mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Subsystems (20)
Mike Rapoport
maintainerv10 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git
that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.
Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.
The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.
To limit fragmentation of the direct map to splitting only PUD-size pages, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.
As the memory allocated by secretmem becomes unmovable, we use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.
v10:
* Drop changes to arm64 compatibility layer
* Add Roman's Ack for memcg accounting
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Fix build with and without CONFIG_MEMCG
* Update memcg accounting to avoid copying memcg_data, per Roman comments
* Fix issues in secretmem_fault(), thanks Matthew
* Do not wire up syscall in arm64 compatibility layer
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Use CMA for all secretmem allocations as David suggested
* Update memcg accounting after transtion to CMA
* Prevent hibernation when there are active secretmem users
* Add zeroing of the memory before releasing it back to cma/page allocator
* Rebase on v5.10-rc2-mmotm-2020-11-07-21-40
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Use set_direct_map() instead of __kernel_map_pages() to ensure error handling in case the direct map update fails
* Add accounting of large pages used to reduce the direct map fragmentation
* Teach get_user_pages() and frieds to refuse get/pin secretmem pages
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Silence the warning about missing syscall, thanks to Qian Cai
* Replace spaces with tabs in Kconfig additions, per Randy
* Add a selftest.
Older history:
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Mike Rapoport (9):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
secretmem: add memcg accounting
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +- fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 30 ++ include/linux/set_memory.h | 4 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 5 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/filemap.c | 3 +- mm/gup.c | 10 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 446 ++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 298 +++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests | 17 + 36 files changed, 888 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
base-commit: 9f8ce377d420db12b19d6a4f636fecbd88a725a5
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 1/9 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.
Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.
--- fs/dax.c | 11 ++++------- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +4 -7
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)#define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)#define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) -/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES ];static int __init init_dax_wait_table (void )
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)static unsigned int dax_entry_order (void *entry) {if (xa_to_value (entry) &DAX_PMD ) -return PMD_ORDER ; +return PMD_PAGE_ORDER ;return 0 ; }
@@ -1470,7 +1467,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; -XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_ORDER ); +XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address &PMD_MASK ;bool write = vmf->flags &FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;bool sync;
@@ -1529,7 +1526,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,* entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_ORDER ); + entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (xa_is_internal (entry)) { result =xa_to_internal (entry); goto fallback;
@@ -1695,7 +1692,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)if (order ==0 ) ret =vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite (vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret =vmf_insert_pfn_pmd (vmf, pfn,FAULT_FLAG_WRITE );#endif else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@#define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL#endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) +/* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] *
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 2/9 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.
--- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
@@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)extern void mlock_vma_page (struct page *page);extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page (struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len); +/* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
@@ -1348,9 +1348,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm, -unsigned long flags, -unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len) {unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 3/9 set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once.
Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 ++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +++-- 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +2 -2
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);#include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +6 -4
@@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable) __pgprot(PTE_VALID)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask =__pgprot (0 ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (PTE_VALID ), }; +unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages;if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full)return 0 ;return apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, (unsigned long )page_address (page), -PAGE_SIZE , change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask =__pgprot (PTE_VALID |PTE_WRITE ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (PTE_RDONLY ), }; +unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages;if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full)return 0 ;return apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, (unsigned long )page_address (page), -PAGE_SIZE , change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }static inline int set_memory_nx (unsigned long addr,int numpages) {return 0 ; }#endif -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +4 -4
@@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)return __set_memory (addr, numpages,__pgprot (0 ),__pgprot (_PAGE_EXEC)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {int ret;unsigned long start = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE ; +unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE * numpages;struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask =__pgprot (0 ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT)
@@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)return ret; } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {int ret;unsigned long start = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE ; +unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE * numpages;struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask =PAGE_KERNEL , .clear_mask =__pgprot (0 )
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages);int set_pages_ro (struct page *page,int numpages);int set_pages_rw (struct page *page,int numpages); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +4 -4
@@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages)return __change_page_attr_set_clr (&cpa,0 ); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) { -return __set_pages_np (page,1 ); +return __set_pages_np (page, numpages); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) { -return __set_pages_p (page,1 ); +return __set_pages_p (page, numpages); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
include/linux/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }#endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP -static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {return 0 ; } -static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {return 0 ; }
kernel/power/snapshot.c +2 -2
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ static inline void hibernate_map_page(struct page *page, int enable)* changes and this will no longer be the case. */ if (enable) - ret =set_direct_map_default_noflush (page); + ret =set_direct_map_default_noflush (page,1 );else - ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); + ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page,1 );if (ret) {pr_warn_once ("Failed to remap page\n" );
mm/vmalloc.c +3 -2
@@ -2179,13 +2179,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr) }static inline void set_area_direct_map (const struct vm_struct *area, -int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page)) +int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page, +int numpages)) {int i;for (i =0 ; i < area->nr_pages; i++)if (page_address (area->pages[i])) -set_direct_map (area->pages[i]); +set_direct_map (area->pages[i],1 ); }/* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 4/9 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call where flags supplied as a parameter to this system call will define the desired protection mode for the memory associated with that file descriptor.
The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses.
Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area.
A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed.
Currently there are two protection modes:
* exclusive - the memory area is unmapped from the kernel direct map and it is present only in the page tables of the owning mm.
* uncached - the memory area is present only in the page tables of the owning mm and it is mapped there as uncached.
The "exclusive" mode is enabled implicitly and it is the default mode for memfd_secret().
The "uncached" mode requires architecture support and an architecture should opt-in for this mode using HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED configuration option.
For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
--- arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 24 +++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 ++ mm/secretmem.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 340 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
arch/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -1041,6 +1041,13 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID bool +config HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED + bool + help + An architecture can select this if its semantics of non-cached + mappings can be used to prevent speculative loads and it is + useful for secret protection. + source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO + select HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
include/linux/secretmem.h new file +24 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page) +{ +return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@#define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d/* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33#define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d/* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h new file +8 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +/* secretmem operation modes */ +#define SECRETMEM_UNCACHED 0x1 + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
@@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_alloc);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret);/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -884,4 +884,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/gup.c +10 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/rmap.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/swapops.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h>
@@ -793,6 +794,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,struct follow_page_context ctx = {NULL };struct page *page; +if (vma_is_secretmem (vma)) +return NULL ; + page =follow_page_mask (vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx);if (ctx.pgmap)put_dev_pagemap (ctx.pgmap);
@@ -923,6 +927,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)if (gup_flags &FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous (vma))return -EFAULT ; +if (vma_is_secretmem (vma)) +return -EFAULT ; +if (write) {if (!(vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) {if (!(gup_flags &FOLL_FORCE ))
@@ -2196,6 +2203,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,VM_BUG_ON (!pfn_valid (pte_pfn (pte))); page =pte_page (pte); +if (page_is_secretmem (page)) + goto pte_unmap; + head =try_grab_compound_head (page,1 , flags);if (!head) goto pte_unmap;
mm/secretmem.c new file +283 -0
283 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 5/9 secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages.
As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.
The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption.
--- mm/Kconfig | 2 + mm/secretmem.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -886,5 +886,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS config SECRETMEM def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR + select CMA endmenu
mm/secretmem.c +133 -19
247 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 6/9 secretmem: add memcg accounting
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed.
--- mm/filemap.c | 3 ++- mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +2 -1
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@#include <linux/psi.h> #include <linux/ramfs.h> #include <linux/page_idle.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include "internal.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ static noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page, page->mapping = mapping; page->index = offset; -if (!huge) { +if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem (page)) { error =mem_cgroup_charge (page, current->mm, gfp);if (error) goto error;
mm/secretmem.c +35 -1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/secretmem.h> +#include <linux/memcontrol.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static int secretmem_account_pages (struct page *page,gfp_t gfp,int order) +{ +int err; + + err =memcg_kmem_charge_page (page, gfp, order); +if (err) +return err; + +/* +* seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat +* them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes +*/ +mod_node_page_state (page_pgdat (page),NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B , +PAGE_SIZE << order); + +return 0 ; +} + +static void secretmem_unaccount_pages (struct page *page,int order) +{ + +mod_node_page_state (page_pgdat (page),NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B , + -PAGE_SIZE << order); +memcg_kmem_uncharge_page (page, order); +} +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) {unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER );
@@ -62,10 +89,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)if (!page)return -ENOMEM ; - err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page, nr_pages); + err =secretmem_account_pages (page, gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (err) goto err_cma_release; + err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page, nr_pages); +if (err) + goto err_memcg_uncharge; + addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE );if (err)
@@ -82,6 +113,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)* won't fail */ set_direct_map_default_noflush (page, nr_pages); +err_memcg_uncharge: +secretmem_unaccount_pages (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); err_cma_release:cma_release (secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages);return err;
@@ -312,6 +345,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,int i;set_direct_map_default_noflush (page, nr_pages); +secretmem_unaccount_pages (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );for (i =0 ; i < nr_pages; i++)clear_highpage (page + i);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 7/9 PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
--- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/secretmem.h +6 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma);bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page); +bool secretmem_active (void );#else
@@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active (void ) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
kernel/power/hibernate.c +4 -1
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include <trace/events/power.h> #include "power.h"
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void)bool hibernation_available (void ) { -return nohibernate ==0 && !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ); +return nohibernate ==0 && + !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ) && + !secretmem_active (); }/**
mm/secretmem.c +15 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active (void ) +{ +return !!atomic_read (&secretmem_users); +} +static int secretmem_account_pages (struct page *page,gfp_t gfp,int order) {int err;
@@ -185,6 +192,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) +{ +atomic_dec (&secretmem_users); +return 0 ; +} +static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
@@ -211,6 +224,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) }static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, };
@@ -328,6 +342,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) file->f_flags |=O_LARGEFILE ;fd_install (fd, file); +atomic_inc (&secretmem_users);return fd; err_put_fd:
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 8/9 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
--- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@*/ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -446,3 +446,4 @@ 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 440 i386 process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 i386 watch_mount sys_watch_mount +442 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 common watch_mount sys_watch_mount +442 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
@@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd (int pidfd,int fd,unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_watch_mount (int dfd,const char __user *path,unsigned int at_flags,int watch_fd,int watch_id); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret (unsigned long flags);/* * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +5 -1
@@ -861,9 +861,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise)#define __NR_watch_mount 441 __SYSCALL(__NR_watch_mount, sys_watch_mount) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 442 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif #undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 442 +#define __NR_syscalls 443/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
scripts/checksyscalls.sh +4 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */ #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Re: [PATCH v10 8/9] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h line 25
Quoted 11 lines · Mike Rapoport
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1
-0@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
For arm64:
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v10 9/9 secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail.
--- tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 298 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests | 17 ++ 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch map_fixed_noreplace write_to_hugetlbfs hmm-tests +memfd_secret local_config.*
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate +TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure: endif endif -$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap +$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h
tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file +298 -0
298 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests +17 -0
@@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else exitcode=1 fi +echo "running memfd_secret test" +echo "------------------------------------" +./memfd_secret +ret_val=$? + +if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then + echo "[PASS]" +elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then + echo "[SKIP]" + exitcode=$ksft_skip +else + echo "[FAIL]" + exitcode=1 +fi + +exit $exitcode + exit $exitcode
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Andy Lutomirski
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
Quoted 7 lines
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in general. The issues that immediately come to mind are:
- Performance and DoS potential. UC will have bizarre, architecture- and platform-dependent performance characteristics. For all I know, even the access semantics might be architecture dependent. I'm not convinced it's possible to write portable code in C using the uncached feature. I'm also concerned that certain operation (unaligned locks, for example, and possibly any locked access) will trigger bus locks on x86, which, depending on CPU and kernel config will either DoS all other CPUs or send signals. (Or cause the hypervisor to terminate or otherwise penalize the the VM, which would be nasty.)
- Correctness. I have reports that different x86 hypervisors do
different things with UC mappings, including treating them as regular WB mappings. So the memory type you get out when you ask for "uncached" might not actually be uncached.
UC is really an MMIO feature, not a "protect my data" feature. Abusing it to protect data is certainly interesting, but I'm far from convinced that it's wise. I'm especially unconvinced that monkey-patching a program to use uncached memory when it expects regular malloced memory is a reasonable thing to do.
Mike Rapoport
maintainerQuoted 16 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 7 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
Quoted 7 lines
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86 for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.