KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups
Sean Christopherson
maintainerv3 cover KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups
Minor bug fixes and refactorings of SEV related code, mainly to clean up the KVM code for tracking whether or not SEV and SEV-ES are enabled. E.g. KVM has both sev_es and svm_sev_enabled(), and a global 'sev' flag while also using 'sev' as a local variable in several places.
Based on v5.11-rc3.
v3:
- Drop two patches: add a dedicated feature word for CPUID_0x8000001F, and use the new word to mask host CPUID in KVM. I'll send these as a separate mini-series so that Boris can take them through tip.
- Add a patch to remove dependency on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT. [Boris / Paolo]
- Use kcalloc() instead of an open-coded equivalent. [Tom]
- Nullify sev_asid_bitmap when freeing it during setup. [Tom]
- Add a comment in sev_hardware_teardown() to document why it's safe to query the ASID bitmap without taking the lock. [Tom]
- Collect reviews. [Tom and Brijesh]
v2:
- Remove the kernel's sev_enabled instead of renaming it to sev_guest.
- Fix various build issues. [Tom]
- Remove stable tag from the patch to free sev_asid_bitmap. Keeping the bitmap on failure is truly only a leak once svm_sev_enabled() is dropped later in the series. It's still arguably a fix since KVM will unnecessarily keep memory, but it's not stable material. [Tom]
- Collect one Ack. [Tom]
v1:
- https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Sean Christopherson (13):
KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control
variables
KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on
CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of
sev_flush_asids()
KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 35 +++++---------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 8 +--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 1/13 KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that pre_sev_run() won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2 -3
@@ -571,9 +571,8 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)clear_page (page_address (sd->save_area));if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { - sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 , -sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL ); + sd->sev_vmcbs =kcalloc (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), +GFP_KERNEL );if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) goto free_save_area; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 2/13 KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
In reply to Sean ChristophersonFree sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.
Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +4 -1
@@ -1274,8 +1274,11 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap =bitmap_zalloc (max_sev_asid,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) +if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) { +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap); + sev_asid_bitmap =NULL ; goto out; + }pr_info ("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n" , max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid +1 ); sev_supported = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Re: [PATCH v3 02/13] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Free
sev_asid_bitmapif the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates
svm_sev_enabled()in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. Whilesev_hardware_enabled()checksmax_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 22 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +4
-1@@ -1274,8 +1274,11 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap =bitmap_zalloc (max_sev_asid,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) +if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) { +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap); + sev_asid_bitmap =NULL ; goto out; + }pr_info ("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n" , max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid +1 ); sev_supported = true;
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 3/13 KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
In reply to Sean ChristophersonUnconditionally invoke sev_hardware_setup() when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' in sev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static within sev.c and reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +-------------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x) +/* enable/disable SEV support */ +static int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param (sev, int,0444 ); + +/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ +static int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); +static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);
@@ -1249,6 +1257,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev) + goto out; +/* Does the CPU support SEV? */ if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) goto out;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -14
@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);static int vgif = true;module_param (vgif, int,0444 ); -/* enable/disable SEV support */ -int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev, int,0444 ); - -/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); -bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;module_param (dump_invalid_vmcb, bool,0644 );
@@ -975,12 +967,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME |EFER_LMSLE ); } -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) && sev) { -sev_hardware_setup (); - }else { - sev = false; - sev_es = false; - } +sev_hardware_setup ();svm_adjust_mmio_mask ();
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -2
@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)#define MSR_CR3_LONG_MBZ_MASK 0xfff0000000000000U#define MSR_INVALID 0xffffffffU -extern int sev; -extern int sev_es;extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;u32 svm_msrpm_offset (u32 msr);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 4/13 x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDrop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).
Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +0 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@extern u64 sme_me_mask;extern u64 sev_status; -extern bool sev_enabled; void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5 -7
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (sev_enable_key);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sev_enable_key); -bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); -/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE ]__initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) ;
@@ -373,16 +371,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ -bool sme_active (void ) -{ -return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled; -} -bool sev_active (void ) {return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ; } +bool sme_active (void ) +{ +return sme_me_mask && !sev_active (); +} +/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) {
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0 -1
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; - sev_enabled = true; physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 5/13 KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRename sev and sev_es to sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled respectively to better align with other KVM terminology, and to avoid pseudo-shadowing when the variables are moved to sev.c in a future patch ('sev' is often used for local struct kvm_sev_info pointers.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -10
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)/* enable/disable SEV support */ -static int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev, int,0444 ); +static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -static int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); +static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 );static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)static int sev_es_guest_init (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { -if (!sev_es) +if (!sev_es_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;to_kvm_svm (kvm)->sev_info.es_active = true;
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev) +if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)
@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev) +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_supported = true;/* SEV-ES support requested? */ -if (!sev_es) +if (!sev_es_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
@@ -1310,8 +1310,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_es_supported = true; out: - sev = sev_supported; - sev_es = sev_es_supported; + sev_enabled = sev_supported; + sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 6/13 KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDefine sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled as 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all of sev_hardware_setup() if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:
- Makes sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled off by default if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.
- Hides the sev and sev_es modules params when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.
- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in __sev_recycle_asids() that is currently masked by the equivalent IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) check in svm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -1
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x) +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV /* enable/disable SEV support */ static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );
@@ -34,6 +35,10 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 ); +#else +#define sev_enabled false +#define sev_es_enabled false +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );
@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)void __init sev_hardware_setup (void ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1312,6 +1318,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) out: sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; +#endif }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 7/13 KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
In reply to Sean ChristophersonEnable the 'sev' and 'sev_es' module params by default instead of having them conditioned on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT. The extra Kconfig is pointless as KVM SEV/SEV-ES support is already controlled via CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV, and CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT has the unfortunate side effect of enabling all the SEV-ES _guest_ code due to it being dependent on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -2
@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV /* enable/disable SEV support */ -static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +static bool sev_enabled = true;module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +static bool sev_es_enabled = true;module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 );#else #define sev_enabled false
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Re: [PATCH v3 07/13] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Enable the 'sev' and '
sev_es' module params by default instead of having them conditioned onCONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT. The extraKconfigis pointless as KVM SEV/SEV-ES support is already controlled viaCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV, andCONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULThas the unfortunate side effect of enabling all the SEV-ES _guest_ code due to it being dependent onCONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y.Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 23 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2
-2@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV /* enable/disable SEV support */ -static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +static bool sev_enabled = true;module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +static bool sev_es_enabled = true;module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 );#else #define sev_enabled false
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 8/13 KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRemove the redundant svm_sev_enabled() check when calling sev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check from svm.c will eventually allow dropping svm_sev_enabled() entirely.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -2
@@ -886,8 +886,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void) {int cpu; -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) -sev_hardware_teardown (); +sev_hardware_teardown ();for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)svm_cpu_uninit (cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 9/13 KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuery max_sev_asid directly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper, svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ max_sev_asid = ecx; - -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!max_sev_asid) goto out;/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 10/13 KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
In reply to Sean ChristophersonMove the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +12 -0
@@ -1331,6 +1331,18 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)sev_flush_asids (); } +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) +{ +if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +return 0 ; + + sd->sev_vmcbs =kcalloc (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) +return -ENOMEM ; + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before * returning them to the system.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8 -8
@@ -552,22 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)static int svm_cpu_init (int cpu) {struct svm_cpu_data *sd; +int ret; sd =kzalloc (sizeof (struct svm_cpu_data ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!sd)return -ENOMEM ; sd->cpu = cpu; sd->save_area =alloc_page (GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sd->save_area) +if (!sd->save_area) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto free_cpu_data; + }clear_page (page_address (sd->save_area)); -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { - sd->sev_vmcbs =kcalloc (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) - goto free_save_area; - } + ret =sev_cpu_init (sd); +if (ret) + goto free_save_area;per_cpu (svm_data, cpu) = sd;
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)__free_page (sd->save_area); free_cpu_data:kfree (sd); -return -ENOMEM ; +return ret; }
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,void pre_sev_run (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int cpu);void __init sev_hardware_setup (void );void sev_hardware_teardown (void ); +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd);void sev_free_vcpu (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_handle_vmgexit (struct vcpu_svm *svm);int sev_es_string_io (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int size,unsigned int port,int in);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 11/13 KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
In reply to Sean ChristophersonReplace calls to svm_sev_enabled() with direct checks on sev_enabled, or in the case of svm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call to svm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a valid max_sev_asid with checks against sev_enabled. sev_enabled is forced off by sev_hardware_setup() if max_sev_asid is invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run after sev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario where max_sev_asid is valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -3
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)void sev_hardware_teardown (void ) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return ;bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return 0 ; sd->sev_vmcbs =kcalloc (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *),GFP_KERNEL );
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -5
@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);extern unsigned int max_sev_asid; -static inline bool svm_sev_enabled (void ) -{ -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) ? max_sev_asid :0 ; -} -void sev_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm);int svm_mem_enc_op (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 12/13 KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRemove the forward declaration of sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -1
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit; -static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (sev_bitmap_lock);unsigned int max_sev_asid;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v3 13/13 KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
In reply to Sean ChristophersonSkip SEV's expensive WBINVD and DF_FLUSH if there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where the DF_FLUSH fails during hardware teardown if the original SEV_INIT failed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM if SEV_INIT fails, but that's a problem for another day.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11 -12
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {unsigned long size; }; -static int sev_flush_asids (void ) +static int sev_flush_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int ret, error =0 ; +int ret, pos, error =0 ; + +/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ + pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); +if (pos >= max_asid) +return -EBUSY ;/* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
@@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int pos; - -/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ - pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); -if (pos >= max_asid) -return false; - -if (sev_flush_asids ()) +if (sev_flush_asids (min_asid, max_asid))return false;/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
@@ -1324,10 +1322,11 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)if (!sev_enabled)return ; +/* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */ +sev_flush_asids (0 , max_sev_asid); +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);bitmap_free (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); - -sev_flush_asids (); }int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog
Re: [PATCH v3 13/13] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and
DF_FLUSHif there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where theDF_FLUSHfails during hardware teardown if the originalSEV_INITfailed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM ifSEV_INITfails, but that's a problem for another day.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 56 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11
-12@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {unsigned long size; }; -static int sev_flush_asids (void ) +static int sev_flush_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int ret, error =0 ; +int ret, pos, error =0 ; + +/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ + pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); +if (pos >= max_asid) +return -EBUSY ;/* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail, @@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int pos; - -/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ - pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); -if (pos >= max_asid) -return false; - -if (sev_flush_asids ()) +if (sev_flush_asids (min_asid, max_asid))return false;/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */ @@ -1324,10 +1322,11 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)if (!sev_enabled)return ; +/* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */ +sev_flush_asids (0 , max_sev_asid); +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);bitmap_free (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); - -sev_flush_asids (); }int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd)