arm64: split ARM64_PTR_AUTH option to userspace and kernel
Subsystems (3)
v5 cover arm64: split ARM64_PTR_AUTH option to userspace and kernel
This patch series is to support pointer authentication in userspace independently from the kernel use.
Use of pointer authentication in kernel depends on toolchain suppport and might not be desired in production due to deployment problems. Debugging the kernel also a bit harder with PAC. Let the distributions choose where the pointer authentication is used.
Config structure for BTI is similar.
This patch series can be cleanly applied on 5.13-rc4
The patch series has been tested on Arm FVP in all three config combinations.
Changes from v4:
* Rebased to 5.13-rc4.
Changes from v3:
* Removed the duplicated #ifdef block in asm/pointer_auth.h.
Changes from v2:
* Moved the toolchain version check under ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL.
Changes from v1:
* Keep the A key in register while running in the kernel.
Daniel Kiss (2):
arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++------ arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 49 +++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 59 +++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 4 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +-- 7 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v5 1/2 arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
This patch add the ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config and deals with the build aspect of it.
Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +19 -14
@@ -1481,12 +1481,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features" config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y - depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC - # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC - # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. - depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100) - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE - depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) help Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
@@ -1498,13 +1492,6 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. - If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or - -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option - will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address - protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to - support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be - disabled with minimal loss of protection. - The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled.
@@ -1515,6 +1502,24 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should not be selected. +config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + bool "Use pointer authentication for kernel" + default y + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC + # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC + # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. + depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 233010000 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100) + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE + depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) + help + If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or + -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option + will cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address + protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to + support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be + disabled with minimal loss of protection. + This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled.
@@ -1606,7 +1611,7 @@ config ARM64_BTI_KERNEL bool "Use Branch Target Identification for kernel" default y depends on ARM64_BTI - depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL depends on CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94697 depends on !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 100100
arch/arm64/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ endif # off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection. branch-prot-flags-y += $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) -ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all # We enable additional protection for leaf functions as there is some # narrow potential for ROP protection benefits and no substantial
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_SCTLR_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.sctlr_user));#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +3 -3
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT(void)#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 static noinline void change_pac_parameters(void) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL )) {/* Reset the keys of current task */ ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current);ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (current);
@@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void)#define CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE 10int i; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )) -pr_err ("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH\n" ); +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL )) +pr_err ("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL\n" );if (!system_supports_address_auth ()) {pr_err ("FAIL: CPU lacks pointer authentication feature\n" );
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
Quoted 8 lines · Daniel Kiss
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -1481,12 +1481,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features" config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y
[...]
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1508
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +4
-0+config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + bool "Use pointer authentication for kernel" + default y + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
Nitpick: if you only apply this patch and disable ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL, I suspect it will go wrong. Maybe make it unselectable in this patch:
config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
bool
default y
depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
and add the description in the next one, once all the other bits are in place (for bisectability reasons):
With that:
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Will Deacon
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 1/2] arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
In reply to Daniel KissQuoted 50 lines · Daniel Kiss
This patch add the
ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNELconfig and deals with the build aspect of it.Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.Signed-off-by Daniel Kiss <[email protected]>Acked-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-13@@ -1481,12 +1481,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features" config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y - depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC - # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC - # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. - depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100) - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE - depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) help Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret@@ -1498,13 +1492,6 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. - If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or - -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option - will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address - protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to - support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be - disabled with minimal loss of protection. - The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled.@@ -1515,6 +1502,24 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1512
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +8
-0not be selected. +config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + bool "Use pointer authentication for kernel" + default y + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC + # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC + # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. + depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 233010000 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100)
Why is this checking 'LD_VERSION >= 233010000' whereas the code you removed from ARM64_PTR_AUTH was checking 'LD_VERSION >= 23301' ?
Will
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Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
Quoted 57 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 52 lines · Daniel Kiss
This patch add the
ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNELconfig and deals with the build aspect of it.Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.Signed-off-by Daniel Kiss <[email protected]>Acked-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -1481,12 +1481,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"config
ARM64_PTR_AUTH
bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default yarch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-6- depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC - # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC - # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. - depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100) - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE - depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)help
Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secretarch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-7@@ -1498,13 +1492,6 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. - If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or - -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option - will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address - protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to - support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be - disabled with minimal loss of protection. - The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled.@@ -1515,6 +1502,24 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should not be selected.
Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1512
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +8
-0+config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + bool "Use pointer authentication for kernel" + default y + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC + # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC + # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. + depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 233010000 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100)Why is this checking '
LD_VERSION>= 233010000' whereas the code you removed fromARM64_PTR_AUTHwas checking 'LD_VERSION>= 23301’ ?
This is unintentional, since the first patch the "kbuild: LD_VERSION redenomination” is landed and I missed during the rebase.
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PATCH v5 2/2 arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
In reply to Daniel KissIf the kernel is not compiled with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y, then no PACI/AUTI instructions are expected while the kernel is running so the kernel's key will not be used. Write of a system regiters is expensive therefore avoid it not required.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 49 +++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 59 +++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +29 -20
@@ -7,19 +7,7 @@#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -/* -* thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range -* so use the base value of ldp as thread.keys_user and offset as -* thread.keys_user.ap*. -*/ - .macro __ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 - mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_USER - add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA] - msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 - msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL .macro __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL
@@ -42,6 +30,33 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ + + .macro __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +/* + * thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range + * so use the base value of ldp as thread.keys_user and offset as + * thread.keys_user.ap*. + */ + .macro __ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_USER + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + .endm + .macro __ptrauth_keys_init_cpu tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 mrs \tmp1, id_aa64isar1_el1 ubfx \tmp1, \tmp1, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8
@@ -64,17 +79,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif .Lno_addr_auth\@: .endm -#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +#else /* !CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 - .endm - - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 - .endm -#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +33 -26
92 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +2 -0
@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ struct thread_struct {struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel;#endif +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE u64 gcr_user_excl;#endif
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
@@ -155,7 +155,9 @@ int main(void)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apia)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel , apia)); +#endif BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
Quoted 3 lines · Daniel Kiss
If the kernel is not compiled with
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y, then no PACI/AUTI instructions are expected while the kernel is running so the kernel's key will not be used. Write of a system regiters
s/regiters/registers/
Quoted 1 line
is expensive therefore avoid it not required.
s/it/if/
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Daniel Kiss <[email protected]>
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