KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups
Sean Christopherson
maintainerv2 cover KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups
Minor bug fixes and refactorings of SEV related code, mainly to clean up the KVM code for tracking whether or not SEV and SEV-ES are enabled. E.g. KVM has both sev_es and svm_sev_enabled(), and a global 'sev' flag while also using 'sev' as a local variable in several places.
Based on kvm/master, commit 872f36eb0b0f ("KVM: x86: __kvm_vcpu_halt can be static").
v2:
- Remove the kernel's sev_enabled instead of renaming it to sev_guest.
- Fix various build issues. [Tom]
- Remove stable tag from the patch to free sev_asid_bitmap. Keeping the bitmap on failure is truly only a leak once svm_sev_enabled() is dropped later in the series. It's still arguably a fix since KVM will unnecessarily keep memory, but it's not stable material. [Tom]
- Collect one Ack. [Tom]
v1:
- https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Sean Christopherson (14):
KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control
variables
KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on
CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of
sev_flush_asids()
KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 17 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 5 -- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 71 +++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 35 +++------ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 8 +-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 ++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- .../arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- 16 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 1/14 KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that pre_sev_run() won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL ); +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) goto free_save_area; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson
Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that
pre_sev_run()won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) · line 576
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1
-1@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL ); +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
Alternatively, this call could just be changed to kcalloc().
Either way,
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) goto free_save_area; }
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
Quoted 20 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 19 lines · Sean Christopherson
Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that
pre_sev_run()won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) · line 576
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1
-1@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL ); +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);Alternatively, this call could just be changed to
kcalloc().
Agreed, kcalloc() is a better option. I'll do that in v3.
Re: [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson
Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that
pre_sev_run()won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) · line 579
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1
-1@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL ); +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) goto free_save_area; }
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 2/14 KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
In reply to Sean ChristophersonFree sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.
Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -1
@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap =bitmap_zalloc (max_sev_asid,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) +if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) { +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap); goto out; + }pr_info ("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n" , max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid +1 ); sev_supported = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Free
sev_asid_bitmapif the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates
svm_sev_enabled()in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. Whilesev_hardware_enabled()checksmax_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 1278
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2
-1@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap =bitmap_zalloc (max_sev_asid,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) +if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) { +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);
Until that future change, you probably need to do sev_asid_bitmap = NULL here to avoid an issue in sev_hardware_teardown() when it tries to free it again.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-0goto out; + }pr_info ("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n" , max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid +1 ); sev_supported = true;
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
Quoted 17 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson
Free
sev_asid_bitmapif the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates
svm_sev_enabled()in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. Whilesev_hardware_enabled()checksmax_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 1277
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2
-1@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap =bitmap_zalloc (max_sev_asid,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) +if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) { +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);Until that future change, you probably need to do
sev_asid_bitmap= NULL here to avoid an issue insev_hardware_teardown()when it tries to free it again.
Argh, you're right. Thanks!
Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 4 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Free
sev_asid_bitmapif the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.
Quoted 7 lines
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Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates
svm_sev_enabled()in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. Whilesev_hardware_enabled()checksmax_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")
Oops, missed this last time... I don't think the Fixes: tag is needed anymore unless you don't want the memory consumption of the first bitmap, should the allocation of the second bitmap fail, until kvm_amd is rmmod'ed. Up to you.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 23 lines
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Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 1277
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2
-1@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) goto out; sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap =bitmap_zalloc (max_sev_asid,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) +if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) { +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);Until that future change, you probably need to do
sev_asid_bitmap= NULL here to avoid an issue insev_hardware_teardown()when it tries to free it again.Argh, you're right. Thanks!
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
Quoted 12 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Free
sev_asid_bitmapif the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates
svm_sev_enabled()in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. Whilesev_hardware_enabled()checksmax_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.
Quoted 4 lines
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Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")Oops, missed this last time... I don't think the Fixes: tag is needed anymore unless you don't want the memory consumption of the first bitmap,
If Fixes is viewed as purely a "this needs to be backported", then yes, it should be dropped. But, since KVM policy is to backport only patches that are explicitly tagged with stable@, I like to use to Fixes to create a paper trail for bug fixes even if the bug is essentially benign.
That being said, I have no objection to dropping it if anyone feels strongly about not playing fast and loose with Fixes.
Quoted 2 lines
should the allocation of the second bitmap fail, until
kvm_amdis rmmod'ed. Up to you.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 3/14 KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
In reply to Sean ChristophersonUnconditionally invoke sev_hardware_setup() when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' in sev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static within sev.c and reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +-------------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x) +/* enable/disable SEV support */ +static int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param (sev, int,0444 ); + +/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ +static int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); +static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);
@@ -1249,6 +1257,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev) + goto out; +/* Does the CPU support SEV? */ if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) goto out;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -14
@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);static int vgif = true;module_param (vgif, int,0444 ); -/* enable/disable SEV support */ -int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev, int,0444 ); - -/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); -bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;module_param (dump_invalid_vmcb, bool,0644 );
@@ -976,12 +968,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME |EFER_LMSLE ); } -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) && sev) { -sev_hardware_setup (); - }else { - sev = false; - sev_es = false; - } +sev_hardware_setup ();svm_adjust_mmio_mask ();
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -2
@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)#define MSR_CR3_LONG_MBZ_MASK 0xfff0000000000000U#define MSR_INVALID 0xffffffffU -extern int sev; -extern int sev_es;extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;u32 svm_msrpm_offset (u32 msr);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Unconditionally invoke
sev_hardware_setup()when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' insev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static withinsev.cand reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +-------------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Unconditionally invoke
sev_hardware_setup()when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' insev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static withinsev.cand reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +-------------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Quoted 76 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11
-0@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x) +/* enable/disable SEV support */ +static int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param (sev, int,0444 ); + +/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ +static int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); +static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);@@ -1249,6 +1257,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev) + goto out; +/* Does the CPU support SEV? */ if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) goto out;arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1
-14@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);static int vgif = true;module_param (vgif, int,0444 ); -/* enable/disable SEV support */ -int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev, int,0444 ); - -/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); -bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;module_param (dump_invalid_vmcb, bool,0644 );@@ -976,12 +968,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME |EFER_LMSLE ); } -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) && sev) { -sev_hardware_setup (); - }else { - sev = false; - sev_es = false; - } +sev_hardware_setup ();svm_adjust_mmio_mask ();arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0
-2@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)#define MSR_CR3_LONG_MBZ_MASK 0xfff0000000000000U#define MSR_INVALID 0xffffffffU -extern int sev; -extern int sev_es;extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;u32 svm_msrpm_offset (u32 msr);
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 4/14 x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
In reply to Sean ChristophersonCollect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 17 +++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 5 ----- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5 -2
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafsCPUID_7_ECX ,CPUID_8000_0007_EBX ,CPUID_7_EDX , + CPUID_8000_001F_EAX, };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -88,8 +89,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET (feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@@ -111,8 +113,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))#define cpu_has (c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +11 -6
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@/* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 19/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 20/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1/* N 32-bit bug flags */ /*
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14)/* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15)/* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16)/* REP microcode works well */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT ( 3*32+17)/* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* FREE! ( 3*32+17) */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18)/* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19)/* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20)/* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7)/* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8)/* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9)/* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10)/* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11)/* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12)/* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13)/* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17)/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18)/* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19)/* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+20) */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21)/* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22)/* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23)/* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
@@ -236,8 +236,6 @@#define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD ( 8*32+17)/* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL ( 8*32+18)/* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19)/* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ -#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH ( 8*32+21)/* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0)/* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
@@ -383,6 +381,13 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30)/* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31)/* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +/* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME (19*32+ 0)/* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV (19*32+ 1)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH (19*32+ 2)/* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10)/* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* * BUG word(s) */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3 -0
@@ -960,6 +960,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000000a ) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX ] =cpuid_edx (0x8000000a ); +if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f ) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ); +init_scattered_cpuid_features (c);init_speculation_control (c);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +0 -5
@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, CPUID_EAX, 3, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } };
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>---
Subject should be:
x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for CPUID_0x8000001F[EAX]
but other than that, LGTM.
Anything against me taking it through tip now?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergSean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
Quoted 12 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Subject should be:
x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for CPUID_0x8000001F[EAX]
but other than that, LGTM.
Anything against me taking it through tip now?
Hmm, patch 05/14 depends on the existence of the new word. That's a non-issue if you're planning on taking this for 5.11. If it's destined for 5.12, maybe get an ack from Paolo on patch 05 and take both through tip? I can drop them from this series when I send v3. In hindsight, I should have split these two patches into a separate mini-series from the get-go.
Thanks!
Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Hmm, patch 05/14 depends on the existence of the new word. That's a non-issue if you're planning on taking this for 5.11. If it's destined for 5.12, maybe get an ack from Paolo on patch 05 and take both through tip?
Yeah, I guess that. Both are not urgent 5.11 material to take 'em now. So I guess I'll wait for Paolo's ACK.
Quoted 3 lines
I can drop them from this series when I send v3. In hindsight, I should have split these two patches into a separate mini-series from the get-go.
Nah, no worries. We do patch acrobatics on a daily basis. :-)
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergPaolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Hmm, patch 05/14 depends on the existence of the new word. That's a non-issue if you're planning on taking this for 5.11. If it's destined for 5.12, maybe get an ack from Paolo on patch 05 and take both through tip?
Yeah, I guess that. Both are not urgent 5.11 material to take 'em now. So I guess I'll wait for Paolo's ACK.
If you think this patch is valuable go ahead and pick it. I can wait until after the merge window to queue patch 5. It is independent from the others and I had questions, so I am just queuing the others for 5.12.
Paolo
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I can drop them from this series when I send v3. In hindsight, I should have split these two patches into a separate mini-series from the get-go.
Nah, no worries. We do patch acrobatics on a daily basis. :-)
Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 17 +++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 5 ----- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
Thanks
Quoted 180 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5
-2@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafsCPUID_7_ECX ,CPUID_8000_0007_EBX ,CPUID_7_EDX , + CPUID_8000_001F_EAX, };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -88,8 +89,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET (feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \@@ -111,8 +113,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))#define cpu_has (c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +11
-6@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@/* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 19/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 20/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1/* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14)/* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15)/* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16)/* REP microcode works well */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT ( 3*32+17)/* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* FREE! ( 3*32+17) */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18)/* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19)/* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20)/* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7)/* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8)/* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9)/* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10)/* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11)/* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12)/* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13)/* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17)/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18)/* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19)/* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+20) */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21)/* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22)/* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23)/* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ @@ -236,8 +236,6 @@#define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD ( 8*32+17)/* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL ( 8*32+18)/* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19)/* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ -#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH ( 8*32+21)/* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0)/* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ @@ -383,6 +381,13 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30)/* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31)/* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +/* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME (19*32+ 0)/* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV (19*32+ 1)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH (19*32+ 2)/* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10)/* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* * BUG word(s) */ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2
-1@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2
-1@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3
-0@@ -960,6 +960,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000000a ) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX ] =cpuid_edx (0x8000000a ); +if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f ) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ); +init_scattered_cpuid_features (c);init_speculation_control (c);arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +0
-5@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, CPUID_EAX, 3, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } };tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2
-1@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2
-1@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 5/14 KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask
In reply to Sean ChristophersonAdd a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)case 0x8000001F :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; +else +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1 -0
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX}, };/*
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.
Quoted 7 lines
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
thanks
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-0@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)case 0x8000001F :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; +else +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1
-0@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX}, };/*
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 33 lines · Sean Christopherson
Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-0@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)case 0x8000001F :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; +else +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { · line 69
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1
-0@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX}, };/*
I don't understand, wouldn't this also need a kvm_cpu_cap_mask call somewhere else? As it is, it doesn't do anything.
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask
Quoted 35 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 34 lines · Sean Christopherson
Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-0@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)case 0x8000001F :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; +else +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +0
-0@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1
-0[CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX}, };/* I don't understand, wouldn't this also need a
kvm_cpu_cap_maskcall somewhere else? As it is, it doesn't do anything.
Ugh, yes, apparently I thought the kernel would magically clear bits it doesn't care about.
Looking at this again, I think the kvm_cpu_cap_mask() invocation should always mask off X86_FEATURE_SME. SME cannot be virtualized, and AFAIK it's not emulated by KVM. This would fix an oddity where SME would be advertised if SEV is also supported.
Boris has queue the kernel change to tip/x86/cpu, I'll spin v4 against that.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask
Quoted 48 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 35 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 34 lines · Sean Christopherson
Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-0@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)case 0x8000001F :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SEV )) entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; +else +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +0
-0@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX},Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1
-0[CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX}, };/* I don't understand, wouldn't this also need a
kvm_cpu_cap_maskcall somewhere else? As it is, it doesn't do anything.Ugh, yes, apparently I thought the kernel would magically clear bits it doesn't care about.
Quoted 6 lines
Looking at this again, I think the
kvm_cpu_cap_mask()invocation should always mask offX86_FEATURE_SME. SME cannot be virtualized, and AFAIK it's not emulated by KVM. This would fix an oddity where SME would be advertised if SEV is also supported.Boris has queue the kernel change to tip/x86/cpu, I'll spin v4 against that.
You can send it after the 5.12 merge window.
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 6/14 x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDrop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).
Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +0 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@extern u64 sme_me_mask;extern u64 sev_status; -extern bool sev_enabled; void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5 -7
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (sev_enable_key);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sev_enable_key); -bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); -/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE ]__initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) ;
@@ -342,16 +340,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ -bool sme_active (void ) -{ -return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled; -} -bool sev_active (void ) {return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ; } +bool sme_active (void ) +{ +return sme_me_mask && !sev_active (); +} +/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) {
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0 -1
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; - sev_enabled = true; physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Drop the
sev_enabledflag and switch its one user over tosev_active().sev_enabledwas made redundant with the introduction ofsev_statusin commitb57de6cd1639("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection").sev_enabledandsev_active()are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status&MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version ofsev_status).
Quoted 7 lines
Removing
sev_enabledavoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Drop the
sev_enabledflag and switch its one user over tosev_active().sev_enabledwas made redundant with the introduction ofsev_statusin commitb57de6cd1639("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection").sev_enabledandsev_active()are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status&MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version ofsev_status).Removing
sev_enabledavoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.
Quoted 8 lines
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Thanks
Quoted 59 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +0
-1@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@extern u64 sme_me_mask;extern u64 sev_status; -extern bool sev_enabled; void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5
-7@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (sev_enable_key);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sev_enable_key); -bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); -/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE ]__initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) ;@@ -342,16 +340,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ -bool sme_active (void ) -{ -return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled; -} -bool sev_active (void ) {return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ; } +bool sme_active (void ) +{ +return sme_me_mask && !sev_active (); +} +/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) {arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0
-1@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; - sev_enabled = true; physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;return ; }
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 7/14 KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRename sev and sev_es to sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled respectively to better align with other KVM terminology, and to avoid pseudo-shadowing when the variables are moved to sev.c in a future patch ('sev' is often used for local struct kvm_sev_info pointers.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -10
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)/* enable/disable SEV support */ -static int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev, int,0444 ); +static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -static int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); +static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 );static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)static int sev_es_guest_init (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { -if (!sev_es) +if (!sev_es_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;to_kvm_svm (kvm)->sev_info.es_active = true;
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev) +if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)
@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev) +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_supported = true;/* SEV-ES support requested? */ -if (!sev_es) +if (!sev_es_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
@@ -1309,8 +1309,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_es_supported = true; out: - sev = sev_supported; - sev_es = sev_es_supported; + sev_enabled = sev_supported; + sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
Rename sev and
sev_estosev_enabledandsev_es_enabledrespectively to better align with other KVM terminology, and to avoid pseudo-shadowing when the variables are moved tosev.cin a future patch ('sev' is often used for local structkvm_sev_infopointers.
Quoted 7 lines
No functional change intended.
Acked-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
thanks
Quoted 69 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10
-10@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)/* enable/disable SEV support */ -static int sev =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev, int,0444 ); +static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ -static int sev_es =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); -module_param (sev_es, int,0444 ); +static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT ); +module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 );static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)static int sev_es_guest_init (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { -if (!sev_es) +if (!sev_es_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;to_kvm_svm (kvm)->sev_info.es_active = true;@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev) +if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev) +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */ @@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_supported = true;/* SEV-ES support requested? */ -if (!sev_es) +if (!sev_es_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */ @@ -1309,8 +1309,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_es_supported = true; out: - sev = sev_supported; - sev_es = sev_es_supported; + sev_enabled = sev_supported; + sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 8/14 KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDefine sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled as 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all of sev_hardware_setup() if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:
- Makes sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled off by default if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.
- Hides the sev and sev_es module params when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.
- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in __sev_recycle_asids() that is currently masked by the equivalent IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) check in svm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -1
@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)/* enable/disable SEV support */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 ); +#else +#define sev_enabled false +#define sev_es_enabled false +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );
@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)void __init sev_hardware_setup (void ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1311,6 +1317,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) out: sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; +#endif }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Define
sev_enabledandsev_es_enabledas 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all ofsev_hardware_setup()ifCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:- Makes
sev_enabledandsev_es_enabledoff by default ifCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default ifCONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.
Quoted 8 lines
- Hides the sev and
sev_esmodule params whenCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in
__sev_recycle_asids()that is currently masked by the equivalentIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)check insvm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Quoted 49 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-1@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)/* enable/disable SEV support */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 ); +#else +#define sev_enabled false +#define sev_es_enabled false +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)void __init sev_hardware_setup (void ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */ @@ -1311,6 +1317,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) out: sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; +#endif }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Define
sev_enabledandsev_es_enabledas 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all ofsev_hardware_setup()ifCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:- Makes
sev_enabledandsev_es_enabledoff by default ifCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default ifCONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.- Hides the sev and
sev_esmodule params whenCONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in
__sev_recycle_asids()that is currently masked by the equivalentIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)check insvm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.
Quoted 5 lines
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
thanks
Quoted 45 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-1@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@#define __ex (x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)/* enable/disable SEV support */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV static bool sev_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev, sev_enabled, bool,0444 );/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */ static bool sev_es_enabled =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT );module_param_named (sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool,0444 ); +#else +#define sev_enabled false +#define sev_es_enabled false +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit;static int sev_flush_asids (void );@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)void __init sev_hardware_setup (void ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;bool sev_es_supported = false;bool sev_supported = false; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled) goto out;/* Does the CPU support SEV? */ @@ -1311,6 +1317,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) out: sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; +#endif }void sev_hardware_teardown (void )
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 9/14 KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRemove the redundant svm_sev_enabled() check when calling sev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check from svm.c will eventually allow dropping svm_sev_enabled() entirely.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -2
@@ -887,8 +887,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void) {int cpu; -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) -sev_hardware_teardown (); +sev_hardware_teardown ();for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)svm_cpu_uninit (cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 09/14] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
Quoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson
Remove the redundant
svm_sev_enabled()check when callingsev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check fromsvm.cwill eventually allow droppingsvm_sev_enabled()entirely.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 19 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1
-2@@ -887,8 +887,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void) {int cpu; -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) -sev_hardware_teardown (); +sev_hardware_teardown ();for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)svm_cpu_uninit (cpu);
Re: [PATCH v2 09/14] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Remove the redundant
svm_sev_enabled()check when callingsev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check fromsvm.cwill eventually allow droppingsvm_sev_enabled()entirely.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1
-2@@ -887,8 +887,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void) {int cpu; -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) -sev_hardware_teardown (); +sev_hardware_teardown ();for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)svm_cpu_uninit (cpu);
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 10/14 KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuery max_sev_asid directly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper, svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ max_sev_asid = ecx; - -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!max_sev_asid) goto out;/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Query
max_sev_asiddirectly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper,svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
thanks
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-2@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ max_sev_asid = ecx; - -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!max_sev_asid) goto out;/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Query
max_sev_asiddirectly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper,svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 19 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-2@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ max_sev_asid = ecx; - -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!max_sev_asid) goto out;/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 11/14 KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
In reply to Sean ChristophersonMove the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +13 -0
@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)sev_flush_asids (); } +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) +{ +if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +return 0 ; + + sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); +if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) +return -ENOMEM ; + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before * returning them to the system.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8 -9
@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)static int svm_cpu_init (int cpu) {struct svm_cpu_data *sd; +int ret; sd =kzalloc (sizeof (struct svm_cpu_data ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!sd)return -ENOMEM ; sd->cpu = cpu; sd->save_area =alloc_page (GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sd->save_area) +if (!sd->save_area) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto free_cpu_data; + }clear_page (page_address (sd->save_area)); -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { - sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 , -sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); -if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) - goto free_save_area; - } + ret =sev_cpu_init (sd); +if (ret) + goto free_save_area;per_cpu (svm_data, cpu) = sd;
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)__free_page (sd->save_area); free_cpu_data:kfree (sd); -return -ENOMEM ; +return ret; }
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,void pre_sev_run (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int cpu);void __init sev_hardware_setup (void );void sev_hardware_teardown (void ); +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd);void sev_free_vcpu (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_handle_vmgexit (struct vcpu_svm *svm);int sev_es_string_io (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int size,unsigned int port,int in);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
Quoted 17 lines · Sean Christopherson
Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to
sev.cto help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly withinsev.c.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1339
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7
-0@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)sev_flush_asids (); } +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) +{ +if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +return 0 ; + + sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous patch. With that fixed,
Quoted 65 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +6
-0+if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) +return -ENOMEM ; + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before * returning them to the system. arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8
-9@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)static int svm_cpu_init (int cpu) {struct svm_cpu_data *sd; +int ret; sd =kzalloc (sizeof (struct svm_cpu_data ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!sd)return -ENOMEM ; sd->cpu = cpu; sd->save_area =alloc_page (GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sd->save_area) +if (!sd->save_area) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto free_cpu_data; + }clear_page (page_address (sd->save_area)); -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { - sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 , -sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); -if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) - goto free_save_area; - } + ret =sev_cpu_init (sd); +if (ret) + goto free_save_area;per_cpu (svm_data, cpu) = sd;@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)__free_page (sd->save_area); free_cpu_data:kfree (sd); -return -ENOMEM ; +return ret; }arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1
-0@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,void pre_sev_run (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int cpu);void __init sev_hardware_setup (void );void sev_hardware_teardown (void ); +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd);void sev_free_vcpu (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_handle_vmgexit (struct vcpu_svm *svm);int sev_es_string_io (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int size,unsigned int port,int in);
Re: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
Quoted 22 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson
Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to
sev.cto help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly withinsev.c.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)sev_flush_asids (); }
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1339
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7
-0+int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) +{ +if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +return 0 ; + + sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 ,sizeof (void *), +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of
__GFP_ZEROin previous
kcalloc :)
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 70 lines
patch. With that fixed,
Reviewed-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Quoted 65 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +6
-0+if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) +return -ENOMEM ; + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before * returning them to the system. arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8
-9@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)static int svm_cpu_init (int cpu) {struct svm_cpu_data *sd; +int ret; sd =kzalloc (sizeof (struct svm_cpu_data ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!sd)return -ENOMEM ; sd->cpu = cpu; sd->save_area =alloc_page (GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sd->save_area) +if (!sd->save_area) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto free_cpu_data; + }clear_page (page_address (sd->save_area)); -if (svm_sev_enabled ()) { - sd->sev_vmcbs =kmalloc_array (max_sev_asid +1 , -sizeof (void *), -GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); -if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) - goto free_save_area; - } + ret =sev_cpu_init (sd); +if (ret) + goto free_save_area;per_cpu (svm_data, cpu) = sd;@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)__free_page (sd->save_area); free_cpu_data:kfree (sd); -return -ENOMEM ; +return ret; }arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1
-0@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,void pre_sev_run (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int cpu);void __init sev_hardware_setup (void );void sev_hardware_teardown (void ); +int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd);void sev_free_vcpu (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_handle_vmgexit (struct vcpu_svm *svm);int sev_es_string_io (struct vcpu_svm *svm,int size,unsigned int port,int in);
Re: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to
sev.cto help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly withinsev.c.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 12/14 KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
In reply to Sean ChristophersonReplace calls to svm_sev_enabled() with direct checks on sev_enabled, or in the case of svm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call to svm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a valid max_sev_asid with checks against sev_enabled. sev_enabled is forced off by sev_hardware_setup() if max_sev_asid is invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run after sev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario where max_sev_asid is valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -3
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)void sev_hardware_teardown (void ) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return ;bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return 0 ; sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -5
@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);extern unsigned int max_sev_asid; -static inline bool svm_sev_enabled (void ) -{ -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) ? max_sev_asid :0 ; -} -void sev_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm);int svm_mem_enc_op (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 12/14] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Replace calls to
svm_sev_enabled()with direct checks onsev_enabled, or in the case ofsvm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call tosvm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a validmax_sev_asidwith checks againstsev_enabled.sev_enabledis forced off bysev_hardware_setup()ifmax_sev_asidis invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run aftersev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario wheremax_sev_asidis valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Thanks
Quoted 47 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3
-3@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)void sev_hardware_teardown (void ) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return ;bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return 0 ; sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0
-5@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);extern unsigned int max_sev_asid; -static inline bool svm_sev_enabled (void ) -{ -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) ? max_sev_asid :0 ; -} -void sev_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm);int svm_mem_enc_op (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
Re: [PATCH v2 12/14] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Replace calls to
svm_sev_enabled()with direct checks onsev_enabled, or in the case ofsvm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call tosvm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a validmax_sev_asidwith checks againstsev_enabled.sev_enabledis forced off bysev_hardware_setup()ifmax_sev_asidis invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run aftersev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario wheremax_sev_asidis valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Ultimately the #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV that you added that #defines sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled to false, resolves the build issue when kvm_amd is built into the kernel and ccp is built as a module, for which svm_sev_enabled() was originally created.
Quoted 53 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3
-3@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;int r; -if (!svm_sev_enabled () || !sev_enabled) +if (!sev_enabled)return -ENOTTY ;if (!argp)@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)void sev_hardware_teardown (void ) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return ;bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { -if (!svm_sev_enabled ()) +if (!sev_enabled)return 0 ; sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0
-5@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);extern unsigned int max_sev_asid; -static inline bool svm_sev_enabled (void ) -{ -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV ) ? max_sev_asid :0 ; -} -void sev_vm_destroy (struct kvm *kvm);int svm_mem_enc_op (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *argp); int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 13/14 KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRemove the forward declaration of sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -1
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit; -static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (sev_bitmap_lock);unsigned int max_sev_asid;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Remove the forward declaration of
sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
Thanks
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-1@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit; -static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (sev_bitmap_lock);unsigned int max_sev_asid;
Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Remove the forward declaration of
sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 17 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-1@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ static u8 sev_enc_bit; -static int sev_flush_asids (void );static DECLARE_RWSEM (sev_deactivate_lock);static DEFINE_MUTEX (sev_bitmap_lock);unsigned int max_sev_asid;
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 14/14 KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
In reply to Sean ChristophersonSkip SEV's expensive WBINVD and DF_FLUSH if there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where the DF_FLUSH fails during hardware teardown if the original SEV_INIT failed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM if SEV_INIT fails, but that's a problem for another day.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -12
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {unsigned long size; }; -static int sev_flush_asids (void ) +static int sev_flush_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int ret, error =0 ; +int ret, pos, error =0 ; + +/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ + pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); +if (pos >= max_asid) +return -EBUSY ;/* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
@@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int pos; - -/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ - pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); -if (pos >= max_asid) -return false; - -if (sev_flush_asids ()) +if (sev_flush_asids (min_asid, max_asid))return false;/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)if (!sev_enabled)return ; +sev_flush_asids (0 , max_sev_asid); +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);bitmap_free (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); - -sev_flush_asids (); }int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
Quoted 49 lines · Sean Christopherson
Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and
DF_FLUSHif there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where theDF_FLUSHfails during hardware teardown if the originalSEV_INITfailed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM ifSEV_INITfails, but that's a problem for another day.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-10@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {unsigned long size; }; -static int sev_flush_asids (void ) +static int sev_flush_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int ret, error =0 ; +int ret, pos, error =0 ; + +/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ + pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); +if (pos >= max_asid) +return -EBUSY ;/* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail, @@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int pos; - -/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ - pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); -if (pos >= max_asid) -return false; - -if (sev_flush_asids ()) +if (sev_flush_asids (min_asid, max_asid))return false;/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1324
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-0@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)if (!sev_enabled)return ; +sev_flush_asids (0 , max_sev_asid);
I guess you could have called __sev_recycle_asids(0, max_sev_asid) here and left things unchanged up above. It would do the extra bitmap_xor() and bitmap_zero() operations, though. What do you think?
Also, maybe a comment about not needing the bitmap lock because this is during teardown.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-2+bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);bitmap_free (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); - -sev_flush_asids (); }int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
Quoted 46 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 45 lines · Sean Christopherson
Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and
DF_FLUSHif there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where theDF_FLUSHfails during hardware teardown if the originalSEV_INITfailed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM ifSEV_INITfails, but that's a problem for another day.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-10@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {unsigned long size; }; -static int sev_flush_asids (void ) +static int sev_flush_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int ret, error =0 ; +int ret, pos, error =0 ; + +/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ + pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); +if (pos >= max_asid) +return -EBUSY ;/* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail, @@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int pos; - -/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ - pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); -if (pos >= max_asid) -return false; - -if (sev_flush_asids ()) +if (sev_flush_asids (min_asid, max_asid))return false;/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1323
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-0@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)if (!sev_enabled)return ; +sev_flush_asids (0 , max_sev_asid);I guess you could have called
__sev_recycle_asids(0, max_sev_asid)here and left things unchanged up above. It would do the extrabitmap_xor()andbitmap_zero()operations, though. What do you think?
IMO, calling "recycle" from the teardown flow would be confusing without a comment to explain that it's the flush that we really care about, and at that point it's hard to argue against calling "flush" directly.
The cost of the extra operations is almost certainly negligible, but similar to above it will leave readers wonder why the teardown flow bothers to xor/zero the bitmap, only to immediately free it.
Quoted 2 lines
Also, maybe a comment about not needing the bitmap lock because this is during teardown.
Ya, I'll add that.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 52 lines · Sean Christopherson
Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and
DF_FLUSHif there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where theDF_FLUSHfails during hardware teardown if the originalSEV_INITfailed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM ifSEV_INITfails, but that's a problem for another day.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8
-10@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {unsigned long size; }; -static int sev_flush_asids (void ) +static int sev_flush_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int ret, error =0 ; +int ret, pos, error =0 ; + +/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ + pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); +if (pos >= max_asid) +return -EBUSY ;/* * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail, @@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (int min_asid,int max_asid) { -int pos; - -/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */ - pos =find_next_bit (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid); -if (pos >= max_asid) -return false; - -if (sev_flush_asids ()) +if (sev_flush_asids (min_asid, max_asid))return false;/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */ @@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)if (!sev_enabled)return ;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1330
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2
-2+sev_flush_asids (0 , max_sev_asid); +bitmap_free (sev_asid_bitmap);bitmap_free (sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap); - -sev_flush_asids (); }int sev_cpu_init (struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
I can't find 00/14 in my inbox, so: queued 1-3 and 6-14, thanks.
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
Quoted 1 line · Paolo Bonzini
I can't find 00/14 in my inbox, so: queued 1-3 and 6-14, thanks.
If it's not too late, v3 has a few tweaks that would be nice to have, as well as a new patch to remove the CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT dependency.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · Paolo Bonzini
I can't find 00/14 in my inbox, so: queued 1-3 and 6-14, thanks.
If it's not too late, v3 has a few tweaks that would be nice to have, as well as a new patch to remove the
CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULTdependency.
Yes, will do (I had done all of them myself except the comment in sev_hardware_teardown() but it's better to match what was sent to LKML).
Paolo