
  *      seqcount_t seq;
  *      bool X = true, Y = false;
  *
@@ -262,11 +269,11 @@ static inline void raw_write_seqcount_end(seqcount_t *s)
  *
  *      void write(void)
  *      {
- *              Y = true;
+ *              WRITE_ONCE(Y, true);
  *
  *              raw_write_seqcount_barrier(seq);
  *
- *              X = false;
+ *              WRITE_ONCE(X, false);
  *      }
  */
 static inline void raw_write_seqcount_barrier(seqcount_t *s)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 47/206 media: ti-vpe: cal: Restrict DMA to avoid memory corruption

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nikhil Devshatwar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6e72eab2e7b7a157d554b8f9faed7676047be7c1 ]

When setting DMA for video capture from CSI channel, if the DMA size is not given, it ends up writing as much data as sent by the camera.

This may lead to overwriting the buffers causing memory corruption. Observed green lines on the default framebuffer.

Restrict the DMA to maximum height as specified in the S_FMT ioctl.

---
 drivers/media/platform/ti-vpe/cal.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/ti-vpe/cal.c +4 -2
index be3155275a6ba..d945323fc437d 100644
@@ -684,12 +684,13 @@ static void pix_proc_config(struct cal_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 static void cal_wr_dma_config(struct cal_ctx *ctx,
-			      unsigned int width)
+			      unsigned int width, unsigned int height)
 {
 	u32 val;
 
 	val = reg_read(ctx->dev, CAL_WR_DMA_CTRL(ctx->csi2_port));
 	set_field(&val, ctx->csi2_port, CAL_WR_DMA_CTRL_CPORT_MASK);
+	set_field(&val, height, CAL_WR_DMA_CTRL_YSIZE_MASK);
 	set_field(&val, CAL_WR_DMA_CTRL_DTAG_PIX_DAT,
 		  CAL_WR_DMA_CTRL_DTAG_MASK);
 	set_field(&val, CAL_WR_DMA_CTRL_MODE_CONST,
@@ -1315,7 +1316,8 @@ static int cal_start_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq, unsigned int count)
 	csi2_lane_config(ctx);
 	csi2_ctx_config(ctx);
 	pix_proc_config(ctx);
-	cal_wr_dma_config(ctx, ctx->v_fmt.fmt.pix.bytesperline);
+	cal_wr_dma_config(ctx, ctx->v_fmt.fmt.pix.bytesperline,
+			  ctx->v_fmt.fmt.pix.height);
 	cal_wr_dma_addr(ctx, addr);
 	csi2_ppi_enable(ctx);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 48/206 sctp: move trace_sctp_probe_path into sctp_outq_sack

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kevin Kou <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f643ee295c1c63bc117fb052d4da681354d6f732 ]

The original patch bringed in the "SCTP ACK tracking trace event" feature was committed at Dec.20, 2017, it replaced jprobe usage with trace events, and bringed in two trace events, one is TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe), another one is TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe_path). The original patch intended to trigger the trace_sctp_probe_path in TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe) as below code,

+TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe,
+
+ TP_PROTO(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk),
+
+ TP_ARGS(ep, asoc, chunk),
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field(__u64, asoc)
+ __field(__u32, mark)
+ __field(__u16, bind_port)
+ __field(__u16, peer_port)
+ __field(__u32, pathmtu)
+ __field(__u32, rwnd)
+ __field(__u16, unack_data)
+ ),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
+
+ __entry->asoc = (unsigned long)asoc;
+ __entry->mark = skb->mark;
+ __entry->bind_port = ep->base.bind_addr.port;
+ __entry->peer_port = asoc->peer.port;
+ __entry->pathmtu = asoc->pathmtu;
+ __entry->rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
+ __entry->unack_data = asoc->unack_data;
+
+ if (trace_sctp_probe_path_enabled()) {
+ struct sctp_transport *sp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(sp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
+ transports) {
+ trace_sctp_probe_path(sp, asoc);
+ }
+ }
+ ),

But I found it did not work when I did testing, and trace_sctp_probe_path had no output, I finally found that there is trace buffer lock operation(trace_event_buffer_reserve) in include/trace/trace_events.h:

static notrace void \
trace_event_raw_event_##call(void *__data, proto) \

{									\
	struct trace_event_file *trace_file = __data;			\
	struct trace_event_data_offsets_##call __maybe_unused __data_offsets;\
	struct trace_event_buffer fbuffer;				\
	struct trace_event_raw_##call *entry;				\
	int __data_size;						\
									\
	if (trace_trigger_soft_disabled(trace_file))			\
		return;							\
									\
	__data_size = trace_event_get_offsets_##call(&__data_offsets, args); \
									\
	entry = trace_event_buffer_reserve(&fbuffer, trace_file,	\
				 sizeof(*entry) + __data_size);		\
									\
	if (!entry)							\
		return;							\
									\
	tstruct								\
									\
	{ assign; }							\
									\
	trace_event_buffer_commit(&fbuffer);				\
}

The reason caused no output of trace_sctp_probe_path is that trace_sctp_probe_path written in TP_fast_assign part of TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe), and it will be placed( { assign; } ) after the trace_event_buffer_reserve() when compiler expands Macro,

        entry = trace_event_buffer_reserve(&fbuffer, trace_file,        \
                                 sizeof(*entry) + __data_size);         \
                                                                        \
        if (!entry)                                                     \
                return;                                                 \
                                                                        \
        tstruct                                                         \
                                                                        \
        { assign; }                                                     \

so trace_sctp_probe_path finally can not acquire trace_event_buffer and return no output, that is to say the nest of tracepoint entry function is not allowed. The function call flow is:

trace_sctp_probe()
-> trace_event_raw_event_sctp_probe()
-> lock buffer
-> trace_sctp_probe_path()
-> trace_event_raw_event_sctp_probe_path() --nested -> buffer has been locked and return no output.

This patch is to remove trace_sctp_probe_path from the TP_fast_assign part of TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe) to avoid the nest of entry function, and trigger sctp_probe_path_trace in sctp_outq_sack.

After this patch, you can enable both events individually,

  # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
  # echo 1 > events/sctp/sctp_probe/enable
  # echo 1 > events/sctp/sctp_probe_path/enable

Or, you can enable all the events under sctp.

  # echo 1 > events/sctp/enable
---
 include/trace/events/sctp.h | 9 ---------
 net/sctp/outqueue.c         | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/sctp.h +0 -9
index 7475c7be165aa..d4aac34365955 100644
@@ -75,15 +75,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sctp_probe,
 		__entry->pathmtu = asoc->pathmtu;
 		__entry->rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
 		__entry->unack_data = asoc->unack_data;
-
-		if (trace_sctp_probe_path_enabled()) {
-			struct sctp_transport *sp;
-
-			list_for_each_entry(sp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
-					    transports) {
-				trace_sctp_probe_path(sp, asoc);
-			}
-		}
 	),
 
 	TP_printk("asoc=%#llx mark=%#x bind_port=%d peer_port=%d pathmtu=%d "
net/sctp/outqueue.c +6 -0
index 7bb8e5603298d..d6e83a37a1adf 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <net/sctp/sctp.h>
 #include <net/sctp/sm.h>
 #include <net/sctp/stream_sched.h>
+#include <trace/events/sctp.h>
 
 /* Declare internal functions here.  */
 static int sctp_acked(struct sctp_sackhdr *sack, __u32 tsn);
@@ -1257,6 +1258,11 @@ int sctp_outq_sack(struct sctp_outq *q, struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
 	/* Grab the association's destination address list. */
 	transport_list = &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list;
 
+	/* SCTP path tracepoint for congestion control debugging. */
+	list_for_each_entry(transport, transport_list, transports) {
+		trace_sctp_probe_path(transport, asoc);
+	}
+
 	sack_ctsn = ntohl(sack->cum_tsn_ack);
 	gap_ack_blocks = ntohs(sack->num_gap_ack_blocks);
 	asoc->stats.gapcnt += gap_ack_blocks;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 49/206 ACPI: EC: Reference count query handlers under lock

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3df663a147fe077a6ee8444ec626738946e65547 ]

There is a race condition in acpi_ec_get_query_handler() theoretically allowing query handlers to go away before refernce counting them.

In order to avoid it, call kref_get() on query handlers under ec->mutex.

Also simplify the code a bit while at it.

---
 drivers/acpi/ec.c | 16 ++++------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/ec.c +4 -12
index 49e16f0090957..9415a0041aaf7 100644
@@ -1080,29 +1080,21 @@ void acpi_ec_dispatch_gpe(void)
 /* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Event Management
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-static struct acpi_ec_query_handler *
-acpi_ec_get_query_handler(struct acpi_ec_query_handler *handler)
-{
-	if (handler)
-		kref_get(&handler->kref);
-	return handler;
-}
-
 static struct acpi_ec_query_handler *
 acpi_ec_get_query_handler_by_value(struct acpi_ec *ec, u8 value)
 {
 	struct acpi_ec_query_handler *handler;
-	bool found = false;
 
 	mutex_lock(&ec->mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry(handler, &ec->list, node) {
 		if (value == handler->query_bit) {
-			found = true;
-			break;
+			kref_get(&handler->kref);
+			mutex_unlock(&ec->mutex);
+			return handler;
 		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ec->mutex);
-	return found ? acpi_ec_get_query_handler(handler) : NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static void acpi_ec_query_handler_release(struct kref *kref)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 50/206 scsi: ufs: Make ufshcd_add_command_trace() easier to read

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4d2add7fd5bc64ee3e388eabe6b9e081cb42e11 ]

Since the lrbp->cmd expression occurs multiple times, introduce a new local variable to hold that pointer. This patch does not change any functionality.

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +6 -6
index eb10a5cacd90c..faf1959981784 100644
@@ -353,27 +353,27 @@ static void ufshcd_add_command_trace(struct ufs_hba *hba,
 	u8 opcode = 0;
 	u32 intr, doorbell;
 	struct ufshcd_lrb *lrbp = &hba->lrb[tag];
+	struct scsi_cmnd *cmd = lrbp->cmd;
 	int transfer_len = -1;
 
 	if (!trace_ufshcd_command_enabled()) {
 		/* trace UPIU W/O tracing command */
-		if (lrbp->cmd)
+		if (cmd)
 			ufshcd_add_cmd_upiu_trace(hba, tag, str);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (lrbp->cmd) { /* data phase exists */
+	if (cmd) { /* data phase exists */
 		/* trace UPIU also */
 		ufshcd_add_cmd_upiu_trace(hba, tag, str);
-		opcode = (u8)(*lrbp->cmd->cmnd);
+		opcode = cmd->cmnd[0];
 		if ((opcode == READ_10) || (opcode == WRITE_10)) {
 			/*
 			 * Currently we only fully trace read(10) and write(10)
 			 * commands
 			 */
-			if (lrbp->cmd->request && lrbp->cmd->request->bio)
-				lba =
-				  lrbp->cmd->request->bio->bi_iter.bi_sector;
+			if (cmd->request && cmd->request->bio)
+				lba = cmd->request->bio->bi_iter.bi_sector;
 			transfer_len = be32_to_cpu(
 				lrbp->ucd_req_ptr->sc.exp_data_transfer_len);
 		}
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
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[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mediatek
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 51/206 scsi: ufs: Fix a race condition in the tracing code

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eacf36f5bebde5089dddb3d5bfcbeab530b01f8a ]

Starting execution of a command before tracing a command may cause the completion handler to free data while it is being traced. Fix this race by tracing a command before it is submitted.

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +1 -1
index faf1959981784..b2cbdd01ab10b 100644
@@ -1910,12 +1910,12 @@ void ufshcd_send_command(struct ufs_hba *hba, unsigned int task_tag)
 {
 	hba->lrb[task_tag].issue_time_stamp = ktime_get();
 	hba->lrb[task_tag].compl_time_stamp = ktime_set(0, 0);
+	ufshcd_add_command_trace(hba, task_tag, "send");
 	ufshcd_clk_scaling_start_busy(hba);
 	__set_bit(task_tag, &hba->outstanding_reqs);
 	ufshcd_writel(hba, 1 << task_tag, REG_UTP_TRANSFER_REQ_DOOR_BELL);
 	/* Make sure that doorbell is committed immediately */
 	wmb();
-	ufshcd_add_command_trace(hba, task_tag, "send");
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 7 lines
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_______________________________________________
Linux-mediatek mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mediatek
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 52/206 efi/arm: Defer probe of PCIe backed efifb on DT systems

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 64c8a0cd0a535891d5905c3a1651150f0f141439 ]

The new of_devlink support breaks PCIe probing on ARM platforms booting via UEFI if the firmware exposes a EFI framebuffer that is backed by a PCI device. The reason is that the probing order gets reversed, resulting in a resource conflict on the framebuffer memory window when the PCIe probes last, causing it to give up entirely.

Given that we rely on PCI quirks to deal with EFI framebuffers that get moved around in memory, we cannot simply drop the memory reservation, so instead, let's use the device link infrastructure to register this dependency, and force the probing to occur in the expected order.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c +103 -4
index 1a6a77df8a5e8..85533ec55396a 100644
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"efi: " fmt
 
 #include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/fwnode.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/of_address.h>
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/screen_info.h>
@@ -271,15 +273,112 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
 		efi_memmap_unmap();
 }
 
+static bool efifb_overlaps_pci_range(const struct of_pci_range *range)
+{
+	u64 fb_base = screen_info.lfb_base;
+
+	if (screen_info.capabilities & VIDEO_CAPABILITY_64BIT_BASE)
+		fb_base |= (u64)(unsigned long)screen_info.ext_lfb_base << 32;
+
+	return fb_base >= range->cpu_addr &&
+	       fb_base < (range->cpu_addr + range->size);
+}
+
+static struct device_node *find_pci_overlap_node(void)
+{
+	struct device_node *np;
+
+	for_each_node_by_type(np, "pci") {
+		struct of_pci_range_parser parser;
+		struct of_pci_range range;
+		int err;
+
+		err = of_pci_range_parser_init(&parser, np);
+		if (err) {
+			pr_warn("of_pci_range_parser_init() failed: %d\n", err);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		for_each_of_pci_range(&parser, &range)
+			if (efifb_overlaps_pci_range(&range))
+				return np;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the efifb framebuffer is backed by a PCI graphics controller, we have
+ * to ensure that this relation is expressed using a device link when
+ * running in DT mode, or the probe order may be reversed, resulting in a
+ * resource reservation conflict on the memory window that the efifb
+ * framebuffer steals from the PCIe host bridge.
+ */
+static int efifb_add_links(const struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
+			   struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct device_node *sup_np;
+	struct device *sup_dev;
+
+	sup_np = find_pci_overlap_node();
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's no PCI graphics controller backing the efifb, we are
+	 * done here.
+	 */
+	if (!sup_np)
+		return 0;
+
+	sup_dev = get_dev_from_fwnode(&sup_np->fwnode);
+	of_node_put(sup_np);
+
+	/*
+	 * Return -ENODEV if the PCI graphics controller device hasn't been
+	 * registered yet.  This ensures that efifb isn't allowed to probe
+	 * and this function is retried again when new devices are
+	 * registered.
+	 */
+	if (!sup_dev)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this fails, retrying this function at a later point won't
+	 * change anything. So, don't return an error after this.
+	 */
+	if (!device_link_add(dev, sup_dev, 0))
+		dev_warn(dev, "device_link_add() failed\n");
+
+	put_device(sup_dev);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct fwnode_operations efifb_fwnode_ops = {
+	.add_links = efifb_add_links,
+};
+
+static struct fwnode_handle efifb_fwnode = {
+	.ops = &efifb_fwnode_ops,
+};
+
 static int __init register_gop_device(void)
 {
-	void *pd;
+	struct platform_device *pd;
+	int err;
 
 	if (screen_info.orig_video_isVGA != VIDEO_TYPE_EFI)
 		return 0;
 
-	pd = platform_device_register_data(NULL, "efi-framebuffer", 0,
-					   &screen_info, sizeof(screen_info));
-	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pd);
+	pd = platform_device_alloc("efi-framebuffer", 0);
+	if (!pd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI))
+		pd->dev.fwnode = &efifb_fwnode;
+
+	err = platform_device_add_data(pd, &screen_info, sizeof(screen_info));
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return platform_device_add(pd);
 }
 subsys_initcall(register_gop_device);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 53/206 dmaengine: zynqmp_dma: fix burst length configuration

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Matthias Fend <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc88525ebffc757e00cc5a5d61da6271646c7f5f ]

Since the dma engine expects the burst length register content as power of 2 value, the burst length needs to be converted first. Additionally add a burst length range check to avoid corrupting unrelated register bits.

---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/xilinx/zynqmp_dma.c +15 -9
index 73de6a6179fcd..e002ff8413e2a 100644
@@ -127,10 +127,12 @@
 /* Max transfer size per descriptor */
 #define ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN	0x40000000
 
+/* Max burst lengths */
+#define ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_DST_BURST_LEN    32768U
+#define ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_SRC_BURST_LEN    32768U
+
 /* Reset values for data attributes */
 #define ZYNQMP_DMA_AXCACHE_VAL		0xF
-#define ZYNQMP_DMA_ARLEN_RST_VAL	0xF
-#define ZYNQMP_DMA_AWLEN_RST_VAL	0xF
 
 #define ZYNQMP_DMA_SRC_ISSUE_RST_VAL	0x1F
 
@@ -536,17 +538,19 @@ static void zynqmp_dma_handle_ovfl_int(struct zynqmp_dma_chan *chan, u32 status)
 
 static void zynqmp_dma_config(struct zynqmp_dma_chan *chan)
 {
-	u32 val;
+	u32 val, burst_val;
 
 	val = readl(chan->regs + ZYNQMP_DMA_CTRL0);
 	val |= ZYNQMP_DMA_POINT_TYPE_SG;
 	writel(val, chan->regs + ZYNQMP_DMA_CTRL0);
 
 	val = readl(chan->regs + ZYNQMP_DMA_DATA_ATTR);
+	burst_val = __ilog2_u32(chan->src_burst_len);
 	val = (val & ~ZYNQMP_DMA_ARLEN) |
-		(chan->src_burst_len << ZYNQMP_DMA_ARLEN_OFST);
+		((burst_val << ZYNQMP_DMA_ARLEN_OFST) & ZYNQMP_DMA_ARLEN);
+	burst_val = __ilog2_u32(chan->dst_burst_len);
 	val = (val & ~ZYNQMP_DMA_AWLEN) |
-		(chan->dst_burst_len << ZYNQMP_DMA_AWLEN_OFST);
+		((burst_val << ZYNQMP_DMA_AWLEN_OFST) & ZYNQMP_DMA_AWLEN);
 	writel(val, chan->regs + ZYNQMP_DMA_DATA_ATTR);
 }
 
@@ -562,8 +566,10 @@ static int zynqmp_dma_device_config(struct dma_chan *dchan,
 {
 	struct zynqmp_dma_chan *chan = to_chan(dchan);
 
-	chan->src_burst_len = config->src_maxburst;
-	chan->dst_burst_len = config->dst_maxburst;
+	chan->src_burst_len = clamp(config->src_maxburst, 1U,
+		ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_SRC_BURST_LEN);
+	chan->dst_burst_len = clamp(config->dst_maxburst, 1U,
+		ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_DST_BURST_LEN);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -884,8 +890,8 @@ static int zynqmp_dma_chan_probe(struct zynqmp_dma_device *zdev,
 		return PTR_ERR(chan->regs);
 
 	chan->bus_width = ZYNQMP_DMA_BUS_WIDTH_64;
-	chan->dst_burst_len = ZYNQMP_DMA_AWLEN_RST_VAL;
-	chan->src_burst_len = ZYNQMP_DMA_ARLEN_RST_VAL;
+	chan->dst_burst_len = ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_DST_BURST_LEN;
+	chan->src_burst_len = ZYNQMP_DMA_MAX_SRC_BURST_LEN;
 	err = of_property_read_u32(node, "xlnx,bus-width", &chan->bus_width);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "missing xlnx,bus-width property\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 54/206 s390/cpum_sf: Use kzalloc and minor changes

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 32dab6828c42f087439d3e2617dc7283546bd8f7 ]

Use kzalloc() to allocate auxiliary buffer structure initialized with all zeroes to avoid random value in trace output.

Avoid double access to SBD hardware flags.

---
 arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c +4 -5
index 74a296cea21cc..0e6d01225a670 100644
@@ -1377,8 +1377,8 @@ static int aux_output_begin(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
 		idx = aux->empty_mark + 1;
 		for (i = 0; i < range_scan; i++, idx++) {
 			te = aux_sdb_trailer(aux, idx);
-			te->flags = te->flags & ~SDB_TE_BUFFER_FULL_MASK;
-			te->flags = te->flags & ~SDB_TE_ALERT_REQ_MASK;
+			te->flags &= ~(SDB_TE_BUFFER_FULL_MASK |
+				       SDB_TE_ALERT_REQ_MASK);
 			te->overflow = 0;
 		}
 		/* Save the position of empty SDBs */
@@ -1425,8 +1425,7 @@ static bool aux_set_alert(struct aux_buffer *aux, unsigned long alert_index,
 	te = aux_sdb_trailer(aux, alert_index);
 	do {
 		orig_flags = te->flags;
-		orig_overflow = te->overflow;
-		*overflow = orig_overflow;
+		*overflow = orig_overflow = te->overflow;
 		if (orig_flags & SDB_TE_BUFFER_FULL_MASK) {
 			/*
 			 * SDB is already set by hardware.
@@ -1660,7 +1659,7 @@ static void *aux_buffer_setup(struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate aux_buffer struct for the event */
-	aux = kmalloc(sizeof(struct aux_buffer), GFP_KERNEL);
+	aux = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aux_buffer), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!aux)
 		goto no_aux;
 	sfb = &aux->sfb;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 55/206 powerpc/powernv/ioda: Fix ref count for devices with their own PE

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Frederic Barrat <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05dd7da76986937fb288b4213b1fa10dbe0d1b33 ]

The pci_dn structure used to store a pointer to the struct pci_dev, so taking a reference on the device was required. However, the pci_dev pointer was later removed from the pci_dn structure, but the reference was kept for the npu device.
See commit 902bdc57451c ("powerpc/powernv/idoa: Remove unnecessary pcidev from pci_dn").

We don't need to take a reference on the device when assigning the PE as the struct pnv_ioda_pe is cleaned up at the same time as the (physical) device is released. Doing so prevents the device from being released, which is a problem for opencapi devices, since we want to be able to remove them through PCI hotplug.

Now the ugly part: nvlink npu devices are not meant to be released. Because of the above, we've always leaked a reference and simply removing it now is dangerous and would likely require more work. There's currently no release device callback for nvlink devices for example. So to be safe, this patch leaks a reference on the npu device, but only for nvlink and not opencapi.

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c +12 -7
index ecd211c5f24a5..19cd6affdd5fb 100644
@@ -1071,14 +1071,13 @@ static struct pnv_ioda_pe *pnv_ioda_setup_dev_PE(struct pci_dev *dev)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	/* NOTE: We get only one ref to the pci_dev for the pdn, not for the
-	 * pointer in the PE data structure, both should be destroyed at the
-	 * same time. However, this needs to be looked at more closely again
-	 * once we actually start removing things (Hotplug, SR-IOV, ...)
+	/* NOTE: We don't get a reference for the pointer in the PE
+	 * data structure, both the device and PE structures should be
+	 * destroyed at the same time. However, removing nvlink
+	 * devices will need some work.
 	 *
 	 * At some point we want to remove the PDN completely anyways
 	 */
-	pci_dev_get(dev);
 	pdn->pe_number = pe->pe_number;
 	pe->flags = PNV_IODA_PE_DEV;
 	pe->pdev = dev;
@@ -1093,7 +1092,6 @@ static struct pnv_ioda_pe *pnv_ioda_setup_dev_PE(struct pci_dev *dev)
 		pnv_ioda_free_pe(pe);
 		pdn->pe_number = IODA_INVALID_PE;
 		pe->pdev = NULL;
-		pci_dev_put(dev);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -1213,6 +1211,14 @@ static struct pnv_ioda_pe *pnv_ioda_setup_npu_PE(struct pci_dev *npu_pdev)
 	struct pci_controller *hose = pci_bus_to_host(npu_pdev->bus);
 	struct pnv_phb *phb = hose->private_data;
 
+	/*
+	 * Intentionally leak a reference on the npu device (for
+	 * nvlink only; this is not an opencapi path) to make sure it
+	 * never goes away, as it's been the case all along and some
+	 * work is needed otherwise.
+	 */
+	pci_dev_get(npu_pdev);
+
 	/*
 	 * Due to a hardware errata PE#0 on the NPU is reserved for
 	 * error handling. This means we only have three PEs remaining
@@ -1236,7 +1242,6 @@ static struct pnv_ioda_pe *pnv_ioda_setup_npu_PE(struct pci_dev *npu_pdev)
 			 */
 			dev_info(&npu_pdev->dev,
 				"Associating to existing PE %x\n", pe_num);
-			pci_dev_get(npu_pdev);
 			npu_pdn = pci_get_pdn(npu_pdev);
 			rid = npu_pdev->bus->number << 8 | npu_pdn->devfn;
 			npu_pdn->pe_number = pe_num;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 56/206 powerpc/eeh: Only dump stack once if an MMIO loop is detected

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Oliver O'Halloran <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e0942c0302b5ad76b228b1a7b8c09f658a1d58a ]

Many drivers don't check for errors when they get a 0xFFs response from an MMIO load. As a result after an EEH event occurs a driver can get stuck in a polling loop unless it some kind of internal timeout logic.

Currently EEH tries to detect and report stuck drivers by dumping a stack trace after eeh_dev_check_failure() is called EEH_MAX_FAILS times on an already frozen PE. The value of EEH_MAX_FAILS was chosen so that a dump would occur every few seconds if the driver was spinning in a loop. This results in a lot of spurious stack traces in the kernel log.

Fix this by limiting it to printing one stack trace for each PE freeze. If the driver is truely stuck the kernel's hung task detector is better suited to reporting the probelm anyway.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c +1 -1
index fe3c6f3bd3b62..d123cba0992d0 100644
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int eeh_dev_check_failure(struct eeh_dev *edev)
 	rc = 1;
 	if (pe->state & EEH_PE_ISOLATED) {
 		pe->check_count++;
-		if (pe->check_count % EEH_MAX_FAILS == 0) {
+		if (pe->check_count == EEH_MAX_FAILS) {
 			dn = pci_device_to_OF_node(dev);
 			if (dn)
 				location = of_get_property(dn, "ibm,loc-code",
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 57/206 Bluetooth: btrtl: Use kvmalloc for FW allocations

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Maxim Mikityanskiy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 268d3636dfb22254324774de1f8875174b3be064 ]

Currently, kmemdup is applied to the firmware data, and it invokes kmalloc under the hood. The firmware size and patch_length are big (more than PAGE_SIZE), and on some low-end systems (like ASUS E202SA) kmalloc may fail to allocate a contiguous chunk under high memory usage and fragmentation:

Bluetooth: hci0: RTL: examining hci_ver=06 hci_rev=000a lmp_ver=06 lmp_subver=8821
Bluetooth: hci0: RTL: rom_version status=0 version=1
Bluetooth: hci0: RTL: loading rtl_bt/rtl8821a_fw.bin
kworker/u9:2: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x40cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0 <stack trace follows>

As firmware load happens on each resume, Bluetooth will stop working after several iterations, when the kernel fails to allocate an order-4 page.

This patch replaces kmemdup with kvmalloc+memcpy. It's not required to have a contiguous chunk here, because it's not mapped to the device directly.

---
 drivers/bluetooth/btrtl.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/bluetooth/btrtl.c +11 -9
index 8d1cd2479e36f..cc51395d8b0e5 100644
@@ -343,11 +343,11 @@ static int rtlbt_parse_firmware(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 	 * the end.
 	 */
 	len = patch_length;
-	buf = kmemdup(btrtl_dev->fw_data + patch_offset, patch_length,
-		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	buf = kvmalloc(patch_length, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	memcpy(buf, btrtl_dev->fw_data + patch_offset, patch_length - 4);
 	memcpy(buf + patch_length - 4, &epatch_info->fw_version, 4);
 
 	*_buf = buf;
@@ -415,8 +415,10 @@ static int rtl_load_file(struct hci_dev *hdev, const char *name, u8 **buff)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	ret = fw->size;
-	*buff = kmemdup(fw->data, ret, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!*buff)
+	*buff = kvmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (*buff)
+		memcpy(*buff, fw->data, ret);
+	else
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 
 	release_firmware(fw);
@@ -454,14 +456,14 @@ static int btrtl_setup_rtl8723b(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (btrtl_dev->cfg_len > 0) {
-		tbuff = kzalloc(ret + btrtl_dev->cfg_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		tbuff = kvzalloc(ret + btrtl_dev->cfg_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!tbuff) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
 		memcpy(tbuff, fw_data, ret);
-		kfree(fw_data);
+		kvfree(fw_data);
 
 		memcpy(tbuff + ret, btrtl_dev->cfg_data, btrtl_dev->cfg_len);
 		ret += btrtl_dev->cfg_len;
@@ -474,7 +476,7 @@ static int btrtl_setup_rtl8723b(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 	ret = rtl_download_firmware(hdev, fw_data, ret);
 
 out:
-	kfree(fw_data);
+	kvfree(fw_data);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -501,8 +503,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *btrtl_read_local_version(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 
 void btrtl_free(struct btrtl_device_info *btrtl_dev)
 {
-	kfree(btrtl_dev->fw_data);
-	kfree(btrtl_dev->cfg_data);
+	kvfree(btrtl_dev->fw_data);
+	kvfree(btrtl_dev->cfg_data);
 	kfree(btrtl_dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(btrtl_free);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 58/206 tracing: Set kernel_stack's caller size properly

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cbc3b92ce037f5e7536f6db157d185cd8b8f615c ]

I noticed when trying to use the trace-cmd python interface that reading the raw buffer wasn't working for kernel_stack events. This is because it uses a stubbed version of __dynamic_array that doesn't do the __data_loc trick and encode the length of the array into the field. Instead it just shows up as a size of 0. So change this to __array and set the len to FTRACE_STACK_ENTRIES since this is what we actually do in practice and matches how user_stack_trace works.

[ Pulled from the archeological digging of my INBOX ]
---
 kernel/trace/trace_entries.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace_entries.h +1 -1
index 06bb2fd9a56c5..a97aad105d367 100644
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ FTRACE_ENTRY(kernel_stack, stack_entry,
 
 	F_STRUCT(
 		__field(	int,		size	)
-		__dynamic_array(unsigned long,	caller	)
+		__array(	unsigned long,	caller,	FTRACE_STACK_ENTRIES	)
 	),
 
 	F_printk("\t=> (" IP_FMT ")\n\t=> (" IP_FMT ")\n\t=> (" IP_FMT ")\n"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 59/206 ext4: make dioread_nolock the default

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 244adf6426ee31a83f397b700d964cff12a247d3 ]

This fixes the direct I/O versus writeback race which can reveal stale data, and it improves the tail latency of commits on slow devices.

---
 fs/ext4/super.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +4 -3
index 0c15ff19acbd4..0076ea7427e34 100644
@@ -1538,6 +1538,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
 	{Opt_auto_da_alloc, "auto_da_alloc"},
 	{Opt_noauto_da_alloc, "noauto_da_alloc"},
 	{Opt_dioread_nolock, "dioread_nolock"},
+	{Opt_dioread_lock, "nodioread_nolock"},
 	{Opt_dioread_lock, "dioread_lock"},
 	{Opt_discard, "discard"},
 	{Opt_nodiscard, "nodiscard"},
@@ -3712,6 +3713,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
 	/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
 	set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
+	set_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
 	set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
 #endif
@@ -3849,9 +3851,8 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		goto failed_mount;
 
 	if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
-		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting "
-			    "with data=journal disables delayed "
-			    "allocation and O_DIRECT support!\n");
+		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting with data=journal disables delayed allocation, dioread_nolock, and O_DIRECT support!\n");
+		clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
 		if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_DELALLOC)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
 				 "both data=journal and delalloc");
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#59 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 059/206] ext4: make dioread_nolock the default

Quoted 10 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 244adf6426ee31a83f397b700d964cff12a247d3 ]

This fixes the direct I/O versus writeback race which can reveal stale data, and it improves the tail latency of commits on slow devices.

Any particular reason to be backporting this? I thought I saw some fixes for dioread_nolock go by, after it was made the default. Are you getting all of those fixes too?

- Eric

#60 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 059/206] ext4: make dioread_nolock the default

Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 7 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 244adf6426ee31a83f397b700d964cff12a247d3 ]

This fixes the direct I/O versus writeback race which can reveal stale data, and it improves the tail latency of commits on slow devices.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Any particular reason to be backporting this? I thought I saw some fixes for dioread_nolock go by, after it was made the default. Are you getting all of those fixes too?

Agreed, making dioread_nolock the default has enough issues that it's not something that I'd suggest backporting at this point. It's a fundamental behavioral change that it's not something we should change in a stable kernel.

- Ted

author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 60/206 ARM: 8948/1: Prevent OOB access in stacktrace

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vincent Whitchurch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 40ff1ddb5570284e039e0ff14d7a859a73dc3673 ]

The stacktrace code can read beyond the stack size, when it attempts to read pt_regs from exception frames.

This can happen on normal, non-corrupt stacks. Since the unwind information in the extable is not correct for function prologues, the unwinding code can return data from the stack which is not actually the caller function address, and if in_entry_text() happens to succeed on this value, we can end up reading data from outside the task's stack when attempting to read pt_regs, since there is no bounds check.

Example:

[<8010e729>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<8010a9c9>] (show_stack+0x11/0x14) [<8010a9c9>] (show_stack) from [<8057d8d7>] (dump_stack+0x87/0xac) [<8057d8d7>] (dump_stack) from [<8012271d>] (tasklet_action_common.constprop.4+0xa5/0xa8) [<8012271d>] (tasklet_action_common.constprop.4) from [<80102333>] (__do_softirq+0x11b/0x31c) [<80102333>] (__do_softirq) from [<80122485>] (irq_exit+0xad/0xd8) [<80122485>] (irq_exit) from [<8015f3d7>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x47/0x84) [<8015f3d7>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<8036a523>] (gic_handle_irq+0x43/0x78) [<8036a523>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80101a49>] (__irq_svc+0x69/0xb4)

 Exception stack(0xeb491f58 to 0xeb491fa0)
 1f40:                                                       7eb14794 00000000
 1f60: ffffffff 008dd32c 008dd324 ffffffff 008dd314 0000002a 801011e4 eb490000
 1f80: 0000002a 7eb1478c 50c5387d eb491fa8 80101001 8023d09c 40080033 ffffffff
 [<80101a49>] (__irq_svc) from [<8023d09c>] (do_pipe2+0x0/0xac)
 [<8023d09c>] (do_pipe2) from [<ffffffff>] (0xffffffff)
 Exception stack(0xeb491fc8 to 0xeb492010)
 1fc0:                   008dd314 0000002a 00511ad8 008de4c8 7eb14790 7eb1478c
 1fe0: 00511e34 7eb14774 004c8557 76f44098 60080030 7eb14794 00000000 00000000
 2000: 00000001 00000000 ea846c00 ea847cc0

In this example, the stack limit is 0xeb492000, but 16 bytes outside the stack have been read.

Fix it by adding bounds checks.

---
 arch/arm/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 ++
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c      | 6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/stacktrace.c +2 -0
index a4d4a28fe07df..d23ab9ec130a3 100644
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ static int save_trace(struct stackframe *frame, void *d)
 		return 0;
 
 	regs = (struct pt_regs *)frame->sp;
+	if ((unsigned long)&regs[1] > ALIGN(frame->sp, THREAD_SIZE))
+		return 0;
 
 	trace->entries[trace->nr_entries++] = regs->ARM_pc;
 
arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +4 -2
index badf02ca36938..aec533168f046 100644
@@ -67,14 +67,16 @@ static void dump_mem(const char *, const char *, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 
 void dump_backtrace_entry(unsigned long where, unsigned long from, unsigned long frame)
 {
+	unsigned long end = frame + 4 + sizeof(struct pt_regs);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS
 	printk("[<%08lx>] (%ps) from [<%08lx>] (%pS)\n", where, (void *)where, from, (void *)from);
 #else
 	printk("Function entered at [<%08lx>] from [<%08lx>]\n", where, from);
 #endif
 
-	if (in_entry_text(from))
-		dump_mem("", "Exception stack", frame + 4, frame + 4 + sizeof(struct pt_regs));
+	if (in_entry_text(from) && end <= ALIGN(frame, THREAD_SIZE))
+		dump_mem("", "Exception stack", frame + 4, end);
 }
 
 void dump_backtrace_stm(u32 *stack, u32 instruction)
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 61/206 ar5523: Add USB ID of SMCWUSBT-G2 wireless adapter

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mert Dirik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5b362498a79631f283578b64bf6f4d15ed4cc19a ]

Add the required USB ID for running SMCWUSBT-G2 wireless adapter (SMC "EZ Connect g").

This device uses ar5523 chipset and requires firmware to be loaded. Even though pid of the device is 4507, this patch adds it as 4506 so that AR5523_DEVICE_UG macro can set the AR5523_FLAG_PRE_FIRMWARE flag for pid 4507.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +2 -0
index da2d179430ca5..4c57e79e5779a 100644
@@ -1770,6 +1770,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id ar5523_id_table[] = {
 	AR5523_DEVICE_UX(0x0846, 0x4300),	/* Netgear / WG111U */
 	AR5523_DEVICE_UG(0x0846, 0x4250),	/* Netgear / WG111T */
 	AR5523_DEVICE_UG(0x0846, 0x5f00),	/* Netgear / WPN111 */
+	AR5523_DEVICE_UG(0x083a, 0x4506),	/* SMC / EZ Connect
+						   SMCWUSBT-G2 */
 	AR5523_DEVICE_UG(0x157e, 0x3006),	/* Umedia / AR5523_1 */
 	AR5523_DEVICE_UX(0x157e, 0x3205),	/* Umedia / AR5523_2 */
 	AR5523_DEVICE_UG(0x157e, 0x3006),	/* Umedia / TEW444UBEU */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#63 lore raw

PATCH 62/206 ceph: ensure we have a new cap before continuing in fill_inode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9a6bed4fe0c8bf57785cbc4db9f86086cb9b193d ]

If the caller passes in a NULL cap_reservation, and we can't allocate one then ensure that we fail gracefully.

---
 fs/ceph/inode.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/inode.c +4 -1
index 1e438e0faf77e..3c24fb77ef325 100644
@@ -764,8 +764,11 @@ static int fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page,
 	info_caps = le32_to_cpu(info->cap.caps);
 
 	/* prealloc new cap struct */
-	if (info_caps && ceph_snap(inode) == CEPH_NOSNAP)
+	if (info_caps && ceph_snap(inode) == CEPH_NOSNAP) {
 		new_cap = ceph_get_cap(mdsc, caps_reservation);
+		if (!new_cap)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * prealloc xattr data, if it looks like we'll need it.  only
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#64 lore raw

PATCH 63/206 selftests/ftrace: fix glob selftest

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af4ddd607dff7aabd466a4a878e01b9f592a75ab ]

test.d/ftrace/func-filter-glob.tc is failing on s390 because it has ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_LOCK and friends set to 'y'. So the usual __raw_spin_lock symbol isn't in the ftrace function list. Change '*aw*lock' to '*spin*lock' which would hopefully match some of the locking functions on all platforms.

---
 .../testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/ftrace/func-filter-glob.tc  | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/ftrace/func-filter-glob.tc +1 -1
index 27a54a17da65d..f4e92afab14b2 100644
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ ftrace_filter_check '*schedule*' '^.*schedule.*$'
 ftrace_filter_check 'schedule*' '^schedule.*$'
 
 # filter by *mid*end
-ftrace_filter_check '*aw*lock' '.*aw.*lock$'
+ftrace_filter_check '*pin*lock' '.*pin.*lock$'
 
 # filter by start*mid*
 ftrace_filter_check 'mutex*try*' '^mutex.*try.*'
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#65 lore raw

PATCH 64/206 tools/power/x86/intel_pstate_tracer: changes for python 3 compatibility

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Doug Smythies <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e749e09db30c38f1a275945814b0109e530a07b0 ]

Some syntax needs to be more rigorous for python 3. Backwards compatibility tested with python 2.7

---
 .../intel_pstate_tracer.py                    | 22 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
tools/power/x86/intel_pstate_tracer/intel_pstate_tracer.py +11 -11
index 2fa3c5757bcb5..dbed3d213bf17 100755
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ then this utility enables and collects trace data for a user specified interval
 and generates performance plots.
 
 Prerequisites:
-    Python version 2.7.x
+    Python version 2.7.x or higher
     gnuplot 5.0 or higher
-    gnuplot-py 1.8
+    gnuplot-py 1.8 or higher
     (Most of the distributions have these required packages. They may be called
-     gnuplot-py, phython-gnuplot. )
+     gnuplot-py, phython-gnuplot or phython3-gnuplot, gnuplot-nox, ... )
 
     HWP (Hardware P-States are disabled)
     Kernel config for Linux trace is enabled
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ def plot_pstate_cpu_with_sample():
         g_plot('set xlabel "Samples"')
         g_plot('set ylabel "P-State"')
         g_plot('set title "{} : cpu pstate vs. sample : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
-        title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+        title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
         plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_SAMPLE, C_TO)
         g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
         g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ def plot_pstate_cpu():
 #    the following command is really cool, but doesn't work with the CPU masking option because it aborts on the first missing file.
 #    plot_str = 'plot for [i=0:*] file=sprintf("cpu%03d.csv",i) title_s=sprintf("cpu%03d",i) file using 16:7 pt 7 ps 1 title title_s'
 #
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_TO)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ def plot_load_cpu():
     g_plot('set ylabel "CPU load (percent)"')
     g_plot('set title "{} : cpu loads : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
 
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_LOAD)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ def plot_frequency_cpu():
     g_plot('set ylabel "CPU Frequency (GHz)"')
     g_plot('set title "{} : cpu frequencies : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
 
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_FREQ)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ def plot_duration_cpu():
     g_plot('set ylabel "Timer Duration (MilliSeconds)"')
     g_plot('set title "{} : cpu durations : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
 
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_DURATION)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ def plot_scaled_cpu():
     g_plot('set ylabel "Scaled Busy (Unitless)"')
     g_plot('set title "{} : cpu scaled busy : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
 
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_SCALED)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ def plot_boost_cpu():
     g_plot('set ylabel "CPU IO Boost (percent)"')
     g_plot('set title "{} : cpu io boost : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
 
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_BOOST)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ def plot_ghz_cpu():
     g_plot('set ylabel "TSC Frequency (GHz)"')
     g_plot('set title "{} : cpu TSC Frequencies (Sanity check calculation) : {:%F %H:%M}"'.format(testname, datetime.now()))
 
-    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).replace('\n', ' ')
+    title_list = subprocess.check_output('ls cpu???.csv | sed -e \'s/.csv//\'',shell=True).decode('utf-8').replace('\n', ' ')
     plot_str = "plot for [i in title_list] i.'.csv' using {:d}:{:d} pt 7 ps 1 title i".format(C_ELAPSED, C_GHZ)
     g_plot('title_list = "{}"'.format(title_list))
     g_plot(plot_str)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#66 lore raw

PATCH 65/206 Bluetooth: Fix refcount use-after-free issue

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Manish Mandlik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c08fc896b60893c5d673764b0668015d76df462 ]

There is no lock preventing both l2cap_sock_release() and chan->ops->close() from running at the same time.

If we consider Thread A running l2cap_chan_timeout() and Thread B running l2cap_sock_release(), expected behavior is:
A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill() B::l2cap_sock_release()->sock_orphan() B::l2cap_sock_release()->l2cap_sock_kill()

where,
sock_orphan() clears "sk->sk_socket" and l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() marks socket as SOCK_ZAPPED.

In l2cap_sock_kill(), there is an "if-statement" that checks if both sock_orphan() and sock_teardown() has been run i.e. sk->sk_socket is NULL and socket is marked as SOCK_ZAPPED. Socket is killed if the condition is satisfied.

In the race condition, following occurs:
A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() B::l2cap_sock_release()->sock_orphan() B::l2cap_sock_release()->l2cap_sock_kill() A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()

In this scenario, "if-statement" is true in both B::l2cap_sock_kill() and A::l2cap_sock_kill() and we hit "refcount: underflow; use-after-free" bug.

Similar condition occurs at other places where teardown/sock_kill is happening:
l2cap_disconnect_rsp()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_disconnect_rsp()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()

l2cap_conn_del()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_conn_del()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()

l2cap_disconnect_req()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_disconnect_req()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()

l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()->l2cap_sock_kill()

Protect teardown/sock_kill and orphan/sock_kill by adding hold_lock on l2cap channel to ensure that the socket is killed only after marked as zapped and orphan.

---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +15 -11
index 0d84d1f820d4c..b1f51cb007ea6 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ static void l2cap_chan_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 	BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state));
 
 	mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
+	/* __set_chan_timer() calls l2cap_chan_hold(chan) while scheduling
+	 * this work. No need to call l2cap_chan_hold(chan) here again.
+	 */
 	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
 
 	if (chan->state == BT_CONNECTED || chan->state == BT_CONFIG)
@@ -426,12 +429,12 @@ static void l2cap_chan_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	l2cap_chan_close(chan, reason);
 
-	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
-
 	chan->ops->close(chan);
-	mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
 
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
 }
 
 struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_chan_create(void)
@@ -1725,9 +1728,9 @@ static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err)
 
 		l2cap_chan_del(chan, err);
 
-		l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
-
 		chan->ops->close(chan);
+
+		l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 		l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 	}
 
@@ -4337,6 +4340,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
 
 	rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
@@ -4345,12 +4349,11 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 	chan->ops->set_shutdown(chan);
 
-	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET);
 
-	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
-
 	chan->ops->close(chan);
+
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
@@ -4382,20 +4385,21 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
 
 	if (chan->state != BT_DISCONN) {
 		l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+		l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 		mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_del(chan, 0);
 
-	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
-
 	chan->ops->close(chan);
+
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +13 -3
index a3a2cd55e23a9..d128750e47305 100644
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ done:
 }
 
 /* Kill socket (only if zapped and orphan)
- * Must be called on unlocked socket.
+ * Must be called on unlocked socket, with l2cap channel lock.
  */
 static void l2cap_sock_kill(struct sock *sk)
 {
@@ -1200,8 +1200,15 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
 
 	err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, 2);
 
+	l2cap_chan_hold(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
+	l2cap_chan_lock(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
+
 	sock_orphan(sk);
 	l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
+
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
+	l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
+
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1219,12 +1226,15 @@ static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent)
 		BT_DBG("child chan %p state %s", chan,
 		       state_to_string(chan->state));
 
+		l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
 		l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+
 		__clear_chan_timer(chan);
 		l2cap_chan_close(chan, ECONNRESET);
-		l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
-
 		l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
+
+		l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+		l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#67 lore raw

PATCH 66/206 mm/swapfile.c: swap_next should increase position index

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10c8d69f314d557d94d74ec492575ae6a4f1eb1c ]

If seq_file .next fuction does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.

In Aug 2018 NeilBrown noticed commit 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c:
simplify seq_file iteration code and interface") "Some ->next functions do not increment *pos when they return NULL... Note that such ->next functions are buggy and should be fixed. A simple demonstration is

dd if=/proc/swaps bs=1000 skip=1

Choose any block size larger than the size of /proc/swaps. This will always show the whole last line of /proc/swaps"

Described problem is still actual. If you make lseek into middle of last output line following read will output end of last line and whole last line once again.

  $ dd if=/proc/swaps bs=1  # usual output
  Filename				Type		Size	Used	Priority
  /dev/dm-0                               partition	4194812	97536	-2
  104+0 records in
  104+0 records out
  104 bytes copied
  $ dd if=/proc/swaps bs=40 skip=1    # last line was generated twice
  dd: /proc/swaps: cannot skip to specified offset
  v/dm-0                               partition	4194812	97536	-2
  /dev/dm-0                               partition	4194812	97536	-2
  3+1 records in
  3+1 records out
  131 bytes copied

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

---
 mm/swapfile.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/swapfile.c +1 -1
index 0047dcaf93697..c3684cfa9534e 100644
@@ -2738,10 +2738,10 @@ static void *swap_next(struct seq_file *swap, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 	else
 		type = si->type + 1;
 
+	++(*pos);
 	for (; (si = swap_type_to_swap_info(type)); type++) {
 		if (!(si->flags & SWP_USED) || !si->swap_map)
 			continue;
-		++*pos;
 		return si;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#68 lore raw

PATCH 67/206 mm: pagewalk: fix termination condition in walk_pte_range()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Steven Price <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c02a98753e0a36ba65a05818626fa6adeb4e7c97 ]

If walk_pte_range() is called with a 'end' argument that is beyond the last page of memory (e.g. ~0UL) then the comparison between 'addr' and 'end' will always fail and the loop will be infinite. Instead change the comparison to >= while accounting for overflow.

Cc Albert Ou <[email protected]>
Cc Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Hogan <[email protected]>
Cc James Morse <[email protected]>
Cc Jerome Glisse <[email protected]>
Cc "Liang, Kan" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Zong Li <[email protected]>
---
 mm/pagewalk.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/pagewalk.c +2 -2
index c3084ff2569d2..3c0930d94a295 100644
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ static int walk_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 		err = walk->pte_entry(pte, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE, walk);
 		if (err)
 		       break;
-		addr += PAGE_SIZE;
-		if (addr == end)
+		if (addr >= end - PAGE_SIZE)
 			break;
+		addr += PAGE_SIZE;
 		pte++;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#69 lore raw

PATCH 68/206 Bluetooth: prefetch channel before killing sock

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a154903cec20fb64ff4d7d617ca53c16f8fd53a ]

Prefetch channel before killing sock in order to fix UAF like

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_release+0x24c/0x290 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1212
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880944904a0 by task syz-fuzzer/9751
Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 6c08fc896b60 ("Bluetooth: Fix refcount use-after-free issue")
Cc Manish Mandlik <[email protected]>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +6 -4
index d128750e47305..5572042f04531 100644
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	int err;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 
 	BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
 
@@ -1199,15 +1200,16 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
 	bt_sock_unlink(&l2cap_sk_list, sk);
 
 	err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, 2);
+	chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
 
-	l2cap_chan_hold(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
-	l2cap_chan_lock(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
+	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
 
 	sock_orphan(sk);
 	l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
 
-	l2cap_chan_unlock(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
-	l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 
 	return err;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#70 lore raw

PATCH 69/206 KVM: fix overflow of zero page refcount with ksm running

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Zhuang Yanying <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7df003c85218b5f5b10a7f6418208f31e813f38f ]

We are testing Virtual Machine with KSM on v5.4-rc2 kernel, and found the zero_page refcount overflow.
The cause of refcount overflow is increased in try_async_pf (get_user_page) without being decreased in mmu_set_spte() while handling ept violation.
In kvm_release_pfn_clean(), only unreserved page will call put_page. However, zero page is reserved.
So, as well as creating and destroy vm, the refcount of zero page will continue to increase until it overflows.

step1:
echo 10000 > /sys/kernel/pages_to_scan/pages_to_scan echo 1 > /sys/kernel/pages_to_scan/run
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/pages_to_scan/use_zero_pages

step2:
just create several normal qemu kvm vms.
And destroy it after 10s.
Repeat this action all the time.

After a long period of time, all domains hang because of the refcount of zero page overflow.

Qemu print error log as follow:
…
error: kvm run failed Bad address
EAX=00006cdc EBX=00000008 ECX=80202001 EDX=078bfbfd ESI=ffffffff EDI=00000000 EBP=00000008 ESP=00006cc4 EIP=000efd75 EFL=00010002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0010 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS [-WA]
CS =0008 00000000 ffffffff 00c09b00 DPL=0 CS32 [-RA]

 SS =0010 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]
 DS =0010 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]
 FS =0010 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]
 GS =0010 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]

LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200 DPL=0 LDT
TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00 DPL=0 TSS32-busy
GDT= 000f7070 00000037
IDT= 000f70ae 00000000
CR0=00000011 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000
DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000
DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400
EFER=0000000000000000
Code=00 01 00 00 00 e9 e8 00 00 00 c7 05 4c 55 0f 00 01 00 00 00 <8b> 35 00 00 01 00 8b 3d 04 00 01 00 b8 d8 d3 00 00 c1 e0 08 0c ea a3 00 00 01 00 c7 05 04 …

Meanwhile, a kernel warning is departed.

 [40914.836375] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 82067 at ./include/linux/mm.h:987 try_get_page+0x1f/0x30
 [40914.836412] CPU: 3 PID: 82067 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE     5.2.0-rc2 #5
 [40914.836415] RIP: 0010:try_get_page+0x1f/0x30
 [40914.836417] Code: 40 00 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 47 08 a8 01 75 11 8b 47 34 85 c0 7e 10 f0 ff 47 34 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 8d 78 ff eb e9 <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 66 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 0
 0 00 00 00 48 8b 47 08 a8
 [40914.836418] RSP: 0018:ffffb4144e523988 EFLAGS: 00010286
 [40914.836419] RAX: 0000000080000000 RBX: 0000000000000326 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [40914.836420] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00004ffdeba10000 RDI: ffffdf07093f6440
 [40914.836421] RBP: ffffdf07093f6440 R08: 800000424fd91225 R09: 0000000000000000
 [40914.836421] R10: ffff9eb41bfeebb8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffdf06bbd1e8a8
 [40914.836422] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 800000424fd91225 R15: ffffdf07093f6440
 [40914.836423] FS:  00007fb60ffff700(0000) GS:ffff9eb4802c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [40914.836425] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [40914.836426] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000002f220e6002 CR4: 00000000003626e0
 [40914.836427] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 [40914.836427] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 [40914.836428] Call Trace:
 [40914.836433]  follow_page_pte+0x302/0x47b
 [40914.836437]  __get_user_pages+0xf1/0x7d0
 [40914.836441]  ? irq_work_queue+0x9/0x70
 [40914.836443]  get_user_pages_unlocked+0x13f/0x1e0
 [40914.836469]  __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x10e/0x400 [kvm]
 [40914.836486]  try_async_pf+0x87/0x240 [kvm]
 [40914.836503]  tdp_page_fault+0x139/0x270 [kvm]
 [40914.836523]  kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x76/0x5e0 [kvm]
 [40914.836588]  vcpu_enter_guest+0xb45/0x1570 [kvm]
 [40914.836632]  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x35d/0x580 [kvm]
 [40914.836645]  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x26e/0x5d0 [kvm]
 [40914.836650]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x620
 [40914.836653]  ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
 [40914.836654]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
 [40914.836658]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
 [40914.836664]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 [40914.836666] RIP: 0033:0x7fb61cb6bfc7
---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -0
index 2155b52b17eca..595502f8d4a27 100644
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ bool kvm_is_reserved_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 	 */
 	if (pfn_valid(pfn))
 		return PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
+		       !is_zero_pfn(pfn) &&
 		       !kvm_is_zone_device_pfn(pfn);
 
 	return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#71 lore raw

PATCH 70/206 ALSA: hda: Clear RIRB status before reading WP

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mohan Kumar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d011d5057ff88ee556c000ac6fe0be23bdfcd72 ]

RIRB interrupt status getting cleared after the write pointer is read causes a race condition, where last response(s) into RIRB may remain unserviced by IRQ, eventually causing azx_rirb_get_response to fall back to polling mode. Clearing the RIRB interrupt status ahead of write pointer access ensures that this condition is avoided.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_controller.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/hda_controller.c +9 -2
index fa261b27d8588..8198d2e53b7df 100644
@@ -1169,16 +1169,23 @@ irqreturn_t azx_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
 		if (snd_hdac_bus_handle_stream_irq(bus, status, stream_update))
 			active = true;
 
-		/* clear rirb int */
 		status = azx_readb(chip, RIRBSTS);
 		if (status & RIRB_INT_MASK) {
+			/*
+			 * Clearing the interrupt status here ensures that no
+			 * interrupt gets masked after the RIRB wp is read in
+			 * snd_hdac_bus_update_rirb. This avoids a possible
+			 * race condition where codec response in RIRB may
+			 * remain unserviced by IRQ, eventually falling back
+			 * to polling mode in azx_rirb_get_response.
+			 */
+			azx_writeb(chip, RIRBSTS, RIRB_INT_MASK);
 			active = true;
 			if (status & RIRB_INT_RESPONSE) {
 				if (chip->driver_caps & AZX_DCAPS_CTX_WORKAROUND)
 					udelay(80);
 				snd_hdac_bus_update_rirb(bus);
 			}
-			azx_writeb(chip, RIRBSTS, RIRB_INT_MASK);
 		}
 	} while (active && ++repeat < 10);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#72 lore raw

PATCH 71/206 skbuff: fix a data race in skb_queue_len()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 86b18aaa2b5b5bb48e609cd591b3d2d0fdbe0442 ]

sk_buff.qlen can be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN,

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_from_queue / unix_dgram_sendmsg

read to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 5371 on cpu 96:

  unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x9a9/0xb70 include/linux/skbuff.h:1821
				 net/unix/af_unix.c:1761
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x33e/0x370
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xa6/0xf0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xf0
  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x70
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

write to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 99:

  __skb_try_recv_from_queue+0x327/0x410 include/linux/skbuff.h:2029
  __skb_try_recv_datagram+0xbe/0x220
  unix_dgram_recvmsg+0xee/0x850
  ____sys_recvmsg+0x1fb/0x210
  ___sys_recvmsg+0xa2/0xf0
  __sys_recvmsg+0x66/0xf0
  __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x70
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Since only the read is operating as lockless, it could introduce a logic bug in unix_recvq_full() due to the load tearing. Fix it by adding a lockless variant of skb_queue_len() and unix_recvq_full() where READ_ONCE() is on the read while WRITE_ONCE() is on the write similar to the commit d7d16a89350a ("net: add skb_queue_empty_lockless()").

---
 include/linux/skbuff.h | 14 +++++++++++++-
 net/unix/af_unix.c     | 11 +++++++++--
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/skbuff.h +13 -1
index 25407c206e732..f0474ea735695 100644
@@ -1688,6 +1688,18 @@ static inline __u32 skb_queue_len(const struct sk_buff_head *list_)
 	return list_->qlen;
 }
 
+/**
+ *	skb_queue_len_lockless	- get queue length
+ *	@list_: list to measure
+ *
+ *	Return the length of an &sk_buff queue.
+ *	This variant can be used in lockless contexts.
+ */
+static inline __u32 skb_queue_len_lockless(const struct sk_buff_head *list_)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(list_->qlen);
+}
+
 /**
  *	__skb_queue_head_init - initialize non-spinlock portions of sk_buff_head
  *	@list: queue to initialize
@@ -1895,7 +1907,7 @@ static inline void __skb_unlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *next, *prev;
 
-	list->qlen--;
+	WRITE_ONCE(list->qlen, list->qlen - 1);
 	next	   = skb->next;
 	prev	   = skb->prev;
 	skb->next  = skb->prev = NULL;
net/unix/af_unix.c +9 -2
index 2318e2e2748f4..2020306468af4 100644
@@ -192,11 +192,17 @@ static inline int unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk)
 	return unix_peer(osk) == NULL || unix_our_peer(sk, osk);
 }
 
-static inline int unix_recvq_full(struct sock const *sk)
+static inline int unix_recvq_full(const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	return skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
 }
 
+static inline int unix_recvq_full_lockless(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return skb_queue_len_lockless(&sk->sk_receive_queue) >
+		READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog);
+}
+
 struct sock *unix_peer_get(struct sock *s)
 {
 	struct sock *peer;
@@ -1788,7 +1794,8 @@ restart_locked:
 	 * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
 	 */
 	if (other != sk &&
-	    unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+	    unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk &&
+	    unix_recvq_full_lockless(other))) {
 		if (timeo) {
 			timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#73 lore raw

PATCH 72/206 audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Steve Grubb <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 70b3eeed49e8190d97139806f6fbaf8964306cdb ]

Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.

Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then audit_panic is called which is sufficient.

The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.

---
 kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
kernel/audit_watch.c +0 -2
index 4f7262eba73d8..50952d6d81209 100644
@@ -317,8 +317,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
 			if (oentry->rule.exe)
 				audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
 
-			audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
 			call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
 		}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#74 lore raw

PATCH 73/206 selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d269a8e2a8f0bca89022f4ec98de460acb90365 ]

If seq_file .next function does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.

$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output
lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees
817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037
1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683
1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s

$# read after lseek to midle of last line

$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1
dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset
056 9115   <<<< end of last line
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115  <<< whole last line once again
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s

$# read after lseek beyond end of of file

$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1
dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115  <<<< generates whole last line
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

---
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +1 -0
index f3a5a138a096d..60b3f16bb5c7b 100644
@@ -1509,6 +1509,7 @@ static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
 		*idx = cpu + 1;
 		return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
 	}
+	(*idx)++;
 	return NULL;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#75 lore raw

PATCH 74/206 scsi: lpfc: Fix RQ buffer leakage when no IOCBs available

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: James Smart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 39c4f1a965a9244c3ba60695e8ff8da065ec6ac4 ]

The driver is occasionally seeing the following SLI Port error, requiring reset and reinit:

Port Status Event: ... error 1=0x52004a01, error 2=0x218

The failure means an RQ timeout. That is, the adapter had received asynchronous receive frames, ran out of buffer slots to place the frames, and the driver did not replenish the buffer slots before a timeout occurred. The driver should not be so slow in replenishing buffers that a timeout can occur.

When the driver received all the frames of a sequence, it allocates an IOCB to put the frames in. In a situation where there was no IOCB available for the frame of a sequence, the RQ buffer corresponding to the first frame of the sequence was not returned to the FW. Eventually, with enough traffic encountering the situation, the timeout occurred.

Fix by releasing the buffer back to firmware whenever there is no IOCB for the first frame.

[mkp: typo]

---
 drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c +4 -0
index a56a939792ac1..2ab351260e815 100644
@@ -17413,6 +17413,10 @@ lpfc_prep_seq(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct hbq_dmabuf *seq_dmabuf)
 			list_add_tail(&iocbq->list, &first_iocbq->list);
 		}
 	}
+	/* Free the sequence's header buffer */
+	if (!first_iocbq)
+		lpfc_in_buf_free(vport->phba, &seq_dmabuf->dbuf);
+
 	return first_iocbq;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#76 lore raw

PATCH 75/206 scsi: lpfc: Fix coverity errors in fmdi attribute handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: James Smart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4cb9e1ddaa145be9ed67b6a7de98ca705a43f998 ]

Coverity reported a memory corruption error for the fdmi attributes routines:

CID 15768 [Memory Corruption] Out-of-bounds access on FDMI

Sloppy coding of the fmdi structures. In both the lpfc_fdmi_attr_def and lpfc_fdmi_reg_port_list structures, a field was placed at the start of payload that may have variable content. The field was given an arbitrary type (uint32_t). The code then uses the field name to derive an address, which it used in things such as memset and memcpy. The memset sizes or memcpy lengths were larger than the arbitrary type, thus coverity reported an error.

Fix by replacing the arbitrary fields with the real field structures describing the payload.

---
 drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw.h |  36 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c +69 -68
index 384f5cd7c3c81..99b4ff78f9dce 100644
@@ -1737,8 +1737,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_wwnn(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_def *ad)
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	memcpy(&ae->un.AttrWWN, &vport->fc_sparam.nodeName,
 	       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
@@ -1754,8 +1754,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_manufacturer(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	/* This string MUST be consistent with other FC platforms
 	 * supported by Broadcom.
@@ -1779,8 +1779,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_sn(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_def *ad)
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, phba->SerialNumber,
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -1801,8 +1801,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_model(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, phba->ModelName,
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -1822,8 +1822,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_description(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, phba->ModelDesc,
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -1845,8 +1845,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_hdw_ver(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t i, j, incr, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	/* Convert JEDEC ID to ascii for hardware version */
 	incr = vp->rev.biuRev;
@@ -1875,8 +1875,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_drvr_ver(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, lpfc_release_version,
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -1897,8 +1897,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_rom_ver(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev == LPFC_SLI_REV4)
 		lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(phba, ae->un.AttrString, 1);
@@ -1922,8 +1922,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_fmw_ver(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(phba, ae->un.AttrString, 1);
 	len = strnlen(ae->un.AttrString,
@@ -1942,8 +1942,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_os_ver(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	snprintf(ae->un.AttrString, sizeof(ae->un.AttrString), "%s %s %s",
 		 init_utsname()->sysname,
@@ -1965,7 +1965,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_ct_len(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(LPFC_MAX_CT_SIZE);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
@@ -1981,8 +1981,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_symbolic_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	len = lpfc_vport_symbolic_node_name(vport,
 				ae->un.AttrString, 256);
@@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_vendor_info(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	/* Nothing is defined for this currently */
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(0);
@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_num_ports(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	/* Each driver instance corresponds to a single port */
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(1);
@@ -2034,8 +2034,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_fabric_wwnn(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	memcpy(&ae->un.AttrWWN, &vport->fabric_nodename,
 	       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
@@ -2053,8 +2053,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_bios_ver(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(phba, ae->un.AttrString, 1);
 	len = strnlen(ae->un.AttrString,
@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_bios_state(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	/* Driver doesn't have access to this information */
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(0);
@@ -2090,8 +2090,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_hba_attr_vendor_id(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, "EMULEX",
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -2112,8 +2112,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_fc4type(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 32);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	ae->un.AttrTypes[3] = 0x02; /* Type 0x1 - ELS */
 	ae->un.AttrTypes[2] = 0x01; /* Type 0x8 - FCP */
@@ -2134,7 +2134,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_support_speed(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	ae->un.AttrInt = 0;
 	if (!(phba->hba_flag & HBA_FCOE_MODE)) {
@@ -2186,7 +2186,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_speed(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	if (!(phba->hba_flag & HBA_FCOE_MODE)) {
 		switch (phba->fc_linkspeed) {
@@ -2253,7 +2253,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_max_frame(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	hsp = (struct serv_parm *)&vport->fc_sparam;
 	ae->un.AttrInt = (((uint32_t) hsp->cmn.bbRcvSizeMsb) << 8) |
@@ -2273,8 +2273,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_os_devname(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	snprintf(ae->un.AttrString, sizeof(ae->un.AttrString),
 		 "/sys/class/scsi_host/host%d", shost->host_no);
@@ -2294,8 +2294,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_host_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	snprintf(ae->un.AttrString, sizeof(ae->un.AttrString), "%s",
 		 init_utsname()->nodename);
@@ -2315,8 +2315,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_wwnn(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0,  sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	memcpy(&ae->un.AttrWWN, &vport->fc_sparam.nodeName,
 	       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
@@ -2333,8 +2333,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_wwpn(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0,  sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	memcpy(&ae->un.AttrWWN, &vport->fc_sparam.portName,
 	       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
@@ -2351,8 +2351,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_symbolic_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	len = lpfc_vport_symbolic_port_name(vport, ae->un.AttrString, 256);
 	len += (len & 3) ? (4 - (len & 3)) : 4;
@@ -2370,7 +2370,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_port_type(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	if (phba->fc_topology == LPFC_TOPOLOGY_LOOP)
 		ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(LPFC_FDMI_PORTTYPE_NLPORT);
 	else
@@ -2388,7 +2388,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_class(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	ae->un.AttrInt = cpu_to_be32(FC_COS_CLASS2 | FC_COS_CLASS3);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
 	ad->AttrLen = cpu_to_be16(size);
@@ -2403,8 +2403,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_fabric_wwpn(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0,  sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	memcpy(&ae->un.AttrWWN, &vport->fabric_portname,
 	       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
@@ -2421,8 +2421,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_active_fc4type(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 32);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	ae->un.AttrTypes[3] = 0x02; /* Type 0x1 - ELS */
 	ae->un.AttrTypes[2] = 0x01; /* Type 0x8 - FCP */
@@ -2442,7 +2442,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_port_state(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	/* Link Up - operational */
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(LPFC_FDMI_PORTSTATE_ONLINE);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_num_disc(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	vport->fdmi_num_disc = lpfc_find_map_node(vport);
 	ae->un.AttrInt = cpu_to_be32(vport->fdmi_num_disc);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_port_attr_nportid(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(vport->fc_myDID);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
 	ad->AttrLen = cpu_to_be16(size);
@@ -2489,8 +2489,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_service(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, "Smart SAN Initiator",
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -2510,8 +2510,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_guid(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	memcpy(&ae->un.AttrString, &vport->fc_sparam.nodeName,
 	       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
@@ -2531,8 +2531,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_version(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, "Smart SAN Version 2.0",
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -2553,8 +2553,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_model(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t len, size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
-	memset(ae, 0, 256);
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
+	memset(ae, 0, sizeof(*ae));
 
 	strncpy(ae->un.AttrString, phba->ModelName,
 		sizeof(ae->un.AttrString));
@@ -2573,7 +2573,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_port_info(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 
 	/* SRIOV (type 3) is not supported */
 	if (vport->vpi)
@@ -2593,7 +2593,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_qos(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(0);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
 	ad->AttrLen = cpu_to_be16(size);
@@ -2608,7 +2608,7 @@ lpfc_fdmi_smart_attr_security(struct lpfc_vport *vport,
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	ae = (struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry *)&ad->AttrValue;
+	ae = &ad->AttrValue;
 	ae->un.AttrInt =  cpu_to_be32(1);
 	size = FOURBYTES + sizeof(uint32_t);
 	ad->AttrLen = cpu_to_be16(size);
@@ -2756,7 +2756,8 @@ lpfc_fdmi_cmd(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp,
 			/* Registered Port List */
 			/* One entry (port) per adapter */
 			rh->rpl.EntryCnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
-			memcpy(&rh->rpl.pe, &phba->pport->fc_sparam.portName,
+			memcpy(&rh->rpl.pe.PortName,
+			       &phba->pport->fc_sparam.portName,
 			       sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
 
 			/* point to the HBA attribute block */
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw.h +16 -20
index 009aa0eee0408..48d4d576d588e 100644
@@ -1333,25 +1333,8 @@ struct fc_rdp_res_frame {
 /* lpfc_sli_ct_request defines the CT_IU preamble for FDMI commands */
 #define  SLI_CT_FDMI_Subtypes     0x10	/* Management Service Subtype */
 
-/*
- * Registered Port List Format
- */
-struct lpfc_fdmi_reg_port_list {
-	uint32_t EntryCnt;
-	uint32_t pe;		/* Variable-length array */
-};
-
-
 /* Definitions for HBA / Port attribute entries */
 
-struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_def { /* Defined in TLV format */
-	/* Structure is in Big Endian format */
-	uint32_t AttrType:16;
-	uint32_t AttrLen:16;
-	uint32_t AttrValue;  /* Marks start of Value (ATTRIBUTE_ENTRY) */
-};
-
-
 /* Attribute Entry */
 struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry {
 	union {
@@ -1362,7 +1345,13 @@ struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry {
 	} un;
 };
 
-#define LPFC_FDMI_MAX_AE_SIZE	sizeof(struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry)
+struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_def { /* Defined in TLV format */
+	/* Structure is in Big Endian format */
+	uint32_t AttrType:16;
+	uint32_t AttrLen:16;
+	/* Marks start of Value (ATTRIBUTE_ENTRY) */
+	struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_entry AttrValue;
+} __packed;
 
 /*
  * HBA Attribute Block
@@ -1386,13 +1375,20 @@ struct lpfc_fdmi_hba_ident {
 	struct lpfc_name PortName;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Registered Port List Format
+ */
+struct lpfc_fdmi_reg_port_list {
+	uint32_t EntryCnt;
+	struct lpfc_fdmi_port_entry pe;
+} __packed;
+
 /*
  * Register HBA(RHBA)
  */
 struct lpfc_fdmi_reg_hba {
 	struct lpfc_fdmi_hba_ident hi;
-	struct lpfc_fdmi_reg_port_list rpl;	/* variable-length array */
-/* struct lpfc_fdmi_attr_block   ab; */
+	struct lpfc_fdmi_reg_port_list rpl;
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#77 lore raw

PATCH 76/206 drm/omap: fix possible object reference leak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wen Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 47340e46f34a3b1d80e40b43ae3d7a8da34a3541 ]

The call to of_find_matching_node returns a node pointer with refcount incremented thus it must be explicitly decremented after the last usage.

Detected by coccinelle with the following warnings:
drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/dss/omapdss-boot-init.c:212:2-8: ERROR: missing of_node_put; acquired a node pointer with refcount incremented on line 209, but without a corresponding object release within this function. drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/dss/omapdss-boot-init.c:237:1-7: ERROR: missing of_node_put; acquired a node pointer with refcount incremented on line 209, but without a corresponding object release within this function.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/dss/omapdss-boot-init.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/dss/omapdss-boot-init.c +3 -1
index 3bfb95d230e0e..d8fb686c1fda9 100644
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int __init omapdss_boot_init(void)
 	dss = of_find_matching_node(NULL, omapdss_of_match);
 
 	if (dss == NULL || !of_device_is_available(dss))
-		return 0;
+		goto put_node;
 
 	omapdss_walk_device(dss, true);
 
@@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ static int __init omapdss_boot_init(void)
 		kfree(n);
 	}
 
+put_node:
+	of_node_put(dss);
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#78 lore raw

PATCH 77/206 clk: stratix10: use do_div() for 64-bit calculation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc26ed7be46c5f5fa45f3df8161ed7ca3c4d318c ]

do_div() macro to perform u64 division and guards against overflow if the result is too large for the unsigned long return type.

---
 drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-pll-s10.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-pll-s10.c +3 -1
index c4d0b6f6abf2e..fc2e2839fe570 100644
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ static unsigned long clk_pll_recalc_rate(struct clk_hw *hwclk,
 	/* read VCO1 reg for numerator and denominator */
 	reg = readl(socfpgaclk->hw.reg);
 	refdiv = (reg & SOCFPGA_PLL_REFDIV_MASK) >> SOCFPGA_PLL_REFDIV_SHIFT;
-	vco_freq = (unsigned long long)parent_rate / refdiv;
+
+	vco_freq = parent_rate;
+	do_div(vco_freq, refdiv);
 
 	/* Read mdiv and fdiv from the fdbck register */
 	reg = readl(socfpgaclk->hw.reg + 0x4);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#79 lore raw

PATCH 78/206 crypto: chelsio - This fixes the kernel panic which occurs during a libkcapi test

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ayush Sawal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9195189e00a7db55e7d448cee973cae87c5a3c71 ]

The libkcapi test which causes kernel panic is
aead asynchronous vmsplice multiple test.

./bin/kcapi -v -d 4 -x 10 -c "ccm(aes)"
-q 4edb58e8d5eb6bc711c43a6f3693daebde2e5524f1b55297abb29f003236e43d -t a7877c99 -n 674742abd0f5ba -k 2861fd0253705d7875c95ba8a53171b4 -a fb7bc304a3909e66e2e0c5ef952712dd884ce3e7324171369f2c5db1adc48c7d

This patch avoids dma_mapping of a zero length sg which causes the panic, by using sg_nents_for_len which maps only upto a specific length

---
 drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c +3 -2
index 9b3c259f081d3..ee508bbbb7504 100644
@@ -2418,8 +2418,9 @@ int chcr_aead_dma_map(struct device *dev,
 	else
 		reqctx->b0_dma = 0;
 	if (req->src == req->dst) {
-		error = dma_map_sg(dev, req->src, sg_nents(req->src),
-				   DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+		error = dma_map_sg(dev, req->src,
+				sg_nents_for_len(req->src, dst_size),
+					DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
 		if (!error)
 			goto err;
 	} else {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#80 lore raw

PATCH 79/206 mt76: clear skb pointers from rx aggregation reorder buffer during cleanup

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9379df2fd9234e3b67a23101c2370c99f6af6d77 ]

During the cleanup of the aggregation session, a rx handler (or release timer) on another CPU might still hold a pointer to the reorder buffer and could attempt to release some packets.
Clearing pointers during cleanup avoids a theoretical use-after-free bug here.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/agg-rx.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/agg-rx.c +1 -0
index d44d57e6eb27a..97df6b3a472b1 100644
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static void mt76_rx_aggr_shutdown(struct mt76_dev *dev, struct mt76_rx_tid *tid)
 		if (!skb)
 			continue;
 
+		tid->reorder_buf[i] = NULL;
 		tid->nframes--;
 		dev_kfree_skb(skb);
 	}
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
Linux-mediatek mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mediatek
author maintainer
#81 lore raw

PATCH 80/206 ALSA: usb-audio: Don't create a mixer element with bogus volume range

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9a0ef0b5ddcbc0d56c65aefc0f18d16e6f71207 ]

Some USB-audio descriptors provide a bogus volume range (e.g. volume min and max are identical), which confuses user-space. This patch makes the driver skipping such a control element.

---
 sound/usb/mixer.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
sound/usb/mixer.c +10 -0
index 45bd3d54be54b..451b8ea383c61 100644
@@ -1699,6 +1699,16 @@ static void __build_feature_ctl(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer,
 	/* get min/max values */
 	get_min_max_with_quirks(cval, 0, kctl);
 
+	/* skip a bogus volume range */
+	if (cval->max <= cval->min) {
+		usb_audio_dbg(mixer->chip,
+			      "[%d] FU [%s] skipped due to invalid volume\n",
+			      cval->head.id, kctl->id.name);
+		snd_ctl_free_one(kctl);
+		return;
+	}
+
+
 	if (control == UAC_FU_VOLUME) {
 		check_mapped_dB(map, cval);
 		if (cval->dBmin < cval->dBmax || !cval->initialized) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#82 lore raw

PATCH 81/206 perf test: Fix test trace+probe_vfs_getname.sh on s390

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2bbc83537614517730e9f2811195004b712de207 ]

This test places a kprobe to function getname_flags() in the kernel which has the following prototype:

struct filename *getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty)

The 'filename' argument points to a filename located in user space memory.

Looking at commit 88903c464321c ("tracing/probe: Add ustring type for user-space string") the kprobe should indicate that user space memory is accessed.

Output before:

[root@m35lp76 perf]# ./perf test 66 67
66: Use vfs_getname probe to get syscall args filenames : FAILED!
67: Check open filename arg using perf trace + vfs_getname: FAILED! [root@m35lp76 perf]#

Output after:

[root@m35lp76 perf]# ./perf test 66 67
66: Use vfs_getname probe to get syscall args filenames : Ok
67: Check open filename arg using perf trace + vfs_getname: Ok [root@m35lp76 perf]#

Comments from Masami Hiramatsu:

This bug doesn't happen on x86 or other archs on which user address space and kernel address space is the same. On some arches (ppc64 in this case?) user address space is partially or completely the same as kernel address space.

(Yes, they switch the world when running into the kernel) In this case, we need to use different data access functions for each space.

That is why I introduced the "ustring" type for kprobe events.

As far as I can see, Thomas's patch is sane. Thomas, could you show us your result on your test environment?

Comments from Thomas Richter:

Test results for s/390 included above.

---
 tools/perf/tests/shell/lib/probe_vfs_getname.sh | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/tests/shell/lib/probe_vfs_getname.sh +1 -1
index 7cb99b433888b..c2cc42daf9242 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ add_probe_vfs_getname() {
 	if [ $had_vfs_getname -eq 1 ] ; then
 		line=$(perf probe -L getname_flags 2>&1 | egrep 'result.*=.*filename;' | sed -r 's/[[:space:]]+([[:digit:]]+)[[:space:]]+result->uptr.*/\1/')
 		perf probe -q       "vfs_getname=getname_flags:${line} pathname=result->name:string" || \
-		perf probe $verbose "vfs_getname=getname_flags:${line} pathname=filename:string"
+		perf probe $verbose "vfs_getname=getname_flags:${line} pathname=filename:ustring"
 	fi
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#83 lore raw

PATCH 82/206 RDMA/rxe: Fix configuration of atomic queue pair attributes

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fb3063d31995cc4cf1d47a406bb61d6fb1b1d58d ]

From the comment above the definition of the roundup_pow_of_two() macro:

     The result is undefined when n == 0.

Hence only pass positive values to roundup_pow_of_two(). This patch fixes the following UBSAN complaint:

  UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
  shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6
   ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x26
   __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x4c/0xf9
   rxe_qp_from_attr.cold+0x37/0x5d [rdma_rxe]
   rxe_modify_qp+0x59/0x70 [rdma_rxe]
   _ib_modify_qp+0x5aa/0x7c0 [ib_core]
   ib_modify_qp+0x3b/0x50 [ib_core]
   cma_modify_qp_rtr+0x234/0x260 [rdma_cm]
   __rdma_accept+0x1a7/0x650 [rdma_cm]
   nvmet_rdma_cm_handler+0x1286/0x14cd [nvmet_rdma]
   cma_cm_event_handler+0x6b/0x330 [rdma_cm]
   cma_ib_req_handler+0xe60/0x22d0 [rdma_cm]
   cm_process_work+0x30/0x140 [ib_cm]
   cm_req_handler+0x11f4/0x1cd0 [ib_cm]
   cm_work_handler+0xb8/0x344e [ib_cm]
   process_one_work+0x569/0xb60
   worker_thread+0x7a/0x5d0
   kthread+0x1e6/0x210
   ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
---
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c +4 -3
index 230697fa31fe3..8a22ab8b29e9b 100644
@@ -583,15 +583,16 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
 	int err;
 
 	if (mask & IB_QP_MAX_QP_RD_ATOMIC) {
-		int max_rd_atomic = __roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_rd_atomic);
+		int max_rd_atomic = attr->max_rd_atomic ?
+			roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_rd_atomic) : 0;
 
 		qp->attr.max_rd_atomic = max_rd_atomic;
 		atomic_set(&qp->req.rd_atomic, max_rd_atomic);
 	}
 
 	if (mask & IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC) {
-		int max_dest_rd_atomic =
-			__roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_dest_rd_atomic);
+		int max_dest_rd_atomic = attr->max_dest_rd_atomic ?
+			roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_dest_rd_atomic) : 0;
 
 		qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#84 lore raw

PATCH 83/206 KVM: x86: fix incorrect comparison in trace event

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 147f1a1fe5d7e6b01b8df4d0cbd6f9eaf6b6c73b ]

The "u" field in the event has three states, -1/0/1. Using u8 however means that comparison with -1 will always fail, so change to signed char.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmutrace.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmutrace.h +1 -1
index cb41b036eb264..7e0dc8c7da2c0 100644
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(
 		/* These depend on page entry type, so compute them now.  */
 		__field(bool, r)
 		__field(bool, x)
-		__field(u8, u)
+		__field(signed char, u)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#85 lore raw

PATCH 84/206 dmaengine: stm32-mdma: use vchan_terminate_vdesc() in .terminate_all

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Amelie Delaunay <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dfc708812a2acfc0ca56f56233b3c3e7b0d4ffe7 ]

To avoid race with vchan_complete, use the race free way to terminate running transfer.

Move vdesc->node list_del in stm32_mdma_start_transfer instead of in stm32_mdma_xfer_end to avoid another race in vchan_dma_desc_free_list.

---
 drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/stm32-mdma.c +6 -3
index 8c3c3e5b812a8..9c6867916e890 100644
@@ -1137,6 +1137,8 @@ static void stm32_mdma_start_transfer(struct stm32_mdma_chan *chan)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	list_del(&vdesc->node);
+
 	chan->desc = to_stm32_mdma_desc(vdesc);
 	hwdesc = chan->desc->node[0].hwdesc;
 	chan->curr_hwdesc = 0;
@@ -1252,8 +1254,10 @@ static int stm32_mdma_terminate_all(struct dma_chan *c)
 	LIST_HEAD(head);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->vchan.lock, flags);
-	if (chan->busy) {
-		stm32_mdma_stop(chan);
+	if (chan->desc) {
+		vchan_terminate_vdesc(&chan->desc->vdesc);
+		if (chan->busy)
+			stm32_mdma_stop(chan);
 		chan->desc = NULL;
 	}
 	vchan_get_all_descriptors(&chan->vchan, &head);
@@ -1341,7 +1345,6 @@ static enum dma_status stm32_mdma_tx_status(struct dma_chan *c,
 
 static void stm32_mdma_xfer_end(struct stm32_mdma_chan *chan)
 {
-	list_del(&chan->desc->vdesc.node);
 	vchan_cookie_complete(&chan->desc->vdesc);
 	chan->desc = NULL;
 	chan->busy = false;
Signature · 7 lines
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#86 lore raw

PATCH 85/206 media: staging/imx: Missing assignment in imx_media_capture_device_register()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ef0ed05dcef8a74178a8b480cce23a377b1de2b8 ]

There was supposed to be a "ret = " assignment here, otherwise the error handling on the next line won't work.

Fixes 64b5a49df486 ("[media] media: imx: Add Capture Device Interface")
---
 drivers/staging/media/imx/imx-media-capture.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/media/imx/imx-media-capture.c +1 -1
index 256039ce561e6..81a3370551dbc 100644
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ int imx_media_capture_device_register(struct imx_media_video_dev *vdev)
 	/* setup default format */
 	fmt_src.pad = priv->src_sd_pad;
 	fmt_src.which = V4L2_SUBDEV_FORMAT_ACTIVE;
-	v4l2_subdev_call(sd, pad, get_fmt, NULL, &fmt_src);
+	ret = v4l2_subdev_call(sd, pad, get_fmt, NULL, &fmt_src);
 	if (ret) {
 		v4l2_err(sd, "failed to get src_sd format\n");
 		goto unreg;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#87 lore raw

PATCH 86/206 x86/pkeys: Add check for pkey "overflow"

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16171bffc829272d5e6014bad48f680cb50943d9 ]

Alex Shi reported the pkey macros above arch_set_user_pkey_access() to be unused. They are unused, and even refer to a nonexistent CONFIG option.

But, they might have served a good use, which was to ensure that the code does not try to set values that would not fit in the PKRU register. As it stands, a too-large 'pkey' value would be likely to silently overflow the u32 new_pkru_bits.

Add a check to look for overflows. Also add a comment to remind any future developer to closely examine the types used to store pkey values if arch_max_pkey() ever changes.

This boots and passes the x86 pkey selftests.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h +5 -0
index 19b137f1b3beb..2ff9b98812b76 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 
 #define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY	0
 
+/*
+ * If more than 16 keys are ever supported, a thorough audit
+ * will be necessary to ensure that the types that store key
+ * numbers and masks have sufficient capacity.
+ */
 #define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
 
 extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +7 -2
index 4b900035f2202..601a5da1d196a 100644
@@ -907,8 +907,6 @@ const void *get_xsave_field_ptr(int xsave_state)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 
-#define NR_VALID_PKRU_BITS (CONFIG_NR_PROTECTION_KEYS * 2)
-#define PKRU_VALID_MASK (NR_VALID_PKRU_BITS - 1)
 /*
  * This will go out and modify PKRU register to set the access
  * rights for @pkey to @init_val.
@@ -927,6 +925,13 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * This code should only be called with valid 'pkey'
+	 * values originating from in-kernel users.  Complain
+	 * if a bad value is observed.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(pkey >= arch_max_pkey());
+
 	/* Set the bits we need in PKRU:  */
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
 		new_pkru_bits |= PKRU_AD_BIT;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#88 lore raw

PATCH 87/206 bpf: Remove recursion prevention from rcu free callback

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8a37963c7ac9ecb7f86f8ebda020e3f8d6d7b8a0 ]

If an element is freed via RCU then recursion into BPF instrumentation functions is not a concern. The element is already detached from the map and the RCU callback does not hold any locks on which a kprobe, perf event or tracepoint attached BPF program could deadlock.

---
 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c +0 -8
index 1b28fb006763a..3f3ed33bd2fdc 100644
@@ -667,15 +667,7 @@ static void htab_elem_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 	struct htab_elem *l = container_of(head, struct htab_elem, rcu);
 	struct bpf_htab *htab = l->htab;
 
-	/* must increment bpf_prog_active to avoid kprobe+bpf triggering while
-	 * we're calling kfree, otherwise deadlock is possible if kprobes
-	 * are placed somewhere inside of slub
-	 */
-	preempt_disable();
-	__this_cpu_inc(bpf_prog_active);
 	htab_elem_free(htab, l);
-	__this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active);
-	preempt_enable();
 }
 
 static void htab_put_fd_value(struct bpf_htab *htab, struct htab_elem *l)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#89 lore raw

PATCH 88/206 dmaengine: stm32-dma: use vchan_terminate_vdesc() in .terminate_all

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Amelie Delaunay <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d80cbef35bf89b763f06e03bb4ff8f933bf012c5 ]

To avoid race with vchan_complete, use the race free way to terminate running transfer.

Move vdesc->node list_del in stm32_dma_start_transfer instead of in stm32_mdma_chan_complete to avoid another race in vchan_dma_desc_free_list.

---
 drivers/dma/stm32-dma.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/stm32-dma.c +6 -3
index 4903a408fc146..ac7af440f8658 100644
@@ -494,8 +494,10 @@ static int stm32_dma_terminate_all(struct dma_chan *c)
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->vchan.lock, flags);
 
-	if (chan->busy) {
-		stm32_dma_stop(chan);
+	if (chan->desc) {
+		vchan_terminate_vdesc(&chan->desc->vdesc);
+		if (chan->busy)
+			stm32_dma_stop(chan);
 		chan->desc = NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -551,6 +553,8 @@ static void stm32_dma_start_transfer(struct stm32_dma_chan *chan)
 		if (!vdesc)
 			return;
 
+		list_del(&vdesc->node);
+
 		chan->desc = to_stm32_dma_desc(vdesc);
 		chan->next_sg = 0;
 	}
@@ -628,7 +632,6 @@ static void stm32_dma_handle_chan_done(struct stm32_dma_chan *chan)
 		} else {
 			chan->busy = false;
 			if (chan->next_sg == chan->desc->num_sgs) {
-				list_del(&chan->desc->vdesc.node);
 				vchan_cookie_complete(&chan->desc->vdesc);
 				chan->desc = NULL;
 			}
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#90 lore raw

PATCH 89/206 dmaengine: tegra-apb: Prevent race conditions on channel's freeing

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8e84172e372bdca20c305d92d51d33640d2da431 ]

It's incorrect to check the channel's "busy" state without taking a lock. That shouldn't cause any real troubles, nevertheless it's always better not to have any race conditions in the code.

---
 drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c +1 -2
index 15481aeaeecd1..5ccd24a46e381 100644
@@ -1225,8 +1225,7 @@ static void tegra_dma_free_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *dc)
 
 	dev_dbg(tdc2dev(tdc), "Freeing channel %d\n", tdc->id);
 
-	if (tdc->busy)
-		tegra_dma_terminate_all(dc);
+	tegra_dma_terminate_all(dc);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&tdc->lock, flags);
 	list_splice_init(&tdc->pending_sg_req, &sg_req_list);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#91 lore raw

PATCH 90/206 drm/amd/display: dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_create can fail causing panic

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Aric Cyr <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a6c4a4d459ecacc9013c45dcbf2bc9747fdbdbd ]

[Why]
Since the i2c payload allocation can fail need to check return codes

[How]
Clean up i2c payload allocations and check for errors

---
 .../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_ddc.c | 52 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_ddc.c +25 -27
index 46c9cb47a96e5..145af3bb2dfcb 100644
@@ -127,22 +127,16 @@ struct aux_payloads {
 	struct vector payloads;
 };
 
-static struct i2c_payloads *dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_create(struct dc_context *ctx, uint32_t count)
+static bool dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_create(
+		struct dc_context *ctx,
+		struct i2c_payloads *payloads,
+		uint32_t count)
 {
-	struct i2c_payloads *payloads;
-
-	payloads = kzalloc(sizeof(struct i2c_payloads), GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (!payloads)
-		return NULL;
-
 	if (dal_vector_construct(
 		&payloads->payloads, ctx, count, sizeof(struct i2c_payload)))
-		return payloads;
-
-	kfree(payloads);
-	return NULL;
+		return true;
 
+	return false;
 }
 
 static struct i2c_payload *dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_get(struct i2c_payloads *p)
@@ -155,14 +149,12 @@ static uint32_t dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_get_count(struct i2c_payloads *p)
 	return p->payloads.count;
 }
 
-static void dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_destroy(struct i2c_payloads **p)
+static void dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_destroy(struct i2c_payloads *p)
 {
-	if (!p || !*p)
+	if (!p)
 		return;
-	dal_vector_destruct(&(*p)->payloads);
-	kfree(*p);
-	*p = NULL;
 
+	dal_vector_destruct(&p->payloads);
 }
 
 static struct aux_payloads *dal_ddc_aux_payloads_create(struct dc_context *ctx, uint32_t count)
@@ -580,9 +572,13 @@ bool dal_ddc_service_query_ddc_data(
 
 	uint32_t payloads_num = write_payloads + read_payloads;
 
+
 	if (write_size > EDID_SEGMENT_SIZE || read_size > EDID_SEGMENT_SIZE)
 		return false;
 
+	if (!payloads_num)
+		return false;
+
 	/*TODO: len of payload data for i2c and aux is uint8!!!!,
 	 *  but we want to read 256 over i2c!!!!*/
 	if (dal_ddc_service_is_in_aux_transaction_mode(ddc)) {
@@ -613,23 +609,25 @@ bool dal_ddc_service_query_ddc_data(
 		dal_ddc_aux_payloads_destroy(&payloads);
 
 	} else {
-		struct i2c_payloads *payloads =
-			dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_create(ddc->ctx, payloads_num);
+		struct i2c_command command = {0};
+		struct i2c_payloads payloads;
 
-		struct i2c_command command = {
-			.payloads = dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_get(payloads),
-			.number_of_payloads = 0,
-			.engine = DDC_I2C_COMMAND_ENGINE,
-			.speed = ddc->ctx->dc->caps.i2c_speed_in_khz };
+		if (!dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_create(ddc->ctx, &payloads, payloads_num))
+			return false;
+
+		command.payloads = dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_get(&payloads);
+		command.number_of_payloads = 0;
+		command.engine = DDC_I2C_COMMAND_ENGINE;
+		command.speed = ddc->ctx->dc->caps.i2c_speed_in_khz;
 
 		dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_add(
-			payloads, address, write_size, write_buf, true);
+			&payloads, address, write_size, write_buf, true);
 
 		dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_add(
-			payloads, address, read_size, read_buf, false);
+			&payloads, address, read_size, read_buf, false);
 
 		command.number_of_payloads =
-			dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_get_count(payloads);
+			dal_ddc_i2c_payloads_get_count(&payloads);
 
 		ret = dm_helpers_submit_i2c(
 				ddc->ctx,
Signature · 6 lines
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author maintainer
#92 lore raw

PATCH 91/206 firmware: arm_sdei: Use cpus_read_lock() to avoid races with cpuhp

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54f529a6806c9710947a4f2cdc15d6ea54121ccd ]

SDEI has private events that need registering and enabling on each CPU. CPUs can come and go while we are trying to do this. SDEI tries to avoid these problems by setting the reregister flag before the register call, so any CPUs that come online register the event too. Sticking plaster like this doesn't work, as if the register call fails, a CPU that subsequently comes online will register the event before reregister is cleared.

Take cpus_read_lock() around the register and enable calls. We don't want surprise CPUs to do the wrong thing if they race with these calls failing.

---
 drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c +14 -12
index 05b528c7ed8fd..e809f4d9a9e93 100644
@@ -410,14 +410,19 @@ int sdei_event_enable(u32 event_num)
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	spin_lock(&sdei_list_lock);
-	event->reenable = true;
-	spin_unlock(&sdei_list_lock);
 
+	cpus_read_lock();
 	if (event->type == SDEI_EVENT_TYPE_SHARED)
 		err = sdei_api_event_enable(event->event_num);
 	else
 		err = sdei_do_cross_call(_local_event_enable, event);
+
+	if (!err) {
+		spin_lock(&sdei_list_lock);
+		event->reenable = true;
+		spin_unlock(&sdei_list_lock);
+	}
+	cpus_read_unlock();
 	mutex_unlock(&sdei_events_lock);
 
 	return err;
@@ -619,21 +624,18 @@ int sdei_event_register(u32 event_num, sdei_event_callback *cb, void *arg)
 			break;
 		}
 
-		spin_lock(&sdei_list_lock);
-		event->reregister = true;
-		spin_unlock(&sdei_list_lock);
-
+		cpus_read_lock();
 		err = _sdei_event_register(event);
 		if (err) {
-			spin_lock(&sdei_list_lock);
-			event->reregister = false;
-			event->reenable = false;
-			spin_unlock(&sdei_list_lock);
-
 			sdei_event_destroy(event);
 			pr_warn("Failed to register event %u: %d\n", event_num,
 				err);
+		} else {
+			spin_lock(&sdei_list_lock);
+			event->reregister = true;
+			spin_unlock(&sdei_list_lock);
 		}
+		cpus_read_unlock();
 	} while (0);
 	mutex_unlock(&sdei_events_lock);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#93 lore raw

PATCH 92/206 random: fix data races at timer_rand_state

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e00d996a4317aff5351c4338dd97d390225412c2 ]

Fields in "struct timer_rand_state" could be accessed concurrently. Lockless plain reads and writes result in data races. Fix them by adding pairs of READ|WRITE_ONCE(). The data races were reported by KCSAN,

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in add_timer_randomness / add_timer_randomness

write to 0xffff9f320a0a01d0 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 22:

  add_timer_randomness+0x100/0x190
  add_timer_randomness at drivers/char/random.c:1152
  add_disk_randomness+0x85/0x280
  scsi_end_request+0x43a/0x4a0
  scsi_io_completion+0xb7/0x7e0
  scsi_finish_command+0x1ed/0x2a0
  scsi_softirq_done+0x1c9/0x1d0
  blk_done_softirq+0x181/0x1d0
  __do_softirq+0xd9/0x57c
  irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0
  do_IRQ+0x8b/0x190
  ret_from_intr+0x0/0x42
  cpuidle_enter_state+0x15e/0x980
  cpuidle_enter+0x69/0xc0
  call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40
  do_idle+0x248/0x280
  cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x1f
  start_secondary+0x1b2/0x230
  secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0

no locks held by swapper/22/0.

 irq event stamp: 32871382
 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x60
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x21/0x60
 _local_bh_enable+0x21/0x30
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

read to 0xffff9f320a0a01d0 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 2:

  add_timer_randomness+0xe8/0x190
  add_disk_randomness+0x85/0x280
  scsi_end_request+0x43a/0x4a0
  scsi_io_completion+0xb7/0x7e0
  scsi_finish_command+0x1ed/0x2a0
  scsi_softirq_done+0x1c9/0x1d0
  blk_done_softirq+0x181/0x1d0
  __do_softirq+0xd9/0x57c
  irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0
  do_IRQ+0x8b/0x190
  ret_from_intr+0x0/0x42
  cpuidle_enter_state+0x15e/0x980
  cpuidle_enter+0x69/0xc0
  call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40
  do_idle+0x248/0x280
  cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x1f
  start_secondary+0x1b2/0x230
  secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0

no locks held by swapper/2/0.

 irq event stamp: 37846304
 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x60
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x21/0x60
 _local_bh_enable+0x21/0x30
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:

 Hardware name: HP ProLiant BL660c Gen9, BIOS I38 10/17/2018
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +6 -6
index 6a5d4dfafc474..80dedecfe15c5 100644
@@ -1150,14 +1150,14 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
 	 * in order to make our estimate.
 	 */
-	delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time;
-	state->last_time = sample.jiffies;
+	delta = sample.jiffies - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, sample.jiffies);
 
-	delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
-	state->last_delta = delta;
+	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
 
-	delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
-	state->last_delta2 = delta2;
+	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
 
 	if (delta < 0)
 		delta = -delta;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#94 lore raw

PATCH 93/206 bus: hisi_lpc: Fixup IO ports addresses to avoid use-after-free in host removal

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: John Garry <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6dd255bdd7d00bbdbf78ba00bde9fc64f86c3a7 ]

Some released ACPI FW for Huawei boards describes incorrect the port IO address range for child devices, in that it tells us the IO port max range is 0x3fff for each child device, which is not correct. The address range should be [e4:e8) or similar. With this incorrect upper range, the child device IO port resources overlap.

As such, the kernel thinks that the LPC host serial device is a child of the IPMI device:

root@(none)$ more /proc/ioports
[...]
00ffc0e3-00ffffff : hisi-lpc-ipmi.0.auto
  00ffc0e3-00ffc0e3 : ipmi_si
  00ffc0e4-00ffc0e4 : ipmi_si
  00ffc0e5-00ffc0e5 : ipmi_si
  00ffc2f7-00ffffff : serial8250.1.auto
    00ffc2f7-00ffc2fe : serial
root@(none)$

They should both be siblings. Note that these are logical PIO addresses, which have a direct mapping from the FW IO port ranges.

This shows up as a real issue when we enable CONFIG_KASAN and CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE - we see use-after-free warnings in the host removal path:

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in release_resource+0x38/0xc8
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0026accdbc38 by task swapper/0/1

CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00001-g68e186e77b5c-dirty #1593
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2180 /D03, BIOS Hisilicon D03 IT20 Nemo 2.0 RC0 03/30/2018
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x290
show_stack+0x14/0x20
dump_stack+0xf0/0x14c
print_address_description.isra.9+0x6c/0x3b8
__kasan_report+0x12c/0x23c
kasan_report+0xc/0x18
__asan_load8+0x94/0xb8
release_resource+0x38/0xc8
platform_device_del.part.10+0x80/0xe0
platform_device_unregister+0x20/0x38
hisi_lpc_acpi_remove_subdev+0x10/0x20
device_for_each_child+0xc8/0x128
hisi_lpc_acpi_remove+0x4c/0xa8
hisi_lpc_remove+0xbc/0xc0
platform_drv_remove+0x3c/0x68
really_probe+0x174/0x548
driver_probe_device+0x7c/0x148
device_driver_attach+0x94/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xa4/0x110
bus_for_each_dev+0xe8/0x158
driver_attach+0x30/0x40
bus_add_driver+0x234/0x2f0
driver_register+0xbc/0x1d0
__platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x88
hisi_lpc_driver_init+0x18/0x20
do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x258
kernel_init_freeable+0x248/0x2c0
kernel_init+0x10/0x118
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c

...

The issue here is that the kernel created an incorrect parent-child resource dependency between two devices, and references the false parent node when deleting the second child device, when it had been deleted already.

Fix up the child device resources from FW to create proper IO port resource relationships for broken FW.

With this, the IO port layout looks more healthy:

root@(none)$ more /proc/ioports
[...]
00ffc0e3-00ffc0e7 : hisi-lpc-ipmi.0.auto
  00ffc0e3-00ffc0e3 : ipmi_si
  00ffc0e4-00ffc0e4 : ipmi_si
  00ffc0e5-00ffc0e5 : ipmi_si
00ffc2f7-00ffc2ff : serial8250.1.auto
  00ffc2f7-00ffc2fe : serial
---
 drivers/bus/hisi_lpc.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/bus/hisi_lpc.c +25 -2
index e31c02dc77709..cbd970fb02f18 100644
@@ -358,6 +358,26 @@ static int hisi_lpc_acpi_xlat_io_res(struct acpi_device *adev,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Released firmware describes the IO port max address as 0x3fff, which is
+ * the max host bus address. Fixup to a proper range. This will probably
+ * never be fixed in firmware.
+ */
+static void hisi_lpc_acpi_fixup_child_resource(struct device *hostdev,
+					       struct resource *r)
+{
+	if (r->end != 0x3fff)
+		return;
+
+	if (r->start == 0xe4)
+		r->end = 0xe4 + 0x04 - 1;
+	else if (r->start == 0x2f8)
+		r->end = 0x2f8 + 0x08 - 1;
+	else
+		dev_warn(hostdev, "unrecognised resource %pR to fixup, ignoring\n",
+			 r);
+}
+
 /*
  * hisi_lpc_acpi_set_io_res - set the resources for a child
  * @child: the device node to be updated the I/O resource
@@ -419,8 +439,11 @@ static int hisi_lpc_acpi_set_io_res(struct device *child,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	count = 0;
-	list_for_each_entry(rentry, &resource_list, node)
-		resources[count++] = *rentry->res;
+	list_for_each_entry(rentry, &resource_list, node) {
+		resources[count] = *rentry->res;
+		hisi_lpc_acpi_fixup_child_resource(hostdev, &resources[count]);
+		count++;
+	}
 
 	acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resource_list);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#95 lore raw

PATCH 94/206 media: go7007: Fix URB type for interrupt handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a3ea410cac41b19a5490aad7fe6d9a9a772e646e ]

Josef reported that his old-and-good Plextor ConvertX M402U video converter spews lots of WARNINGs on the recent kernels, and it turned out that the device uses a bulk endpoint for interrupt handling just like 2250 board.

For fixing it, generalize the check with the proper verification of the endpoint instead of hard-coded board type check.

Fixes 7e5219d18e93 ("[media] go7007: Fix 2250 urb type")
---
 drivers/media/usb/go7007/go7007-usb.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/go7007/go7007-usb.c +3 -1
index 19c6a0354ce00..b84a6f6548610 100644
@@ -1052,6 +1052,7 @@ static int go7007_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 	struct go7007_usb *usb;
 	const struct go7007_usb_board *board;
 	struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
+	struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
 	unsigned num_i2c_devs;
 	char *name;
 	int video_pipe, i, v_urb_len;
@@ -1148,7 +1149,8 @@ static int go7007_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 	if (usb->intr_urb->transfer_buffer == NULL)
 		goto allocfail;
 
-	if (go->board_id == GO7007_BOARDID_SENSORAY_2250)
+	ep = usb->usbdev->ep_in[4];
+	if (usb_endpoint_type(&ep->desc) == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK)
 		usb_fill_bulk_urb(usb->intr_urb, usb->usbdev,
 			usb_rcvbulkpipe(usb->usbdev, 4),
 			usb->intr_urb->transfer_buffer, 2*sizeof(u16),
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#96 lore raw

PATCH 95/206 Bluetooth: guard against controllers sending zero'd events

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alain Michaud <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08bb4da90150e2a225f35e0f642cdc463958d696 ]

Some controllers have been observed to send zero'd events under some conditions. This change guards against this condition as well as adding a trace to facilitate diagnosability of this condition.

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6 -0
index 2b4a7cf03041b..ec6b3a87b3e7f 100644
@@ -5738,6 +5738,11 @@ void hci_event_packet(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u8 status = 0, event = hdr->evt, req_evt = 0;
 	u16 opcode = HCI_OP_NOP;
 
+	if (!event) {
+		bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Received unexpected HCI Event 00000000");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
 	if (hdev->sent_cmd && bt_cb(hdev->sent_cmd)->hci.req_event == event) {
 		struct hci_command_hdr *cmd_hdr = (void *) hdev->sent_cmd->data;
 		opcode = __le16_to_cpu(cmd_hdr->opcode);
@@ -5949,6 +5954,7 @@ void hci_event_packet(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		req_complete_skb(hdev, status, opcode, orig_skb);
 	}
 
+done:
 	kfree_skb(orig_skb);
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	hdev->stat.evt_rx++;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#97 lore raw

PATCH 96/206 timekeeping: Prevent 32bit truncation in scale64_check_overflow()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wen Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4cbbc3a0eeed675449b1a4d080008927121f3da3 ]

While unlikely the divisor in scale64_check_overflow() could be >= 32bit in scale64_check_overflow(). do_div() truncates the divisor to 32bit at least on 32bit platforms.

Use div64_u64() instead to avoid the truncation to 32-bit.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

---
 kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +1 -2
index 81ee5b83c9200..c66fd11d94bc4 100644
@@ -1004,9 +1004,8 @@ static int scale64_check_overflow(u64 mult, u64 div, u64 *base)
 	    ((int)sizeof(u64)*8 - fls64(mult) < fls64(rem)))
 		return -EOVERFLOW;
 	tmp *= mult;
-	rem *= mult;
 
-	do_div(rem, div);
+	rem = div64_u64(rem * mult, div);
 	*base = tmp + rem;
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#98 lore raw

PATCH 97/206 ext4: fix a data race at inode->i_disksize

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dce8e237100f60c28cc66effb526ba65a01d8cb3 ]

KCSAN find inode->i_disksize could be accessed concurrently.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_mark_iloc_dirty / ext4_write_end

write (marked) to 0xffff8b8932f40090 of 8 bytes by task 66792 on cpu 0:

 ext4_write_end+0x53f/0x5b0
 ext4_da_write_end+0x237/0x510
 generic_perform_write+0x1c4/0x2a0
 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x13a/0x210
 ext4_file_write_iter+0xe2/0x9b0
 new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3a0
 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0
 vfs_write+0xfc/0x2a0
 ksys_write+0xe8/0x140
 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60
 do_syscall_64+0x8a/0x2a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

read to 0xffff8b8932f40090 of 8 bytes by task 14414 on cpu 1:

 ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0x716/0x1190
 ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0xc9/0x360
 ext4_convert_unwritten_extents+0x1bc/0x2a0
 ext4_convert_unwritten_io_end_vec+0xc5/0x150
 ext4_put_io_end+0x82/0x130
 ext4_writepages+0xae7/0x16f0
 do_writepages+0x64/0x120
 __writeback_single_inode+0x7d/0x650
 writeback_sb_inodes+0x3a4/0x860
 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x150
 wb_writeback+0x43f/0x510
 wb_workfn+0x3b2/0x8a0
 process_one_work+0x39b/0x7e0
 worker_thread+0x88/0x650
 kthread+0x1d4/0x1f0
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The plain read is outside of inode->i_data_sem critical section which results in a data race. Fix it by adding READ_ONCE().

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +1 -1
index cd833f4e64ef1..52be4c9650241 100644
@@ -5315,7 +5315,7 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle,
 		raw_inode->i_file_acl_high =
 			cpu_to_le16(ei->i_file_acl >> 32);
 	raw_inode->i_file_acl_lo = cpu_to_le32(ei->i_file_acl);
-	if (ei->i_disksize != ext4_isize(inode->i_sb, raw_inode)) {
+	if (READ_ONCE(ei->i_disksize) != ext4_isize(inode->i_sb, raw_inode)) {
 		ext4_isize_set(raw_inode, ei->i_disksize);
 		need_datasync = 1;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#99 lore raw

PATCH 98/206 perf jevents: Fix leak of mapfile memory

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: John Garry <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f5777fbaf04c58d940526a22a2e0c813c837936 ]

The memory for global pointer is never freed during normal program execution, so let's do that in the main function exit as a good programming practice.

A stray blank line is also removed.

---
 tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c | 15 +++++++++------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
tools/perf/pmu-events/jevents.c +9 -6
index c17e594041712..6631970f96832 100644
@@ -1064,10 +1064,9 @@ static int process_one_file(const char *fpath, const struct stat *sb,
  */
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
-	int rc;
+	int rc, ret = 0;
 	int maxfds;
 	char ldirname[PATH_MAX];
-
 	const char *arch;
 	const char *output_file;
 	const char *start_dirname;
@@ -1138,7 +1137,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		/* Make build fail */
 		fclose(eventsfp);
 		free_arch_std_events();
-		return 1;
+		ret = 1;
+		goto out_free_mapfile;
 	} else if (rc) {
 		goto empty_map;
 	}
@@ -1156,14 +1156,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		/* Make build fail */
 		fclose(eventsfp);
 		free_arch_std_events();
-		return 1;
+		ret = 1;
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+
+	goto out_free_mapfile;
 
 empty_map:
 	fclose(eventsfp);
 	create_empty_mapping(output_file);
 	free_arch_std_events();
-	return 0;
+out_free_mapfile:
+	free(mapfile);
+	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#100 lore raw

PATCH 99/206 mm: avoid data corruption on CoW fault into PFN-mapped VMA

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c3e5ea6ee574ae5e845a40ac8198de1fb63bb3ab ]

Jeff Moyer has reported that one of xfstests triggers a warning when run on DAX-enabled filesystem:

	WARNING: CPU: 76 PID: 51024 at mm/memory.c:2317 wp_page_copy+0xc40/0xd50
	...
	wp_page_copy+0x98c/0xd50 (unreliable)
	do_wp_page+0xd8/0xad0
	__handle_mm_fault+0x748/0x1b90
	handle_mm_fault+0x120/0x1f0
	__do_page_fault+0x240/0xd70
	do_page_fault+0x38/0xd0
	handle_page_fault+0x10/0x30

The warning happens on failed __copy_from_user_inatomic() which tries to copy data into a CoW page.

This happens because of race between MADV_DONTNEED and CoW page fault:

	CPU0					CPU1
 handle_mm_fault()
   do_wp_page()
     wp_page_copy()
       do_wp_page()
					madvise(MADV_DONTNEED)
					  zap_page_range()
					    zap_pte_range()
					      ptep_get_and_clear_full()
					      <TLB flush>
	 __copy_from_user_inatomic()
	 sees empty PTE and fails
	 WARN_ON_ONCE(1)
	 clear_page()

The solution is to re-try __copy_from_user_inatomic() under PTL after checking that PTE is matches the orig_pte.

The second copy attempt can still fail, like due to non-readable PTE, but there's nothing reasonable we can do about, except clearing the CoW page.

---
 mm/memory.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +27 -8
index fcad8a0d943d3..eeae63bd95027 100644
@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ static inline bool cow_user_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src,
 	bool ret;
 	void *kaddr;
 	void __user *uaddr;
-	bool force_mkyoung;
+	bool locked = false;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
 	unsigned long addr = vmf->address;
@@ -2378,11 +2378,11 @@ static inline bool cow_user_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src,
 	 * On architectures with software "accessed" bits, we would
 	 * take a double page fault, so mark it accessed here.
 	 */
-	force_mkyoung = arch_faults_on_old_pte() && !pte_young(vmf->orig_pte);
-	if (force_mkyoung) {
+	if (arch_faults_on_old_pte() && !pte_young(vmf->orig_pte)) {
 		pte_t entry;
 
 		vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, vmf->pmd, addr, &vmf->ptl);
+		locked = true;
 		if (!likely(pte_same(*vmf->pte, vmf->orig_pte))) {
 			/*
 			 * Other thread has already handled the fault
@@ -2406,18 +2406,37 @@ static inline bool cow_user_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src,
 	 * zeroes.
 	 */
 	if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(kaddr, uaddr, PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		if (locked)
+			goto warn;
+
+		/* Re-validate under PTL if the page is still mapped */
+		vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, vmf->pmd, addr, &vmf->ptl);
+		locked = true;
+		if (!likely(pte_same(*vmf->pte, vmf->orig_pte))) {
+			/* The PTE changed under us. Retry page fault. */
+			ret = false;
+			goto pte_unlock;
+		}
+
 		/*
-		 * Give a warn in case there can be some obscure
-		 * use-case
+		 * The same page can be mapped back since last copy attampt.
+		 * Try to copy again under PTL.
 		 */
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
-		clear_page(kaddr);
+		if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(kaddr, uaddr, PAGE_SIZE)) {
+			/*
+			 * Give a warn in case there can be some obscure
+			 * use-case
+			 */
+warn:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			clear_page(kaddr);
+		}
 	}
 
 	ret = true;
 
 pte_unlock:
-	if (force_mkyoung)
+	if (locked)
 		pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
 	kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
 	flush_dcache_page(dst);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#101 lore raw

PATCH 100/206 drm/amdgpu: increase atombios cmd timeout

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: John Clements <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b3460a8b19688ad3033b75237d40fa580a5a953 ]

mitigates race condition on BACO reset between GPU bootcode and driver reload

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/atom.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/atom.c +2 -2
index e9934de1b9cf8..0222bb7ea49b4 100644
@@ -742,8 +742,8 @@ static void atom_op_jump(atom_exec_context *ctx, int *ptr, int arg)
 			cjiffies = jiffies;
 			if (time_after(cjiffies, ctx->last_jump_jiffies)) {
 				cjiffies -= ctx->last_jump_jiffies;
-				if ((jiffies_to_msecs(cjiffies) > 5000)) {
-					DRM_ERROR("atombios stuck in loop for more than 5secs aborting\n");
+				if ((jiffies_to_msecs(cjiffies) > 10000)) {
+					DRM_ERROR("atombios stuck in loop for more than 10secs aborting\n");
 					ctx->abort = true;
 				}
 			} else {
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#102 lore raw

PATCH 101/206 drm/amd/display: Stop if retimer is not available

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rodrigo Siqueira <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a0e40018dcc3f59a10ca21d58f8ea8ceb1b035ac ]

Raven provides retimer feature support that requires i2c interaction in order to make it work well, all settings required for this configuration are loaded from the Atom bios which include the i2c address. If the retimer feature is not available, we should abort the attempt to set this feature, otherwise, it makes the following line return I2C_CHANNEL_OPERATION_NO_RESPONSE:

i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
...
if (!i2c_success)
ASSERT(i2c_success);

This ends up causing problems with hotplugging HDMI displays on Raven, and causes retimer settings to warn like so:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 429 at

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../dal/dc/core/dc_link.c:1998 write_i2c_retimer_setting+0xc2/0x3c0 [amdgpu] Modules linked in:
edac_mce_amd ccp kvm irqbypass binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel amdgpu(+) snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi aesni_intel snd_seq amd_iommu_v2 gpu_sched aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper snd_seq_device ttm drm_kms_helper snd_timer eeepc_wmi wmi_bmof asus_wmi sparse_keymap drm mxm_wmi snd k10temp fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt soundcore joydev input_leds mac_hid sch_fq_codel parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 igb i2c_algo_bit hid_generic usbhid i2c_piix4 dca ahci hid libahci video wmi gpio_amdpt gpio_generic CPU: 1 PID: 429 Comm:
systemd-udevd Tainted: G W 5.2.0-rc1sept162019+ #1

Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX B450-F
GAMING, BIOS 2605 08/06/2019
RIP: 0010:write_i2c_retimer_setting+0xc2/0x3c0 [amdgpu]
Code: ff 0f b6 4d ce 44 0f b6 45 cf 44 0f b6 c8 45 89 cf 44 89 e2 48 c7
c6 f0 34 bc c0 bf 04 00 00 00 e8 63 b0 90 ff 45 84 ff 75 02 <0f> 0b 42
0f b6 04 73 8d 50 f6 80 fa 02 77 8c 3c 0a 0f 85 c8 00 00 RSP:
0018:ffffa99d02726fd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa99d02727035 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff976acc857440
RBP: ffffa99d02727018 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000002a600
R10: ffffe90610193680 R11: 00000000000005e3 R12: 000000000000005d
R13: ffff976ac4b201b8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f14f99e1680(0000) GS:ffff976acc840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdf212843b8 CR3: 0000000408906000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
Call Trace:
 core_link_enable_stream+0x626/0x680 [amdgpu]
 dce110_apply_ctx_to_hw+0x414/0x4e0 [amdgpu]
 dc_commit_state+0x331/0x5e0 [amdgpu]
 ? drm_calc_timestamping_constants+0xf9/0x150 [drm]
 amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x395/0x1e00 [amdgpu]
 ? dm_plane_helper_prepare_fb+0x20c/0x280 [amdgpu]
 commit_tail+0x42/0x70 [drm_kms_helper]
 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x10c/0x120 [drm_kms_helper]
 amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit+0x95/0xa0 [amdgpu]
 drm_atomic_commit+0x4a/0x50 [drm]
 restore_fbdev_mode_atomic+0x1c0/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper]
 restore_fbdev_mode+0x4c/0x160 [drm_kms_helper]
 ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
 drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x4e/0xa0 [drm_kms_helper]
 drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [drm_kms_helper]
 fbcon_init+0x471/0x630
 visual_init+0xd5/0x130
 do_bind_con_driver+0x20a/0x430
 do_take_over_console+0x7d/0x1b0
 do_fbcon_takeover+0x5c/0xb0
 fbcon_event_notify+0x6cd/0x8a0
 notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x70
 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x43/0x60
 fb_notifier_call_chain+0x1b/0x20
 register_framebuffer+0x254/0x360
 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x2c5/0x510 [drm_kms_helper]
 drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x35/0x40 [drm_kms_helper]
 amdgpu_fbdev_init+0xcd/0x100 [amdgpu]
 amdgpu_device_init+0x1156/0x1930 [amdgpu]
 amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x8d/0x2e0 [amdgpu]
 drm_dev_register+0x12b/0x1c0 [drm]
 amdgpu_pci_probe+0xd3/0x160 [amdgpu]
 local_pci_probe+0x47/0xa0
 pci_device_probe+0x142/0x1b0
 really_probe+0xf5/0x3d0
 driver_probe_device+0x11b/0x130
 device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60
 __driver_attach+0xa3/0x140
 ? device_driver_attach+0x60/0x60
 ? device_driver_attach+0x60/0x60
 bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xb0
 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1a3/0x1c0
 driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
 bus_add_driver+0x147/0x220
 ? 0xffffffffc0cb9000
 driver_register+0x60/0x100
 ? 0xffffffffc0cb9000
 __pci_register_driver+0x5a/0x60
 amdgpu_init+0x74/0x83 [amdgpu]
 do_one_initcall+0x4a/0x1fa
 ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x3f/0x1c0
 ? __vunmap+0x1cc/0x200
 do_init_module+0x5f/0x227
 load_module+0x2330/0x2b40
 __do_sys_finit_module+0xfc/0x120
 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xfc/0x120
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x130
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f14f9500839
Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89

f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1f f6 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff9bc4f5a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055afb5abce30 RCX: 00007f14f9500839
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055afb5ace0f0 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 000055afb5ace0f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000a
R10: 0000000000000017 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000055afb5aad800 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000000000

---[ end trace c286e96563966f08 ]---

This commit reworks the way that we handle i2c write for retimer in the way that we abort this configuration if the feature is not available in the device. For debug sake, we kept a simple log message in case the retimer is not available.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c | 67 ++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c +29 -38
index 3abc0294c05f5..2fb2c683ad54b 100644
@@ -1576,8 +1576,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 						buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 
 			if (!i2c_success)
-				/* Write failure */
-				ASSERT(i2c_success);
+				goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 			/* Based on DP159 specs, APPLY_RX_TX_CHANGE bit in 0x0A
 			 * needs to be set to 1 on every 0xA-0xC write.
@@ -1595,8 +1594,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 						pipe_ctx->stream->sink->link->ddc,
 						slave_address, &offset, 1, &value, 1);
 					if (!i2c_success)
-						/* Write failure */
-						ASSERT(i2c_success);
+						goto i2c_write_fail;
 				}
 
 				buffer[0] = offset;
@@ -1605,8 +1603,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 				i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 						buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 				if (!i2c_success)
-					/* Write failure */
-					ASSERT(i2c_success);
+					goto i2c_write_fail;
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -1623,8 +1620,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 							buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 
 				if (!i2c_success)
-					/* Write failure */
-					ASSERT(i2c_success);
+					goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 				/* Based on DP159 specs, APPLY_RX_TX_CHANGE bit in 0x0A
 				 * needs to be set to 1 on every 0xA-0xC write.
@@ -1642,8 +1638,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 								pipe_ctx->stream->sink->link->ddc,
 								slave_address, &offset, 1, &value, 1);
 						if (!i2c_success)
-							/* Write failure */
-							ASSERT(i2c_success);
+							goto i2c_write_fail;
 					}
 
 					buffer[0] = offset;
@@ -1652,8 +1647,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 					i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 							buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 					if (!i2c_success)
-						/* Write failure */
-						ASSERT(i2c_success);
+						goto i2c_write_fail;
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -1668,8 +1662,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 		i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 				buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 		if (!i2c_success)
-			/* Write failure */
-			ASSERT(i2c_success);
+			goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 		/* Write offset 0x00 to 0x23 */
 		buffer[0] = 0x00;
@@ -1677,8 +1670,7 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 		i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 				buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 		if (!i2c_success)
-			/* Write failure */
-			ASSERT(i2c_success);
+			goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 		/* Write offset 0xff to 0x00 */
 		buffer[0] = 0xff;
@@ -1686,10 +1678,14 @@ static void write_i2c_retimer_setting(
 		i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 				buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 		if (!i2c_success)
-			/* Write failure */
-			ASSERT(i2c_success);
+			goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 	}
+
+	return;
+
+i2c_write_fail:
+	DC_LOG_DEBUG("Set retimer failed");
 }
 
 static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
@@ -1710,8 +1706,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 	i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 			buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 	/* Write offset 0x0A to 0x17 */
 	buffer[0] = 0x0A;
@@ -1719,8 +1714,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 	i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 			buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 	/* Write offset 0x0B to 0xDA or 0xD8 */
 	buffer[0] = 0x0B;
@@ -1728,8 +1722,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 	i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 			buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 	/* Write offset 0x0A to 0x17 */
 	buffer[0] = 0x0A;
@@ -1737,8 +1730,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 	i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 			buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 	/* Write offset 0x0C to 0x1D or 0x91 */
 	buffer[0] = 0x0C;
@@ -1746,8 +1738,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 	i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 			buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 	/* Write offset 0x0A to 0x17 */
 	buffer[0] = 0x0A;
@@ -1755,8 +1746,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 	i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 			buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 
 	if (is_vga_mode) {
@@ -1768,8 +1758,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 		i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 				buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 		if (!i2c_success)
-			/* Write failure */
-			ASSERT(i2c_success);
+			goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 		/* Write offset 0x00 to 0x23 */
 		buffer[0] = 0x00;
@@ -1777,8 +1766,7 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 		i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 				buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 		if (!i2c_success)
-			/* Write failure */
-			ASSERT(i2c_success);
+			goto i2c_write_fail;
 
 		/* Write offset 0xff to 0x00 */
 		buffer[0] = 0xff;
@@ -1786,9 +1774,13 @@ static void write_i2c_default_retimer_setting(
 		i2c_success = i2c_write(pipe_ctx, slave_address,
 				buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 		if (!i2c_success)
-			/* Write failure */
-			ASSERT(i2c_success);
+			goto i2c_write_fail;
 	}
+
+	return;
+
+i2c_write_fail:
+	DC_LOG_DEBUG("Set default retimer failed");
 }
 
 static void write_i2c_redriver_setting(
@@ -1811,8 +1803,7 @@ static void write_i2c_redriver_setting(
 					buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 
 	if (!i2c_success)
-		/* Write failure */
-		ASSERT(i2c_success);
+		DC_LOG_DEBUG("Set redriver failed");
 }
 
 static void enable_link_hdmi(struct pipe_ctx *pipe_ctx)
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
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[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#103 lore raw

PATCH 102/206 ath10k: use kzalloc to read for ath10k_sdio_hif_diag_read

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wen Gong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 402f2992b4d62760cce7c689ff216ea3bf4d6e8a ]

When use command to read values, it crashed.

command:
dd if=/sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/phy0/ath10k/mem_value count=1 bs=4 skip=$((0x100233))

It will call to ath10k_sdio_hif_diag_read with address = 0x4008cc and buf_len = 4.

Then system crash:

[ 1786.013258] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc00bd45000
[ 1786.013273] Mem abort info:
[ 1786.013281]   ESR = 0x96000045
[ 1786.013291]   Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1786.013299]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1786.013307]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1786.013314] Data abort info:
[ 1786.013322]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000045
[ 1786.013330]   CM = 0, WnR = 1
[ 1786.013342] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp = 000000008542a60e
[ 1786.013350] [ffffffc00bd45000] pgd=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[ 1786.013368] Internal error: Oops: 96000045 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1786.013609] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000084b153c6)
[ 1786.013623] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.86 #137
[ 1786.013631] Hardware name: MediaTek krane sku176 board (DT)
[ 1786.013643] pstate: 80000085 (Nzcv daIf -PAN -UAO)
[ 1786.013662] pc : __memcpy+0x94/0x180
[ 1786.013678] lr : swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single+0x84/0x150
[ 1786.013686] sp : ffffff8008003c60
[ 1786.013694] x29: ffffff8008003c90 x28: ffffffae96411f80
[ 1786.013708] x27: ffffffae960d2018 x26: ffffff8019a4b9a8
[ 1786.013721] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001
[ 1786.013734] x23: ffffffae96567000 x22: 00000000000051d4
[ 1786.013747] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 00000000fe6e9000
[ 1786.013760] x19: 0000000000000004 x18: 0000000000000020
[ 1786.013773] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1786.013787] x15: 00000000ffffffff x14: 00000000000044c0
[ 1786.013800] x13: 0000000000365ba4 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1786.013813] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 00000037be6e9000
[ 1786.013826] x9 : ffffffc940000000 x8 : 000000000bd45000
[ 1786.013839] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffffc00bd45000
[ 1786.013852] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 1786.013865] x3 : 0000000000000c00 x2 : 0000000000000004
[ 1786.013878] x1 : fffffff7be6e9004 x0 : ffffffc00bd45000
[ 1786.013891] Call trace:
[ 1786.013903]  __memcpy+0x94/0x180
[ 1786.013914]  unmap_single+0x6c/0x84
[ 1786.013925]  swiotlb_unmap_sg_attrs+0x54/0x80
[ 1786.013938]  __swiotlb_unmap_sg_attrs+0x8c/0xa4
[ 1786.013952]  msdc_unprepare_data+0x6c/0x84
[ 1786.013963]  msdc_request_done+0x58/0x84
[ 1786.013974]  msdc_data_xfer_done+0x1a0/0x1c8
[ 1786.013985]  msdc_irq+0x12c/0x17c
[ 1786.013996]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xe4/0x250
[ 1786.014006]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x28/0x68
[ 1786.014015]  handle_irq_event+0x48/0x78
[ 1786.014026]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xd0/0x1a0
[ 1786.014039]  __handle_domain_irq+0x84/0xc4
[ 1786.014050]  gic_handle_irq+0x124/0x1a4
[ 1786.014059]  el1_irq+0xb0/0x128
[ 1786.014072]  cpuidle_enter_state+0x298/0x328
[ 1786.014082]  cpuidle_enter+0x30/0x40
[ 1786.014094]  do_idle+0x190/0x268
[ 1786.014104]  cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x28
[ 1786.014116]  rest_init+0xd4/0xe0
[ 1786.014126]  start_kernel+0x30c/0x38c
[ 1786.014139] Code: f8408423 f80084c3 36100062 b8404423 (b80044c3)
[ 1786.014150] ---[ end trace 3b02ddb698ea69ee ]---
[ 1786.015415] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 1786.015433] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1786.015447] Kernel Offset: 0x2e8d200000 from 0xffffff8008000000
[ 1786.015458] CPU features: 0x0,2188200c
[ 1786.015466] Memory Limit: none

For sdio chip, it need the memory which is kmalloc, if it is vmalloc from ath10k_mem_value_read, then it have a memory error. kzalloc of ath10k_sdio_hif_diag_read32 is the correct type, so add kzalloc in ath10k_sdio_hif_diag_read to replace the buffer which is vmalloc from ath10k_mem_value_read.

This patch only effect sdio chip.

Tested with QCA6174 SDIO with firmware WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00029.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/sdio.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/sdio.c +14 -4
index 0ecaba824fb28..0cdaecb0e28a9 100644
@@ -1567,23 +1567,33 @@ static int ath10k_sdio_hif_diag_read(struct ath10k *ar, u32 address, void *buf,
 				     size_t buf_len)
 {
 	int ret;
+	void *mem;
+
+	mem = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!mem)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* set window register to start read cycle */
 	ret = ath10k_sdio_write32(ar, MBOX_WINDOW_READ_ADDR_ADDRESS, address);
 	if (ret) {
 		ath10k_warn(ar, "failed to set mbox window read address: %d", ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* read the data */
-	ret = ath10k_sdio_read(ar, MBOX_WINDOW_DATA_ADDRESS, buf, buf_len);
+	ret = ath10k_sdio_read(ar, MBOX_WINDOW_DATA_ADDRESS, mem, buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 		ath10k_warn(ar, "failed to read from mbox window data address: %d\n",
 			    ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+	memcpy(buf, mem, buf_len);
+
+out:
+	kfree(mem);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int ath10k_sdio_hif_diag_read32(struct ath10k *ar, u32 address,
Signature · 7 lines
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_______________________________________________
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/ath10k
author maintainer
#104 lore raw

PATCH 103/206 scsi: aacraid: Disabling TM path and only processing IOP reset

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sagar Biradar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bef18d308a2215eff8c3411a23d7f34604ce56c3 ]

Fixes the occasional adapter panic when sg_reset is issued with -d, -t, -b and -H flags. Removal of command type HBA_IU_TYPE_SCSI_TM_REQ in aac_hba_send since iu_type, request_id and fib_flags are not populated. Device and target reset handlers are made to send TMF commands only when reset_state is 0.

---
 drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c   | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c +1 -1
index b7588de4484e5..4cb6ee6e1212e 100644
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ int aac_hba_send(u8 command, struct fib *fibptr, fib_callback callback,
 		hbacmd->request_id =
 			cpu_to_le32((((u32)(fibptr - dev->fibs)) << 2) + 1);
 		fibptr->flags |= FIB_CONTEXT_FLAG_SCSI_CMD;
-	} else if (command != HBA_IU_TYPE_SCSI_TM_REQ)
+	} else
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 
drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +25 -9
index 1046947064a0b..0142547aaadd2 100644
@@ -736,7 +736,11 @@ static int aac_eh_abort(struct scsi_cmnd* cmd)
 		status = aac_hba_send(HBA_IU_TYPE_SCSI_TM_REQ, fib,
 				  (fib_callback) aac_hba_callback,
 				  (void *) cmd);
-
+		if (status != -EINPROGRESS) {
+			aac_fib_complete(fib);
+			aac_fib_free(fib);
+			return ret;
+		}
 		/* Wait up to 15 secs for completion */
 		for (count = 0; count < 15; ++count) {
 			if (cmd->SCp.sent_command) {
@@ -915,11 +919,11 @@ static int aac_eh_dev_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 
 	info = &aac->hba_map[bus][cid];
 
-	if (info->devtype != AAC_DEVTYPE_NATIVE_RAW &&
-	    info->reset_state > 0)
+	if (!(info->devtype == AAC_DEVTYPE_NATIVE_RAW &&
+	 !(info->reset_state > 0)))
 		return FAILED;
 
-	pr_err("%s: Host adapter reset request. SCSI hang ?\n",
+	pr_err("%s: Host device reset request. SCSI hang ?\n",
 	       AAC_DRIVERNAME);
 
 	fib = aac_fib_alloc(aac);
@@ -934,7 +938,12 @@ static int aac_eh_dev_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 	status = aac_hba_send(command, fib,
 			      (fib_callback) aac_tmf_callback,
 			      (void *) info);
-
+	if (status != -EINPROGRESS) {
+		info->reset_state = 0;
+		aac_fib_complete(fib);
+		aac_fib_free(fib);
+		return ret;
+	}
 	/* Wait up to 15 seconds for completion */
 	for (count = 0; count < 15; ++count) {
 		if (info->reset_state == 0) {
@@ -973,11 +982,11 @@ static int aac_eh_target_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 
 	info = &aac->hba_map[bus][cid];
 
-	if (info->devtype != AAC_DEVTYPE_NATIVE_RAW &&
-	    info->reset_state > 0)
+	if (!(info->devtype == AAC_DEVTYPE_NATIVE_RAW &&
+	 !(info->reset_state > 0)))
 		return FAILED;
 
-	pr_err("%s: Host adapter reset request. SCSI hang ?\n",
+	pr_err("%s: Host target reset request. SCSI hang ?\n",
 	       AAC_DRIVERNAME);
 
 	fib = aac_fib_alloc(aac);
@@ -994,6 +1003,13 @@ static int aac_eh_target_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 			      (fib_callback) aac_tmf_callback,
 			      (void *) info);
 
+	if (status != -EINPROGRESS) {
+		info->reset_state = 0;
+		aac_fib_complete(fib);
+		aac_fib_free(fib);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	/* Wait up to 15 seconds for completion */
 	for (count = 0; count < 15; ++count) {
 		if (info->reset_state <= 0) {
@@ -1046,7 +1062,7 @@ static int aac_eh_bus_reset(struct scsi_cmnd* cmd)
 		}
 	}
 
-	pr_err("%s: Host adapter reset request. SCSI hang ?\n", AAC_DRIVERNAME);
+	pr_err("%s: Host bus reset request. SCSI hang ?\n", AAC_DRIVERNAME);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check the health of the controller
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#105 lore raw

PATCH 104/206 Bluetooth: L2CAP: handle l2cap config request during open state

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Howard Chung <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96298f640104e4cd9a913a6e50b0b981829b94ff ]

According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state.

The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change.

=== Before ===
...

Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22

      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16                #23
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12                #24
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27

      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00                                            ..
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18                #28
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30

      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6
        Source CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31

      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00 91 02 11 11                                ......

< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 #32
L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6
Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64
Source CID: 65

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #33

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1
...
=== After ===
...

Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22

      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4
        PSM: 1 (0x0001)
        Source CID: 65
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16               #23
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 65
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #24
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27

      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00                                            ..
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18               #28
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30

      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6
        Source CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
Quoted 1 line

ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31

      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12
        Destination CID: 64
        Flags: 0x0000
        Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint]
        01 00 91 02 11 11                                .....
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18               #32
      L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
        Source CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
        Result: Success (0x0000)
        Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
          MTU: 672
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12               #33
      L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4
        Destination CID: 65
        Flags: 0x0000
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #34

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #35

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1
...

---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +2 -1
index b1f51cb007ea6..c04107d446016 100644
@@ -4117,7 +4117,8 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (chan->state != BT_CONFIG && chan->state != BT_CONNECT2) {
+	if (chan->state != BT_CONFIG && chan->state != BT_CONNECT2 &&
+	    chan->state != BT_CONNECTED) {
 		cmd_reject_invalid_cid(conn, cmd->ident, chan->scid,
 				       chan->dcid);
 		goto unlock;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#106 lore raw

PATCH 105/206 media: tda10071: fix unsigned sign extension overflow

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a7463e2dc698075132de9905b89f495df888bb79 ]

The shifting of buf[3] by 24 bits to the left will be promoted to a 32 bit signed int and then sign-extended to an unsigned long. In the unlikely event that the the top bit of buf[3] is set then all then all the upper bits end up as also being set because of the sign-extension and this affect the ev->post_bit_error sum. Fix this by using the temporary u32 variable bit_error to avoid the sign-extension promotion. This also removes the need to do the computation twice.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unintended sign extension")

Fixes 267897a4708f ("[media] tda10071: implement DVBv5 statistics")
---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda10071.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/tda10071.c +5 -4
index 097c42d3f8c26..df0c7243eafe4 100644
@@ -483,10 +483,11 @@ static int tda10071_read_status(struct dvb_frontend *fe, enum fe_status *status)
 			goto error;
 
 		if (dev->delivery_system == SYS_DVBS) {
-			dev->dvbv3_ber = buf[0] << 24 | buf[1] << 16 |
-					 buf[2] << 8 | buf[3] << 0;
-			dev->post_bit_error += buf[0] << 24 | buf[1] << 16 |
-					       buf[2] << 8 | buf[3] << 0;
+			u32 bit_error = buf[0] << 24 | buf[1] << 16 |
+					buf[2] << 8 | buf[3] << 0;
+
+			dev->dvbv3_ber = bit_error;
+			dev->post_bit_error += bit_error;
 			c->post_bit_error.stat[0].scale = FE_SCALE_COUNTER;
 			c->post_bit_error.stat[0].uvalue = dev->post_bit_error;
 			dev->block_error += buf[4] << 8 | buf[5] << 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#107 lore raw

PATCH 106/206 xfs: don't ever return a stale pointer from __xfs_dir3_free_read

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1cb5deb5bc095c070c09a4540c45f9c9ba24be43 ]

If we decide that a directory free block is corrupt, we must take care not to leak a buffer pointer to the caller. After xfs_trans_brelse returns, the buffer can be freed or reused, which means that we have to set *bpp back to NULL.

Callers are supposed to notice the nonzero return value and not use the buffer pointer, but we should code more defensively, even if all current callers handle this situation correctly.

Fixes de14c5f541e7 ("xfs: verify free block header fields")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_node.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_node.c +1 -0
index f1bb3434f51c7..01e99806b941f 100644
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ __xfs_dir3_free_read(
 	if (fa) {
 		xfs_verifier_error(*bpp, -EFSCORRUPTED, fa);
 		xfs_trans_brelse(tp, *bpp);
+		*bpp = NULL;
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#108 lore raw

PATCH 107/206 xfs: mark dir corrupt when lookup-by-hash fails

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2e107cf869eecc770e3f630060bb4e5f547d0fd8 ]

In xchk_dir_actor, we attempt to validate the directory hash structures by performing a directory entry lookup by (hashed) name. If the lookup returns ENOENT, that means that the hash information is corrupt. The _process_error functions don't catch this, so we have to add that explicitly.

---
 fs/xfs/scrub/dir.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/scrub/dir.c +3 -0
index cd3e4d768a18c..33dfcba72c7a0 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ xchk_dir_actor(
 	xname.type = XFS_DIR3_FT_UNKNOWN;
 
 	error = xfs_dir_lookup(sdc->sc->tp, ip, &xname, &lookup_ino, NULL);
+	/* ENOENT means the hash lookup failed and the dir is corrupt */
+	if (error == -ENOENT)
+		error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	if (!xchk_fblock_process_error(sdc->sc, XFS_DATA_FORK, offset,
 			&error))
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#109 lore raw

PATCH 108/206 ext4: mark block bitmap corrupted when found instead of BUGON

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb5760863fc28feab28b567ddcda7e667e638da0 ]

We already has similar code in ext4_mb_complex_scan_group(), but ext4_mb_simple_scan_group() still affected.

Other reports: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-ext4/msg60231.html

---
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/mballoc.c +9 -2
index 8dd54a8a03610..054cfdd007d69 100644
@@ -1901,8 +1901,15 @@ void ext4_mb_simple_scan_group(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac,
 		BUG_ON(buddy == NULL);
 
 		k = mb_find_next_zero_bit(buddy, max, 0);
-		BUG_ON(k >= max);
-
+		if (k >= max) {
+			ext4_grp_locked_error(ac->ac_sb, e4b->bd_group, 0, 0,
+				"%d free clusters of order %d. But found 0",
+				grp->bb_counters[i], i);
+			ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted(ac->ac_sb,
+					 e4b->bd_group,
+					EXT4_GROUP_INFO_BBITMAP_CORRUPT);
+			break;
+		}
 		ac->ac_found++;
 
 		ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len = 1 << i;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#110 lore raw

PATCH 109/206 tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d8d74ea3c00214aee1e1826ca18e77944812b9b4 ]

Synchronize with the results from the CRQs before continuing with the initialization. This avoids trying to send TPM commands while the rtce buffer has not been allocated, yet.

This patch fixes an existing race condition that may occurr if the hypervisor does not quickly respond to the VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE request sent during initialization and therefore the ibmvtpm->rtce_buf has not been allocated at the time the first TPM command is sent.

Fixes 132f76294744 ("drivers/char/tpm: Add new device driver to support IBM vTPM")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c | 9 +++++++++
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c +9 -0
index 569e93e1f06cc..3ba67bc6baba0 100644
@@ -588,6 +588,7 @@ static irqreturn_t ibmvtpm_interrupt(int irq, void *vtpm_instance)
 	 */
 	while ((crq = ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(ibmvtpm)) != NULL) {
 		ibmvtpm_crq_process(crq, ibmvtpm);
+		wake_up_interruptible(&ibmvtpm->crq_queue.wq);
 		crq->valid = 0;
 		smp_wmb();
 	}
@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 	}
 
 	crq_q->num_entry = CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE / sizeof(*crq_q->crq_addr);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&crq_q->wq);
 	ibmvtpm->crq_dma_handle = dma_map_single(dev, crq_q->crq_addr,
 						 CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE,
 						 DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
@@ -687,6 +689,13 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 	if (rc)
 		goto init_irq_cleanup;
 
+	if (!wait_event_timeout(ibmvtpm->crq_queue.wq,
+				ibmvtpm->rtce_buf != NULL,
+				HZ)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "CRQ response timed out\n");
+		goto init_irq_cleanup;
+	}
+
 	return tpm_chip_register(chip);
 init_irq_cleanup:
 	do {
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h +1 -0
index 91dfe766d0800..4f6a124601db4 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue {
 	struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq_addr;
 	u32 index;
 	u32 num_entry;
+	wait_queue_head_t wq;
 };
 
 struct ibmvtpm_dev {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#111 lore raw

PATCH 110/206 rtc: sa1100: fix possible race condition

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f2997775b111c6d660c32a18d5d44d37cb7361b1 ]

Both RTC IRQs are requested before the struct rtc_device is allocated, this may lead to a NULL pointer dereference in the IRQ handler.

To fix this issue, allocating the rtc_device struct before requesting the IRQs using devm_rtc_allocate_device, and use rtc_register_device to register the RTC device.

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-sa1100.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-sa1100.c +10 -8
index 304d905cb23fd..56f625371735f 100644
@@ -186,7 +186,6 @@ static const struct rtc_class_ops sa1100_rtc_ops = {
 
 int sa1100_rtc_init(struct platform_device *pdev, struct sa1100_rtc *info)
 {
-	struct rtc_device *rtc;
 	int ret;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&info->lock);
@@ -215,15 +214,14 @@ int sa1100_rtc_init(struct platform_device *pdev, struct sa1100_rtc *info)
 		writel_relaxed(0, info->rcnr);
 	}
 
-	rtc = devm_rtc_device_register(&pdev->dev, pdev->name, &sa1100_rtc_ops,
-					THIS_MODULE);
-	if (IS_ERR(rtc)) {
+	info->rtc->ops = &sa1100_rtc_ops;
+	info->rtc->max_user_freq = RTC_FREQ;
+
+	ret = rtc_register_device(info->rtc);
+	if (ret) {
 		clk_disable_unprepare(info->clk);
-		return PTR_ERR(rtc);
+		return ret;
 	}
-	info->rtc = rtc;
-
-	rtc->max_user_freq = RTC_FREQ;
 
 	/* Fix for a nasty initialization problem the in SA11xx RTSR register.
 	 * See also the comments in sa1100_rtc_interrupt().
@@ -272,6 +270,10 @@ static int sa1100_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	info->irq_1hz = irq_1hz;
 	info->irq_alarm = irq_alarm;
 
+	info->rtc = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&pdev->dev);
+	if (IS_ERR(info->rtc))
+		return PTR_ERR(info->rtc);
+
 	ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq_1hz, sa1100_rtc_interrupt, 0,
 			       "rtc 1Hz", &pdev->dev);
 	if (ret) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#112 lore raw

PATCH 111/206 rtc: ds1374: fix possible race condition

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c11af8131a4e7ba1960faed731ee7e84c2c13c94 ]

The RTC IRQ is requested before the struct rtc_device is allocated, this may lead to a NULL pointer dereference in the IRQ handler.

To fix this issue, allocating the rtc_device struct before requesting the RTC IRQ using devm_rtc_allocate_device, and use rtc_register_device to register the RTC device.

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c | 15 +++++++++------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c +9 -6
index 38a2e9e684df4..77a106e90124b 100644
@@ -620,6 +620,10 @@ static int ds1374_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 	if (!ds1374)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	ds1374->rtc = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&client->dev);
+	if (IS_ERR(ds1374->rtc))
+		return PTR_ERR(ds1374->rtc);
+
 	ds1374->client = client;
 	i2c_set_clientdata(client, ds1374);
 
@@ -641,12 +645,11 @@ static int ds1374_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 		device_set_wakeup_capable(&client->dev, 1);
 	}
 
-	ds1374->rtc = devm_rtc_device_register(&client->dev, client->name,
-						&ds1374_rtc_ops, THIS_MODULE);
-	if (IS_ERR(ds1374->rtc)) {
-		dev_err(&client->dev, "unable to register the class device\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(ds1374->rtc);
-	}
+	ds1374->rtc->ops = &ds1374_rtc_ops;
+
+	ret = rtc_register_device(ds1374->rtc);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1374_WDT
 	save_client = client;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#113 lore raw

PATCH 112/206 nfsd: Don't add locks to closed or closing open stateids

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a451b12311aa8c96c6f6e01c783a86995dc3ec6b ]

In NFSv4, the lock stateids are tied to the lockowner, and the open stateid, so that the action of closing the file also results in either an automatic loss of the locks, or an error of the form NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD.

In practice this means we must not add new locks to the open stateid after the close process has been invoked. In fact doing so, can result in the following panic:

kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI

 CPU: 2 PID: 1085 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3+ #2
 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware7,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW71.00V.14410784.B64.1908150010 08/15/2019
 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x55
 Code: 1a 3d 9b e8 74 10 c2 ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 1a 3d 9b e8 66 10 c2 ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b0 1a 3d 9b e8 52 10 c2 ff <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 4c 89 c2 48 c7 c7 78 1a 3d 9b e8 3e 10 c2 ff 0f 0b
 RSP: 0018:ffffb296c1d47d90 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff8ba032456ec8 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8ba039e99cc8 RDI: ffff8ba039e99cc8
 RBP: ffff8ba032456e60 R08: 0000000000000781 R09: 0000000000000003
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ba009a4abe0
 R13: ffff8ba032456e8c R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8ba00adb01d8
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ba039e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007fb213f0b008 CR3: 00000001347de006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
 Call Trace:
  release_lock_stateid+0x2b/0x80 [nfsd]
  nfsd4_free_stateid+0x1e9/0x210 [nfsd]
  nfsd4_proc_compound+0x414/0x700 [nfsd]
  ? nfs4svc_decode_compoundargs+0x407/0x4c0 [nfsd]
  nfsd_dispatch+0xc1/0x200 [nfsd]
  svc_process_common+0x476/0x6f0 [sunrpc]
  ? svc_sock_secure_port+0x12/0x30 [sunrpc]
  ? svc_recv+0x313/0x9c0 [sunrpc]
  ? nfsd_svc+0x2d0/0x2d0 [nfsd]
  svc_process+0xd4/0x110 [sunrpc]
  nfsd+0xe3/0x140 [nfsd]
  kthread+0xf9/0x130
  ? nfsd_destroy+0x50/0x50 [nfsd]
  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40

The fix is to ensure that lock creation tests for whether or not the open stateid is unhashed, and to fail if that is the case.

Fixes 659aefb68eca ("nfsd: Ensure we don't recognise lock stateids after freeing them")
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +43 -30
index c24306af9758f..655079ae1dd1f 100644
@@ -471,6 +471,8 @@ find_any_file(struct nfs4_file *f)
 {
 	struct file *ret;
 
+	if (!f)
+		return NULL;
 	spin_lock(&f->fi_lock);
 	ret = __nfs4_get_fd(f, O_RDWR);
 	if (!ret) {
@@ -1207,6 +1209,12 @@ static void nfs4_put_stateowner(struct nfs4_stateowner *sop)
 	nfs4_free_stateowner(sop);
 }
 
+static bool
+nfs4_ol_stateid_unhashed(const struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
+{
+	return list_empty(&stp->st_perfile);
+}
+
 static bool unhash_ol_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
 {
 	struct nfs4_file *fp = stp->st_stid.sc_file;
@@ -1274,9 +1282,11 @@ static bool unhash_lock_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
 {
 	lockdep_assert_held(&stp->st_stid.sc_client->cl_lock);
 
+	if (!unhash_ol_stateid(stp))
+		return false;
 	list_del_init(&stp->st_locks);
 	nfs4_unhash_stid(&stp->st_stid);
-	return unhash_ol_stateid(stp);
+	return true;
 }
 
 static void release_lock_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
@@ -1341,13 +1351,12 @@ static void release_open_stateid_locks(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *open_stp,
 static bool unhash_open_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp,
 				struct list_head *reaplist)
 {
-	bool unhashed;
-
 	lockdep_assert_held(&stp->st_stid.sc_client->cl_lock);
 
-	unhashed = unhash_ol_stateid(stp);
+	if (!unhash_ol_stateid(stp))
+		return false;
 	release_open_stateid_locks(stp, reaplist);
-	return unhashed;
+	return true;
 }
 
 static void release_open_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
@@ -5774,21 +5783,21 @@ alloc_init_lock_stateowner(unsigned int strhashval, struct nfs4_client *clp,
 }
 
 static struct nfs4_ol_stateid *
-find_lock_stateid(struct nfs4_lockowner *lo, struct nfs4_file *fp)
+find_lock_stateid(const struct nfs4_lockowner *lo,
+		  const struct nfs4_ol_stateid *ost)
 {
 	struct nfs4_ol_stateid *lst;
-	struct nfs4_client *clp = lo->lo_owner.so_client;
 
-	lockdep_assert_held(&clp->cl_lock);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&ost->st_stid.sc_client->cl_lock);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(lst, &lo->lo_owner.so_stateids, st_perstateowner) {
-		if (lst->st_stid.sc_type != NFS4_LOCK_STID)
-			continue;
-		if (lst->st_stid.sc_file == fp) {
-			refcount_inc(&lst->st_stid.sc_count);
-			return lst;
+	/* If ost is not hashed, ost->st_locks will not be valid */
+	if (!nfs4_ol_stateid_unhashed(ost))
+		list_for_each_entry(lst, &ost->st_locks, st_locks) {
+			if (lst->st_stateowner == &lo->lo_owner) {
+				refcount_inc(&lst->st_stid.sc_count);
+				return lst;
+			}
 		}
-	}
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -5804,11 +5813,11 @@ init_lock_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lo,
 	mutex_lock_nested(&stp->st_mutex, OPEN_STATEID_MUTEX);
 retry:
 	spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
-	spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
-	retstp = find_lock_stateid(lo, fp);
+	if (nfs4_ol_stateid_unhashed(open_stp))
+		goto out_close;
+	retstp = find_lock_stateid(lo, open_stp);
 	if (retstp)
-		goto out_unlock;
-
+		goto out_found;
 	refcount_inc(&stp->st_stid.sc_count);
 	stp->st_stid.sc_type = NFS4_LOCK_STID;
 	stp->st_stateowner = nfs4_get_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner);
@@ -5817,22 +5826,26 @@ retry:
 	stp->st_access_bmap = 0;
 	stp->st_deny_bmap = open_stp->st_deny_bmap;
 	stp->st_openstp = open_stp;
+	spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
 	list_add(&stp->st_locks, &open_stp->st_locks);
 	list_add(&stp->st_perstateowner, &lo->lo_owner.so_stateids);
 	list_add(&stp->st_perfile, &fp->fi_stateids);
-out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock);
 	spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
-	if (retstp) {
-		if (nfsd4_lock_ol_stateid(retstp) != nfs_ok) {
-			nfs4_put_stid(&retstp->st_stid);
-			goto retry;
-		}
-		/* To keep mutex tracking happy */
-		mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
-		stp = retstp;
-	}
 	return stp;
+out_found:
+	spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
+	if (nfsd4_lock_ol_stateid(retstp) != nfs_ok) {
+		nfs4_put_stid(&retstp->st_stid);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	/* To keep mutex tracking happy */
+	mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
+	return retstp;
+out_close:
+	spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static struct nfs4_ol_stateid *
@@ -5847,7 +5860,7 @@ find_or_create_lock_stateid(struct nfs4_lockowner *lo, struct nfs4_file *fi,
 
 	*new = false;
 	spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
-	lst = find_lock_stateid(lo, fi);
+	lst = find_lock_stateid(lo, ost);
 	spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
 	if (lst != NULL) {
 		if (nfsd4_lock_ol_stateid(lst) == nfs_ok)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#114 lore raw

PATCH 113/206 RDMA/cm: Remove a race freeing timewait_info

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bede86a39d9dc3387ac00dcb8e1ac221676b2f25 ]

When creating a cm_id during REQ the id immediately becomes visible to the other MAD handlers, and shortly after the state is moved to IB_CM_REQ_RCVD

This allows cm_rej_handler() to run concurrently and free the work:

CPU 0 CPU1
cm_req_handler()
ib_create_cm_id()
cm_match_req()

    id_priv->state = IB_CM_REQ_RCVD
                                       cm_rej_handler()
                                         cm_acquire_id()
                                         spin_lock(&id_priv->lock)
                                         switch (id_priv->state)
  					   case IB_CM_REQ_RCVD:
                                            cm_reset_to_idle()
                                             kfree(id_priv->timewait_info);
   goto destroy
  destroy:
    kfree(id_priv->timewait_info);
                                             id_priv->timewait_info = NULL

Causing a double free or worse.

Do not free the timewait_info without also holding the id_priv->lock. Simplify this entire flow by making the free unconditional during cm_destroy_id() and removing the confusing special case error unwind during creation of the timewait_info.

This also fixes a leak of the timewait if cm_destroy_id() is called in IB_CM_ESTABLISHED with an XRC TGT QP. The state machine will be left in ESTABLISHED while it needed to transition through IB_CM_TIMEWAIT to release the timewait pointer.

Also fix a leak of the timewait_info if the caller mis-uses the API and does ib_send_cm_reqs().

Fixes a977049dacde ("[PATCH] IB: Add the kernel CM implementation")
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c +15 -10
index 64f206e11d497..4ebf63360a697 100644
@@ -1100,14 +1100,22 @@ retest:
 		break;
 	}
 
-	spin_lock_irq(&cm.lock);
+	spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
+	spin_lock(&cm.lock);
+	/* Required for cleanup paths related cm_req_handler() */
+	if (cm_id_priv->timewait_info) {
+		cm_cleanup_timewait(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
+		kfree(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
+		cm_id_priv->timewait_info = NULL;
+	}
 	if (!list_empty(&cm_id_priv->altr_list) &&
 	    (!cm_id_priv->altr_send_port_not_ready))
 		list_del(&cm_id_priv->altr_list);
 	if (!list_empty(&cm_id_priv->prim_list) &&
 	    (!cm_id_priv->prim_send_port_not_ready))
 		list_del(&cm_id_priv->prim_list);
-	spin_unlock_irq(&cm.lock);
+	spin_unlock(&cm.lock);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
 
 	cm_free_id(cm_id->local_id);
 	cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
@@ -1424,7 +1432,7 @@ int ib_send_cm_req(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
 	/* Verify that we're not in timewait. */
 	cm_id_priv = container_of(cm_id, struct cm_id_private, id);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
-	if (cm_id->state != IB_CM_IDLE) {
+	if (cm_id->state != IB_CM_IDLE || WARN_ON(cm_id_priv->timewait_info)) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -1442,12 +1450,12 @@ int ib_send_cm_req(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
 				 param->ppath_sgid_attr, &cm_id_priv->av,
 				 cm_id_priv);
 	if (ret)
-		goto error1;
+		goto out;
 	if (param->alternate_path) {
 		ret = cm_init_av_by_path(param->alternate_path, NULL,
 					 &cm_id_priv->alt_av, cm_id_priv);
 		if (ret)
-			goto error1;
+			goto out;
 	}
 	cm_id->service_id = param->service_id;
 	cm_id->service_mask = ~cpu_to_be64(0);
@@ -1465,7 +1473,7 @@ int ib_send_cm_req(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
 
 	ret = cm_alloc_msg(cm_id_priv, &cm_id_priv->msg);
 	if (ret)
-		goto error1;
+		goto out;
 
 	req_msg = (struct cm_req_msg *) cm_id_priv->msg->mad;
 	cm_format_req(req_msg, cm_id_priv, param);
@@ -1488,7 +1496,6 @@ int ib_send_cm_req(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
 	return 0;
 
 error2:	cm_free_msg(cm_id_priv->msg);
-error1:	kfree(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
 out:	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_send_cm_req);
@@ -1973,7 +1980,7 @@ static int cm_req_handler(struct cm_work *work)
 		pr_debug("%s: local_id %d, no listen_cm_id_priv\n", __func__,
 			 be32_to_cpu(cm_id->local_id));
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto free_timeinfo;
+		goto destroy;
 	}
 
 	cm_id_priv->id.cm_handler = listen_cm_id_priv->id.cm_handler;
@@ -2057,8 +2064,6 @@ static int cm_req_handler(struct cm_work *work)
 rejected:
 	atomic_dec(&cm_id_priv->refcount);
 	cm_deref_id(listen_cm_id_priv);
-free_timeinfo:
-	kfree(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
 destroy:
 	ib_destroy_cm_id(cm_id);
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#115 lore raw

PATCH 114/206 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Treat TM-related invalid form instructions on P9 like the valid ones

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1dff3064c764b5a51c367b949b341d2e38972bec ]

On P9 DD2.2 due to a CPU defect some TM instructions need to be emulated by KVM. This is handled at first by the hardware raising a softpatch interrupt when certain TM instructions that need KVM assistance are executed in the guest. Althought some TM instructions per Power ISA are invalid forms they can raise a softpatch interrupt too. For instance, 'tresume.' instruction as defined in the ISA must have bit 31 set (1), but an instruction that matches 'tresume.' PO and XO opcode fields but has bit 31 not set (0), like 0x7cfe9ddc, also raises a softpatch interrupt. Similarly for 'treclaim.' and 'trechkpt.' instructions with bit 31 = 0, i.e. 0x7c00075c and 0x7c0007dc, respectively. Hence, if a code like the following is executed in the guest it will raise a softpatch interrupt just like a 'tresume.' when the TM facility is enabled ('tabort. 0' in the example is used only to enable the TM facility):

int main() { asm("tabort. 0; .long 0x7cfe9ddc;"); }

Currently in such a case KVM throws a complete trace like:

[345523.705984] WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 64413 at arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c:211 kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation+0x68/0x620 [kvm_hv]
[345523.705985] Modules linked in: kvm_hv(E) xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_tcpudp ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat

iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter bridge stp llc sch_fq_codel ipmi_powernv at24 vmx_crypto ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv uio_pdrv_genirq kvm opal_prd uio leds_powernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear tg3 crct10dif_vpmsum crc32c_vpmsum ipr [last unloaded: kvm_hv]

[345523.706030] CPU: 24 PID: 64413 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Tainted: G        W   E     5.5.0+ #1
[345523.706031] NIP:  c0080000072cb9c0 LR: c0080000072b5e80 CTR: c0080000085c7850
[345523.706034] REGS: c000000399467680 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G        W   E      (5.5.0+)
[345523.706034] MSR:  900000010282b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[E]>  CR: 24022428  XER: 00000000
[345523.706042] CFAR: c0080000072b5e7c IRQMASK: 0
                GPR00: c0080000072b5e80 c000000399467910 c0080000072db500 c000000375ccc720
                GPR04: c000000375ccc720 00000003fbec0000 0000a10395dda5a6 0000000000000000
                GPR08: 000000007cfe9ddc 7cfe9ddc000005dc 7cfe9ddc7c0005dc c0080000072cd530
                GPR12: c0080000085c7850 c0000003fffeb800 0000000000000001 00007dfb737f0000
                GPR16: c0002001edcca558 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
                GPR20: c000000001b21258 c0002001edcca558 0000000000000018 0000000000000000
                GPR24: 0000000001000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 0000000000001500
                GPR28: c0002001edcc4278 c00000037dd80000 800000050280f033 c000000375ccc720
[345523.706062] NIP [c0080000072cb9c0] kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation+0x68/0x620 [kvm_hv]
[345523.706065] LR [c0080000072b5e80] kvmppc_handle_exit_hv.isra.53+0x3e8/0x798 [kvm_hv]
[345523.706066] Call Trace:
[345523.706069] [c000000399467910] [c000000399467940] 0xc000000399467940 (unreliable)
[345523.706071] [c000000399467950] [c000000399467980] 0xc000000399467980
[345523.706075] [c0000003994679f0] [c0080000072bd1c4] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0xa1c/0xb80 [kvm_hv]
[345523.706079] [c000000399467ac0] [c0080000072bd8e0] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x5b8/0xb00 [kvm_hv]
[345523.706087] [c000000399467b90] [c0080000085c93cc] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm]
[345523.706095] [c000000399467bb0] [c0080000085c582c] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x244/0x420 [kvm]
[345523.706101] [c000000399467c40] [c0080000085b7498] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3d0/0x7b0 [kvm]
[345523.706105] [c000000399467db0] [c0000000004adf9c] ksys_ioctl+0x13c/0x170
[345523.706107] [c000000399467e00] [c0000000004adff8] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80
[345523.706111] [c000000399467e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68
[345523.706112] Instruction dump:
[345523.706114] 419e0390 7f8a4840 409d0048 6d497c00 2f89075d 419e021c 6d497c00 2f8907dd
[345523.706119] 419e01c0 6d497c00 2f8905dd 419e00a4 <0fe00000> 38210040 38600000 ebc1fff0

and then treats the executed instruction as a 'nop'.

However the POWER9 User's Manual, in section "4.6.10 Book II Invalid Forms", informs that for TM instructions bit 31 is in fact ignored, thus for the TM-related invalid forms ignoring bit 31 and handling them like the valid forms is an acceptable way to handle them. POWER8 behaves the same way too.

This commit changes the handling of the cases here described by treating the TM-related invalid forms that can generate a softpatch interrupt just like their valid forms (w/ bit 31 = 1) instead of as a 'nop' and by gently reporting any other unrecognized case to the host and treating it as illegal instruction instead of throwing a trace and treating it as a 'nop'.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_asm.h      |  3 +++
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c         | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c | 16 ++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +3 -0
index a790d5cf6ea37..684e8ae00d160 100644
@@ -163,4 +163,7 @@
 
 #define KVM_INST_FETCH_FAILED	-1
 
+/* Extract PO and XOP opcode fields */
+#define PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK 0xfc0007fe
+
 #endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_ASM_H__ */
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c +23 -5
index 31cd0f327c8a2..e7fd60cf97804 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 
 #include <asm/kvm_ppc.h>
@@ -47,7 +49,18 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	u64 newmsr, bescr;
 	int ra, rs;
 
-	switch (instr & 0xfc0007ff) {
+	/*
+	 * rfid, rfebb, and mtmsrd encode bit 31 = 0 since it's a reserved bit
+	 * in these instructions, so masking bit 31 out doesn't change these
+	 * instructions. For treclaim., tsr., and trechkpt. instructions if bit
+	 * 31 = 0 then they are per ISA invalid forms, however P9 UM, in section
+	 * 4.6.10 Book II Invalid Forms, informs specifically that ignoring bit
+	 * 31 is an acceptable way to handle these invalid forms that have
+	 * bit 31 = 0. Moreover, for emulation purposes both forms (w/ and wo/
+	 * bit 31 set) can generate a softpatch interrupt. Hence both forms
+	 * are handled below for these instructions so they behave the same way.
+	 */
+	switch (instr & PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK) {
 	case PPC_INST_RFID:
 		/* XXX do we need to check for PR=0 here? */
 		newmsr = vcpu->arch.shregs.srr1;
@@ -108,7 +121,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = newmsr;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 
-	case PPC_INST_TSR:
+	/* ignore bit 31, see comment above */
+	case (PPC_INST_TSR & PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK):
 		/* check for PR=1 and arch 2.06 bit set in PCR */
 		if ((msr & MSR_PR) && (vcpu->arch.vcore->pcr & PCR_ARCH_206)) {
 			/* generate an illegal instruction interrupt */
@@ -143,7 +157,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = msr;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 
-	case PPC_INST_TRECLAIM:
+	/* ignore bit 31, see comment above */
+	case (PPC_INST_TRECLAIM & PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK):
 		/* check for TM disabled in the HFSCR or MSR */
 		if (!(vcpu->arch.hfscr & HFSCR_TM)) {
 			/* generate an illegal instruction interrupt */
@@ -179,7 +194,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 
-	case PPC_INST_TRECHKPT:
+	/* ignore bit 31, see comment above */
+	case (PPC_INST_TRECHKPT & PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK):
 		/* XXX do we need to check for PR=0 here? */
 		/* check for TM disabled in the HFSCR or MSR */
 		if (!(vcpu->arch.hfscr & HFSCR_TM)) {
@@ -211,6 +227,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 
 	/* What should we do here? We didn't recognize the instruction */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	kvmppc_core_queue_program(vcpu, SRR1_PROGILL);
+	pr_warn_ratelimited("Unrecognized TM-related instruction %#x for emulation", instr);
+
 	return RESUME_GUEST;
 }
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c +14 -2
index 3cf5863bc06e8..3c7ca2fa19597 100644
@@ -26,7 +26,18 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	u64 newmsr, msr, bescr;
 	int rs;
 
-	switch (instr & 0xfc0007ff) {
+	/*
+	 * rfid, rfebb, and mtmsrd encode bit 31 = 0 since it's a reserved bit
+	 * in these instructions, so masking bit 31 out doesn't change these
+	 * instructions. For the tsr. instruction if bit 31 = 0 then it is per
+	 * ISA an invalid form, however P9 UM, in section 4.6.10 Book II Invalid
+	 * Forms, informs specifically that ignoring bit 31 is an acceptable way
+	 * to handle TM-related invalid forms that have bit 31 = 0. Moreover,
+	 * for emulation purposes both forms (w/ and wo/ bit 31 set) can
+	 * generate a softpatch interrupt. Hence both forms are handled below
+	 * for tsr. to make them behave the same way.
+	 */
+	switch (instr & PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK) {
 	case PPC_INST_RFID:
 		/* XXX do we need to check for PR=0 here? */
 		newmsr = vcpu->arch.shregs.srr1;
@@ -76,7 +87,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = newmsr;
 		return 1;
 
-	case PPC_INST_TSR:
+	/* ignore bit 31, see comment above */
+	case (PPC_INST_TSR & PO_XOP_OPCODE_MASK):
 		/* we know the MSR has the TS field = S (0b01) here */
 		msr = vcpu->arch.shregs.msr;
 		/* check for PR=1 and arch 2.06 bit set in PCR */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#116 lore raw

PATCH 115/206 drm/msm: fix leaks if initialization fails

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 66be340f827554cb1c8a1ed7dea97920b4085af2 ]

We should free resources in unlikely case of allocation failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c +4 -2
index 7f45486b6650b..3ba3ae9749bec 100644
@@ -495,8 +495,10 @@ static int msm_drm_init(struct device *dev, struct drm_driver *drv)
 	if (!dev->dma_parms) {
 		dev->dma_parms = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*dev->dma_parms),
 					      GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!dev->dma_parms)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (!dev->dma_parms) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_msm_uninit;
+		}
 	}
 	dma_set_max_seg_size(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#117 lore raw

PATCH 116/206 drm/msm/a5xx: Always set an OPP supported hardware value

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jordan Crouse <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0478b4fc5f37f4d494245fe7bcce3f531cf380e9 ]

If the opp table specifies opp-supported-hw as a property but the driver has not set a supported hardware value the OPP subsystem will reject all the table entries.

Set a "default" value that will match the default table entries but not conflict with any possible real bin values. Also fix a small memory leak and free the buffer allocated by nvmem_cell_read().

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a5xx_gpu.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a5xx_gpu.c +20 -7
index ba6f3c14495c0..dd298abc5f393 100644
@@ -1474,18 +1474,31 @@ static const struct adreno_gpu_funcs funcs = {
 static void check_speed_bin(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct nvmem_cell *cell;
-	u32 bin, val;
+	u32 val;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the OPP table specifies a opp-supported-hw property then we have
+	 * to set something with dev_pm_opp_set_supported_hw() or the table
+	 * doesn't get populated so pick an arbitrary value that should
+	 * ensure the default frequencies are selected but not conflict with any
+	 * actual bins
+	 */
+	val = 0x80;
 
 	cell = nvmem_cell_get(dev, "speed_bin");
 
-	/* If a nvmem cell isn't defined, nothing to do */
-	if (IS_ERR(cell))
-		return;
+	if (!IS_ERR(cell)) {
+		void *buf = nvmem_cell_read(cell, NULL);
+
+		if (!IS_ERR(buf)) {
+			u8 bin = *((u8 *) buf);
 
-	bin = *((u32 *) nvmem_cell_read(cell, NULL));
-	nvmem_cell_put(cell);
+			val = (1 << bin);
+			kfree(buf);
+		}
 
-	val = (1 << bin);
+		nvmem_cell_put(cell);
+	}
 
 	dev_pm_opp_set_supported_hw(dev, &val, 1);
 }
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#118 lore raw

PATCH 117/206 tracing: Use address-of operator on section symbols

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bf2cbe044da275021b2de5917240411a19e5c50d ]

Clang warns:

../kernel/trace/trace.c:9335:33: warning: array comparison always evaluates to true [-Wtautological-compare]

        if (__stop___trace_bprintk_fmt != __start___trace_bprintk_fmt)
                                       ^

1 warning generated.

These are not true arrays, they are linker defined symbols, which are just addresses. Using the address of operator silences the warning and does not change the runtime result of the check (tested with some print statements compiled in with clang + ld.lld and gcc + ld.bfd in QEMU).

---
 kernel/trace/trace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +1 -1
index 17505a22d800b..6bf617ff03694 100644
@@ -8529,7 +8529,7 @@ __init static int tracer_alloc_buffers(void)
 		goto out_free_buffer_mask;
 
 	/* Only allocate trace_printk buffers if a trace_printk exists */
-	if (__stop___trace_bprintk_fmt != __start___trace_bprintk_fmt)
+	if (&__stop___trace_bprintk_fmt != &__start___trace_bprintk_fmt)
 		/* Must be called before global_trace.buffer is allocated */
 		trace_printk_init_buffers();
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#119 lore raw

PATCH 118/206 thermal: rcar_thermal: Handle probe error gracefully

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 39056e8a989ef52486e063e34b4822b341e47b0e ]

If the common register memory resource is not available the driver needs to fail gracefully to disable PM. Instead of returning the error directly store it in ret and use the already existing error path.

---
 drivers/thermal/rcar_thermal.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/thermal/rcar_thermal.c +4 -2
index 4dc30e7890f6c..140386d7c75a3 100644
@@ -505,8 +505,10 @@ static int rcar_thermal_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM,
 						    mres++);
 			common->base = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, res);
-			if (IS_ERR(common->base))
-				return PTR_ERR(common->base);
+			if (IS_ERR(common->base)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(common->base);
+				goto error_unregister;
+			}
 
 			idle = 0; /* polling delay is not needed */
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#120 lore raw

PATCH 119/206 perf parse-events: Fix 3 use after frees found with clang ASAN

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d4953f7ef1a2e87ef732823af35361404d13fea8 ]

Reproducible with a clang asan build and then running perf test in particular 'Parse event definition strings'.

---
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c        | 1 +
 tools/perf/util/parse-events.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +1 -0
index 4fad92213609f..68c5ab0e1800b 100644
@@ -1290,6 +1290,7 @@ void perf_evsel__exit(struct perf_evsel *evsel)
 	thread_map__put(evsel->threads);
 	zfree(&evsel->group_name);
 	zfree(&evsel->name);
+	zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
 	perf_evsel__object.fini(evsel);
 }
 
tools/perf/util/parse-events.c +2 -2
index 95043cae57740..6d087d9acd5ee 100644
@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ int parse_events_add_pmu(struct parse_events_state *parse_state,
 		attr.type = pmu->type;
 		evsel = __add_event(list, &parse_state->idx, &attr, NULL, pmu, NULL, auto_merge_stats);
 		if (evsel) {
-			evsel->pmu_name = name;
+			evsel->pmu_name = name ? strdup(name) : NULL;
 			evsel->use_uncore_alias = use_uncore_alias;
 			return 0;
 		} else {
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ int parse_events_add_pmu(struct parse_events_state *parse_state,
 		evsel->snapshot = info.snapshot;
 		evsel->metric_expr = info.metric_expr;
 		evsel->metric_name = info.metric_name;
-		evsel->pmu_name = name;
+		evsel->pmu_name = name ? strdup(name) : NULL;
 		evsel->use_uncore_alias = use_uncore_alias;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#121 lore raw

PATCH 120/206 serial: 8250_port: Don't service RX FIFO if throttled

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vignesh Raghavendra <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f19c3f6c8109b8bab000afd35580929958e087a9 ]

When port's throttle callback is called, it should stop pushing any more data into TTY buffer to avoid buffer overflow. This means driver has to stop HW from receiving more data and assert the HW flow control. For UARTs with auto HW flow control (such as 8250_omap) manual assertion of flow control line is not possible and only way is to allow RX FIFO to fill up, thus trigger auto HW flow control logic.

Therefore make sure that 8250 generic IRQ handler does not drain data when port is stopped (i.e UART_LSR_DR is unset in read_status_mask). Not servicing, RX FIFO would trigger auto HW flow control when FIFO occupancy reaches preset threshold, thus halting RX.
Since, error conditions in UART_LSR register are cleared just by reading the register, data has to be drained in case there are FIFO errors, else error information will lost.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +15 -1
index 09f0dc3b967b1..60ca19eca1f63 100644
@@ -1861,6 +1861,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir)
 	unsigned char status;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct uart_8250_port *up = up_to_u8250p(port);
+	bool skip_rx = false;
 
 	if (iir & UART_IIR_NO_INT)
 		return 0;
@@ -1869,7 +1870,20 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir)
 
 	status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR);
 
-	if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) {
+	/*
+	 * If port is stopped and there are no error conditions in the
+	 * FIFO, then don't drain the FIFO, as this may lead to TTY buffer
+	 * overflow. Not servicing, RX FIFO would trigger auto HW flow
+	 * control when FIFO occupancy reaches preset threshold, thus
+	 * halting RX. This only works when auto HW flow control is
+	 * available.
+	 */
+	if (!(status & (UART_LSR_FIFOE | UART_LSR_BRK_ERROR_BITS)) &&
+	    (port->status & (UPSTAT_AUTOCTS | UPSTAT_AUTORTS)) &&
+	    !(port->read_status_mask & UART_LSR_DR))
+		skip_rx = true;
+
+	if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) && !skip_rx) {
 		if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir))
 			status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#122 lore raw

PATCH 121/206 serial: 8250_omap: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context during probe

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Peter Ujfalusi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4ce35a3617c0ac758c61122b2218b6c8c9ac9398 ]

When booting j721e the following bug is printed:

[    1.154821] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/sched/completion.c:99
[    1.154827] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 12, name: kworker/0:1
[    1.154832] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/12:
[    1.154836]  #0: ffff000840030728 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d4/0x6e8
[    1.154852]  #1: ffff80001214fdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d4/0x6e8
[    1.154860]  #2: ffff00084060b170 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x138
[    1.154872] irq event stamp: 63096
[    1.154881] hardirqs last  enabled at (63095): [<ffff800010b74318>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x70/0x78
[    1.154887] hardirqs last disabled at (63096): [<ffff800010b740d8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x28/0x80
[    1.154893] softirqs last  enabled at (62254): [<ffff800010080c88>] _stext+0x488/0x564
[    1.154899] softirqs last disabled at (62247): [<ffff8000100fdb3c>] irq_exit+0x114/0x140
[    1.154906] CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6-next-20200318-00094-g45e4089b0bd3 #221
[    1.154911] Hardware name: Texas Instruments K3 J721E SoC (DT)
[    1.154917] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
[    1.154923] Call trace:
[    1.154928]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x190
[    1.154933]  show_stack+0x14/0x20
[    1.154940]  dump_stack+0xe0/0x148
[    1.154946]  ___might_sleep+0x150/0x1f0
[    1.154952]  __might_sleep+0x4c/0x80
[    1.154957]  wait_for_completion_timeout+0x40/0x140
[    1.154964]  ti_sci_set_device_state+0xa0/0x158
[    1.154969]  ti_sci_cmd_get_device_exclusive+0x14/0x20
[    1.154977]  ti_sci_dev_start+0x34/0x50
[    1.154984]  genpd_runtime_resume+0x78/0x1f8
[    1.154991]  __rpm_callback+0x3c/0x140
[    1.154996]  rpm_callback+0x20/0x80
[    1.155001]  rpm_resume+0x568/0x758
[    1.155007]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x44/0xb0
[    1.155013]  omap8250_probe+0x2b4/0x508
[    1.155019]  platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xa0
[    1.155023]  really_probe+0xd4/0x318
[    1.155028]  driver_probe_device+0x54/0xe8
[    1.155033]  __device_attach_driver+0x80/0xb8
[    1.155039]  bus_for_each_drv+0x74/0xc0
[    1.155044]  __device_attach+0xdc/0x138
[    1.155049]  device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18
[    1.155053]  bus_probe_device+0x98/0xa0
[    1.155058]  deferred_probe_work_func+0x74/0xb0
[    1.155063]  process_one_work+0x280/0x6e8
[    1.155068]  worker_thread+0x48/0x430
[    1.155073]  kthread+0x108/0x138
[    1.155079]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

To fix the bug we need to first call pm_runtime_enable() prior to any pm_runtime calls.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c +1 -1
index a019286f8bb65..a7e555e413a69 100644
@@ -1227,11 +1227,11 @@ static int omap8250_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	spin_lock_init(&priv->rx_dma_lock);
 
 	device_init_wakeup(&pdev->dev, true);
+	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(&pdev->dev, -1);
 
 	pm_runtime_irq_safe(&pdev->dev);
-	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 
 	pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#123 lore raw

PATCH 122/206 serial: 8250: 8250_omap: Terminate DMA before pushing data on RX timeout

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vignesh Raghavendra <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7cf4df30a98175033e9849f7f16c46e96ba47f41 ]

Terminate and flush DMA internal buffers, before pushing RX data to higher layer. Otherwise, this will lead to data corruption, as driver would end up pushing stale buffer data to higher layer while actual data is still stuck inside DMA hardware and has yet not arrived at the memory.
While at that, replace deprecated dmaengine_terminate_all() with dmaengine_terminate_async().

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c +4 -2
index a7e555e413a69..cbd006fb7fbb9 100644
@@ -781,7 +781,10 @@ static void __dma_rx_do_complete(struct uart_8250_port *p)
 	dmaengine_tx_status(dma->rxchan, dma->rx_cookie, &state);
 
 	count = dma->rx_size - state.residue;
-
+	if (count < dma->rx_size)
+		dmaengine_terminate_async(dma->rxchan);
+	if (!count)
+		goto unlock;
 	ret = tty_insert_flip_string(tty_port, dma->rx_buf, count);
 
 	p->port.icount.rx += ret;
@@ -843,7 +846,6 @@ static void omap_8250_rx_dma_flush(struct uart_8250_port *p)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->rx_dma_lock, flags);
 
 	__dma_rx_do_complete(p);
-	dmaengine_terminate_all(dma->rxchan);
 }
 
 static int omap_8250_rx_dma(struct uart_8250_port *p)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#124 lore raw

PATCH 123/206 perf cpumap: Fix snprintf overflow check

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d74b181a028bb5a468f0c609553eff6a8fdf4887 ]

'snprintf' returns the number of characters which would be generated for the given input.

If the returned value is *greater than* or equal to the buffer size, it means that the output has been truncated.

Fix the overflow test accordingly.

Fixes 7780c25bae59f ("perf tools: Allow ability to map cpus to nodes easily")
Fixes 92a7e1278005b ("perf cpumap: Add cpu__max_present_cpu()")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Cc He Zhe <[email protected]>
Cc Jan Stancek <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +5 -5
index f93846edc1e0d..827d844f4efb1 100644
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static void set_max_cpu_num(void)
 
 	/* get the highest possible cpu number for a sparse allocation */
 	ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s/devices/system/cpu/possible", mnt);
-	if (ret = PATH_MAX) {
+	if (ret >= PATH_MAX) {
 		pr_err("sysfs path crossed PATH_MAX(%d) size\n", PATH_MAX);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void set_max_cpu_num(void)
 
 	/* get the highest present cpu number for a sparse allocation */
 	ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s/devices/system/cpu/present", mnt);
-	if (ret = PATH_MAX) {
+	if (ret >= PATH_MAX) {
 		pr_err("sysfs path crossed PATH_MAX(%d) size\n", PATH_MAX);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ static void set_max_node_num(void)
 
 	/* get the highest possible cpu number for a sparse allocation */
 	ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s/devices/system/node/possible", mnt);
-	if (ret = PATH_MAX) {
+	if (ret >= PATH_MAX) {
 		pr_err("sysfs path crossed PATH_MAX(%d) size\n", PATH_MAX);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ int cpu__setup_cpunode_map(void)
 		return 0;
 
 	n = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s/devices/system/node", mnt);
-	if (n = PATH_MAX) {
+	if (n >= PATH_MAX) {
 		pr_err("sysfs path crossed PATH_MAX(%d) size\n", PATH_MAX);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ int cpu__setup_cpunode_map(void)
 			continue;
 
 		n = snprintf(buf, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", path, dent1->d_name);
-		if (n = PATH_MAX) {
+		if (n >= PATH_MAX) {
 			pr_err("sysfs path crossed PATH_MAX(%d) size\n", PATH_MAX);
 			continue;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#125 lore raw

PATCH 124/206 cpufreq: powernv: Fix frame-size-overflow in powernv_cpufreq_work_fn

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pratik Rajesh Sampat <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d95fe371ecd28901f11256c610b988ed44e36ee2 ]

The patch avoids allocating cpufreq_policy on stack hence fixing frame size overflow in 'powernv_cpufreq_work_fn'

Fixes 227942809b52 ("cpufreq: powernv: Restore cpu frequency to policy->cur on unthrottling")
---
 drivers/cpufreq/powernv-cpufreq.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/cpufreq/powernv-cpufreq.c +8 -5
index 687c92ef76440..79942f7057576 100644
@@ -903,6 +903,7 @@ static struct notifier_block powernv_cpufreq_reboot_nb = {
 void powernv_cpufreq_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct chip *chip = container_of(work, struct chip, throttle);
+	struct cpufreq_policy *policy;
 	unsigned int cpu;
 	cpumask_t mask;
 
@@ -917,12 +918,14 @@ void powernv_cpufreq_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
 	chip->restore = false;
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, &mask) {
 		int index;
-		struct cpufreq_policy policy;
 
-		cpufreq_get_policy(&policy, cpu);
-		index = cpufreq_table_find_index_c(&policy, policy.cur);
-		powernv_cpufreq_target_index(&policy, index);
-		cpumask_andnot(&mask, &mask, policy.cpus);
+		policy = cpufreq_cpu_get(cpu);
+		if (!policy)
+			continue;
+		index = cpufreq_table_find_index_c(policy, policy->cur);
+		powernv_cpufreq_target_index(policy, index);
+		cpumask_andnot(&mask, &mask, policy->cpus);
+		cpufreq_cpu_put(policy);
 	}
 out:
 	put_online_cpus();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#126 lore raw

PATCH 125/206 tools: gpio-hammer: Avoid potential overflow in main

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Gabriel Ravier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d1ee7e1f5c9191afb69ce46cc7752e4257340a31 ]

If '-o' was used more than 64 times in a single invocation of gpio-hammer, this could lead to an overflow of the 'lines' array. This commit fixes this by avoiding the overflow and giving a proper diagnostic back to the user

---
 tools/gpio/gpio-hammer.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/gpio/gpio-hammer.c +16 -1
index 4bcb234c0fcab..3da5462a0c7d3 100644
@@ -138,7 +138,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			device_name = optarg;
 			break;
 		case 'o':
-			lines[i] = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+			/*
+			 * Avoid overflow. Do not immediately error, we want to
+			 * be able to accurately report on the amount of times
+			 * '-o' was given to give an accurate error message
+			 */
+			if (i < GPIOHANDLES_MAX)
+				lines[i] = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+
 			i++;
 			break;
 		case '?':
@@ -146,6 +153,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
+
+	if (i >= GPIOHANDLES_MAX) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"Only %d occurences of '-o' are allowed, %d were found\n",
+			GPIOHANDLES_MAX, i + 1);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	nlines = i;
 
 	if (!device_name || !nlines) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#127 lore raw

PATCH 126/206 nvme-multipath: do not reset on unknown status

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: John Meneghini <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 764e9332098c0e60251386a507fe46ac91276120 ]

The nvme multipath error handling defaults to controller reset if the error is unknown. There are, however, no existing nvme status codes that indicate a reset should be used, and resetting causes unnecessary disruption to the rest of IO.

Change nvme's error handling to first check if failover should happen. If not, let the normal error handling take over rather than reset the controller.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c      |  5 +----
 drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c | 21 +++++++++------------
 drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h      |  5 +++--
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +1 -4
index 0d60f2f8f3eec..4b182ac15687e 100644
@@ -255,11 +255,8 @@ void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req)
 	trace_nvme_complete_rq(req);
 
 	if (unlikely(status != BLK_STS_OK && nvme_req_needs_retry(req))) {
-		if ((req->cmd_flags & REQ_NVME_MPATH) &&
-		    blk_path_error(status)) {
-			nvme_failover_req(req);
+		if ((req->cmd_flags & REQ_NVME_MPATH) && nvme_failover_req(req))
 			return;
-		}
 
 		if (!blk_queue_dying(req->q)) {
 			nvme_req(req)->retries++;
drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c +9 -12
index 2e63c1106030b..e71075338ff5c 100644
@@ -73,17 +73,12 @@ void nvme_set_disk_name(char *disk_name, struct nvme_ns *ns,
 	}
 }
 
-void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req)
+bool nvme_failover_req(struct request *req)
 {
 	struct nvme_ns *ns = req->q->queuedata;
 	u16 status = nvme_req(req)->status;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&ns->head->requeue_lock, flags);
-	blk_steal_bios(&ns->head->requeue_list, req);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ns->head->requeue_lock, flags);
-	blk_mq_end_request(req, 0);
-
 	switch (status & 0x7ff) {
 	case NVME_SC_ANA_TRANSITION:
 	case NVME_SC_ANA_INACCESSIBLE:
@@ -111,15 +106,17 @@ void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req)
 		nvme_mpath_clear_current_path(ns);
 		break;
 	default:
-		/*
-		 * Reset the controller for any non-ANA error as we don't know
-		 * what caused the error.
-		 */
-		nvme_reset_ctrl(ns->ctrl);
-		break;
+		/* This was a non-ANA error so follow the normal error path. */
+		return false;
 	}
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&ns->head->requeue_lock, flags);
+	blk_steal_bios(&ns->head->requeue_list, req);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ns->head->requeue_lock, flags);
+	blk_mq_end_request(req, 0);
+
 	kblockd_schedule_work(&ns->head->requeue_work);
+	return true;
 }
 
 void nvme_kick_requeue_lists(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +3 -2
index cc4273f119894..31c1496f938fb 100644
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ void nvme_mpath_wait_freeze(struct nvme_subsystem *subsys);
 void nvme_mpath_start_freeze(struct nvme_subsystem *subsys);
 void nvme_set_disk_name(char *disk_name, struct nvme_ns *ns,
 			struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int *flags);
-void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req);
+bool nvme_failover_req(struct request *req);
 void nvme_kick_requeue_lists(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
 int nvme_mpath_alloc_disk(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,struct nvme_ns_head *head);
 void nvme_mpath_add_disk(struct nvme_ns *ns, struct nvme_id_ns *id);
@@ -521,8 +521,9 @@ static inline void nvme_set_disk_name(char *disk_name, struct nvme_ns *ns,
 	sprintf(disk_name, "nvme%dn%d", ctrl->instance, ns->head->instance);
 }
 
-static inline void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req)
+static inline bool nvme_failover_req(struct request *req)
 {
+	return false;
 }
 static inline void nvme_kick_requeue_lists(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#128 lore raw

PATCH 127/206 nvme: Fix controller creation races with teardown flow

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Israel Rukshin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce1518139e6976cf19c133b555083354fdb629b8 ]

Calling nvme_sysfs_delete() when the controller is in the middle of creation may cause several bugs. If the controller is in NEW state we remove delete_controller file and don't delete the controller. The user will not be able to use nvme disconnect command on that controller again, although the controller may be active. Other bugs may happen if the controller is in the middle of create_ctrl callback and nvme_do_delete_ctrl() starts. For example, freeing I/O tagset at nvme_do_delete_ctrl() before it was allocated at create_ctrl callback.

To fix all those races don't allow the user to delete the controller before it was fully created.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 5 +++++
 drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +5 -0
index 4b182ac15687e..faa7feebb6095 100644
@@ -2856,6 +2856,10 @@ static ssize_t nvme_sysfs_delete(struct device *dev,
 {
 	struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 
+	/* Can't delete non-created controllers */
+	if (!ctrl->created)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
 	if (device_remove_file_self(dev, attr))
 		nvme_delete_ctrl_sync(ctrl);
 	return count;
@@ -3576,6 +3580,7 @@ void nvme_start_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
 		queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work);
 		nvme_start_queues(ctrl);
 	}
+	ctrl->created = true;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_start_ctrl);
 
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +1 -0
index 31c1496f938fb..a70b997060e68 100644
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ struct nvme_ctrl {
 	struct nvme_command ka_cmd;
 	struct work_struct fw_act_work;
 	unsigned long events;
+	bool created;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH
 	/* asymmetric namespace access: */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#129 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 127/206] nvme: Fix controller creation races with teardown flow

This causes a regression and was reverted upstream, just FYI.

Quoted 62 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Israel Rukshin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce1518139e6976cf19c133b555083354fdb629b8 ]

Calling nvme_sysfs_delete() when the controller is in the middle of creation may cause several bugs. If the controller is in NEW state we remove delete_controller file and don't delete the controller. The user will not be able to use nvme disconnect command on that controller again, although the controller may be active. Other bugs may happen if the controller is in the middle of create_ctrl callback and nvme_do_delete_ctrl() starts. For example, freeing I/O tagset at nvme_do_delete_ctrl() before it was allocated at create_ctrl callback.

To fix all those races don't allow the user to delete the controller before it was fully created.

---
  drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 5 +++++
  drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 1 +
  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +5 -0
index 4b182ac15687e..faa7feebb6095 100644
@@ -2856,6 +2856,10 @@ static ssize_t nvme_sysfs_delete(struct device *dev,
  {
  	struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 
+	/* Can't delete non-created controllers */
+	if (!ctrl->created)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
  	if (device_remove_file_self(dev, attr))
  		nvme_delete_ctrl_sync(ctrl);
  	return count;
@@ -3576,6 +3580,7 @@ void nvme_start_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
  		queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work);
  		nvme_start_queues(ctrl);
  	}
+	ctrl->created = true;
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_start_ctrl);
 
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +1 -0
index 31c1496f938fb..a70b997060e68 100644
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ struct nvme_ctrl {
  	struct nvme_command ka_cmd;
  	struct work_struct fw_act_work;
  	unsigned long events;
+	bool created;
 
  #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH
  	/* asymmetric namespace access: */
author maintainer
#130 lore raw

PATCH 128/206 RDMA/rxe: Set sys_image_guid to be aligned with HW IB devices

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d0ca2c35dd15a3d989955caec02beea02f735ee6 ]

The RXE driver doesn't set sys_image_guid and user space applications see zeros. This causes to pyverbs tests to fail with the following traceback, because the IBTA spec requires to have valid sys_image_guid.

Traceback (most recent call last):
File "./tests/test_device.py", line 51, in test_query_device
self.verify_device_attr(attr)
File "./tests/test_device.py", line 74, in verify_device_attr

     assert attr.sys_image_guid != 0

In order to fix it, set sys_image_guid to be equal to node_guid.

Before:
5: rxe0: ... node_guid 5054:00ff:feaa:5363 sys_image_guid 0000:0000:0000:0000

After:
5: rxe0: ... node_guid 5054:00ff:feaa:5363 sys_image_guid 5054:00ff:feaa:5363

---
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe.c +2 -0
index 10999fa692818..157d08f167345 100644
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ static void rxe_init_device_param(struct rxe_dev *rxe)
 	rxe->attr.max_fast_reg_page_list_len	= RXE_MAX_FMR_PAGE_LIST_LEN;
 	rxe->attr.max_pkeys			= RXE_MAX_PKEYS;
 	rxe->attr.local_ca_ack_delay		= RXE_LOCAL_CA_ACK_DELAY;
+	addrconf_addr_eui48((unsigned char *)&rxe->attr.sys_image_guid,
+			rxe->ndev->dev_addr);
 
 	rxe->max_ucontext			= RXE_MAX_UCONTEXT;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#131 lore raw

PATCH 129/206 scsi: hpsa: correct race condition in offload enabled

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Don Brace <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3e16e83a62edac7617bfd8dbb4e55d04ff6adbe1 ]

Correct race condition where ioaccel is re-enabled before the raid_map is updated. For RAID_1, RAID_1ADM, and RAID 5/6 there is a BUG_ON called which is bad.

- Change event thread to disable ioaccel only. Send all requests down the RAID path instead.

- Have rescan thread handle offload_enable.

- Since there is only one rescan allowed at a time, turning offload_enabled on/off should not be racy. Each handler queues up a rescan if one is already in progress.

- For timing diagram, offload_enabled is initially off due to a change (transformation: splitmirror/remirror), ...

otbe = offload_to_be_enabled
oe = offload_enabled

  Time Event         Rescan              Completion     Request
       Worker        Worker              Thread         Thread
  ---- ------        ------              ----------     -------
   T0   |             |                       + UA      |
   T1   |             + rescan started        | 0x3f    |
   T2   + Event       |                       | 0x0e    |
   T3   + Ack msg     |                       |         |
   T4   |             + if (!dev[i]->oe &&    |         |
   T5   |             |     dev[i]->otbe)     |         |
   T6   |             |      get_raid_map     |         |
   T7   + otbe = 1    |                       |         |
   T8   |             |                       |         |
   T9   |             + oe = otbe             |         |
   T10  |             |                       |         + ioaccel request
   T11                                                  * BUG_ON

T0 - I/O completion with UA 0x3f 0x0e sets rescan flag. T1 - rescan worker thread starts a rescan.
T2 - event comes in
T3 - event thread starts and issues "Acknowledge" message
...
T6 - rescan thread has bypassed code to reload new raid map.
...
T7 - event thread runs and sets offload_to_be_enabled
...
T9 - rescan thread turns on offload_enabled.
T10- request comes in and goes down ioaccel path. T11- BUG_ON.

- After the patch is applied, ioaccel_enabled can only be re-enabled in the re-scan thread.

---
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/hpsa.c +57 -23
index f570b8c5d857c..11de2198bb87d 100644
@@ -507,6 +507,12 @@ static ssize_t host_store_rescan(struct device *dev,
 	return count;
 }
 
+static void hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(struct hpsa_scsi_dev_t *device)
+{
+	device->offload_enabled = 0;
+	device->offload_to_be_enabled = 0;
+}
+
 static ssize_t host_show_firmware_revision(struct device *dev,
 	     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
@@ -1743,8 +1749,7 @@ static void hpsa_figure_phys_disk_ptrs(struct ctlr_info *h,
 				__func__,
 				h->scsi_host->host_no, logical_drive->bus,
 				logical_drive->target, logical_drive->lun);
-			logical_drive->offload_enabled = 0;
-			logical_drive->offload_to_be_enabled = 0;
+			hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(logical_drive);
 			logical_drive->queue_depth = 8;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2496,8 +2501,7 @@ static void process_ioaccel2_completion(struct ctlr_info *h,
 			IOACCEL2_SERV_RESPONSE_FAILURE) {
 		if (c2->error_data.status ==
 			IOACCEL2_STATUS_SR_IOACCEL_DISABLED) {
-			dev->offload_enabled = 0;
-			dev->offload_to_be_enabled = 0;
+			hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(dev);
 		}
 
 		return hpsa_retry_cmd(h, c);
@@ -3676,10 +3680,17 @@ static void hpsa_get_ioaccel_status(struct ctlr_info *h,
 	this_device->offload_config =
 		!!(ioaccel_status & OFFLOAD_CONFIGURED_BIT);
 	if (this_device->offload_config) {
-		this_device->offload_to_be_enabled =
+		bool offload_enabled =
 			!!(ioaccel_status & OFFLOAD_ENABLED_BIT);
-		if (hpsa_get_raid_map(h, scsi3addr, this_device))
-			this_device->offload_to_be_enabled = 0;
+		/*
+		 * Check to see if offload can be enabled.
+		 */
+		if (offload_enabled) {
+			rc = hpsa_get_raid_map(h, scsi3addr, this_device);
+			if (rc) /* could not load raid_map */
+				goto out;
+			this_device->offload_to_be_enabled = 1;
+		}
 	}
 
 out:
@@ -3998,8 +4009,7 @@ static int hpsa_update_device_info(struct ctlr_info *h,
 	} else {
 		this_device->raid_level = RAID_UNKNOWN;
 		this_device->offload_config = 0;
-		this_device->offload_enabled = 0;
-		this_device->offload_to_be_enabled = 0;
+		hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(this_device);
 		this_device->hba_ioaccel_enabled = 0;
 		this_device->volume_offline = 0;
 		this_device->queue_depth = h->nr_cmds;
@@ -5213,8 +5223,12 @@ static int hpsa_scsi_ioaccel_raid_map(struct ctlr_info *h,
 		/* Handles load balance across RAID 1 members.
 		 * (2-drive R1 and R10 with even # of drives.)
 		 * Appropriate for SSDs, not optimal for HDDs
+		 * Ensure we have the correct raid_map.
 		 */
-		BUG_ON(le16_to_cpu(map->layout_map_count) != 2);
+		if (le16_to_cpu(map->layout_map_count) != 2) {
+			hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(dev);
+			return IO_ACCEL_INELIGIBLE;
+		}
 		if (dev->offload_to_mirror)
 			map_index += le16_to_cpu(map->data_disks_per_row);
 		dev->offload_to_mirror = !dev->offload_to_mirror;
@@ -5222,8 +5236,12 @@ static int hpsa_scsi_ioaccel_raid_map(struct ctlr_info *h,
 	case HPSA_RAID_ADM:
 		/* Handles N-way mirrors  (R1-ADM)
 		 * and R10 with # of drives divisible by 3.)
+		 * Ensure we have the correct raid_map.
 		 */
-		BUG_ON(le16_to_cpu(map->layout_map_count) != 3);
+		if (le16_to_cpu(map->layout_map_count) != 3) {
+			hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(dev);
+			return IO_ACCEL_INELIGIBLE;
+		}
 
 		offload_to_mirror = dev->offload_to_mirror;
 		raid_map_helper(map, offload_to_mirror,
@@ -5248,7 +5266,10 @@ static int hpsa_scsi_ioaccel_raid_map(struct ctlr_info *h,
 		r5or6_blocks_per_row =
 			le16_to_cpu(map->strip_size) *
 			le16_to_cpu(map->data_disks_per_row);
-		BUG_ON(r5or6_blocks_per_row == 0);
+		if (r5or6_blocks_per_row == 0) {
+			hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(dev);
+			return IO_ACCEL_INELIGIBLE;
+		}
 		stripesize = r5or6_blocks_per_row *
 			le16_to_cpu(map->layout_map_count);
 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
@@ -8218,7 +8239,7 @@ static int detect_controller_lockup(struct ctlr_info *h)
  *
  * Called from monitor controller worker (hpsa_event_monitor_worker)
  *
- * A Volume (or Volumes that comprise an Array set may be undergoing a
+ * A Volume (or Volumes that comprise an Array set) may be undergoing a
  * transformation, so we will be turning off ioaccel for all volumes that
  * make up the Array.
  */
@@ -8241,6 +8262,9 @@ static void hpsa_set_ioaccel_status(struct ctlr_info *h)
 	 * Run through current device list used during I/O requests.
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < h->ndevices; i++) {
+		int offload_to_be_enabled = 0;
+		int offload_config = 0;
+
 		device = h->dev[i];
 
 		if (!device)
@@ -8258,25 +8282,35 @@ static void hpsa_set_ioaccel_status(struct ctlr_info *h)
 			continue;
 
 		ioaccel_status = buf[IOACCEL_STATUS_BYTE];
-		device->offload_config =
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if offload is still configured on
+		 */
+		offload_config =
 				!!(ioaccel_status & OFFLOAD_CONFIGURED_BIT);
-		if (device->offload_config)
-			device->offload_to_be_enabled =
+		/*
+		 * If offload is configured on, check to see if ioaccel
+		 * needs to be enabled.
+		 */
+		if (offload_config)
+			offload_to_be_enabled =
 				!!(ioaccel_status & OFFLOAD_ENABLED_BIT);
 
+		/*
+		 * If ioaccel is to be re-enabled, re-enable later during the
+		 * scan operation so the driver can get a fresh raidmap
+		 * before turning ioaccel back on.
+		 */
+		if (offload_to_be_enabled)
+			continue;
+
 		/*
 		 * Immediately turn off ioaccel for any volume the
 		 * controller tells us to. Some of the reasons could be:
 		 *    transformation - change to the LVs of an Array.
 		 *    degraded volume - component failure
-		 *
-		 * If ioaccel is to be re-enabled, re-enable later during the
-		 * scan operation so the driver can get a fresh raidmap
-		 * before turning ioaccel back on.
-		 *
 		 */
-		if (!device->offload_to_be_enabled)
-			device->offload_enabled = 0;
+		hpsa_turn_off_ioaccel_for_device(device);
 	}
 
 	kfree(buf);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#132 lore raw

PATCH 130/206 SUNRPC: Fix a potential buffer overflow in 'svc_print_xprts()'

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b25b60d7bfb02a74bc3c2d998e09aab159df8059 ]

'maxlen' is the total size of the destination buffer. There is only one caller and this value is 256.

When we compute the size already used and what we would like to add in the buffer, the trailling NULL character is not taken into account. However, this trailling character will be added by the 'strcat' once we have checked that we have enough place.

So, there is a off-by-one issue and 1 byte of the stack could be erroneously overwridden.

Take into account the trailling NULL, when checking if there is enough place in the destination buffer.

While at it, also replace a 'sprintf' by a safer 'snprintf', check for output truncation and avoid a superfluous 'strlen'.

Fixes dc9a16e49dbba ("svc: Add /proc/sys/sunrpc/transport files")

[ cel: very minor fix to documenting comment

---
 net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +14 -5
index c8ee8e801edb8..709c082dc9059 100644
@@ -103,8 +103,17 @@ void svc_unreg_xprt_class(struct svc_xprt_class *xcl)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_unreg_xprt_class);
 
-/*
- * Format the transport list for printing
+/**
+ * svc_print_xprts - Format the transport list for printing
+ * @buf: target buffer for formatted address
+ * @maxlen: length of target buffer
+ *
+ * Fills in @buf with a string containing a list of transport names, each name
+ * terminated with '\n'. If the buffer is too small, some entries may be
+ * missing, but it is guaranteed that all lines in the output buffer are
+ * complete.
+ *
+ * Returns positive length of the filled-in string.
  */
 int svc_print_xprts(char *buf, int maxlen)
 {
@@ -117,9 +126,9 @@ int svc_print_xprts(char *buf, int maxlen)
 	list_for_each_entry(xcl, &svc_xprt_class_list, xcl_list) {
 		int slen;
 
-		sprintf(tmpstr, "%s %d\n", xcl->xcl_name, xcl->xcl_max_payload);
-		slen = strlen(tmpstr);
-		if (len + slen > maxlen)
+		slen = snprintf(tmpstr, sizeof(tmpstr), "%s %d\n",
+				xcl->xcl_name, xcl->xcl_max_payload);
+		if (slen >= sizeof(tmpstr) || len + slen >= maxlen)
 			break;
 		len += slen;
 		strcat(buf, tmpstr);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#133 lore raw

PATCH 131/206 svcrdma: Fix leak of transport addresses

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1a33d8a284b1e85e03b8c7b1ea8fb985fccd1d71 ]

Kernel memory leak detected:

unreferenced object 0xffff888849cdf480 (size 8):
comm "kworker/u8:3", pid 2086, jiffies 4297898756 (age 4269.856s) hex dump (first 8 bytes):

    30 00 cd 49 88 88 ff ff                          0..I....
  backtrace:
    [<00000000acfc370b>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x137/0x183
    [<00000000a2724354>] kstrdup+0x2b/0x43
    [<0000000082964f84>] xprt_rdma_format_addresses+0x114/0x17d [rpcrdma]
    [<00000000dfa6ed00>] xprt_setup_rdma_bc+0xc0/0x10c [rpcrdma]
    [<0000000073051a83>] xprt_create_transport+0x3f/0x1a0 [sunrpc]
    [<0000000053531a8e>] rpc_create+0x118/0x1cd [sunrpc]
    [<000000003a51b5f8>] setup_callback_client+0x1a5/0x27d [nfsd]
    [<000000001bd410af>] nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.7+0x16c/0x1ac [nfsd]
    [<000000007f4bbd56>] nfsd4_run_cb_work+0x4c/0xbd [nfsd]
    [<0000000055c5586b>] process_one_work+0x1b2/0x2fe
    [<00000000b1e3e8ef>] worker_thread+0x1a6/0x25a
    [<000000005205fb78>] kthread+0xf6/0xfb
    [<000000006d2dc057>] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Introduce a call to xprt_rdma_free_addresses() similar to the way that the TCP backchannel releases a transport's peer address strings.

Fixes 5d252f90a800 ("svcrdma: Add class for RDMA backwards direction transport")
---
 net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_backchannel.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_backchannel.c +1 -0
index b9827665ff355..d183d4aee822c 100644
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ xprt_rdma_bc_put(struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
 {
 	dprintk("svcrdma: %s: xprt %p\n", __func__, xprt);
 
+	xprt_rdma_free_addresses(xprt);
 	xprt_free(xprt);
 	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#134 lore raw

PATCH 132/206 PCI: Use ioremap(), not phys_to_virt() for platform ROM

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mikel Rychliski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 72e0ef0e5f067fd991f702f0b2635d911d0cf208 ]

On some EFI systems, the video BIOS is provided by the EFI firmware. The boot stub code stores the physical address of the ROM image in pdev->rom. Currently we attempt to access this pointer using phys_to_virt(), which doesn't work with CONFIG_HIGHMEM.

On these systems, attempting to load the radeon module on a x86_32 kernel can result in the following:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 3e8ed03c
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  *pde = 00000000
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  CPU: 0 PID: 317 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-next-20200228 #2
  Hardware name: Apple Computer, Inc. MacPro1,1/Mac-F4208DC8, BIOS     MP11.88Z.005C.B08.0707021221 07/02/07
  EIP: radeon_get_bios+0x5ed/0xe50 [radeon]
  Code: 00 00 84 c0 0f 85 12 fd ff ff c7 87 64 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b 47 08 8b 55 b0 e8 1e 83 e1 d6 85 c0 74 1a 8b 55 c0 85 d2 74 13 <80> 38 55 75 0e 80 78 01 aa 0f 84 a4 03 00 00 8d 74 26 00 68 dc 06
  EAX: 3e8ed03c EBX: 00000000 ECX: 3e8ed03c EDX: 00010000
  ESI: 00040000 EDI: eec04000 EBP: eef3fc60 ESP: eef3fbe0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010206
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: 3e8ed03c CR3: 2ec77000 CR4: 000006d0
  Call Trace:
   r520_init+0x26/0x240 [radeon]
   radeon_device_init+0x533/0xa50 [radeon]
   radeon_driver_load_kms+0x80/0x220 [radeon]
   drm_dev_register+0xa7/0x180 [drm]
   radeon_pci_probe+0x10f/0x1a0 [radeon]
   pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x140

Fix the issue by updating all drivers which can access a platform provided ROM. Instead of calling the helper function pci_platform_rom() which uses phys_to_virt(), call ioremap() directly on the pdev->rom.

radeon_read_platform_bios() previously directly accessed an __iomem pointer. Avoid this by calling memcpy_fromio() instead of kmemdup().

pci_platform_rom() now has no remaining callers, so remove it.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bios.c      | 31 +++++++++++--------
 .../drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowpci.c  | 17 ++++++++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_bios.c          | 30 +++++++++++-------
 drivers/pci/rom.c                             | 17 ----------
 include/linux/pci.h                           |  1 -
 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bios.c +18 -13
index a5df80d50d447..6cf3dd5edffda 100644
@@ -191,30 +191,35 @@ static bool amdgpu_read_bios_from_rom(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 
 static bool amdgpu_read_platform_bios(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 {
-	uint8_t __iomem *bios;
-	size_t size;
+	phys_addr_t rom = adev->pdev->rom;
+	size_t romlen = adev->pdev->romlen;
+	void __iomem *bios;
 
 	adev->bios = NULL;
 
-	bios = pci_platform_rom(adev->pdev, &size);
-	if (!bios) {
+	if (!rom || romlen == 0)
 		return false;
-	}
 
-	adev->bios = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (adev->bios == NULL)
+	adev->bios = kzalloc(romlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!adev->bios)
 		return false;
 
-	memcpy_fromio(adev->bios, bios, size);
+	bios = ioremap(rom, romlen);
+	if (!bios)
+		goto free_bios;
 
-	if (!check_atom_bios(adev->bios, size)) {
-		kfree(adev->bios);
-		return false;
-	}
+	memcpy_fromio(adev->bios, bios, romlen);
+	iounmap(bios);
 
-	adev->bios_size = size;
+	if (!check_atom_bios(adev->bios, romlen))
+		goto free_bios;
+
+	adev->bios_size = romlen;
 
 	return true;
+free_bios:
+	kfree(adev->bios);
+	return false;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowpci.c +15 -2
index 9b91da09dc5f8..8d9812a51ef63 100644
@@ -101,9 +101,13 @@ platform_init(struct nvkm_bios *bios, const char *name)
 	else
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
 
+	if (!pdev->rom || pdev->romlen == 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+
 	if ((priv = kmalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL))) {
+		priv->size = pdev->romlen;
 		if (ret = -ENODEV,
-		    (priv->rom = pci_platform_rom(pdev, &priv->size)))
+		    (priv->rom = ioremap(pdev->rom, pdev->romlen)))
 			return priv;
 		kfree(priv);
 	}
@@ -111,11 +115,20 @@ platform_init(struct nvkm_bios *bios, const char *name)
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
+static void
+platform_fini(void *data)
+{
+	struct priv *priv = data;
+
+	iounmap(priv->rom);
+	kfree(priv);
+}
+
 const struct nvbios_source
 nvbios_platform = {
 	.name = "PLATFORM",
 	.init = platform_init,
-	.fini = (void(*)(void *))kfree,
+	.fini = platform_fini,
 	.read = pcirom_read,
 	.rw = true,
 };
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_bios.c +19 -11
index 04c0ed41374f1..dd0528cf98183 100644
@@ -104,25 +104,33 @@ static bool radeon_read_bios(struct radeon_device *rdev)
 
 static bool radeon_read_platform_bios(struct radeon_device *rdev)
 {
-	uint8_t __iomem *bios;
-	size_t size;
+	phys_addr_t rom = rdev->pdev->rom;
+	size_t romlen = rdev->pdev->romlen;
+	void __iomem *bios;
 
 	rdev->bios = NULL;
 
-	bios = pci_platform_rom(rdev->pdev, &size);
-	if (!bios) {
+	if (!rom || romlen == 0)
 		return false;
-	}
 
-	if (size == 0 || bios[0] != 0x55 || bios[1] != 0xaa) {
+	rdev->bios = kzalloc(romlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rdev->bios)
 		return false;
-	}
-	rdev->bios = kmemdup(bios, size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (rdev->bios == NULL) {
-		return false;
-	}
+
+	bios = ioremap(rom, romlen);
+	if (!bios)
+		goto free_bios;
+
+	memcpy_fromio(rdev->bios, bios, romlen);
+	iounmap(bios);
+
+	if (rdev->bios[0] != 0x55 || rdev->bios[1] != 0xaa)
+		goto free_bios;
 
 	return true;
+free_bios:
+	kfree(rdev->bios);
+	return false;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
drivers/pci/rom.c +0 -17
index 137bf0cee897c..8fc9a4e911e3a 100644
@@ -195,20 +195,3 @@ void pci_unmap_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev, void __iomem *rom)
 		pci_disable_rom(pdev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_unmap_rom);
-
-/**
- * pci_platform_rom - provides a pointer to any ROM image provided by the
- * platform
- * @pdev: pointer to pci device struct
- * @size: pointer to receive size of pci window over ROM
- */
-void __iomem *pci_platform_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev, size_t *size)
-{
-	if (pdev->rom && pdev->romlen) {
-		*size = pdev->romlen;
-		return phys_to_virt((phys_addr_t)pdev->rom);
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_platform_rom);
include/linux/pci.h +0 -1
index 2517492dd1855..2fda9893962d1 100644
@@ -1144,7 +1144,6 @@ int pci_enable_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev);
 void pci_disable_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev);
 void __iomem __must_check *pci_map_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev, size_t *size);
 void pci_unmap_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev, void __iomem *rom);
-void __iomem __must_check *pci_platform_rom(struct pci_dev *pdev, size_t *size);
 
 /* Power management related routines */
 int pci_save_state(struct pci_dev *dev);
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#135 lore raw

PATCH 133/206 ubifs: Fix out-of-bounds memory access caused by abnormal value of node_len

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit acc5af3efa303d5f36cc8c0f61716161f6ca1384 ]

In “ubifs_check_node”, when the value of "node_len" is abnormal, the code will goto label of "out_len" for execution. Then, in the following "ubifs_dump_node", if inode type is "UBIFS_DATA_NODE", in "print_hex_dump", an out-of-bounds access may occur due to the wrong "ch->len".

Therefore, when the value of "node_len" is abnormal, data length should to be adjusted to a reasonable safe range. At this time, structured data is not credible, so dump the corrupted data directly for analysis.

---
 fs/ubifs/io.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ubifs/io.c +14 -2
index 099bec94b8207..fab29f899f913 100644
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ int ubifs_is_mapped(const struct ubifs_info *c, int lnum)
 int ubifs_check_node(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *buf, int lnum,
 		     int offs, int quiet, int must_chk_crc)
 {
-	int err = -EINVAL, type, node_len;
+	int err = -EINVAL, type, node_len, dump_node = 1;
 	uint32_t crc, node_crc, magic;
 	const struct ubifs_ch *ch = buf;
 
@@ -290,10 +290,22 @@ int ubifs_check_node(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *buf, int lnum,
 out_len:
 	if (!quiet)
 		ubifs_err(c, "bad node length %d", node_len);
+	if (type == UBIFS_DATA_NODE && node_len > UBIFS_DATA_NODE_SZ)
+		dump_node = 0;
 out:
 	if (!quiet) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "bad node at LEB %d:%d", lnum, offs);
-		ubifs_dump_node(c, buf);
+		if (dump_node) {
+			ubifs_dump_node(c, buf);
+		} else {
+			int safe_len = min3(node_len, c->leb_size - offs,
+				(int)UBIFS_MAX_DATA_NODE_SZ);
+			pr_err("\tprevent out-of-bounds memory access\n");
+			pr_err("\ttruncated data node length      %d\n", safe_len);
+			pr_err("\tcorrupted data node:\n");
+			print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "\t", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 32, 1,
+					buf, safe_len, 0);
+		}
 		dump_stack();
 	}
 	return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#136 lore raw

PATCH 134/206 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix case when USB MIDI interface has more than one extra endpoint descriptor

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c6cd7021a05a02fcf37f360592d7c18d4d807fb ]

The Miditech MIDIFACE 16x16 (USB ID 1290:1749) has more than one extra endpoint descriptor.

The first extra descriptor is: 0x06 0x30 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00

As the code in snd_usbmidi_get_ms_info() looks only at the first extra descriptor to find USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT the device as such is recognized but there is neither input nor output configured.

The patch iterates through the extra descriptors to find the proper one. With this patch the device is correctly configured.

---
 sound/usb/midi.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/usb/midi.c +24 -5
index 28a3ad8b1d74b..137e1e8718d6f 100644
@@ -1828,6 +1828,28 @@ static int snd_usbmidi_create_endpoints(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *find_usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor(
+					struct usb_host_endpoint *hostep)
+{
+	unsigned char *extra = hostep->extra;
+	int extralen = hostep->extralen;
+
+	while (extralen > 3) {
+		struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *ms_ep =
+				(struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *)extra;
+
+		if (ms_ep->bLength > 3 &&
+		    ms_ep->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT &&
+		    ms_ep->bDescriptorSubtype == UAC_MS_GENERAL)
+			return ms_ep;
+		if (!extra[0])
+			break;
+		extralen -= extra[0];
+		extra += extra[0];
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Returns MIDIStreaming device capabilities.
  */
@@ -1865,11 +1887,8 @@ static int snd_usbmidi_get_ms_info(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
 		ep = get_ep_desc(hostep);
 		if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(ep) && !usb_endpoint_xfer_int(ep))
 			continue;
-		ms_ep = (struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *)hostep->extra;
-		if (hostep->extralen < 4 ||
-		    ms_ep->bLength < 4 ||
-		    ms_ep->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT ||
-		    ms_ep->bDescriptorSubtype != UAC_MS_GENERAL)
+		ms_ep = find_usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor(hostep);
+		if (!ms_ep)
 			continue;
 		if (usb_endpoint_dir_out(ep)) {
 			if (endpoints[epidx].out_ep) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#137 lore raw

PATCH 135/206 PCI: pciehp: Fix MSI interrupt race

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Stuart Hayes <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8edf5332c39340b9583cf9cba659eb7ec71f75b5 ]

Without this commit, a PCIe hotplug port can stop generating interrupts on hotplug events, so device adds and removals will not be seen:

The pciehp interrupt handler pciehp_isr() reads the Slot Status register and then writes back to it to clear the bits that caused the interrupt. If a different interrupt event bit gets set between the read and the write, pciehp_isr() returns without having cleared all of the interrupt event bits. If this happens when the MSI isn't masked (which by default it isn't in handle_edge_irq(), and which it will never be when MSI per-vector masking is not supported), we won't get any more hotplug interrupts from that device.

That is expected behavior, according to the PCIe Base Spec r5.0, section 6.7.3.4, "Software Notification of Hot-Plug Events".

Because the Presence Detect Changed and Data Link Layer State Changed event bits can both get set at nearly the same time when a device is added or removed, this is more likely to happen than it might seem. The issue was found (and can be reproduced rather easily) by connecting and disconnecting an NVMe storage device on at least one system model where the NVMe devices were being connected to an AMD PCIe port (PCI device 0x1022/0x1483).

Fix the issue by modifying pciehp_isr() to loop back and re-read the Slot Status register immediately after writing to it, until it sees that all of the event status bits have been cleared.

[lukas: drop loop count limitation, write "events" instead of "status", don't loop back in INTx and poll modes, tweak code comment & commit msg]

---
 drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c +20 -6
index 07940d1d83b70..005817e40ad39 100644
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static irqreturn_t pciehp_isr(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	struct controller *ctrl = (struct controller *)dev_id;
 	struct pci_dev *pdev = ctrl_dev(ctrl);
 	struct device *parent = pdev->dev.parent;
-	u16 status, events;
+	u16 status, events = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Interrupts only occur in D3hot or shallower (PCIe r4.0, sec 6.7.3.4).
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ static irqreturn_t pciehp_isr(int irq, void *dev_id)
 		}
 	}
 
+read_status:
 	pcie_capability_read_word(pdev, PCI_EXP_SLTSTA, &status);
 	if (status == (u16) ~0) {
 		ctrl_info(ctrl, "%s: no response from device\n", __func__);
@@ -565,24 +566,37 @@ static irqreturn_t pciehp_isr(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	 * Slot Status contains plain status bits as well as event
 	 * notification bits; right now we only want the event bits.
 	 */
-	events = status & (PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_ABP | PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_PFD |
-			   PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_PDC | PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_CC |
-			   PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_DLLSC);
+	status &= PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_ABP | PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_PFD |
+		  PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_PDC | PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_CC |
+		  PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_DLLSC;
 
 	/*
 	 * If we've already reported a power fault, don't report it again
 	 * until we've done something to handle it.
 	 */
 	if (ctrl->power_fault_detected)
-		events &= ~PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_PFD;
+		status &= ~PCI_EXP_SLTSTA_PFD;
 
+	events |= status;
 	if (!events) {
 		if (parent)
 			pm_runtime_put(parent);
 		return IRQ_NONE;
 	}
 
-	pcie_capability_write_word(pdev, PCI_EXP_SLTSTA, events);
+	if (status) {
+		pcie_capability_write_word(pdev, PCI_EXP_SLTSTA, events);
+
+		/*
+		 * In MSI mode, all event bits must be zero before the port
+		 * will send a new interrupt (PCIe Base Spec r5.0 sec 6.7.3.4).
+		 * So re-read the Slot Status register in case a bit was set
+		 * between read and write.
+		 */
+		if (pci_dev_msi_enabled(pdev) && !pciehp_poll_mode)
+			goto read_status;
+	}
+
 	ctrl_dbg(ctrl, "pending interrupts %#06x from Slot Status\n", events);
 	if (parent)
 		pm_runtime_put(parent);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#138 lore raw

PATCH 136/206 NFS: Fix races nfs_page_group_destroy() vs nfs_destroy_unlinked_subrequests()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08ca8b21f760c0ed5034a5c122092eec22ccf8f4 ]

When a subrequest is being detached from the subgroup, we want to ensure that it is not holding the group lock, or in the process of waiting for the group lock.

Fixes 5b2b5187fa85 ("NFS: Fix nfs_page_group_destroy() and nfs_lock_and_join_requests() race cases")
---
 fs/nfs/pagelist.c        | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 fs/nfs/write.c           | 10 ++++--
 include/linux/nfs_page.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/pagelist.c +45 -22
index 5dae7c85d9b6e..2c7d76b4c5e18 100644
@@ -132,47 +132,70 @@ nfs_async_iocounter_wait(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_lock_context *l_ctx)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_async_iocounter_wait);
 
 /*
- * nfs_page_group_lock - lock the head of the page group
- * @req - request in group that is to be locked
+ * nfs_page_set_headlock - set the request PG_HEADLOCK
+ * @req: request that is to be locked
  *
- * this lock must be held when traversing or modifying the page
- * group list
+ * this lock must be held when modifying req->wb_head
  *
  * return 0 on success, < 0 on error
  */
 int
-nfs_page_group_lock(struct nfs_page *req)
+nfs_page_set_headlock(struct nfs_page *req)
 {
-	struct nfs_page *head = req->wb_head;
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(head != head->wb_head);
-
-	if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_HEADLOCK, &head->wb_flags))
+	if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_HEADLOCK, &req->wb_flags))
 		return 0;
 
-	set_bit(PG_CONTENDED1, &head->wb_flags);
+	set_bit(PG_CONTENDED1, &req->wb_flags);
 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
-	return wait_on_bit_lock(&head->wb_flags, PG_HEADLOCK,
+	return wait_on_bit_lock(&req->wb_flags, PG_HEADLOCK,
 				TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
 }
 
 /*
- * nfs_page_group_unlock - unlock the head of the page group
- * @req - request in group that is to be unlocked
+ * nfs_page_clear_headlock - clear the request PG_HEADLOCK
+ * @req: request that is to be locked
  */
 void
-nfs_page_group_unlock(struct nfs_page *req)
+nfs_page_clear_headlock(struct nfs_page *req)
 {
-	struct nfs_page *head = req->wb_head;
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(head != head->wb_head);
-
 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
-	clear_bit(PG_HEADLOCK, &head->wb_flags);
+	clear_bit(PG_HEADLOCK, &req->wb_flags);
 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
-	if (!test_bit(PG_CONTENDED1, &head->wb_flags))
+	if (!test_bit(PG_CONTENDED1, &req->wb_flags))
 		return;
-	wake_up_bit(&head->wb_flags, PG_HEADLOCK);
+	wake_up_bit(&req->wb_flags, PG_HEADLOCK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * nfs_page_group_lock - lock the head of the page group
+ * @req: request in group that is to be locked
+ *
+ * this lock must be held when traversing or modifying the page
+ * group list
+ *
+ * return 0 on success, < 0 on error
+ */
+int
+nfs_page_group_lock(struct nfs_page *req)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = nfs_page_set_headlock(req);
+	if (ret || req->wb_head == req)
+		return ret;
+	return nfs_page_set_headlock(req->wb_head);
+}
+
+/*
+ * nfs_page_group_unlock - unlock the head of the page group
+ * @req: request in group that is to be unlocked
+ */
+void
+nfs_page_group_unlock(struct nfs_page *req)
+{
+	if (req != req->wb_head)
+		nfs_page_clear_headlock(req->wb_head);
+	nfs_page_clear_headlock(req);
 }
 
 /*
fs/nfs/write.c +8 -2
index 63d20308a9bb7..d419d89b91f7c 100644
@@ -416,22 +416,28 @@ nfs_destroy_unlinked_subrequests(struct nfs_page *destroy_list,
 		destroy_list = (subreq->wb_this_page == old_head) ?
 				   NULL : subreq->wb_this_page;
 
+		/* Note: lock subreq in order to change subreq->wb_head */
+		nfs_page_set_headlock(subreq);
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(old_head != subreq->wb_head);
 
 		/* make sure old group is not used */
 		subreq->wb_this_page = subreq;
+		subreq->wb_head = subreq;
 
 		clear_bit(PG_REMOVE, &subreq->wb_flags);
 
 		/* Note: races with nfs_page_group_destroy() */
 		if (!kref_read(&subreq->wb_kref)) {
 			/* Check if we raced with nfs_page_group_destroy() */
-			if (test_and_clear_bit(PG_TEARDOWN, &subreq->wb_flags))
+			if (test_and_clear_bit(PG_TEARDOWN, &subreq->wb_flags)) {
+				nfs_page_clear_headlock(subreq);
 				nfs_free_request(subreq);
+			} else
+				nfs_page_clear_headlock(subreq);
 			continue;
 		}
+		nfs_page_clear_headlock(subreq);
 
-		subreq->wb_head = subreq;
 		nfs_release_request(old_head);
 
 		if (test_and_clear_bit(PG_INODE_REF, &subreq->wb_flags)) {
include/linux/nfs_page.h +2 -0
index ad69430fd0eb5..5162fc1533c2f 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ extern	void nfs_unlock_and_release_request(struct nfs_page *);
 extern int nfs_page_group_lock(struct nfs_page *);
 extern void nfs_page_group_unlock(struct nfs_page *);
 extern bool nfs_page_group_sync_on_bit(struct nfs_page *, unsigned int);
+extern	int nfs_page_set_headlock(struct nfs_page *req);
+extern void nfs_page_clear_headlock(struct nfs_page *req);
 extern bool nfs_async_iocounter_wait(struct rpc_task *, struct nfs_lock_context *);
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#139 lore raw

PATCH 137/206 mm/kmemleak.c: use address-of operator on section symbols

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0d14fc43d39203ae025f20ef4d5d25d9ccf4be1 ]

Clang warns:

mm/kmemleak.c:1955:28: warning: array comparison always evaluates to a constant [-Wtautological-compare]

        if (__start_ro_after_init < _sdata || __end_ro_after_init > _edata)
                                  ^
  mm/kmemleak.c:1955:60: warning: array comparison always evaluates to a constant [-Wtautological-compare]
        if (__start_ro_after_init < _sdata || __end_ro_after_init > _edata)

These are not true arrays, they are linker defined symbols, which are just addresses. Using the address of operator silences the warning and does not change the resulting assembly with either clang/ld.lld or gcc/ld (tested with diff + objdump -Dr).

---
 mm/kmemleak.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/kmemleak.c +1 -1
index 5eeabece0c178..f54734abf9466 100644
@@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ void __init kmemleak_init(void)
 	create_object((unsigned long)__bss_start, __bss_stop - __bss_start,
 		      KMEMLEAK_GREY, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	/* only register .data..ro_after_init if not within .data */
-	if (__start_ro_after_init < _sdata || __end_ro_after_init > _edata)
+	if (&__start_ro_after_init < &_sdata || &__end_ro_after_init > &_edata)
 		create_object((unsigned long)__start_ro_after_init,
 			      __end_ro_after_init - __start_ro_after_init,
 			      KMEMLEAK_GREY, GFP_ATOMIC);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#140 lore raw

PATCH 138/206 mm/filemap.c: clear page error before actual read

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Xianting Tian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit faffdfa04fa11ccf048cebdde73db41ede0679e0 ]

Mount failure issue happens under the scenario: Application forked dozens of threads to mount the same number of cramfs images separately in docker, but several mounts failed with high probability. Mount failed due to the checking result of the page(read from the superblock of loop dev) is not uptodate after wait_on_page_locked(page) returned in function cramfs_read:

   wait_on_page_locked(page);
   if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
      ...
   }

The reason of the checking result of the page not uptodate: systemd-udevd read the loopX dev before mount, because the status of loopX is Lo_unbound at this time, so loop_make_request directly trigger the calling of io_end handler end_buffer_async_read, which called SetPageError(page). So It caused the page can't be set to uptodate in function end_buffer_async_read:

   if(page_uptodate && !PageError(page)) {
      SetPageUptodate(page);
   }

Then mount operation is performed, it used the same page which is just accessed by systemd-udevd above, Because this page is not uptodate, it will launch a actual read via submit_bh, then wait on this page by calling wait_on_page_locked(page). When the I/O of the page done, io_end handler end_buffer_async_read is called, because no one cleared the page error(during the whole read path of mount), which is caused by systemd-udevd reading, so this page is still in "PageError" status, which can't be set to uptodate in function end_buffer_async_read, then caused mount failure.

But sometimes mount succeed even through systemd-udeved read loopX dev just before, The reason is systemd-udevd launched other loopX read just between step 3.1 and 3.2, the steps as below:

1, loopX dev default status is Lo_unbound;
2, systemd-udved read loopX dev (page is set to PageError); 3, mount operation
1) set loopX status to Lo_bound; ==>systemd-udevd read loopX dev<==
2) read loopX dev(page has no error)
3) mount succeed

As the loopX dev status is set to Lo_bound after step 3.1, so the other loopX dev read by systemd-udevd will go through the whole I/O stack, part of the call trace as below:

   SYS_read
      vfs_read
          do_sync_read
              blkdev_aio_read
                 generic_file_aio_read
                     do_generic_file_read:
                        ClearPageError(page);
                        mapping->a_ops->readpage(filp, page);

here, mapping->a_ops->readpage() is blkdev_readpage. In latest kernel, some function name changed, the call trace as below:

blkdev_read_iter

      generic_file_read_iter
         generic_file_buffered_read:
            /*
             * A previous I/O error may have been due to temporary
             * failures, eg. mutipath errors.
             * Pg_error will be set again if readpage fails.
             */
            ClearPageError(page);
            /* Start the actual read. The read will unlock the page*/
            error=mapping->a_ops->readpage(flip, page);

We can see ClearPageError(page) is called before the actual read, then the read in step 3.2 succeed.

This patch is to add the calling of ClearPageError just before the actual read of read path of cramfs mount. Without the patch, the call trace as below when performing cramfs mount:

   do_mount
      cramfs_read
         cramfs_blkdev_read
            read_cache_page
               do_read_cache_page:
                  filler(data, page);
                  or
                  mapping->a_ops->readpage(data, page);

With the patch, the call trace as below when performing mount:

   do_mount
      cramfs_read
         cramfs_blkdev_read
            read_cache_page:
               do_read_cache_page:
                  ClearPageError(page); <== new add
                  filler(data, page);
                  or
                  mapping->a_ops->readpage(data, page);

With the patch, mount operation trigger the calling of ClearPageError(page) before the actual read, the page has no error if no additional page error happen when I/O done.

---
 mm/filemap.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
mm/filemap.c +8 -0
index 45f1c6d73b5b0..f2e777003b901 100644
@@ -2889,6 +2889,14 @@ filler:
 		unlock_page(page);
 		goto out;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A previous I/O error may have been due to temporary
+	 * failures.
+	 * Clear page error before actual read, PG_error will be
+	 * set again if read page fails.
+	 */
+	ClearPageError(page);
 	goto filler;
 
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#141 lore raw

PATCH 139/206 mm/vmscan.c: fix data races using kswapd_classzone_idx

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5644e1fbbfe15ad06785502bbfe5751223e5841d ]

pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx could be accessed concurrently in wakeup_kswapd(). Plain writes and reads without any lock protection result in data races. Fix them by adding a pair of READ|WRITE_ONCE() as well as saving a branch (compilers might well optimize the original code in an unintentional way anyway). While at it, also take care of pgdat->kswapd_order and non-kswapd threads in allow_direct_reclaim(). The data races were reported by KCSAN,

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wakeup_kswapd / wakeup_kswapd

write to 0xffff9f427ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 7454 on cpu 13:

  wakeup_kswapd+0xf1/0x400
  wakeup_kswapd at mm/vmscan.c:3967
  wake_all_kswapds+0x59/0xc0
  wake_all_kswapds at mm/page_alloc.c:4241
  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xdcc/0x1290
  __alloc_pages_slowpath at mm/page_alloc.c:4512
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3bb/0x450
  alloc_pages_vma+0x8a/0x2c0
  do_anonymous_page+0x16e/0x6f0
  __handle_mm_fault+0xcd5/0xd40
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
  page_fault+0x34/0x40

1 lock held by mtest01/7454:
#0: ffff9f425afe8808 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}, at:

 do_page_fault+0x143/0x6f9
 do_user_addr_fault at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1405
 (inlined by) do_page_fault at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539
 irq event stamp: 6944085
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x1a6/0x270
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x119/0x270
 __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

read to 0xffff9f427ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 7472 on cpu 38:

  wakeup_kswapd+0xc8/0x400
  wake_all_kswapds+0x59/0xc0
  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xdcc/0x1290
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3bb/0x450
  alloc_pages_vma+0x8a/0x2c0
  do_anonymous_page+0x16e/0x6f0
  __handle_mm_fault+0xcd5/0xd40
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
  page_fault+0x34/0x40

1 lock held by mtest01/7472:
#0: ffff9f425a9ac148 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}, at:

 do_page_fault+0x143/0x6f9
 irq event stamp: 6793561
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x1a6/0x270
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x119/0x270
 __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kswapd / wakeup_kswapd

write to 0xffff90973ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 820 on cpu 6:

  kswapd+0x27c/0x8d0
  kthread+0x1e0/0x200
  ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

read to 0xffff90973ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 6299 on cpu 0:

  wakeup_kswapd+0xf3/0x450
  wake_all_kswapds+0x59/0xc0
  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xdcc/0x1290
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3bb/0x450
  alloc_pages_vma+0x8a/0x2c0
  do_anonymous_page+0x170/0x700
  __handle_mm_fault+0xc9f/0xd00
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
  page_fault+0x34/0x40
---
 mm/vmscan.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/vmscan.c +26 -19
index bc2ecd43251ad..da09b741d08a0 100644
@@ -3101,8 +3101,9 @@ static bool allow_direct_reclaim(pg_data_t *pgdat)
 
 	/* kswapd must be awake if processes are being throttled */
 	if (!wmark_ok && waitqueue_active(&pgdat->kswapd_wait)) {
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = min(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx,
-						(enum zone_type)ZONE_NORMAL);
+		if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx) > ZONE_NORMAL)
+			WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, ZONE_NORMAL);
+
 		wake_up_interruptible(&pgdat->kswapd_wait);
 	}
 
@@ -3618,9 +3619,9 @@ out:
 static enum zone_type kswapd_classzone_idx(pg_data_t *pgdat,
 					   enum zone_type prev_classzone_idx)
 {
-	if (pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES)
-		return prev_classzone_idx;
-	return pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx;
+	enum zone_type curr_idx = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx);
+
+	return curr_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES ? prev_classzone_idx : curr_idx;
 }
 
 static void kswapd_try_to_sleep(pg_data_t *pgdat, int alloc_order, int reclaim_order,
@@ -3664,8 +3665,11 @@ static void kswapd_try_to_sleep(pg_data_t *pgdat, int alloc_order, int reclaim_o
 		 * the previous request that slept prematurely.
 		 */
 		if (remaining) {
-			pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx);
-			pgdat->kswapd_order = max(pgdat->kswapd_order, reclaim_order);
+			WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx,
+				   kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx));
+
+			if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order) < reclaim_order)
+				WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, reclaim_order);
 		}
 
 		finish_wait(&pgdat->kswapd_wait, &wait);
@@ -3747,12 +3751,12 @@ static int kswapd(void *p)
 	tsk->flags |= PF_MEMALLOC | PF_SWAPWRITE | PF_KSWAPD;
 	set_freezable();
 
-	pgdat->kswapd_order = 0;
-	pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = MAX_NR_ZONES;
+	WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, 0);
+	WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, MAX_NR_ZONES);
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		bool ret;
 
-		alloc_order = reclaim_order = pgdat->kswapd_order;
+		alloc_order = reclaim_order = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order);
 		classzone_idx = kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx);
 
 kswapd_try_sleep:
@@ -3760,10 +3764,10 @@ kswapd_try_sleep:
 					classzone_idx);
 
 		/* Read the new order and classzone_idx */
-		alloc_order = reclaim_order = pgdat->kswapd_order;
+		alloc_order = reclaim_order = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order);
 		classzone_idx = kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx);
-		pgdat->kswapd_order = 0;
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = MAX_NR_ZONES;
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, 0);
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, MAX_NR_ZONES);
 
 		ret = try_to_freeze();
 		if (kthread_should_stop())
@@ -3808,20 +3812,23 @@ void wakeup_kswapd(struct zone *zone, gfp_t gfp_flags, int order,
 		   enum zone_type classzone_idx)
 {
 	pg_data_t *pgdat;
+	enum zone_type curr_idx;
 
 	if (!managed_zone(zone))
 		return;
 
 	if (!cpuset_zone_allowed(zone, gfp_flags))
 		return;
+
 	pgdat = zone->zone_pgdat;
+	curr_idx = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx);
+
+	if (curr_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES || curr_idx < classzone_idx)
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, classzone_idx);
+
+	if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order) < order)
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, order);
 
-	if (pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES)
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = classzone_idx;
-	else
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = max(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx,
-						  classzone_idx);
-	pgdat->kswapd_order = max(pgdat->kswapd_order, order);
 	if (!waitqueue_active(&pgdat->kswapd_wait))
 		return;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#142 lore raw

PATCH 140/206 nvmet-rdma: fix double free of rdma queue

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Israel Rukshin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 21f9024355e58772ec5d7fc3534aa5e29d72a8b6 ]

In case rdma accept fails at nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(), release work is scheduled. Later on, a new RDMA CM event may arrive since we didn't destroy the cm-id and call nvmet_rdma_queue_connect_fail(), which schedule another release work. This will cause calling nvmet_rdma_free_queue twice. To fix this we implicitly destroy the cm_id with non-zero ret code, which guarantees that new rdma_cm events will not arrive afterwards. Also add a qp pointer to nvmet_rdma_queue structure, so we can use it when the cm_id pointer is NULL or was destroyed.

---
 drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +18 -12
index 08f997a390d5d..cfd26437aeaea 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum nvmet_rdma_queue_state {
 
 struct nvmet_rdma_queue {
 	struct rdma_cm_id	*cm_id;
+	struct ib_qp		*qp;
 	struct nvmet_port	*port;
 	struct ib_cq		*cq;
 	atomic_t		sq_wr_avail;
@@ -471,7 +472,7 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_post_recv(struct nvmet_rdma_device *ndev,
 	if (ndev->srq)
 		ret = ib_post_srq_recv(ndev->srq, &cmd->wr, NULL);
 	else
-		ret = ib_post_recv(cmd->queue->cm_id->qp, &cmd->wr, NULL);
+		ret = ib_post_recv(cmd->queue->qp, &cmd->wr, NULL);
 
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		pr_err("post_recv cmd failed\n");
@@ -510,7 +511,7 @@ static void nvmet_rdma_release_rsp(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *rsp)
 	atomic_add(1 + rsp->n_rdma, &queue->sq_wr_avail);
 
 	if (rsp->n_rdma) {
-		rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->cm_id->qp,
+		rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->qp,
 				queue->cm_id->port_num, rsp->req.sg,
 				rsp->req.sg_cnt, nvmet_data_dir(&rsp->req));
 	}
@@ -594,7 +595,7 @@ static void nvmet_rdma_read_data_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
 
 	WARN_ON(rsp->n_rdma <= 0);
 	atomic_add(rsp->n_rdma, &queue->sq_wr_avail);
-	rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->cm_id->qp,
+	rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->qp,
 			queue->cm_id->port_num, rsp->req.sg,
 			rsp->req.sg_cnt, nvmet_data_dir(&rsp->req));
 	rsp->n_rdma = 0;
@@ -737,7 +738,7 @@ static bool nvmet_rdma_execute_command(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *rsp)
 	}
 
 	if (nvmet_rdma_need_data_in(rsp)) {
-		if (rdma_rw_ctx_post(&rsp->rw, queue->cm_id->qp,
+		if (rdma_rw_ctx_post(&rsp->rw, queue->qp,
 				queue->cm_id->port_num, &rsp->read_cqe, NULL))
 			nvmet_req_complete(&rsp->req, NVME_SC_DATA_XFER_ERROR);
 	} else {
@@ -1020,6 +1021,7 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib(struct nvmet_rdma_queue *queue)
 		pr_err("failed to create_qp ret= %d\n", ret);
 		goto err_destroy_cq;
 	}
+	queue->qp = queue->cm_id->qp;
 
 	atomic_set(&queue->sq_wr_avail, qp_attr.cap.max_send_wr);
 
@@ -1048,11 +1050,10 @@ err_destroy_cq:
 
 static void nvmet_rdma_destroy_queue_ib(struct nvmet_rdma_queue *queue)
 {
-	struct ib_qp *qp = queue->cm_id->qp;
-
-	ib_drain_qp(qp);
-	rdma_destroy_id(queue->cm_id);
-	ib_destroy_qp(qp);
+	ib_drain_qp(queue->qp);
+	if (queue->cm_id)
+		rdma_destroy_id(queue->cm_id);
+	ib_destroy_qp(queue->qp);
 	ib_free_cq(queue->cq);
 }
 
@@ -1286,9 +1287,12 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
 
 	ret = nvmet_rdma_cm_accept(cm_id, queue, &event->param.conn);
 	if (ret) {
-		schedule_work(&queue->release_work);
-		/* Destroying rdma_cm id is not needed here */
-		return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Don't destroy the cm_id in free path, as we implicitly
+		 * destroy the cm_id here with non-zero ret code.
+		 */
+		queue->cm_id = NULL;
+		goto free_queue;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&nvmet_rdma_queue_mutex);
@@ -1297,6 +1301,8 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
 
 	return 0;
 
+free_queue:
+	nvmet_rdma_free_queue(queue);
 put_device:
 	kref_put(&ndev->ref, nvmet_rdma_free_dev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#143 lore raw

PATCH 141/206 mm/mmap.c: initialize align_offset explicitly for vm_unmapped_area

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jaewon Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 09ef5283fd96ac424ef0e569626f359bf9ab86c9 ]

On passing requirement to vm_unmapped_area, arch_get_unmapped_area and arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown did not set align_offset. Internally on both unmapped_area and unmapped_area_topdown, if info->align_mask is 0, then info->align_offset was meaningless.

But commit df529cabb7a2 ("mm: mmap: add trace point of vm_unmapped_area") always prints info->align_offset even though it is uninitialized.

Fix this uninitialized value issue by setting it to 0 explicitly.

Before:
vm_unmapped_area: addr=0x755b155000 err=0 total_vm=0x15aaf0 flags=0x1 len=0x109000 lo=0x8000 hi=0x75eed48000 mask=0x0 ofs=0x4022

After:
vm_unmapped_area: addr=0x74a4ca1000 err=0 total_vm=0x168ab1 flags=0x1 len=0x9000 lo=0x8000 hi=0x753d94b000 mask=0x0 ofs=0x0

---
 mm/mmap.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/mmap.c +2 -0
index e84fd3347a518..f875386e7acd4 100644
@@ -2077,6 +2077,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
 	info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
 	info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
 	info.align_mask = 0;
+	info.align_offset = 0;
 	return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
 }
 #endif
@@ -2118,6 +2119,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
 	info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, mmap_min_addr);
 	info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base;
 	info.align_mask = 0;
+	info.align_offset = 0;
 	addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
 
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#144 lore raw

PATCH 142/206 scsi: qedi: Fix termination timeouts in session logout

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b9b97e6903032ec56e6dcbe137a9819b74a17fea ]

The destroy connection ramrod timed out during session logout. Fix the wait delay for graceful vs abortive termination as per the FW requirements.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c +3 -0
index 751941a3ed303..aa451c8b49e56 100644
@@ -1065,6 +1065,9 @@ static void qedi_ep_disconnect(struct iscsi_endpoint *ep)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	if (!abrt_conn)
+		wait_delay += qedi->pf_params.iscsi_pf_params.two_msl_timer;
+
 	qedi_ep->state = EP_STATE_DISCONN_START;
 	ret = qedi_ops->destroy_conn(qedi->cdev, qedi_ep->handle, abrt_conn);
 	if (ret) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 143/206 serial: uartps: Wait for tx_empty in console setup

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Raviteja Narayanam <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42e11948ddf68b9f799cad8c0ddeab0a39da33e8 ]

On some platforms, the log is corrupted while console is being registered. It is observed that when set_termios is called, there are still some bytes in the FIFO to be transmitted.

So, wait for tx_empty inside cdns_uart_console_setup before calling set_termios.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c +8 -0
index 31950a38f0fb7..23f9b0cdff086 100644
@@ -1236,6 +1236,7 @@ static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
 	int bits = 8;
 	int parity = 'n';
 	int flow = 'n';
+	unsigned long time_out;
 
 	if (!port->membase) {
 		pr_debug("console on " CDNS_UART_TTY_NAME "%i not present\n",
@@ -1246,6 +1247,13 @@ static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
 	if (options)
 		uart_parse_options(options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);
 
+	/* Wait for tx_empty before setting up the console */
+	time_out = jiffies + usecs_to_jiffies(TX_TIMEOUT);
+
+	while (time_before(jiffies, time_out) &&
+	       cdns_uart_tx_empty(port) != TIOCSER_TEMT)
+		cpu_relax();
+
 	return uart_set_options(port, co, baud, parity, bits, flow);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1