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Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking

PATCH Superseded Yu-cheng Yu 1 participant 10 messages Apr 15, 2021

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v25 of 30 Superseded Latest is v30 →

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#0 lore raw

v25 cover Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking

Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].

This is the second part of CET and enables Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT). It is built on top of the shadow stack series.

Changes in v25:
- Make updates to Kconfig and CPU feature flags for the removal of Kconfig X86_CET and software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET.
- Update ENDBR definition.
- Rebase to Linus tree v5.12-rc7.

[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:

    https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32-
    architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4

[2] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v24:

    https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

H.J. Lu (3):
x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR to __kernel_vsyscall entry point

Yu-cheng Yu (6):
x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: Add user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vdso: Introduce ENDBR macro
x86/vdso: Add ENDBR to __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave

 arch/x86/Kconfig                         | 21 +++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile             |  4 ++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S |  2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S               |  4 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h               |  9 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  8 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h              | 20 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h   |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                 |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c              |  5 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c             | 33 ++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c                    | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c             |  8 ++++
 13 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v25 1/9 x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for Indirect Branch Tracking

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP- oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it. When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without IBT protection.

---
v25:
- Make CONFIG_X86_IBT depend on CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.

 arch/x86/Kconfig                         | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +19 -0
index 77d2e44995d7..6bb69fba0dad 100644
@@ -1965,6 +1965,25 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config X86_IBT
+	prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
+	help
+	  Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
+	  CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks.  It is active when
+	  the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
+	  the application support it.  When this feature is enabled,
+	  legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
+	  IBT protection.
+	  Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
+	  processors released in 2020 or later.  Enabling this feature
+	  increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+	  See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
index e5c6ed9373e8..07cc40d49947 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@
 #define DISABLE_SHSTK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IBT
+#define DISABLE_IBT	0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_IBT	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -96,7 +102,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \
 			 DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_SHSTK)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK18	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK18	(DISABLE_IBT)
 #define DISABLED_MASK19	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v25 2/9 x86/cet/ibt: Add user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

Introduce user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) support. Add routines for the setup/disable of IBT.

---
v24:
- Move IBT routines to a separate ibt.c, update related areas accordingly.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h |  9 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile   |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c      | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +9 -0
index 662335ceb57f..17afcc9ea4d1 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ struct cet_status {
 	unsigned long	shstk_base;
 	unsigned long	shstk_size;
 	unsigned int	locked:1;
+	unsigned int	ibt_enabled:1;
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
@@ -41,6 +42,14 @@ static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
 					  unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IBT
+int ibt_setup(void);
+void ibt_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline int ibt_setup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void ibt_disable(void) {}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
 int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2);
 #else
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index eb13d578ad36..e10e007c1d80 100644
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev-es.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)		+= shstk.o cet_prctl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_IBT)			+= ibt.o
 
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c new file +57 -0

57 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH v25 3/9 x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

When an indirect CALL/JMP instruction is executed and before it reaches the target, it is in 'WAIT_ENDBR' status, which can be read from MSR_IA32_U_CET. The status is part of a task's status before a signal is raised and preserved in the signal frame. It is restored for sigreturn.

IBT state machine is described in Intel SDM Vol. 1, Sec. 18.3.

---
v25:
- Move the addition of sc_ext.wait_endbr from an earlier shadow stack patch to here.
- Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.
- Change wrmsrl() to wrmsrl_safe() and handle error.
v24:
- Update for changes from splitting shadow stack and ibt.

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c           | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +1 -0
index 10d7fa192d48..ee5bacce7d87 100644
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ struct _xstate {
 struct sc_ext {
 	unsigned long total_size;
 	unsigned long ssp;
+	unsigned long wait_endbr;
 };
 
 /*
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +30 -3
index 0488407bec81..0ed01e70b09e 100644
@@ -71,16 +71,29 @@ int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, void __user *restore
 			return err;
 
 		ext.ssp = token_addr;
+	}
 
+	if (new_ssp || cet->ibt_enabled) {
 		fpregs_lock();
 		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
 			__fpregs_load_activate();
 		if (new_ssp)
 			err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, new_ssp);
+
+		if (!err && cet->ibt_enabled) {
+			u64 msr_val;
+
+			err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, &msr_val);
+			if (!err && (msr_val & CET_WAIT_ENDBR)) {
+				ext.wait_endbr = 1;
+				msr_val &= ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+				err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+			}
+		}
 		fpregs_unlock();
 	}
 
-	if (!err && ext.ssp) {
+	if (!err && (ext.ssp || cet->ibt_enabled)) {
 		void __user *p = fp;
 
 		ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
@@ -110,7 +123,8 @@ static int get_extra_state_from_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, struct sc_ex
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!cet->shstk_size)
+	if (!cet->shstk_size &&
+	    !cet->ibt_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	memset(ext, 0, sizeof(*ext));
@@ -149,6 +163,19 @@ static int restore_extra_state_to_xregs(struct sc_ext *sc_ext)
 
 	if (cet->shstk_size)
 		err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, sc_ext->ssp);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (cet->ibt_enabled && sc_ext->wait_endbr) {
+		u64 msr_val;
+
+		err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, &msr_val);
+		if (!err) {
+			msr_val |= CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+			err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+		}
+	}
 #endif
 	return err;
 }
@@ -616,7 +643,7 @@ static unsigned long fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)
 	 * sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size +
 	 * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8.
 	 */
-	if (cet->shstk_size)
+	if (cet->shstk_size || cet->ibt_enabled)
 		sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
 #endif
 	return sp;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH v25 4/9 x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

An ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates features the file supports. The property is parsed at loading time and passed to arch_setup_elf_ property(). Update it for Indirect Branch Tracking.

---
v24:
- Update for splitting shadow stack and ibt.

 arch/x86/Kconfig             | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +2 -0
index 6bb69fba0dad..7436e3a608e8 100644
@@ -1970,6 +1970,8 @@ config X86_IBT
 	def_bool n
 	depends on X86_SHADOW_STACK
 	depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
+	select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
 	help
 	  Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
 	  CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks.  It is active when
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +8 -0
index d71045b29475..bf8ef10e5b78 100644
@@ -864,6 +864,14 @@ int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state)
 			r = shstk_setup();
 	}
 
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+		if (state->gnu_property & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
+			r = ibt_setup();
+	}
+
 	return r;
 }
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH v25 5/9 x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

From: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>

Update ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS and ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE for Indirect Branch Tracking.

---
v24:
- Update for function name changes from splitting shadow stack and ibt.

 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c +5 -0
index 3bb9f32ca70d..ab05597545c5 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct cet_status *cet, u64 __user *ubuf)
 		buf[2] = cet->shstk_size;
 	}
 
+	if (cet->ibt_enabled)
+		buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
+
 	return copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, sizeof(buf));
 }
 
@@ -46,6 +49,8 @@ int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
 			shstk_disable();
+		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
+			ibt_disable();
 		return 0;
 
 	case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK:
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH v25 6/9 x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

From: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>

When Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) is enabled, vDSO functions may be called indirectly, and must have ENDBR32 or ENDBR64 as the first instruction. The compiler must support -fcf-protection=branch so that it can be used to compile vDSO.

Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>

---
v24:
- Replace CONFIG_X86_CET with CONFIG_X86_IBT to reflect splitting of shadow stack and ibt.

 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +4 -0
index 05c4abc2fdfd..a773a5f03b63 100644
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ endif
 
 $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
 
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_IBT
+$(vobjs) $(vobjs32): KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fcf-protection=branch
+endif
+
 #
 # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway.
 #
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH v25 7/9 x86/vdso: Introduce ENDBR macro

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

ENDBR is a special new instruction for the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) component of CET. IBT prevents attacks by ensuring that (most) indirect branches and function calls may only land at ENDBR instructions. Branches that don't follow the rules will result in control flow (#CF) exceptions.

ENDBR is a noop when IBT is unsupported or disabled. Most ENDBR instructions are inserted automatically by the compiler, but branch targets written in assembly must have ENDBR added manually.

There are two ENDBR versions: endbr64 and endbr32. The compilers (gcc and clang) have _CET_ENDBR defined for the proper one. Introduce ENDBR macro, which equals the compiler macro when enabled, otherwise nothing.

Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

---
v25:
- Change from using the compiler's cet.h back to just ENDBR64/ENDBR32, since the information is already known, and keep it simple.

 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h +19 -1
index 98aa103eb4ab..97358246e4c7 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ extern int map_vdso_once(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr);
 extern bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
 				 unsigned long error_code,
 				 unsigned long fault_addr);
-#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+#else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
+/*
+ * ENDBR is an instruction for the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) component
+ * of CET.  IBT prevents attacks by ensuring that (most) indirect branches
+ * function calls may only land at ENDBR instructions.  Branches that don't
+ * follow the rules will result in control flow (#CF) exceptions.
+ * ENDBR is a noop when IBT is unsupported or disabled.  Most ENDBR
+ * instructions are inserted automatically by the compiler, but branch
+ * targets written in assembly must have ENDBR added manually.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IBT
+#define ENDBR64 endbr64
+#define ENDBR32 endbr32
+#else
+#define ENDBR64
+#define ENDBR32
+#endif
 
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH v25 8/9 x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR to __kernel_vsyscall entry point

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

From: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>

ENDBR is a special new instruction for the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) component of CET. IBT prevents attacks by ensuring that (most) indirect branches and function calls may only land at ENDBR instructions. Branches that don't follow the rules will result in control flow (#CF) exceptions.

ENDBR is a noop when IBT is unsupported or disabled. Most ENDBR instructions are inserted automatically by the compiler, but branch targets written in assembly must have ENDBR added manually.

Add that to __kernel_vsyscall entry point.

Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S +2 -0
index de1fff7188aa..7793dc221726 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <asm/dwarf2.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/vdso.h>
 
 	.text
 	.globl __kernel_vsyscall
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
 	ALIGN
 __kernel_vsyscall:
 	CFI_STARTPROC
+	ENDBR32
 	/*
 	 * Reshuffle regs so that all of any of the entry instructions
 	 * will preserve enough state.
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH v25 9/9 x86/vdso: Add ENDBR to __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

ENDBR is a special new instruction for the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) component of CET. IBT prevents attacks by ensuring that (most) indirect branches and function calls may only land at ENDBR instructions. Branches that don't follow the rules will result in control flow (#CF) exceptions.

ENDBR is a noop when IBT is unsupported or disabled. Most ENDBR instructions are inserted automatically by the compiler, but branch targets written in assembly must have ENDBR added manually.

Add ENDBR to __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() branch targets.

Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S +4 -0
index 86a0e94f68df..f3ebd38d1898 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/errno.h>
 #include <asm/enclu.h>
+#include <asm/vdso.h>
 
 #include "extable.h"
 
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
 SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
 	/* Prolog */
 	.cfi_startproc
+	ENDBR64
 	push	%rbp
 	.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset	8
 	.cfi_rel_offset		%rbp, 0
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
 .Lasync_exit_pointer:
 .Lenclu_eenter_eresume:
 	enclu
+	ENDBR64
 
 	/* EEXIT jumps here unless the enclave is doing something fancy. */
 	mov	SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rbx
@@ -91,6 +94,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
 	jmp	.Lout
 
 .Lhandle_exception:
+	ENDBR64
 	mov	SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rbx
 
 	/* Set the exception info. */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0