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KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups

PATCH Superseded Sean Christopherson 5 participants 54 messages Jan 14, 2021 – Jan 28, 2021

Subsystems (4)

v2 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

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Sean Christopherson

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v2 cover KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups

Minor bug fixes and refactorings of SEV related code, mainly to clean up the KVM code for tracking whether or not SEV and SEV-ES are enabled. E.g. KVM has both sev_es and svm_sev_enabled(), and a global 'sev' flag while also using 'sev' as a local variable in several places.

Based on kvm/master, commit 872f36eb0b0f ("KVM: x86: __kvm_vcpu_halt can be static").

v2:
- Remove the kernel's sev_enabled instead of renaming it to sev_guest.
- Fix various build issues. [Tom]
- Remove stable tag from the patch to free sev_asid_bitmap. Keeping the bitmap on failure is truly only a leak once svm_sev_enabled() is dropped later in the series. It's still arguably a fix since KVM will unnecessarily keep memory, but it's not stable material. [Tom]
- Collect one Ack. [Tom]

v1:
- https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Sean Christopherson (14):
KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption
KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control
variables
KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on
CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of
sev_flush_asids()
KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h             |  7 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            | 17 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h            |  1 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c               |  5 --
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                          |  2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 71 +++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        | 35 +++------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |  8 +--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c                     | 12 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c            |  1 -
 .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h  |  3 +-
 .../arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h  |  3 +-
 16 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/14 KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association

Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that pre_sev_run() won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
index 7ef171790d02..ccf52c5531fb 100644
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
 		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
 					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
 			goto free_save_area;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 1/14
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association

Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson

Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that pre_sev_run() won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0 -0
index 7ef171790d02..ccf52c5531fb 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) · line 576

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
  	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
  		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
  					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

Alternatively, this call could just be changed to kcalloc().

Either way,

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0 -0
  		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
  			goto free_save_area;
  	}
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association

Quoted 20 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 19 lines · Sean Christopherson

Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that pre_sev_run() won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 12 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) · line 576

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
index 7ef171790d02..ccf52c5531fb 100644
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
  	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
  		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
  					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

Alternatively, this call could just be changed to kcalloc().

Agreed, kcalloc() is a better option. I'll do that in v3.

Reviewed-by on v2 1/14
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson

Zero out the array of VMCB pointers so that pre_sev_run() won't see garbage when querying the array to detect when an SEV ASID is being associated with a new VMCB. In practice, reading random values is all but guaranteed to be benign as a false negative (which is extremely unlikely on its own) can only happen on CPU0 on the first VMRUN and would only cause KVM to skip the ASID flush. For anything bad to happen, a previous instance of KVM would have to exit without flushing the ASID, _and_ KVM would have to not flush the ASID at any time while building the new SEV guest.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Fixes 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0 -0
index 7ef171790d02..ccf52c5531fb 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) · line 579

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
 		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
 					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
 			goto free_save_area;
 	}
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/14 KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Free sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.

Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.

Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -1
index c8ffdbc81709..0eeb6e1b803d 100644
@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 		goto out;
 
 	sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap)
+	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
+		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1);
 	sev_supported = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails

Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson

Free sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.

Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.

Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -0
index c8ffdbc81709..0eeb6e1b803d 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 1278

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -1
@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
  		goto out;
 
  	sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap)
+	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
+		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);

Until that future change, you probably need to do sev_asid_bitmap = NULL here to avoid an issue in sev_hardware_teardown() when it tries to free it again.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -0
  		goto out;
+	}
 
  	pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1);
  	sev_supported = true;
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails

Quoted 17 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson

Free sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.

Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.

Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 14 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 1277

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -1
index c8ffdbc81709..0eeb6e1b803d 100644
@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
  		goto out;
  	sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap)
+	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
+		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);

Until that future change, you probably need to do sev_asid_bitmap = NULL here to avoid an issue in sev_hardware_teardown() when it tries to free it again.

Argh, you're right. Thanks!

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails

Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 4 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

Free sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.

Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")

Oops, missed this last time... I don't think the Fixes: tag is needed anymore unless you don't want the memory consumption of the first bitmap, should the allocation of the second bitmap fail, until kvm_amd is rmmod'ed. Up to you.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
---
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 14 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 1277

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -1
index c8ffdbc81709..0eeb6e1b803d 100644
@@ -1274,8 +1274,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
   		goto out;
   	sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap)
+	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
+		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);

Until that future change, you probably need to do sev_asid_bitmap = NULL here to avoid an issue in sev_hardware_teardown() when it tries to free it again.

Argh, you're right. Thanks!

author maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails

Quoted 12 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson

Free sev_asid_bitmap if the reclaim bitmap allocation fails, othwerise KVM will unnecessarily keep the bitmap when SEV is not fully enabled.

Freeing the page is also necessary to avoid introducing a bug when a future patch eliminates svm_sev_enabled() in favor of using the global 'sev' flag directly. While sev_hardware_enabled() checks max_sev_asid, which is true even if KVM setup fails, 'sev' will be true if and only if KVM setup fully succeeds.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Fixes 33af3a7ef9e6 ("KVM: SVM: Reduce WBINVD/DF_FLUSH invocations")

Oops, missed this last time... I don't think the Fixes: tag is needed anymore unless you don't want the memory consumption of the first bitmap,

If Fixes is viewed as purely a "this needs to be backported", then yes, it should be dropped. But, since KVM policy is to backport only patches that are explicitly tagged with stable@, I like to use to Fixes to create a paper trail for bug fixes even if the bug is essentially benign.

That being said, I have no objection to dropping it if anyone feels strongly about not playing fast and loose with Fixes.

Quoted 2 lines

should the allocation of the second bitmap fail, until kvm_amd is rmmod'ed. Up to you.

author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/14 KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_setup() when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' in sev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static within sev.c and reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +--------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 --
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11 -0
index 0eeb6e1b803d..8ba93b8fa435 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
 
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
+/* enable/disable SEV support */
+static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
+static int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
+
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
@@ -1249,6 +1257,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev)
+		goto out;
+
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
 		goto out;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -14
index ccf52c5531fb..f89f702b2a58 100644
@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);
 static int vgif = true;
 module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
 
-/* enable/disable SEV support */
-int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev, int, 0444);
-
-/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
-int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
-
 bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
 module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
 
@@ -976,12 +968,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
 	}
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) && sev) {
-		sev_hardware_setup();
-	} else {
-		sev = false;
-		sev_es = false;
-	}
+	sev_hardware_setup();
 
 	svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
 
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -2
index 0fe874ae5498..8e169835f52a 100644
@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 #define MSR_CR3_LONG_MBZ_MASK			0xfff0000000000000U
 #define MSR_INVALID				0xffffffffU
 
-extern int sev;
-extern int sev_es;
 extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;
 
 u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 3/14
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c

Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson

Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_setup() when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' in sev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static within sev.c and reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.

Quoted 6 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +--------------
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 --
  3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by on v2 3/14
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson

Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_setup() when configuring SVM and handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' in sev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static within sev.c and reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.

Quoted 6 lines
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +--------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 --
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Quoted 76 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +11 -0
index 0eeb6e1b803d..8ba93b8fa435 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
 
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
+/* enable/disable SEV support */
+static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
+static int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
+
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
@@ -1249,6 +1257,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev)
+		goto out;
+
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
 		goto out;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -14
index ccf52c5531fb..f89f702b2a58 100644
@@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);
 static int vgif = true;
 module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
 
-/* enable/disable SEV support */
-int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev, int, 0444);
-
-/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
-int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
-
 bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
 module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
 
@@ -976,12 +968,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
 	}
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) && sev) {
-		sev_hardware_setup();
-	} else {
-		sev = false;
-		sev_es = false;
-	}
+	sev_hardware_setup();
 
 	svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
 
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -2
index 0fe874ae5498..8e169835f52a 100644
@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 #define MSR_CR3_LONG_MBZ_MASK			0xfff0000000000000U
 #define MSR_INVALID				0xffffffffU
 
-extern int sev;
-extern int sev_es;
 extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;
 
 u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr);
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/14 x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h              |  7 +++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h             | 17 +++++++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h       |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                   |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c                |  5 -----
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  3 ++-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h |  3 ++-
 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5 -2
index 59bf91c57aa8..1728d4ce5730 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
 	CPUID_7_ECX,
 	CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
 	CPUID_7_EDX,
+	CPUID_8000_001F_EAX,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -88,8 +89,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) ||	\
+	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK					  ||	\
-	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
 
 #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit)				\
 	 ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK,  0, feature_bit) ||	\
@@ -111,8 +113,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) ||	\
+	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   DISABLED_MASK_CHECK					  ||	\
-	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
 
 #define cpu_has(c, bit)							\
 	(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 :	\
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +11 -6
index 9f9e9511f7cd..7c0bb1a20050 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 /*
  * Defines x86 CPU feature bits
  */
-#define NCAPINTS			19	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS			20	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
 #define NBUGINTS			1	   /* N 32-bit bug flags */
 
 /*
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32		( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32		( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD		( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	( 3*32+17) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
+/* FREE!                                ( 3*32+17) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC	( 3*32+18) /* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER		( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL		( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE	( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE		( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+/* FREE!                                ( 7*32+10) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV			( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+/* FREE!                                ( 7*32+20) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
@@ -236,8 +236,6 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD		( 8*32+17) /* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL		( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL		( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	( 8*32+21) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
@@ -383,6 +381,13 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
+/* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME			(19*32+ 0) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV			(19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	(19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
index 5861d34f9771..2216077676c8 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define DISABLED_MASK19	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
index 3ff0d48469f2..b2d504f11937 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define REQUIRED_MASK16	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK17	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK18	0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK19	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3 -0
index 35ad8480c464..9215b91bc044 100644
@@ -960,6 +960,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
 		c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
 
+	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f)
+		c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f);
+
 	init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
 	init_speculation_control(c);
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +0 -5
index 236924930bf0..972ec3bfa9c0 100644
@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_MBA,		CPUID_EBX,  6, 0x80000008, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SME,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SEV,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES,		CPUID_EAX,  3, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT,	CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH,	CPUID_EAX,  2, 0x8000001f, 0 },
 	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
index 5861d34f9771..2216077676c8 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define DISABLED_MASK19	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
index 3ff0d48469f2..b2d504f11937 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define REQUIRED_MASK16	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK17	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK18	0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK19	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson

Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.

No functional change intended.

---

Subject should be:

x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for CPUID_0x8000001F[EAX]

but other than that, LGTM.

Anything against me taking it through tip now?

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

Quoted 12 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson

Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.

No functional change intended.

---

Quoted 7 lines

Subject should be:

x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for CPUID_0x8000001F[EAX]

but other than that, LGTM.

Anything against me taking it through tip now?

Hmm, patch 05/14 depends on the existence of the new word. That's a non-issue if you're planning on taking this for 5.11. If it's destined for 5.12, maybe get an ack from Paolo on patch 05 and take both through tip? I can drop them from this series when I send v3. In hindsight, I should have split these two patches into a separate mini-series from the get-go.

Thanks!

#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

Hmm, patch 05/14 depends on the existence of the new word. That's a non-issue if you're planning on taking this for 5.11. If it's destined for 5.12, maybe get an ack from Paolo on patch 05 and take both through tip?

Yeah, I guess that. Both are not urgent 5.11 material to take 'em now. So I guess I'll wait for Paolo's ACK.

Quoted 3 lines

I can drop them from this series when I send v3. In hindsight, I should have split these two patches into a separate mini-series from the get-go.

Nah, no worries. We do patch acrobatics on a daily basis. :-)

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

Hmm, patch 05/14 depends on the existence of the new word. That's a non-issue if you're planning on taking this for 5.11. If it's destined for 5.12, maybe get an ack from Paolo on patch 05 and take both through tip?

Yeah, I guess that. Both are not urgent 5.11 material to take 'em now. So I guess I'll wait for Paolo's ACK.

If you think this patch is valuable go ahead and pick it. I can wait until after the merge window to queue patch 5. It is independent from the others and I had questions, so I am just queuing the others for 5.12.

Paolo

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I can drop them from this series when I send v3. In hindsight, I should have split these two patches into a separate mini-series from the get-go.

Nah, no worries. We do patch acrobatics on a daily basis. :-)

Reviewed-by on v2 4/14
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson

Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX, with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting the set of supported features to userspace.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 10 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h              |  7 +++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h             | 17 +++++++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h       |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h       |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                   |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c                |  5 -----
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  3 ++-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h |  3 ++-
 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

Thanks

Quoted 180 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5 -2
index 59bf91c57aa8..1728d4ce5730 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
 	CPUID_7_ECX,
 	CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
 	CPUID_7_EDX,
+	CPUID_8000_001F_EAX,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -88,8 +89,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) ||	\
+	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK					  ||	\
-	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
 
 #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit)				\
 	 ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK,  0, feature_bit) ||	\
@@ -111,8 +113,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) ||	\
+	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   DISABLED_MASK_CHECK					  ||	\
-	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
 
 #define cpu_has(c, bit)							\
 	(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 :	\
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +11 -6
index 9f9e9511f7cd..7c0bb1a20050 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 /*
  * Defines x86 CPU feature bits
  */
-#define NCAPINTS			19	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS			20	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
 #define NBUGINTS			1	   /* N 32-bit bug flags */
 
 /*
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32		( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32		( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD		( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	( 3*32+17) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
+/* FREE!                                ( 3*32+17) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC	( 3*32+18) /* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER		( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL		( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE	( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE		( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+/* FREE!                                ( 7*32+10) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV			( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+/* FREE!                                ( 7*32+20) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
@@ -236,8 +236,6 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD		( 8*32+17) /* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL		( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL		( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	( 8*32+21) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
@@ -383,6 +381,13 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
+/* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME			(19*32+ 0) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV			(19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	(19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
index 5861d34f9771..2216077676c8 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define DISABLED_MASK19	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
index 3ff0d48469f2..b2d504f11937 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define REQUIRED_MASK16	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK17	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK18	0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK19	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3 -0
index 35ad8480c464..9215b91bc044 100644
@@ -960,6 +960,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
 		c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
 
+	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f)
+		c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f);
+
 	init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
 	init_speculation_control(c);
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +0 -5
index 236924930bf0..972ec3bfa9c0 100644
@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_MBA,		CPUID_EBX,  6, 0x80000008, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SME,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SEV,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES,		CPUID_EAX,  3, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT,	CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 },
-	{ X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH,	CPUID_EAX,  2, 0x8000001f, 0 },
 	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
index 5861d34f9771..2216077676c8 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define DISABLED_MASK19	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
index 3ff0d48469f2..b2d504f11937 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define REQUIRED_MASK16	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK17	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK18	0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK19	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/14 KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.

Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
index 13036cf0b912..b7618cdd06b5 100644
@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 	case 0x8000001F:
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
 			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		else
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
 		break;
 	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
 	case 0xC0000000:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1 -0
index dc921d76e42e..8b6fc9bde248 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
 	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
 	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
 	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX},
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 5/14
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask

Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson

Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.

Quoted 7 lines
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

thanks

Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
index 13036cf0b912..b7618cdd06b5 100644
@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 	case 0x8000001F:
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
 			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		else
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
 		break;
 	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
 	case 0xC0000000:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1 -0
index dc921d76e42e..8b6fc9bde248 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
 	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
 	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
 	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX},
 };
 
 /*
maintainer
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 33 lines · Sean Christopherson

Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.

Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
index 13036cf0b912..b7618cdd06b5 100644
@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
  	case 0x8000001F:
  		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
  			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		else
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
  		break;
  	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
  	case 0xC0000000:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +0 -0
index dc921d76e42e..8b6fc9bde248 100644

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { · line 69

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1 -0
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
  	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
  	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
  	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX},
  };
 
  /*

I don't understand, wouldn't this also need a kvm_cpu_cap_mask call somewhere else? As it is, it doesn't do anything.

Paolo

author maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask

Quoted 35 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 34 lines · Sean Christopherson

Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.

Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
index 13036cf0b912..b7618cdd06b5 100644
@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
  	case 0x8000001F:
  		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
  			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		else
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
  		break;
  	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
  	case 0xC0000000:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +0 -0
index dc921d76e42e..8b6fc9bde248 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
  	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
  	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1 -0
  	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX},
  };
  /*
 

I don't understand, wouldn't this also need a kvm_cpu_cap_mask call somewhere else? As it is, it doesn't do anything.

Ugh, yes, apparently I thought the kernel would magically clear bits it doesn't care about.

Looking at this again, I think the kvm_cpu_cap_mask() invocation should always mask off X86_FEATURE_SME. SME cannot be virtualized, and AFAIK it's not emulated by KVM. This would fix an oddity where SME would be advertised if SEV is also supported.

Boris has queue the kernel change to tip/x86/cpu, I'll spin v4 against that.

maintainer
#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask

Quoted 48 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 35 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 34 lines · Sean Christopherson

Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace.

Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
   arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
   arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -0
index 13036cf0b912..b7618cdd06b5 100644
@@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
   	case 0x8000001F:
   		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
   			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		else
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
   		break;
   	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
   	case 0xC0000000:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +0 -0
index dc921d76e42e..8b6fc9bde248 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
   	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
   	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +1 -0
   	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 1, CPUID_EAX},
   };
   /*
 

I don't understand, wouldn't this also need a kvm_cpu_cap_mask call somewhere else? As it is, it doesn't do anything.

Ugh, yes, apparently I thought the kernel would magically clear bits it doesn't care about.

Quoted 6 lines

Looking at this again, I think the kvm_cpu_cap_mask() invocation should always mask off X86_FEATURE_SME. SME cannot be virtualized, and AFAIK it's not emulated by KVM. This would fix an oddity where SME would be advertised if SEV is also supported.

Boris has queue the kernel change to tip/x86/cpu, I'll spin v4 against that.

You can send it after the 5.12 merge window.

Paolo

author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/14 x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).

Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  1 -
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 12 +++++-------
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c |  1 -
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +0 -1
index 2f62bbdd9d12..88d624499411 100644
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 
 extern u64 sme_me_mask;
 extern u64 sev_status;
-extern bool sev_enabled;
 
 void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
 			 unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5 -7
index bc0833713be9..b89bc03c63a2 100644
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
 
-bool sev_enabled __section(".data");
-
 /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
 static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
@@ -342,16 +340,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
  * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
  * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
  */
-bool sme_active(void)
-{
-	return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
-}
-
 bool sev_active(void)
 {
 	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
 }
 
+bool sme_active(void)
+{
+	return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
+}
+
 /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
 bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
 {
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0 -1
index 6c5eb6f3f14f..0c2759b7f03a 100644
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 
 		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
-		sev_enabled = true;
 		physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
 		return;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 6/14
#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'

Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson

Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).

Quoted 7 lines

Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 6 lines
---
  arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  1 -
  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 12 +++++-------
  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c |  1 -
  3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by on v2 6/14
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson

Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).

Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes.

Quoted 8 lines

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  1 -
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 12 +++++-------
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c |  1 -
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

Thanks

Quoted 59 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +0 -1
index 2f62bbdd9d12..88d624499411 100644
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 
 extern u64 sme_me_mask;
 extern u64 sev_status;
-extern bool sev_enabled;
 
 void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
 			 unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +5 -7
index bc0833713be9..b89bc03c63a2 100644
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
 
-bool sev_enabled __section(".data");
-
 /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
 static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
@@ -342,16 +340,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
  * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
  * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
  */
-bool sme_active(void)
-{
-	return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
-}
-
 bool sev_active(void)
 {
 	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
 }
 
+bool sme_active(void)
+{
+	return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
+}
+
 /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
 bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
 {
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0 -1
index 6c5eb6f3f14f..0c2759b7f03a 100644
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 
 		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
-		sev_enabled = true;
 		physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
 		return;
 	}
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/14 KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Rename sev and sev_es to sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled respectively to better align with other KVM terminology, and to avoid pseudo-shadowing when the variables are moved to sev.c in a future patch ('sev' is often used for local struct kvm_sev_info pointers.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -10
index 8ba93b8fa435..a024edabaca5 100644
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
-static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
-static int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
+static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 static int sev_es_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
-	if (!sev_es)
+	if (!sev_es_enabled)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
 	to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.es_active = true;
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
 	int r;
 
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev)
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev_enabled)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
 	if (!argp)
@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev)
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	sev_supported = true;
 
 	/* SEV-ES support requested? */
-	if (!sev_es)
+	if (!sev_es_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
@@ -1309,8 +1309,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	sev_es_supported = true;
 
 out:
-	sev = sev_supported;
-	sev_es = sev_es_supported;
+	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
+	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 7/14
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables

Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson

Rename sev and sev_es to sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled respectively to better align with other KVM terminology, and to avoid pseudo-shadowing when the variables are moved to sev.c in a future patch ('sev' is often used for local struct kvm_sev_info pointers.

Quoted 7 lines

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

thanks

Quoted 69 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -10
index 8ba93b8fa435..a024edabaca5 100644
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
-static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
-static int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
-module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
+static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 static int sev_es_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
-	if (!sev_es)
+	if (!sev_es_enabled)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
 	to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.es_active = true;
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
 	int r;
 
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev)
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev_enabled)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
 	if (!argp)
@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev)
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	sev_supported = true;
 
 	/* SEV-ES support requested? */
-	if (!sev_es)
+	if (!sev_es_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
@@ -1309,8 +1309,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	sev_es_supported = true;
 
 out:
-	sev = sev_supported;
-	sev_es = sev_es_supported;
+	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
+	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/14 KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Define sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled as 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all of sev_hardware_setup() if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:

- Makes sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled off by default if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.

- Hides the sev and sev_es module params when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.

- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in __sev_recycle_asids() that is currently masked by the equivalent IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) check in svm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -1
index a024edabaca5..02a66008e9b9 100644
@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
 static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+#else
+#define sev_enabled false
+#define sev_es_enabled false
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev_enabled)
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1311,6 +1317,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 out:
 	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
 	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+#endif
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y

Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson

Define sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled as 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all of sev_hardware_setup() if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:

- Makes sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled off by default if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.

Quoted 8 lines

- Hides the sev and sev_es module params when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.

- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in __sev_recycle_asids() that is currently masked by the equivalent IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) check in svm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.

Reviewed by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>

Quoted 49 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++-
  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -1
index a024edabaca5..02a66008e9b9 100644
@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@
  #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
  /* enable/disable SEV support */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
  static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
  module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
  /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
  static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
  module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+#else
+#define sev_enabled false
+#define sev_es_enabled false
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
  static u8 sev_enc_bit;
  static int sev_flush_asids(void);
@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
  {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
  	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
  	bool sev_es_supported = false;
  	bool sev_supported = false;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev_enabled)
+	if (!sev_enabled)
  		goto out;
 
  	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1311,6 +1317,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
  out:
  	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
  	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+#endif
  }
 
  void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
Reviewed-by on v2 8/14
#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson

Define sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled as 'false' and explicitly #ifdef out all of sev_hardware_setup() if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. This kills three birds at once:

- Makes sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled off by default if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n. Previously, they could be on by default if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y, regardless of KVM SEV support.

- Hides the sev and sev_es module params when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.

- Resolves a false positive -Wnonnull in __sev_recycle_asids() that is currently masked by the equivalent IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) check in svm_sev_enabled(), which will be dropped in a future patch.

Quoted 5 lines
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

thanks

Quoted 45 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -1
index a024edabaca5..02a66008e9b9 100644
@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
 static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+#else
+#define sev_enabled false
+#define sev_es_enabled false
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev_enabled)
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1311,6 +1317,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 out:
 	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
 	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+#endif
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH v2 9/14 KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Remove the redundant svm_sev_enabled() check when calling sev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check from svm.c will eventually allow dropping svm_sev_enabled() entirely.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -2
index f89f702b2a58..bb7b99743bea 100644
@@ -887,8 +887,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled())
-		sev_hardware_teardown();
+	sev_hardware_teardown();
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
 		svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 9/14
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 09/14] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()

Quoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson

Remove the redundant svm_sev_enabled() check when calling sev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check from svm.c will eventually allow dropping svm_sev_enabled() entirely.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 19 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +--
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -2
index f89f702b2a58..bb7b99743bea 100644
@@ -887,8 +887,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void)
  {
  	int cpu;
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled())
-		sev_hardware_teardown();
+	sev_hardware_teardown();
 
  	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
  		svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
Reviewed-by on v2 9/14
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 09/14] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson

Remove the redundant svm_sev_enabled() check when calling sev_hardware_teardown(), the teardown helper itself does the check. Removing the check from svm.c will eventually allow dropping svm_sev_enabled() entirely.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -2
index f89f702b2a58..bb7b99743bea 100644
@@ -887,8 +887,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_teardown(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled())
-		sev_hardware_teardown();
+	sev_hardware_teardown();
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
 		svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH v2 10/14 KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Query max_sev_asid directly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper, svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
index 02a66008e9b9..1a143340103e 100644
@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
 	/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
 	max_sev_asid = ecx;
-
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!max_sev_asid)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 10/14
#36 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()

Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson

Query max_sev_asid directly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper, svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

thanks

Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
index 02a66008e9b9..1a143340103e 100644
@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
 	/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
 	max_sev_asid = ecx;
-
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!max_sev_asid)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
Reviewed-by on v2 10/14
#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson

Query max_sev_asid directly after setting it instead of bouncing through its wrapper, svm_sev_enabled(). Using the wrapper is unnecessary obfuscation.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 19 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +--
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
index 02a66008e9b9..1a143340103e 100644
@@ -1278,8 +1278,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
  	/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
  	max_sev_asid = ecx;
-
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!max_sev_asid)
  		goto out;
 
  	/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH v2 11/14 KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +13 -0
index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644
@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 	sev_flush_asids();
 }
 
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
+				      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
  * returning them to the system.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8 -9
index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
 static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 {
 	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int ret;
 
 	sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sd)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	sd->cpu = cpu;
 	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sd->save_area)
+	if (!sd->save_area) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_cpu_data;
+	}
 	clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
-		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
-					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
-		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
-			goto free_save_area;
-	}
+	ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_save_area;
 
 	per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
 
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	__free_page(sd->save_area);
 free_cpu_data:
 	kfree(sd);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return ret;
 
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 11/14
#39 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c

Quoted 17 lines · Sean Christopherson

Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -0
index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1339

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7 -0
@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 	sev_flush_asids();
 }
 
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
+				      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous patch. With that fixed,

Quoted 65 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +6 -0
+	if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
  * returning them to the system.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8 -9
index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
 static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 {
 	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int ret;
 
 	sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sd)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	sd->cpu = cpu;
 	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sd->save_area)
+	if (!sd->save_area) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_cpu_data;
+	}
 	clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
-		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
-					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
-		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
-			goto free_save_area;
-	}
+	ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_save_area;
 
 	per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
 
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	__free_page(sd->save_area);
 free_cpu_data:
 	kfree(sd);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return ret;
 
 }
 
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
#40 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c

Quoted 22 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson

Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.

No functional change intended.

---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  1 +
  3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -0
index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644
@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
  	sev_flush_asids();
  }
 
Quoted 10 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1339

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7 -0
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
+				      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous

kcalloc :)

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 70 lines

patch. With that fixed,

Quoted 65 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +6 -0
+	if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
  /*
   * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
   * returning them to the system.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +8 -9
index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
  static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
  {
  	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int ret;
 
  	sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!sd)
  		return -ENOMEM;
  	sd->cpu = cpu;
  	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sd->save_area)
+	if (!sd->save_area) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
  		goto free_cpu_data;
+	}
  	clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
-		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
-					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
-		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
-			goto free_save_area;
-	}
+	ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_save_area;
 
  	per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
 
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
  	__free_page(sd->save_area);
  free_cpu_data:
  	kfree(sd);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return ret;
 
  }
 
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
  void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
  void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
  void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
  int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
  int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
Reviewed-by on v2 11/14
#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson

Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 6 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  1 +
  3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH v2 12/14 KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Replace calls to svm_sev_enabled() with direct checks on sev_enabled, or in the case of svm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call to svm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a valid max_sev_asid with checks against sev_enabled. sev_enabled is forced off by sev_hardware_setup() if max_sev_asid is invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run after sev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario where max_sev_asid is valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 -----
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -3
index a2c3e2d42a7f..7e14514dd083 100644
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
 	int r;
 
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev_enabled)
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
 	if (!argp)
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 {
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 
 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
 {
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -5
index 4eb4bab0ca3e..8cb4395b58a0 100644
@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 
-static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
-{
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) ? max_sev_asid : 0;
-}
-
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 12/14
#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 12/14] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper

Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson

Replace calls to svm_sev_enabled() with direct checks on sev_enabled, or in the case of svm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call to svm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a valid max_sev_asid with checks against sev_enabled. sev_enabled is forced off by sev_hardware_setup() if max_sev_asid is invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run after sev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario where max_sev_asid is valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).

Quoted 5 lines
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 -----
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Thanks

Quoted 47 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -3
index a2c3e2d42a7f..7e14514dd083 100644
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
 	int r;
 
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev_enabled)
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
 	if (!argp)
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 {
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 
 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
 {
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -5
index 4eb4bab0ca3e..8cb4395b58a0 100644
@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 
-static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
-{
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) ? max_sev_asid : 0;
-}
-
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
Reviewed-by on v2 12/14
#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 12/14] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson

Replace calls to svm_sev_enabled() with direct checks on sev_enabled, or in the case of svm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call to svm_sev_enabled(). This effectively replaces checks against a valid max_sev_asid with checks against sev_enabled. sev_enabled is forced off by sev_hardware_setup() if max_sev_asid is invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run after sev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario where max_sev_asid is valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).

Ultimately the #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV that you added that #defines sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled to false, resolves the build issue when kvm_amd is built into the kernel and ccp is built as a module, for which svm_sev_enabled() was originally created.

Quoted 53 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 -----
  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -3
index a2c3e2d42a7f..7e14514dd083 100644
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
  	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
  	int r;
 
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled() || !sev_enabled)
+	if (!sev_enabled)
  		return -ENOTTY;
 
  	if (!argp)
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
  void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
  {
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!sev_enabled)
  		return;
 
  	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 
  int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
  {
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+	if (!sev_enabled)
  		return 0;
 
  	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +0 -5
index 4eb4bab0ca3e..8cb4395b58a0 100644
@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ void svm_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
  extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 
-static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
-{
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) ? max_sev_asid : 0;
-}
-
  void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
  int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
  int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH v2 13/14 KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Remove the forward declaration of sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -1
index 7e14514dd083..23a4bead4a82 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
-static int sev_flush_asids(void);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
Reviewed-by on v2 13/14
#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()

Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson

Remove the forward declaration of sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

Thanks

Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -1
index 7e14514dd083..23a4bead4a82 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
-static int sev_flush_asids(void);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
Reviewed-by on v2 13/14
#47 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson

Remove the forward declaration of sev_flush_asids(), which is only a few lines above the function itself.

No functional change intended.

Quoted 17 lines
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 -
  1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -1
index 7e14514dd083..23a4bead4a82 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
  static u8 sev_enc_bit;
-static int sev_flush_asids(void);
  static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
  static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
  unsigned int max_sev_asid;
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH v2 14/14 KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

In reply to Sean Christopherson

Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and DF_FLUSH if there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where the DF_FLUSH fails during hardware teardown if the original SEV_INIT failed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM if SEV_INIT fails, but that's a problem for another day.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -12
index 23a4bead4a82..e71bc742d8da 100644
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {
 	unsigned long size;
 };
 
-static int sev_flush_asids(void)
+static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 {
-	int ret, error = 0;
+	int ret, pos, error = 0;
+
+	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
+	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
+	if (pos >= max_asid)
+		return -EBUSY;
 
 	/*
 	 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
@@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)
 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 {
-	int pos;
-
-	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
-	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
-	if (pos >= max_asid)
-		return false;
-
-	if (sev_flush_asids())
+	if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
 		return false;
 
 	/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 	if (!sev_enabled)
 		return;
 
+	sev_flush_asids(0, max_sev_asid);
+
 	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
 	bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
-
-	sev_flush_asids();
 }
 
 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
#49 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

Quoted 49 lines · Sean Christopherson

Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and DF_FLUSH if there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where the DF_FLUSH fails during hardware teardown if the original SEV_INIT failed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM if SEV_INIT fails, but that's a problem for another day.

---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -10
index 23a4bead4a82..e71bc742d8da 100644
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {
  	unsigned long size;
  };
 
-static int sev_flush_asids(void)
+static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
  {
-	int ret, error = 0;
+	int ret, pos, error = 0;
+
+	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
+	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
+	if (pos >= max_asid)
+		return -EBUSY;
 
  	/*
  	 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
@@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)
  /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
  static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
  {
-	int pos;
-
-	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
-	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
-	if (pos >= max_asid)
-		return false;
-
-	if (sev_flush_asids())
+	if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
  		return false;
 
  	/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1324

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -0
@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
  	if (!sev_enabled)
  		return;
 
+	sev_flush_asids(0, max_sev_asid);

I guess you could have called __sev_recycle_asids(0, max_sev_asid) here and left things unchanged up above. It would do the extra bitmap_xor() and bitmap_zero() operations, though. What do you think?

Also, maybe a comment about not needing the bitmap lock because this is during teardown.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
+
  	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
  	bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
-
-	sev_flush_asids();
  }
 
  int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

Quoted 46 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 45 lines · Sean Christopherson

Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and DF_FLUSH if there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where the DF_FLUSH fails during hardware teardown if the original SEV_INIT failed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM if SEV_INIT fails, but that's a problem for another day.

---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -10
index 23a4bead4a82..e71bc742d8da 100644
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {
  	unsigned long size;
  };
-static int sev_flush_asids(void)
+static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
  {
-	int ret, error = 0;
+	int ret, pos, error = 0;
+
+	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
+	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
+	if (pos >= max_asid)
+		return -EBUSY;
  	/*
  	 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
@@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)
  /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
  static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
  {
-	int pos;
-
-	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
-	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
-	if (pos >= max_asid)
-		return false;
-
-	if (sev_flush_asids())
+	if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
  		return false;
  	/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1323

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -0
@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
  	if (!sev_enabled)
  		return;
+	sev_flush_asids(0, max_sev_asid);

I guess you could have called __sev_recycle_asids(0, max_sev_asid) here and left things unchanged up above. It would do the extra bitmap_xor() and bitmap_zero() operations, though. What do you think?

IMO, calling "recycle" from the teardown flow would be confusing without a comment to explain that it's the flush that we really care about, and at that point it's hard to argue against calling "flush" directly.

The cost of the extra operations is almost certainly negligible, but similar to above it will leave readers wonder why the teardown flow bothers to xor/zero the bitmap, only to immediately free it.

Quoted 2 lines

Also, maybe a comment about not needing the bitmap lock because this is during teardown.

Ya, I'll add that.

maintainer
#51 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 52 lines · Sean Christopherson

Skip SEV's expensive WBINVD and DF_FLUSH if there are no SEV ASIDs waiting to be reclaimed, e.g. if SEV was never used. This "fixes" an issue where the DF_FLUSH fails during hardware teardown if the original SEV_INIT failed. Ideally, SEV wouldn't be marked as enabled in KVM if SEV_INIT fails, but that's a problem for another day.

---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -10
index 23a4bead4a82..e71bc742d8da 100644
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ struct enc_region {
  	unsigned long size;
  };
 
-static int sev_flush_asids(void)
+static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
  {
-	int ret, error = 0;
+	int ret, pos, error = 0;
+
+	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
+	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
+	if (pos >= max_asid)
+		return -EBUSY;
 
  	/*
  	 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
@@ -80,14 +85,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void)
  /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
  static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
  {
-	int pos;
-
-	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
-	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_asid);
-	if (pos >= max_asid)
-		return false;
-
-	if (sev_flush_asids())
+	if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
  		return false;
 
  	/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
@@ -1323,10 +1321,10 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
  	if (!sev_enabled)
  		return;

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_hardware_teardown(void) · line 1330

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -2
 
+	sev_flush_asids(0, max_sev_asid);
+
  	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
  	bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
-
-	sev_flush_asids();
  }
 
  int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)

I can't find 00/14 in my inbox, so: queued 1-3 and 6-14, thanks.

Paolo

author maintainer
#52 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

Quoted 1 line · Paolo Bonzini

I can't find 00/14 in my inbox, so: queued 1-3 and 6-14, thanks.

If it's not too late, v3 has a few tweaks that would be nice to have, as well as a new patch to remove the CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT dependency.

https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

maintainer
#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used

Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · Paolo Bonzini

I can't find 00/14 in my inbox, so: queued 1-3 and 6-14, thanks.

If it's not too late, v3 has a few tweaks that would be nice to have, as well as a new patch to remove the CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT dependency.

https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Yes, will do (I had done all of them myself except the comment in sev_hardware_teardown() but it's better to match what was sent to LKML).

Paolo