Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
Subsystems (7)
v18 cover Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
This is the second part of CET and enables Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT). It is built on top of the shadow stack series.
This version has no changes from v17. It is being re-sent as v18 to synchronize with the shadow stack series v18.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v17:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
H.J. Lu (3):
x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
Yu-cheng Yu (4):
x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 8 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 ++++ 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 1/7 x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
Indirect branch tracking is a hardware security feature that verifies near indirect call/jump instructions arrive at intended targets, which are labeled by the compiler with ENDBR opcodes. If such instructions reach unlabeled locations, the processor raises control-protection faults.
Check the compiler is up-to-date at config time.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -1962,6 +1962,7 @@ config X86_CET def_bool n depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 depends on AS_WRUSS + depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection) select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 2/7 x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
In reply to Yu-cheng YuIntroduce user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) support. Add routines for the setup/disable of IBT.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +3 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ struct cet_status {unsigned long shstk_base;unsigned long shstk_size; unsigned int locked:1; + unsigned int ibt_enabled:1; };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@ void cet_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp);void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc); +int cet_setup_ibt (void ); +void cet_disable_ibt (void );#else static inline int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2) {return -EINVAL ; } static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p,
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +33 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/user.h> #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
@@ -341,3 +343,34 @@ int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor_addr, struct sc_ext *sc_ext)return 0 ; } + +int cet_setup_ibt (void ) +{ +u64 msr_val; + +if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + +start_update_msrs (); +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET , msr_val); + msr_val |= (CET_ENDBR_EN |CET_NO_TRACK_EN ); +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET , msr_val); +end_update_msrs (); + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled =1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +void cet_disable_ibt (void ) +{ +u64 msr_val; + +if (!static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) +return ; + +start_update_msrs (); +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET , msr_val); + msr_val &= ~CET_ENDBR_EN ; +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET , msr_val); +end_update_msrs (); + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled =0 ; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 3/7 x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
In reply to Yu-cheng YuWhen an indirect CALL/JMP instruction is executed and before it reaches the target, it is in 'WAIT_ENDBR' status, which can be read from MSR_IA32_U_CET. The status is part of a task's status before a signal is raised and preserved in the signal frame. It is restored for sigreturn.
IBT state machine is described in Intel SDM Vol. 1, Sec. 18.3.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +25 -2
@@ -295,6 +295,13 @@ void cet_restore_signal(struct sc_ext *sc_ext) msr_val |=CET_SHSTK_EN ; } +if (cet->ibt_enabled) { + msr_val |= (CET_ENDBR_EN |CET_NO_TRACK_EN ); + +if (sc_ext->wait_endbr) + msr_val |=CET_WAIT_ENDBR ; + } +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) cet_user_state->user_cet = msr_val;else
@@ -335,9 +342,25 @@ int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor_addr, struct sc_ext *sc_ext) sc_ext->ssp = new_ssp; } -if (ssp) { +if (ssp || cet->ibt_enabled) { +start_update_msrs (); -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP , ssp); + +if (ssp) +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP , ssp); + +if (cet->ibt_enabled) { +u64 r; + +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET , r); + +if (r &CET_WAIT_ENDBR ) { + sc_ext->wait_endbr =1 ; + r &= ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR ; +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET , r); + } + } +end_update_msrs (); }
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +5 -3
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ int save_cet_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, unsigned long restorer) {int err =0 ; -if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) +if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size && + !current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled)return 0 ;if (fp) {
@@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ static int get_cet_from_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, struct sc_ext *ext)memset (ext,0 ,sizeof (*ext)); -if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) +if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size && + !current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled)return 0 ;if (fp) {
@@ -577,7 +579,7 @@ static unsigned long fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)* sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8. */ -if (cet->shstk_size) +if (cet->shstk_size || cet->ibt_enabled) sp -= (sizeof (struct sc_ext ) +8 );return sp;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 4/7 x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAn ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates features the file supports. The property is parsed at loading time and passed to arch_setup_elf_ property(). Update it for Indirect Branch Tracking.
--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +8 -0
@@ -864,6 +864,14 @@ int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state) r = cet_setup_shstk(); } +if (r <0 ) +return r; + +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) { +if (state->gnu_property &GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT ) + r =cet_setup_ibt (); + } +return r; }#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 5/7 x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
In reply to Yu-cheng YuFrom: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>
Update ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS and ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE for Indirect Branch Tracking.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c +5 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static int copy_status_to_user(struct cet_status *cet, u64 arg2) buf[2 ] = (u64 )cet->shstk_size; } +if (cet->ibt_enabled) + buf[0 ] |=GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT ; +return copy_to_user ((u64 __user *)arg2, buf,sizeof (buf)); }
@@ -56,6 +59,8 @@ int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2)return -EINVAL ;if (features &GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK )cet_disable_shstk (); +if (features &GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT ) +cet_disable_ibt ();return 0 ;case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK :
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 6/7 x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
In reply to Yu-cheng YuFrom: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>
Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point.
--- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ ALIGN __kernel_vsyscall: CFI_STARTPROC +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET + endbr32 +#endif /* * Reshuffle regs so that all of any of the entry instructions * will preserve enough state.
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v18 7/7 x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
In reply to Yu-cheng YuFrom: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>
When Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) is enabled, vDSO functions may be called indirectly, and must have ENDBR32 or ENDBR64 as the first instruction. The compiler must support -fcf-protection=branch so that it can be used to compile vDSO.
--- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +4 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ endif $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) +ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +$(vobjs) $(vobjs32): KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fcf-protection=branch +endif + # # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway. #
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0