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mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

Mike Rapoport linux-api linux-arch linux-arm-kernel linux-fsdevel linux-kselftest linux-mm linux-nvdimm linux-riscv lkml 21 versions – Applied

Status from this message: [merged] secretmem-test-add-basic-selftest-for-memfd_secret2.patch removed from -mm tree

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Versions newest first · linked by author and title

  1. v20 Latest7 patches 2 repliesApplied 7/7
  2. v198 patches 23 repliesSuperseded
  3. v189 patches 11 repliesSuperseded
Earlier versions · 18
VersionPostedPatchesRepliesStatus
v1710 patches62 repliesSuperseded
v1611 patches66 repliesSuperseded
v1511 patches6 repliesSuperseded
v1410 patches14 repliesSuperseded
v1310 patches2 repliesSuperseded
v1210 patches7 repliesSuperseded
v119 patches2 repliesSuperseded
v109 patches3 repliesSuperseded
v99 patches5 repliesSuperseded
v89 patches19 repliesSuperseded
v77 patches4 repliesSuperseded
v66 patches44 repliesSuperseded
v5 posting 2/25 patches8 repliesSuperseded
v5 posting 1/20 of 5 patches2 repliesSuperseded
v46 patches13 repliesSuperseded
v36 patches6 repliesSuperseded
v27 patches7 repliesSuperseded
v16 patches10 repliesSuperseded

Changes in v20 from the cover letter

* Drop the patch that enable multi-page updates to the direct map, per David
* Drop the changes to /dev/mem, they anyway have no effect when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
* Add Acked-by and Reviewed-by tags

Patches in v20 All 7 applied

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/7mmap: make mlock_future_check() globalmm/internal.h mm/mmap.c+5 -30 repliesApplied
2/7riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMUarch/riscv/Kconfig+2 -20 repliesApplied
3/7set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabledarch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h +5 more+43 -150 repliesApplied
4/7mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areasinclude/linux/secretmem.h include/uapi/linux/magic.h kernel/sys_ni.c +5 more+310 -12 repliesApplied
5/7PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem usersinclude/linux/secretmem.h kernel/power/hibernate.c mm/secretmem.c+25 -10 repliesApplied
6/7arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevantarch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +4 more+15 -10 repliesApplied
7/7secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c +1 more+316 -10 repliesApplied

Reviews trailers per patch

All 7 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.

PatchDavid HildenbrandJames BottomleyCatalin MarinasHagen Paul PfeiferPalmer DabbeltArnd Bergmann
1/7R-b A-b
2/7R-b A-b
3/7R-b A-b R-b
4/7A-b A-b
5/7A-b A-b
6/7A-b A-b A-b A-b A-b
7/7A-b

Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes. Scroll the table sideways for all 6 reviewers.

Read the v20 thread

Cover letter [PATCH v20 0/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Hi,

@Andrew, this is based on v5.13-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you prefer.

This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.

The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.

Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.

It's designed to provide the following protections:

* Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks.

* Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.

* Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace.

In the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.

For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git

that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.

Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.

The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.

Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time.

In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/

v20:
* Drop the patch that enable multi-page updates to the direct map, per David
* Drop the changes to /dev/mem, they anyway have no effect when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
* Add Acked-by and Reviewed-by tags

v19: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* block /dev/mem mmap access, per David
* disallow mmap/mprotect with PROT_EXEC, per Kees
* simplify return in page_is_secretmem(), per Matthew
* use unsigned int for syscall falgs, per Yury

v18: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* rebase on v5.12-rc1
* merge kfence fix into the original patch
* massage commit message of the patch introducing the memfd_secret syscall

v17: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Remove pool of large pages backing secretmem allocations, per Michal Hocko
* Add secretmem pages to unevictable LRU, per Michal Hocko
* Use GFP_HIGHUSER as secretmem mapping mask, per Michal Hocko
* Make secretmem an opt-in feature that is disabled by default

v16: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Fix memory leak intorduced in v15
* Clean the data left from previous page user before handing the page to the userspace

Older history:
v15: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/
rfc-v0: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Mike Rapoport (7):
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually
enabled
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)

 arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild             |   1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h       |   6 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h           |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h       |  17 ++
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h      |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c         |   1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                       |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c                  |  13 +-
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                        |   4 +-
 arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h           |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl    |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl    |   1 +
 include/linux/secretmem.h                 |  54 ++++
 include/linux/set_memory.h                |  12 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h                  |   1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h         |   7 +-
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h                |   1 +
 kernel/power/hibernate.c                  |   5 +-
 kernel/sys_ni.c                           |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                                |   5 +
 mm/Makefile                               |   1 +
 mm/gup.c                                  |  12 +
 mm/internal.h                             |   3 +
 mm/mlock.c                                |   3 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                 |   5 +-
 mm/secretmem.c                            | 254 +++++++++++++++++++
 scripts/checksyscalls.sh                  |   4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile       |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh |  17 ++
 31 files changed, 716 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h
 create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c

base-commit: 6efb943b8616ec53a5e444193dccf1af9ad627b5

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0